STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LOUIS REED CHRISTAL (2017)

The defendant, Louis Reed Christal, was charged by bill of information with attempted second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30.1, and pled not guilty. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of the responsive offense of aggravated battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34. The defendant was sentenced to seven and one-half years imprisonment at hard labor and ordered to have no contact with the victim. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 14, 2015, Tammy Collis (the victim) arrived at her Baton Rouge apartment a few minutes before midnight. The victim had been in a relationship with the defendant for approximately two years, and they were living together at the time. According to the victim, when she arrived home the defendant accused her of being with another man and tried to provoke an argument. The victim informed the defendant that she had not been with another man but instead was with her sister, Erica Barrow, prior to arriving at home. The victim further indicated that the verbal confrontation became physical after she began taking a bath and did not comply with the defendant's demand to give him her cell phone. The defendant entered the bathroom with a bat and began striking the victim as she attempted to avoid the blows. The victim further indicated that as she attempted to defend herself, the defendant pulled out a knife and cut her on the arm. After striking additional blows to her with the bat, the defendant dropped the bat and exited the bathroom.

The victim was transported to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital by ambulance. Elizabeth Lowery, the paramedic who served as the victim's primary caregiver as she was transported to the hospital, testified at the trial. Lowery indicated that the victim was very scared and shaken up, and that she initially tried to calm her down. Both of the victim's arms and wrists were swollen, one of her wrists was slightly deformed, she had a laceration on her upper right arm which was covered to control the bleeding, and she had abrasions on her upper right neck and shoulder area.

Corporal Monroe Carter and Detective James Weber, of the Baton Rouge City Police Department (BRPD) Crime Scene Division and Violent Crimes Unit, responded to the scene and the hospital. Corporal Carter photographed the scene, and noted that the bulk of the photographs were taken in the bedroom and bathroom, where there were large amounts of blood. At the hospital, Corporal Carter further took ten photographs of the victim's injuries, and Detective Weber interviewed the victim. The officers observed bruising on the victim's hand and arms, as well as a deep injury to her right shoulder area.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In the sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the victim was the aggressor in this incident. The defendant claims that the victim was controlling and manipulative, that their relationship was not salvageable, and that he packed his belongings and was preparing to leave before the altercation. He further contends that the victim manipulated him into coming into the bathroom and filed the police report in an effort to persecute him for choosing to leave her. The defendant further states that the victim's injuries were not caused by him arbitrarily and intentionally striking her. He claims that the victim grabbed the knife, that they struggled, and that the victim was injured because she was naked in the bathtub at the time. Further, the defendant contends that there was no physical evidence to suggest that he struck the victim with a bat or cut her with a knife other than the victim's own testimony. Finally, the defendant argues that the victim's testimony was suspect because she failed to call the police or seek immediate medical treatment until after she got dressed, pursued the white van in which the defendant left the scene, and called her sister.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207, p. 10 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660. The Jackson v. Virginia standard of review, incorporated in Article 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Patorno, 2001-2585, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id.

Battery is, in pertinent part, “the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another.” La. R.S. 14:33. Aggravated battery is a battery committed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:34(A). A “dangerous weapon” includes any gas, liquid, or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:2(A)(3). The dangerousness of an instrumentality because of its use is a factual question for the jury to decide for purposes of a conviction of aggravated battery. State v. Odom, 2003-1772, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So.2d 582, 589, writ denied, 2004-1105 (La. 10/8/04), 883 So.2d 1026. Aggravated battery requires neither the infliction of serious bodily harm nor the intent to inflict serious injury. Instead, the requisite intent element is general criminal intent. See State v. Howard, 94-0023, p. 3 (La. 6/3/94), 638 So.2d 216, 217 (per curiam); State v. Brown, 2000-1951, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/01), 808 So.2d 622, 623-24.

Criminal intent is addressed in La. R.S. 14:10(2), which provides as follows:

General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.

In general intent crimes, the criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of the acts that have been declared criminal. State v. Payne, 540 So.2d 520, 523-524 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 546 So.2d 169 (La. 1989).

A person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict. La. R.S. 14:21. In the non-homicide situation, a claim of self-defense requires a dual inquiry: first, an objective inquiry into whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances; and second, a subjective inquiry into whether the force used was apparently necessary. State v. Pizzalato, 93-1415, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94), 644 So.2d 712, 714, writ denied, 94-2755 (La. 3/10/95), 650 So.2d 1174.

When self-defense is raised in a homicide case, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the homicide was not perpetrated in self-defense. State v. Spears, 504 So.2d 974, 978 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 507 So.2d 225 (La. 1987). However, Louisiana law is unclear as to who has the burden of proving self-defense in a non-homicide case, and what the burden is. State v. Barnes, 590 So.2d 1298, 1300 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991). In previous cases dealing with this issue, this court has analyzed the evidence under both standards of review, that is whether the defendant proved self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence or whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. In this case, we need not, and thus, do not decide the issue of who has the burden of proving (or disproving) self-defense because under either standard the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant did not act in self-defense. See Pizzalato, 93-1415 at 4, 644 So.2d at 714.

