STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHRISTOPHER RAYMOND DIANO (2026)

The defendant, Christopher Raymond Diano, was charged by amended grand jury indictment with inciting a felony, in violation of La. R.S. 14:28. He pled not guilty and, following a six-person jury trial, was convicted as charged. The defendant filed a motion for new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment, both of which were denied. Thereafter, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information, seeking to adjudicate the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender. The defendant filed a motion to quash the habitual offender bill, which the trial court granted following a hearing. This court denied the State's writ application, and the supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling granting the motion to quash. State v. Diano, 2024-0206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/17/24), 2024 WL 3025008 (unpublished), aff'd, 2024-00888 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So.3d 530. In the interim, the trial court sentenced the defendant to two years imprisonment at hard labor for his conviction. The defendant now appeals, alleging the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions because the evidence was insufficient to support his guilty verdict, and the State made improper and prejudicial comments during closing arguments. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

Between October 2020 and January 2021, Brooke Naquin was operating as a confidential informant (“CI”) for the narcotics division of the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office (“TPSO”). Naquin's boyfriend, the defendant, was a former CI for the TPSO and was aware of her cooperation with law enforcement. At the request of TPSO Agent Julio Escobar, Naquin made controlled purchases from a local drug dealer, Corey LeBlanc.

On January 24, 2021, Naquin and the defendant got into an argument, and Naquin called her friend, Magen Dardar, who invited Naquin to come stay at her residence for the night. At the time of the incident, Dardar and LeBlanc, a target of Naquin's CI work, lived together and shared one phone. The defendant sent Dardar screenshots of messages between Naquin and Agent Escobar implicating Naquin as a CI. As a result, when Naquin arrived at Dardar's and LeBlanc's residence, LeBlanc's daughter, Chellsey, repeatedly beat Naquin and cut her hair with scissors and a knife, all of which was videotaped by those present at the residence. The defendant was arrested several months later.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. Specifically, he argues the State failed to prove he had the requisite criminal intent to incite a felony.²

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. Code Crim. P. art. 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Jacquot, 2023-1254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/24), 392 So.3d 663, 667, writ denied, 2024-00979 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 69.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jacquot, 392 So.3d at 667. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Id.

When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Southall, 2022-0746 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 925, 930, writ denied, 2023-00875 (La. 2/6/24), 378 So.3d 750.

Inciting a felony is the endeavor by one or more persons to incite or procure another person to commit a felony. La. R.S. 14:28(A).

At trial, the victim, Brooke Naquin, testified she was in a relationship with the defendant and the couple had a two-month-old child together.³ On the date of the offense, January 24, 2021, Naquin and the defendant got into a heated argument, prompting her to call the police. Although she called the wrong jurisdiction, an officer was dispatched to her residence. Naquin informed the officer that she did not want to press charges, but wanted the defendant to leave. Because the defendant did not have a ride, the officer brought the defendant home.

Naquin testified that she later messaged her friend, Magen Dardar, about the argument with the defendant. Naquin told Dardar she wanted to “score,” and because she claimed Dardar owed her drugs, Naquin wanted to get the drugs that she was owed. Dardar invited Naquin to come stay the night and offered to have her friends, Chad Trahan and Brooke Stewart, pick her up.

Naquin testified she was a CI for Agent Escobar, and had begun working for him prior to January 24, 2021. Naquin testified that at Agent Escobar's direction, she purchased heroin on two occasions from LeBlanc, who lived with her friend Dardar. She said the purchases were made two or three months before January 24, 2021. Naquin testified the defendant knew who Dardar and LeBlanc were and knew that LeBlanc was her drug supplier.

Naquin testified that when she arrived at Dardar and LeBlanc's residence, she knew “something was going on, something was different.” She identified those present at the residence as Trahan, Stewart, A.J. LeBoeuf, Dardar, and LeBlanc. Naquin said LeBlanc took her phone, looked through her text messages, and started questioning her about messages between her and “E,” which included an exchange where Agent Escobar asked Naquin if she could “score” from LeBlanc again. Although she initially denied it, Naquin ultimately admitted to being a CI. At that point, the group threatened to kill her, stating, “all rats die and to wait, they got something for [her.]” Naquin said she was scared for her life. LeBlanc's daughter, Chellsey LeBlanc, walked in during the confrontation and started beating Naquin.

