ASHTON WILDE v. JAYLON WILDE (2022)

The appellant, Jaylon G. Wilde, challenges the ruling of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, which granted joint custody to both parents and designated the appellee, Ashton L. Wilde, as the domiciliary parent. For the following reasons, we affirm and issue this memorandum opinion in compliance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1(B).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ashton Wilde, who was married to Jaylon Wilde, filed a petition for divorce pursuant to La. C.C. art. 102 on March 25, 2021. In the petition, Ashton alleged she and Jaylon were married on June 27, 2014, and that two children were born of the marriage, the older born on November 12, 2014, and the younger born on November 8, 2016. Ashton sought custody of the children and averred that it would be in the children's best interest if she were designated as the domiciliary parent, with Jaylon having visitation pursuant to a joint custody plan. Ashton also sought child support, as well as interim spousal support, with the reservation of the right to seek permanent spousal support.

In his answer and reconventional demand, Jaylon requested that he and Ashton be awarded joint custody of the children, with physical custody of the children being shared equally. In his supplemental and amending reconventional demand, Jaylon reiterated his request for joint custody and shared physical custody of the children, and also alleged that care for the children had largely rested on him and his parents, while Ashton's parents have had little participation in the children's caretaking. Jaylon further alleged that Ashton had suddenly excluded his parents from participating in the care of the children.

An interim stipulated judgment was signed by the trial court on May 10, 2021, which ordered that the parents would have joint custody of the children, with Ashton designated as the domiciliary parent. Jaylon was awarded physical custody on the first, third, and fourth weekends of each month, as well as on the first and third weeks of June and July. Trial on the matter was heard before the trial court on December 9, 2021. On March 14, 2022, the trial court signed a judgment, in which Ashton and Jaylon were given joint custody of the children, with Ashton being designated as the domiciliary parent. Jaylon was given numerous periods throughout the calendar year when he would have physical custody of the children. The parties were also ordered to share in the decision-making regarding the children. Jaylon filed a motion to appeal that judgment on March 23, 2022.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Jaylon's sole assignment of error is that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to award Jaylon shared physical custody since the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that an award of shared physical custody was feasible and in the children's best interest.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Upon appellate review, the determination of the trial court in child custody matters is entitled to great weight. The trial court is in a better position to evaluate the best interests of the children from its total overview of the conduct and character of the parties and the children and of community standards. The trial court's discretion on the issue will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion, Gathen v. Gathen, 2010-2312 (La. 5/10/11), 66 So.3d 1, n. 4, citing Fulco v. Fulco, 254 So.2d 603, 605 (La. 1971).

DISCUSSION

“Shared custody” means that each parent has physical custody for an approximately equal amount of time. In a proceeding in which joint custody is decreed, the court shall render a joint custody implementation order except for good cause shown.¹ La. R.S. 9:315.9(A)(1). However, a joint custody arrangement does not necessarily require an equal fifty-fifty sharing of physical custody; the trial court's allocation of the physical time for each parent should focus on substantial time rather than strict equality of time, so as to assure that the child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents, in always keeping the paramount goal of reaching a decision which is in the best interests of the child. Harang v. Ponder, 2009-2182 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/10), 36 So.3d 954, 962, writ denied, 2010-0926 (La. 5/19/10), 36 So.3d 219.

The evidence introduced at trial indicates that both parties and the children reside in Ponchatoula and the children attend school in Ponchatoula from 7:00 a.m. to 2:55 p.m., and have extracurricular activities in Ponchatoula after school. Ashton's testimony reflects that she works close to the school from 2:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. during the school week, whereas Jaylon works Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in New Orleans, and that he also works overtime into the night, which often requires him to stay overnight in New Orleans, and that he is on call one week per month.

We note that while Ashton was awarded domiciliary status, Jaylon was likewise awarded an abundance of physical custody periods. Not only does the judgment contain the physical custody periods contained in the interim stipulated judgment, it also specifically awards Jaylon physical custody of the children during the holidays of Christmas, Thanksgiving, Easter/Spring Break, and Mardi Gras, alternating each year with Ashton, and every year on Father's Day. We find that such a detailed plan of custody indicates that the trial court gave much consideration to the evidence introduced at trial and to the best interests of the children by sharing physical custody time between the parents as evenly as possible.

The paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 131.² While Jaylon claims that he and his parents had been primarily caring for the children, the trial court determined from the evidence that Ashton is willing and able to facilitate a close and continuing relationship with Jaylon and was responsible for the care and rearing of the child, which was previously exercised by each party. Furthermore, Jaylon's mother testified at trial that it would be in the best interest of the children that both parents share in their upbringing.

Based on the record and the evidence presented in the instant case, we can find no basis for disturbing the trial court's judgment. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion designating Ashton as the domiciliary parent, and there is no evidence to dispute that the trial court's judgment was made in the best interest of the children.

DECREE

The judgment of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court granting shared custody and domiciliary parent status to the appellee, Ashton L. Wilde, is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Jaylon G. Wilde.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335 governs joint custody decrees and implementation orders. It states, in pertinent part;A. (1) In a proceeding in which joint, custody is decreed, the court shall render a joint custody implementation order except for good cause shown.(2)(a) The implementation order shall allocate the time periods during which each parent shall have physical custody of the child so that the child is assured of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.(b) To the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody of the children should be shared equally.* * *(3) The implementation order shall allocate the legal authority and responsibility of the parents.B, (I) In a decree of joint custody the court shall designate a domiciliary parent except when there is an implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause shown.(2) The domiciliary parent is the parent with whom the child shall primarily reside, hut the other parent shall have physical custody during time periods that assure that the child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents.

2.   Those factors are given in La. C.C. art. 134, to wit:(1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children's Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.(2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child,(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.(4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.(5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.(6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.(7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.(8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any party.(9) The mental and pity steal health of each party. Evidence that an abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.(10) The home, school, and community history of the child.(11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.(12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party, except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive, reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable concerns for the child's safety or well-being while in the care of the other party.(13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.(14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.

LANIER, J.

Welch, J. concurs without reasons. Penzato, J. concurs.