The victim testified that the argument began in their bedroom, noting that it was the night of Valentine's Day and that the defendant was suspicious that she had spent the evening with someone of the opposite sex. The victim indicated that she did not want to argue with the defendant, and that he began packing his bags as he continued “rambling on.” She further stated that she did not care that the defendant was preparing to leave. As he was packing his belongings and stating that he was going to leave, she ran water to take a bath in an effort to get ready for bed and get some rest. The victim further testified that after she got in the bathtub, the defendant “was still wanting to argue.” He came into the bathroom and demanded to see the victim's cell phone. She informed the defendant that her cell phone was not in the bathroom. The defendant then walked out of the bathroom and returned with a bat. According to the victim, at that point the defendant stated, “I'm going to ask you one more time bitch, let me see your cell phone.” After the victim responded the same as before, that she did not have her cell phone with her in the bathtub, the defendant raised the bat and began “swinging with all his might.”

The victim further indicated that the defendant told her he was going to kill her. She begged for her life, attempting to use her arms to block her face as he was hitting her with the bat. At the time, the victim was still in the bathtub. She stated that she grabbed the defendant's prosthetic leg and pulled him down in an attempt to stop the blows. While his prosthetic leg did not come off, she was successfully able to bring him down into the bathtub with her. At that point, the defendant began hitting the victim with his hands, as he reached into his pocket and pulled out a knife. As the defendant swung the knife at her chest area, the victim was stabbed in the right arm while trying to defend herself. She was also struck in the back with the knife before the defendant began hitting her with the bat again.

The victim was unsure how long the attack lasted or why the defendant stopped and walked out. She indicated that she was initially afraid and had difficulty getting up, noting that she has scoliosis and a rod in her back, but managed to walk out of the bathroom. As she approached the hallway, she saw the defendant and his coworker “Frank” (Francis William Stedge, II) standing in the hallway. The victim, who was still naked at the time, told Frank what happened and asked him to call for help. According to the victim, Frank did not respond, and she went into a bedroom to cover herself, noting that she found a gown to put on. She overheard the defendant telling Frank to help him get his television. As they took the television downstairs, the victim left the apartment seeking help. The defendant and Frank entered their company van, as the victim got into her sister's vehicle, called her sister, and told her sister to call the police.¹ As they drove off, the victim followed in pursuit of the van to obtain the license plate number. After ending the call with her sister, the victim immediately called 911, read the license plate number to the dispatcher, and returned to her apartment.

Shortly thereafter, the ambulance arrived and the victim was transported to the hospital where she was treated for her injuries (including seven stiches on her arm and a prescription of pain medication and muscle relaxers), and interviewed and photographed by the police.² She suffered cuts to her right arm, chest area, and back, and bruising and swelling. The victim testified that the bruising and swelling on her arm lasted for over a week, during which time she was unable to use her arms and hands, and was in severe pain. The victim denied having a knife or pulling one out for protection. The victim described the knife that the defendant carried at the time as a kitchen or pear cutting knife with an approximate three-inch blade and a black handle. The victim denied that there had been any recent changes in her relationship with the defendant, indicating that the argument ensued only because she was late arriving home. The victim confirmed that the defendant asked for a cigarette at some point, but denied getting angry at him though he called her names and was saying hurtful things before the confrontation became physical. When questioned about her initial failure to mention the knife (at the apartment), the victim testified,

Like I said ․ it happened very fast. I thought that the bat did all of the damage. When the police made it there, he said it looks like a sharp object. That's when I thought back on exactly what happened from the beginning to the end and that's when I recall Louis coming out of his pocket, that would be his right pocket or whatever right jacket pocket because he had on a hood, and that's when he came up with the knife, yes.

The victim's sister, Erica Barrow, testified and confirmed that the victim had been with her and other family members before Barrow allowed her to use her car to drive home that night. She further confirmed that the victim called her that night. Barrow denied that the victim ever carried a knife, and confirmed that she did not see the victim with a knife that night. Barrow testified that the defendant routinely carried a knife and would sometimes make jokes about having it for protection. While Barrow never saw the whole knife, she described it as a small knife with a black handle. After the victim called Barrow, Barrow called her father, and they went to the victim's apartment. By the time they arrived, the victim had already been transported to the hospital, but several police officers were still in the apartment. Barrow observed blood in the bathroom, including bloody water in the bathtub. After leaving the apartment, Barrow and her father proceeded to the hospital where they observed the victim's injuries.

Corporal Carter confirmed that the baseball bat located in the apartment had blood on its tip and stated that there appeared to be more blood elsewhere on the bat, though he could not be certain. Blood splatter was located on the bathroom wall, behind the bathtub, and there was bloody water in the bathtub. When asked if there were any bloody footprints on the floor from the bathroom to another area, Corporal Carter stated that there were swipe marks “everywhere,” as if someone's arm had rubbed against the wall, and droppings of blood throughout the apartment though he did not observe any bloody footprints. Corporal Carter did not know if a knife was involved in this case and never recovered one. However, he stated, “There was an injury [consistent with] a sharp-edged object, so I don't know what it could've been.”

