NOLAN MILES v. HOPE BENEVOLENT SOCIETY HOPE CEMETERY LIVE OAK CEMETERY AND WINNFIELD FUNERAL HOME OF BATON ROUGE INC (2026)

Plaintiff, Nolan A. Miles (Miles), appeals an August 14, 2025 summary judgment ² in favor of Defendant Winnfield Funeral Home of Baton Rouge, Inc. (Winnfield) dismissing with prejudice Miles’ claims against Winnfield. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This litigation arose following the death and burial of Miles’ father, Willie Lee Harris. Mr. Harris passed away on November 5, 2020. Miles contracted with Winnfield to provide funeral and burial services for her father. Hope Cemetery ³ in Baton Rouge was selected for interment of Mr. Harris. Miles paid Winnfield for funeral and burial services, and Winnfield advanced Hope Cemetery $1,700.00 to facilitate the burial. Winnfield handled the funeral, transport of the body to Hope Cemetery, committal service, and burial. Miles purchased a headstone for her father's grave from a third party.

Miles was present at the burial of her father at Hope Cemetery on November 13, 2020. Approximately one month after the burial, when Miles returned to the cemetery to place the headstone on her father's burial site, she found that the temporary grave markers had been removed. Miles recalled the general location of Mr. Harris’ grave, but she was unable to locate the exact plot where he had been laid to rest. Hope Cemetery was unable to provide Miles any records, documentation, plat or other means of identifying the exact plot where Mr. Harris was buried. The record indicates thereafter, Miles learned that Hope Cemetery was under investigation by the Louisiana Cemetery Board for licensure issues and noncompliance with statutory requirements for operation of a cemetery.

On September 20, 2022, Miles filed a Petition for Damages naming as defendants Winnfield, its unnamed liability insurer, and Hope Cemetery.⁴ This appeal involves only the summary judgment in favor of Winnfield. In her petition, Miles alleged negligence and “breach of contractual and other obligations” on the part of Winnfield for its failure to record the location of her father's burial site. Miles further alleged, in relevant part, that Winnfield breached its fiduciary duty as mandatary or agent of Miles in arranging and facilitating the burial at Hope Cemetery without maintaining a record of the burial site. Miles stated that Winnfield owed her a duty “to interact with her and handle the disposition of her father's remains professionally, ethically, honestly and fairly, all in accordance with the standards for the operations of funeral homes and cemeteries.” Miles alleged that Winnfield knew or should have known that Hope Cemetery was not incorporated, did not have a valid certificate of authority, and failed to keep proper records of interments.

On February 22, 2024, Winnfield filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and memorandum in support thereof, arguing that Hope Cemetery is solely responsible for any failure to record the burial location of Mr. Harris. Winnfield asserted the following: 1) it owed no fiduciary duty to Miles to verify Hope Cemetery's licensing; 2) it had no duty to maintain burial location records; 3) Miles had presented no evidence that Winnfield knowingly recommended the unlicensed Hope Cemetery; and 4) ordinary reasonable diligence would have led to the discovery of the location of Mr. Harris’ grave. Winnfield argued that Louisiana law does not provide for a special duty on the part of a funeral home to family members of the deceased outside of a contract for funeral services. Winnfield further argued that it was under no duty to verify Hope Cemetery's license. Funeral homes and cemeteries are regulated by statute and any duties thereof are to be set by the legislature. In addition, Winnfield argued that it had no duty to obtain or keep records of the burial plots in Hope Cemetery - the cemetery exercised complete control over the location of burial and is solely responsible for identifying and recording a decedent's burial location. Thus, any negligence regarding the lack of recording of Mr. Harris’ burial site lies with Hope Cemetery, not Winnfield. According to Winnfield, the contract with Miles outlined the services for which it would be responsible and services for which Winnfield was not responsible. The latter would be paid through cash advances to Winnfield, which Winnfield would pay to the outside provider.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Winnfield attached Miles’ deposition. Miles testified that she had done business with Winnfield for other family members in the past, which is why she went to Winnfield when her father passed. Miles agreed in her deposition that the contract regarding her father's services specified the following as “Charge For Services Selected” to be provided by Winnfield: basic services of funeral director and staff, embalming and other preparations of the body, use of facilities, staff for funeral ceremony, and transfer of remains to the funeral home in a hearse.⁵ Miles further agreed that the contract specified “Cash Advances” including one to Hope Cemetery for the burial of Mr. Harris.