The group videotaped a portion of the beating, but Naquin testified the beating continued for about an hour after the video ended. At one point, LeBlanc told her she was lucky it was Chellsey beating her and not him because he would kill her. Naquin testified Dardar hit her once, and then Chellsey cut her hair using scissors and a knife. The group also videotaped Chellsey cutting Naquin's hair. Naquin testified that she was at the residence for approximately two hours, and after the beating, Chellsey drove her to Marty J's Truckstop, where she saw someone she knew, who brought her home. Naquin did not know where the defendant was while she was at the residence, but she said LeBlanc held her phone during the beating and was laughing at messages from the defendant asking where Naquin was. The next day, she told the defendant about what happened. She also called Agent Escobar. According to Naquin, when Agent Escobar later obtained a copy of the recorded videos, he contacted Naquin and obtained and recorded her statement. Naquin testified she was placed in a hotel for two days for her safety.

Agent Escobar worked as a senior narcotics agent for the TPSO.⁴ He testified he knew LeBlanc was “a large scale supplier of illegal drugs in the bayou area of the parish” and targeted LeBlanc's operation with hopes of arresting him. Agent Escobar and his team learned Naquin was willing to be a CI to “work off her charges[,]” and once she agreed to be an informant, she provided the names of several people she would be able to purchase narcotics from, including LeBlanc. Agent Escobar testified he first became aware of an incident involving Naquin and LeBlanc when Naquin called to tell him LeBlanc and others were questioning her about being an informant and “pushed [her] around.” Agent Escobar said he did not get the impression that Naquin's life was in danger or that she needed urgent help until he saw the videos, which were provided to his team by another informant. After watching the videos, he immediately contacted Naquin and obtained arrest warrants for those involved. Agent Escobar testified that the defendant was not initially a suspect, but when Chellsey was taken into custody and interviewed, she stated that there were text messages that the defendant sent to Dardar disclosing Naquin's cooperation with the police. Agent Escobar said they recovered the text messages from Dardar's Facebook account, which he identified as those between him and Naquin referencing her buying narcotics from LeBlanc. Agent Escobar testified that they interviewed Dardar, who told them she received the messages from the defendant.

Magen Dardar testified that she had been friends with Naquin since childhood and that LeBlanc was her fiancé. Dardar testified that on January 24, 2021, Naquin called her and Leblanc and told them she “was terrified because [the defendant] was underneath her house saying he was gonna kill her and he had just hit her in the face.” Because Naquin sounded scared, Dardar offered to let her stay overnight with them, and LeBlanc called Trahan to go pick up Naquin so “she can be safe.” Dardar testified that at some point before Naquin arrived, the defendant sent her numerous screenshots from his phone to her Facebook Messenger account of the messages between Naquin and Agent Escobar showing she was working with the police. Dardar showed the messages to LeBlanc. Dardar testified that prior to receiving the messages, neither she nor LeBlanc had any suspicions that Naquin was working with the TPSO, and the disclosure was a complete surprise.

The State introduced evidence that Trahan, LeBlanc, Dardar, Chellsey LeBlanc, LeBoeuf, and Stewart were charged in connection with the incident; and LeBlanc, Dardar, Chellsey LeBlanc, and LeBoeuf pled guilty to felony offenses.

Agent Joseph Crappel, a narcotics agent with the TPSO, testified the defendant had previously worked as a CI for TPSO. Agent Crappel testified the defendant was informed of the need to maintain confidentiality to protect the CI “from having any type of retaliation done against them.”

The defendant testified that Naquin was his fiancé and they had been in a relationship for four years. He testified that he was with Naquin during a traffic stop in September 2020 when she was caught with heroin, but was not arrested. He learned a few weeks later that she had agreed to work as a CI and conduct controlled buys to avoid arrest. According to the defendant, around November or December, Naquin went into rehab. The defendant testified that while Naquin was in rehab, a text from Agent Escobar was received on Naquin's phone, which was in the defendant's possession, saying something like “we need to talk to you.” According to the defendant, he responded to the text as though he were Naquin, by replying, “I'm in rehab right now.”