BRPD Corporal Glen Avorette also responded to the scene and collected the bat in this case. He indicated that he used latex gloves in placing the bat in a brown paper bag and transported it to the evidence division. While the bat was parallel to the door when he recovered it, he had no knowledge of anyone moving the bat. Corporal Avorette testified that he was unaware if the bat was ever tested for DNA evidence.

BRPD Sergeant Hudson Tabor and Sergeant Ralph Palmer (the supervisor of then Corporal Tabor) responded to the scene, and Sergeant Tabor was the officer who summoned the ambulance for the victim. Sergeant Tabor, who interviewed the victim just before calling Emergency Medical Services, testified that the victim was beaten up pretty badly. The victim was bleeding from the right arm from a pretty significant stab wound or cut and was complaining of pain due to the apparent injuries to her arms and her wrists, among other lacerations and bruises. Sergeant Tabor confirmed that the main scene, the bathroom, had a bloody floor, and that the tub was filled halfway with heavily tainted blood in the water. While Sergeant Palmer took photographs of the victim, Sergeant Tabor took a statement from her, including a description of the van (including the license plate number and the company make) and the white male who the defendant was with when he left the apartment. Sergeant Tabor noted that he periodically returned to the area to look for the defendant, who returned to the scene within approximately four hours and was placed under arrest.

Sergeant Tabor encountered the defendant in the parking lot, and read him his Miranda ³ rights. He noted that the defendant's clothes were wet and that he appeared uninjured, though he did not check under the defendant's clothing for injuries. The defendant advised that the incident or attack was in self-defense. Sergeant Tabor inquired as to an explanation for the extent of the victim's injuries and the defendant “kind of quit talking at that time.” The defendant was placed under arrest. Detective Weber indicated that he spoke to the defendant a day or two after his arrest, at the parish prison. The defendant immediately began talking to the officer, but the detective stopped him and advised of his Miranda rights before allowing him to tell his side of the story. After waiving his Miranda rights, the defendant stated that he got into an argument with the victim because he spent a lot of time at work and she was complaining that he did not spend enough time with her. He asked for some cigarettes and when she refused, he took them from her. At that point, the victim produced a small knife that she always carries and started swinging it at him. He took the knife from her and cut her. When she took a bath to get the blood off, the defendant called a friend to come pick him up. Detective Weber noted that the defendant showed him some injuries but they did not appear fresh at the time. While he had difficulty specifically recalling, he noted that the defendant may have shown him his arms.

Francis William Stedge, II, the defendant's coworker at the time of the offense, also testified at the trial. Stedge confirmed that the defendant called him on the night in question and asked him to come pick him up because he and his girlfriend were having problems. He stated that the defendant told him that he had packed his bags and wanted him to pick him up before she returned home. Stedge had the company van at the time and proceeded to the defendant's residence. As the defendant was not outside when Stedge arrived, he went upstairs to the apartment. When he arrived at the door, he heard a lot of yelling and cursing. He knocked on the door several times before the defendant finally opened the door in a panic. The defendant stated, “[C]ome on, man, let's grab my TV, let's go.” When Stedge entered the apartment, the victim was standing in the hallway naked. She was holding out her arm, as she stated, “[L]ook at what he did, look at what he did.” Stedge did not want to look at the victim because she was unclothed, but noted that he saw blood. As he and the defendant left the apartment, the victim was yelling and screaming and saying, “I'm going to get you, you know, Mr. Frank.” She followed them downstairs as they took the television out of the apartment. He further confirmed that the victim was following them in another vehicle when they drove off. He indicated that the victim almost ran into them, and at one point pulled up next to them, “trying, you know, [to] hit the van again.” He stated that he lost her after making a couple of turns. Stedge was with the defendant when he was placed under arrest and noted that he did not see a knife at any point.

The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Richardson, 459 So.2d 31, 38 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 929, 932.

In finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery, the jury accepted the victim's version of the events and rejected the claim of self-defense. The verdict returned indicates that the jury concluded that the scenario of self-defense, as suggested by the defendant, was not supported by the evidence. While the victim's injuries were highly visible and well documented that night, the defendant did not reveal any injuries on the night in question. Moreover, the evidence supports a finding that the defendant was the aggressor in this case and, therefore, cannot claim the right of self-defense. Even accepting the defendant's version of the facts, he admitted that he disarmed the victim and cut her with the knife. In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See Ordodi, 2006-0207 at 14-15, 946 So.2d at 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306, pp. 1-2 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). A court of appeal impinges on a fact finder's discretion beyond the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law in accepting a hypothesis of innocence that was not unreasonably rejected by the fact finder. See State v. Mire, 2014-2295, p. 8 (La. 1/27/16), ____ So.3d _____, ____, 2016 WL 314814 (per curiam). After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of aggravated battery. Accordingly, the sole assignment of error lacks merit.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to the record, the victim had driven home earlier that evening in her sister's vehicle.

2.   The victim testified that she briefly spoke to the police at her apartment before she was transported to the hospital. At that point, she had not had time to reflect on everything that happened and did not tell the police about the knife until she was subsequently interviewed at the hospital.

3.    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

PETTIGREW, J.