Miles maintained in her testimony that someone from Winnfield had recommended Hope Cemetery. However, Miles could not recall who made the recommendation, nor could she identify any particular Winnfield representative with whom she may have spoken. Miles explained that a different cemetery she wanted to use, Thomas Chapel, was not accepting burials at that time and Winnfield suggested Hope Cemetery, rather than its own cemetery, Winnfield Memorial Park. When asked if Winnfield was involved in the burial of her father, Miles responded that “Winnfield was in charge of everything ․ Winnfield took care of everything.” She testified that it was her belief that Winnfield dug the hole and placed the vault and that Hope Cemetery “[j]ust provided the place, the location.” As stated, Miles acknowledged that she attended the burial and testified she had “a slight idea of where I think he could be, but I'm not definitely sure and can't print off the exact location.” She explained that “once you come into the cemetery, it's most likely located towards the back of the cemetery[.]” and to the right of the road that goes down the middle of the cemetery. Miles also acknowledged that her father was placed in a “visible vault” similar to other graves in Hope Cemetery, and agreed that she just did not know which vault was his. Miles had no knowledge of Winnfield's involvement in the moving of the temporary grave markers.

Miles testified she discovered that Hope Cemetery was not licensed when she made a formal complaint against the cemetery with the Louisiana Board of Cemeteries shortly after “the owner” of Hope Cemetery advised her that her father's burial site could not be located. When questioned about her allegation that Winnfield knew or should have known that Hope Cemetery was unincorporated, lacking a certificate of authority, and failed to keep proper records of interment, Miles stated that Winnfield referred her to Hope Cemetery. She explained her viewpoint that “if a person inquire (sic) you about a cemetery, they should know a lot about the cemetery․” However, Miles then agreed that she had no personal knowledge of whether Winnfield knew about Hope Cemetery's problems with certification, stating “No, I can't say anything about that.”

On May 29, 2024, Miles filed Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. Miles stated that she contracted with Winnfield for funeral and burial arrangements and followed Winnfield's recommendations. Thus, Miles submitted that Winnfield owed her a duty to “diligently conduct the funeral/burial arrangements[.]” Miles submitted that, at a minimum, Winnfield had a duty to “vet and/or verify” Hope Cemetery's licensing status before recommending the cemetery for her father's burial. Miles emphasized that she never communicated with anyone from Hope Cemetery throughout the process. Rather, Winnfield contracted with her, arranged and conducted the funeral, recommended Hope Cemetery, transported her father to Hope Cemetery, and conducted the burial.

Miles argued a fiduciary/mandatary relationship existed between her and Winnfield and that Winnfield failed to act properly on her behalf. In this regard, Miles argued Winnfield was given express authority to arrange and conduct all aspects of the process, including burial. Further, Winnfield accepted payment for all services to be provided, including burial. Miles argued, therefore, that Winnfield had a duty to carry out that mandate with prudence and diligence. Since Winnfield maintained control over the burial process, Miles also contended it had a duty to obtain and retain records as to the burial location. For the same reasons, Miles argued Winnfield had a duty to ensure the cemetery it recommended was appropriately licensed for that purpose. Miles pointed out that Winnfield had presented no direct evidence that one of its representatives did not recommend Hope Cemetery to Miles and that it was Winnfield who maintained all communications with Hope Cemetery. Miles asserted, at the least, genuine issues of material fact exist as to the nature of the relationship and resultant duty.

Miles also summarily noted that a finding of fiduciary/mandatary relationship/duty was not necessary for her recovery under theories of negligence and breach of contract. Miles further submitted that Winnfield's argument that Mr. Harris’ grave could have been located with reasonable investigation sounds in comparable fault, which is fact intensive and not appropriately decided on summary judgment.

In support of her opposition to Winnfield's motion for summary judgment, Miles attached excerpts from the La. C.C.P. art. 1442 deposition ⁶ of Marcus Lewis, Winnfield's corporate designee, and excerpts from her own deposition.