The defendant testified that on January 24, 2021, he got mad at Naquin because when he showed up at her residence, she was trying to buy drugs. He testified that he knew Naquin would later get drugs from Dardar, so at some point that day, he sent a text to Dardar's phone showing the message from Agent Escobar saying he needed to talk to Naquin with the response that she was in rehab. The defendant claimed that when he sent the screenshot, he also messaged, “Don't f*** with her,” which he said meant “don't serve her[.]” The defendant denied sending screenshots of any other texts between Agent Escobar and Naquin. The defendant testified that he told Naquin to delete his message to Dardar when Agent Escobar told the defendant he was coming to arrest him. The defendant testified that he did not intend for his actions to result in Naquin getting hurt, and the only reason he sent the screenshot was to stop Naquin from buying or using drugs.

For the first time on appeal, the defendant argues that inciting a felony requires specific criminal intent. He contends that the only issue on review is whether the defendant had the specific intent for the group to commit a battery on Naquin when he sent the message and/or screenshots to Dardar. The defendant argues the evidence was insufficient in this case to support a finding that he possessed the specific intent to incite a felony.

Criminal intent may be specific or general. La. R.S. 14:10. Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. Id. The definitions of some crimes require a specific criminal intent, while in others no intent is required. La. R.S. 14:11. In the absence of qualifying provisions, the terms “intent” and “intentional” have reference to “general criminal intent.” Id.

In this case, the jury was instructed that the defendant was charged with endeavoring to incite or procure someone else to commit at least one of the following felony offenses: (1) second degree battery; or (2) second degree kidnapping; or (3) intimidating a witness; or (4) obstruction of justice. To convict the defendant of inciting a felony, the jury was told it must find beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. that the defendant endeavored to incite or procure someone else to commit a felony offense; and

2. that the defendant either actively desired a felony offense to result from his endeavor, or that the defendant, in the ordinary course of human experience, knew that a felony offense was reasonably certain to result from his endeavor; and

3. that the felony offense he endeavored to incite or procure was either:

a. Second Degree Kidnapping; o

b. Second Degree Battery; or

c. Intimidating a Witness; or

d. Obstruction of Justice, and

4. that any felony offense he endeavored to incite or procure was actually committed.

Thus, the jury was instructed as to both specific and general criminal intent as an element of the crime of inciting a felony. As noted by the defendant on appeal, he failed to object to the jury charge, and therefore did not preserve this issue for appeal. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841(A).⁵ Nonetheless, we consider the defendant's argument in order to address his claim of sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Griner, 2019-0322 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/19), 2019 WL 4731973, *3 (unpublished), writ denied, 2019-01984 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So. 3d 68.

In support of his argument that inciting a felony requires specific intent, the defendant relies upon the definition of criminal attempt, found in La. R.S. 14:27, which provides, in pertinent part, that, “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended.” (Emphasis added.) As the defendant recognizes, an attempt is a separate offense from solicitation, a common law offense similar to the crime of inciting a felony. The defendant contends that inciting a felony would be analogous to solicitation in that the state must prove there was specific criminal intent for a particular outcome. We find the defendant's reliance on the attempt statute is misplaced.

Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. State v. Clarke, 2021-01460 (La. 6/29/22), 345 So.3d 1015, 1017. Louisiana criminal statutes must “be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.” La. R.S. 14:3. What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Clarke, 345 So.3d at 1017. Thus, in Louisiana, we require proof of specific intent where the statutory definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequence (the frequent language being ‘with intent to ․’). State v. Elzie, 343 So.2d 712, 713-14 (La. 1977).

As noted above, inciting a felony is the endeavor by one or more persons to incite or procure another person to commit a felony. La. R.S. 14:28. Unlike the definition of attempt, La. R.S. 14:28 makes no reference to intent. Accordingly, based upon the language of La. R.S. 14:28, and in the absence of any qualifying provisions requiring specific intent, we find that inciting a felony is a general intent crime. See La. R.S. 14:11; Elzie, 343 So.2d at 713-14. Thus, the State was required to prove that the defendant, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. See La. R.S. 14:10.

Turning now to the evidence before us, on January 24, 2021, the defendant became angry and threatened Naquin, prompting her to call the police. She also called her friend Dardar, indicating she was terrified because the defendant had threatened to kill her. The defendant admitted that he sent at least one screenshot to Dardar, and the evidence introduced at trial showed that Dardar received text messages from the defendant disclosing Naquin's cooperation with Agent Escobar to purchase drugs from LeBlanc. Although the defendant claimed that the only reason he sent the message to Dardar was to prevent Naquin from buying drugs, he instructed Naquin to delete the message he sent to Dardar. Based upon the testimony and evidence presented, the jury could have rationally found the State proved that the defendant, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the reasonable certainty that Naquin would be subject to at least one of the following felony offenses: (1) second degree battery; or (2) second degree kidnapping; or (3) intimidating a witness; or (4) obstruction of justice, as a result of the defendant's act of sending screenshots to Dardar disclosing that Naquin was working as a CL

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 422 (per curiam). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the elements of inciting a felony. Accordingly, we find no merit in the defendant's first assignment of error.