Mr. Lewis testified that Winnfield provides clients with all services ranging from the preparation or cremation of the body to burial services. Specifically concerning burial, he explained that Winnfield's service depends on the particular cemetery in which the deceased will be interred. Mr. Lewis testified that when arranging burial at Hope Cemetery, its services include loading the body into a hearse, transporting it to the cemetery with police escort, and following the instruction of the cemetery “gentlemen” as to “where we're going to be at.” Generally, there are not several graves dug, the direction given would be to the grave that has just been dug for the deceased at issue, with a tent in place for the committal service. Winnfield then would direct the pall bearers to place the casket on top of a vault and perform the committal service, after which “the vault guy comes and covers the vault up.” Mr. Lewis further testified that Hope Cemetery would have someone present at the burial; Winnfield basically arrives, finds out where to bury the deceased, performs the committal, gives the Hope Cemetery representative a check, and leaves. In this case, Mr. Lewis explained that Miles paid Winnfield $1,700.00 as a cash advance for burial, which Winnfield tendered in full to Hope Cemetery.

Mr. Lewis agreed that Winnfield has no policy or procedure for keeping record of the location of burials at third party cemeteries. He acknowledged records are kept for Winnfield's cemetery, however, no such records are ever kept for third party burial locations. Mr. Lewis had no knowledge of anyone at Winnfield recommending Hope Cemetery to Miles. Mr. Lewis candidly explained that the cemetery referenced by Miles as her preference, Thomas Chapel, was closed at the time of Mr. Harris’ need and Hope Cemetery was in the same price range as Thomas Chapel. Therefore, Mr. Lewis speculated Hope Cemetery could have been presented as an option - as opposed to a recommendation - but he had no personal knowledge of any such conversation between a Winnfield representative and Miles. Mr. Lewis further denied any knowledge on the part of Winnfield of any licensing, certificate of authority, or record keeping issues with Hope Cemetery at the time of Mr. Harris’ burial.

Winnfield filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in which it, inter alia, outlined the differing statutory duties of funeral homes and cemeteries. Winnfield argued that Miles was conflating the two, asking the trial court to impose a cemetery's duties onto a funeral home. Winnfield argued that the statutory duty of a funeral home ceases “at the time when a body is delivered to the cemetery.” Winnfield further pointed to the absence of any basis in law for a duty of a funeral home to “vet and/or verify” a cemetery's licensure status. Finally, Winnfield noted that Miles alleged no breach of Winnfield's performance of its actual contractual duties to Miles.

Following argument on June 10, 2024 ⁷ , the trial court signed a written judgment granting Winnfield's motion for summary judgment and dismissing with prejudice Miles’ claims against it. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed under the de novo standard, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Painter v. Clouatre, 2024-0767 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/24), 403 So.3d 1217, 1226, writ not considered, 2025-00160 (La. 4/15/25), 406 So.3d 420, reconsideration denied, 2025-00160 (La. 9/10/25), 415 So.3d 1271, citing Corbajal v. Chris Owens French Quarter Parade, LLC, 2024-00191, (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 236, 237-38.

After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3); Cope v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University & A&M College, 2025-003 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/3/25), 417 So.3d 1048, 1055. If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, he is not required to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense; instead, the mover must point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B); Painter, 403 So.3d at 1227, citing Corbajal, 385 So.3d at 238. If the opponent rests merely on conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation, summary judgment may be appropriate. See Lancaster v. Tryforos, 2025-0221 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/25), 427 So.3d 804, 814; Quereau v. Sam & Brett LLC, 2024-0243 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/3/24), 405 So.3d 847, 854. Indeed, when faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's failure to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Painter, 403 So.3d at 1227. Further, simply showing the presence of disputed facts is insufficient if there is no legal issue presented by those contested facts. Mills v. Tarver, 2021-0666 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/21), 340 So.3d 959, 966.

The applicable substantive law determines materiality, so whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Painter, 403 So.3d at 1227.

In the case sub judice, Miles’ claims against Winnfield include breaches of statutory duty and/or fiduciary duty based on mandate or agency, breach of contract, and/or negligence. Under each theory, the threshold inquiry is the existence of a duty owing from the funeral home to the plaintiff. The existence of a duty is a question of law. Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2022-00849 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467, 473. The inquiry is whether the plaintiff has any law (statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general principles of fault) to support the claim that the defendant owed him a duty. Farrell, 359 So.3d at 473.

A funeral home such as Winnfield, providing professional funeral services, has a duty to perform the services with the degree of care, skill, and diligence that is commonly exercised by members of said profession in accordance with law. The specific issue herein is whether under the circumstances of this case, there existed a heightened duty on the part of the funeral home to investigate the licensure status of Hope Cemetery and/or to retain some type of record of the location of the burial site after the contractually agreed upon services, including the committal service performed by the funeral home, is complete and the body is buried at a third-party cemetery. We address each type of duty in turn.

Statutory Duty

Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:831 provides the following definitions:

(42) “Funeral directing” means the operation of a funeral home, or, by way of illustration and not limitation, any service whatsoever connected with the management of funerals, or the supervision of hearses or funeral cars, the purchase of caskets or other funeral merchandise, and retail sale and display thereof, the cleaning or dressing of dead human bodies for burial, and the performance or supervision of any service or act connected with the management of funerals from time of death until the body or bodies are delivered to the cemetery, crematory, or other agent for the purpose of disposition.

(43) “Funeral director” means a person to whom a valid license has been issued by the board to perform the duties of funeral directing.

(44) “Funeral establishment” means any place or premises duly licensed by the board and devoted to or used in the care and preparation for disposition of the body of a deceased person or maintained or held out to the public by advertising or otherwise as the office or place for the practice of funeral directing. (Emphasis added)

A funeral establishment is by law required to affix identification of a deceased person to the casket. La. R.S. 37:853(A). There is no statutory duty of a funeral director or funeral establishment to affix identification of a deceased at the physical location of interment. There is no statutory duty of a funeral director or funeral establishment that extends to the selection, marking, recording, or identification of real property on which a deceased is interred in a third-party cemetery.⁸ If the legislature wished to impose such an affirmative duty upon funeral homes, it could do so. However, the legislature has not chosen to statutorily impose such a duty. See Hawes v. Kilpatrick Funeral Homes, Inc., 39,089 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/17/04), 887 So.2d 711, 716 (finding that the legislature had not imposed a duty of disclosure of services provided by another funeral home under prepaid funeral contract).

In this case, Winnfield's statutory duty ended when it delivered the body of Mr. Harris in its casket to Hope Cemetery. With no dispute as to the performance of said duty, as a matter of law, Winnfield satisfied its statutory duty to Miles.

Breach of Contract

Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. La. C.C. art. 2045. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. C.C. art. 2046. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. C.C. art. 2050. See Benoist v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 2022-0877 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/23), 2023 WL 3861760, *4, writ denied, 2023-00926 (La. 10/31/23), 372 So.3d 813 (unpublished).

In order to state a claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff must do more than merely allege that a promise was inadequately performed; a plaintiff must point to an identifiable contractual promise that the defendant failed to honor. Mills, 340 So.3d at 972, quoting Guidry v. Our Lady of the Lake Nurse Anesthesia Program Through Our Lady of the Lake College, 2014-0461 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/29/15), 170 So.3d 209, 214.

Notably, the contract for services between Miles and Winnfield is not contained in the appellate record. See fn. 5, supra. Without the contract, we are constrained to find that Miles failed to identify any specific contractual provision that Winnfield failed to honor. However, for the sake of completeness, we note that there is evidence of record concerning the contractual provisions found in the deposition testimony of Miles and Mr. Lewis. Our de novo review of this evidence reveals no factual dispute that Winnfield's contractual services provided in the contract as described by both Miles and Mr. Lewis ran from acceptance and preparation of the body to facilitation of committal and burial. After review of the deposition testimony, we conclude that Winnfield's contractual duty ended when Winnfield tendered to Hope Cemetery's representative the entire $1,700.00 cash advance paid to Winnfield by Miles, Mr. Harris’ remains were delivered to Hope Cemetery, Mr. Harris was buried, and Winnfield's employees left the cemetery. Miles produced no evidence that Winnfield had a contractual duty to select or determine the location of burial in Hope Cemetery or any evidence that Winnfield was aware of the location of burial prior to the time when Hope Cemetery representatives directed Winnfield to the grave on the date of interment. On the contrary, Miles testified that Hope Cemetery provided the location of burial. We agree with Winnfield that its duty as a funeral home did not extend to the real property aspect of the interment of Mr. Harris.

In addition, the testimony regarding the contractual provisions does not establish that Winnfield was under a contractual duty regarding use or placement of grave markers, or to ensure that grave markers remained in place post-burial. Likewise, Miles produced no evidence of a contractual duty of Winnfield to “vet and/or verify” third-party cemeteries. We further note that Miles acknowledged through counsel to this Court that there were no complaints regarding the manner in which Winnfield performed the contractual services for Mr. Harris.