IMPROPER CLOSING ARGUMENT

In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erroneously overruled his objections during the State's closing argument and denied his post-trial motions.⁶

Closing arguments shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the State or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. The argument shall not appeal to prejudice. The State's rebuttal shall be confined to answering the argument of the defendant. La. Code Crim. P. art. 774. Although prosecutors are allowed wide latitude in choosing closing argument tactics, they should not misstate the evidence. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 614, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). The trial judge has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments, and this court will not reverse a conviction on the basis of improper closing argument unless thoroughly convinced the remarks influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. State v. Folse, 2023-1299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So.3d 645, 649.

During closing remarks, the prosecutor stated, “This case is very, very simple. I put on what, four witnesses. [Defense counsel] has the ability to subpoena everyone in that room, but didn't. She wasted our time with twenty law enforcement officers subpoenaed.”

Defense counsel objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor continued: “[Defense counsel] wasted our time by putting all of these officers on the witness stand to show what? It didn't have anything to do with what [the defendant] did. It didn't have anything to do with what happened in that room.”

During the defendant's closing argument, defense counsel stated, “I want to remind you that my client has no burden. We subpoenaed Magen, Chellsey, Chad and a slew of officers. Chellsey didn't show up, that's not within my control.” Thereafter, during rebuttal, the prosecutor stated, “Chellsey LeBlanc, if she's such a key witness why did [defense counsel] wait until Tuesday of this week to subpoena her?” Defense counsel objected, and the prosecutor stated, “She brought it up.” The trial court instructed the jurors as follows:

That wasn't specific, but ladies and gentlemen, if you don't have evidence of anything that an attorney says, it is not something that you should take into consideration. Their argument should be based on what the evidence is and if there is evidence of something that is said, fine. If there is no evidence of something said, you shouldn't take it into consideration.

Following the trial, the defendant filed post-trial motions arguing the prosecutor attacked defense counsel personally throughout the trial and continuing after the conclusion of the trial. On appeal, the defendant contends that, taken as a whole, the improper comments objected to by defense counsel were so prejudicial in depicting the defendant as the reason the jurors had to hear testimony from 20 police officers and subject Naquin to the trial that they had a significant impact on the outcome of the case such that the conviction should be reversed.

In the instant case, the complained-of remarks addressed the lack of relevant evidence, which is permissible argument under La. Code Crim. P. art. 774. See State v. Smith, 357 So.2d 798, 802 (La. 1978) Additionally, the trial court instructed the jurors before deliberation that the statements and arguments made by the attorneys were not evidence. The trial court again advised the jurors that they should not consider the arguments of the attorneys as evidence following defense counsel's objection during the State's rebuttal.

The defendant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor's remarks contributed to the verdict. The remarks made by the prosecutor in this case fall under the wide latitude afforded to parties making closing arguments. Moreover, based upon the evidence presented at trial, we are not convinced the remarks influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Accordingly, we find no merit in the defendant's second assignment of error.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The question of the legal sufficiency of evidence is properly raised by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, not by a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821; State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 790 n.3 (en banc), writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177. The defendant filed a motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment but failed to file a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. However, the failure to file a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal does not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Washington, 421 So.2d 887, 889 (La. 1982).

3.   Naquin testified she did not want to participate in the court proceedings and did not want the State to prosecute the defendant.

4.   At the time of trial, Agent Escobar had been transferred to the work release program following an internal affairs investigation related to his actions in another case. During the trial, several officers from the TPSO were called by the defendant and questioned about the internal affairs investigation.

5.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 841(A) provides that an irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.

6.   In addition to the complained-of remarks discussed below, the defendant also references remarks made by the State in closing argument to which there was no objection. Because he did not object, the defendant has waived any argument regarding those statements on appeal.

HAGGERTY, J.

Balfour, J. concurs