Fiduciary Duty

Whether a fiduciary duty exists, and the extent of that duty, depends on the facts and circumstances of the case and the relationship of the parties. Cope v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University & A&M College, 417 So.3d at 1056. Miles argues that because of the all-inclusive nature of the contractual services and Winnfield's purported recommendation of Hope Cemetery, a duty on the part of Winnfield arose to both verify the cemetery's licensure status and retain records of the burial site. We find that even though Winnfield has experience in its field, a fiduciary relationship of trust was not created that required Winnfield to investigate a third-party cemetery's licensure status for its clients. See Hawes, 887 So.2d at 715.

Moreover, even if Winnfield assumed a duty to recommend a licensed cemetery, we cannot say that any breach of that duty was a substantial factor in Miles’ inability to locate her father's grave a month after burial and after the temporary markers had been removed. There is no evidence suggesting that Winnfield knew of Hope Cemetery's licensure issues, that Hope Cemetery would remove grave markers, or its failure to keep a record of the location of interments.

Negligence

Generally, in an action for damages under La. C.C. arts. 2315 and 2316, the plaintiff has the burden of proving liability or negligence on the part of the defendant. In determining whether liability exists under a duty-risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove that the conduct in question was the cause-in-fact of the resulting harm, that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff which the defendant breached, and that the risk of harm was within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached. Johnson v. State Through Dep't of Transportation & Dev., 2017-0973 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/3/19), 275 So.3d 879, 892, writ denied, 2019-00676 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So.3d 970. For the same reasons expressed hereinabove, we find no factual support in this record for any duty on the part of Winnfield outside of the statute governing funeral homes and the contract between the parties, which were undisputedly and satisfactorily performed by Winnfield.

In summary, while a factual issue may exist regarding any alleged recommendation of Hope Cemetery to Miles by Winnfield, such factual dispute is not determinative of whether summary judgment was appropriate in this matter. See Mills, 340 So.3d at 966. The critical question is one of law - whether any duty was owed by Winnfield to Miles surrounding the very unfortunate circumstance of the post-burial removal of grave markers in a third-party cemetery resulting in Miles’ inability to locate her father's vault a month post-burial. Following a thorough de novo review of the record before us, we find that Miles produced no factual evidence supporting the existence of any such duty and, therefore, summary judgment was properly granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment granted in favor of Defendant Winnfield Funeral Home of Baton Rouge, Inc., dismissing with prejudice the claims of Plaintiff, Nolan A. Miles, is affirmed. All costs of appeal are assessed to Nolan A. Miles.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   An initial summary judgment was signed on November 19, 2024. On August 14, 2025, a subsequent judgment was signed stating that the November 19, 2024 judgment was final and appealable in accordance with La. C.C.P. arts. 1911 and 1915(A).

3.   Hope Cemetery is an unincorporated entity operated by Hope Benevolent Society d/b/a Hope Cemetery a/k/a Live Oak Cemetery in East Baton Rouge Parish.

4.   At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, counsel for Winnfield advised the trial court that Hope Cemetery had made no appearance in this matter and the record does not contain any indication otherwise.

5.   The contract for funeral services between Miles and Winnfield was bate stamped and produced during discovery and was identified by Miles onscreen (not physically) during her deposition testimony. Miles testified in her deposition regarding the pertinent provisions of the contract. While attached as an exhibit to Miles’ deposition, the contract itself is not included in the record on appeal.

6.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1442 pertinently states that a party may name a public or private corporation or a partnership or association as a deponent in its notice of deposition and designate with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. The named organization shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will testify. The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization.

7.   During argument, counsel for Winnfield stated “we went out and found” Mr. Harris’ gravesite. Counsel related that “it was during Covid” and it was the only unmarked grave in the location corresponding with Miles’ testimony of the general location of the grave.

8.   In this regard, we note that the legislature allocated the duty of record keeping of interments to cemeteries in La. R.S. 8:662:The cemetery authority in charge of any premises on which interments are made shall keep a record of all remains interred on the premises under its charge, in each case stating the name of each deceased person, date of interment, location of interment, and name of the funeral director or funeral home.

THERIOT, J.