STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CLEVELAND CARTER (2026)

This is a criminal appeal. Defendant—Cleveland Carter—appeals his purse snatching convictions (two counts) and sentences. The sole issue he raises is the sufficiency of the evidence. He argues that the State failed to disprove his affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication. For the reasons that follow, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Procedural History

In July 2023, the State charged Mr. Carter by bill of information with two counts of purse snatching, violations of La. R.S. 14:65.1.¹ He pled not guilty. The district court denied Mr. Carter's pre-trial motion to suppress statements and found probable cause. The case proceeded to trial in April 2024. During the trial, the district court, at Mr. Carter's request, charged the jury that voluntary intoxication was an affirmative defense available to Mr. Carter under La. R.S. 14:15(2).²

At the end of the trial, on April 11, 2024, the six-person jury unanimously found Mr. Carter guilty as charged. Thereafter, on August 8, 2024, the district court denied Mr. Carter's post-trial motions—motion for new trial, motion for judgment of acquittal, and motion for arrest of judgment. Immediately thereafter, the district court sentenced Mr. Carter on each count of purse snatching to thirteen-years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The district court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with credit for time served. On the same day, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which the district court granted.

Ten months later, Mr. Carter filed a motion for an out of time appeal, which the district court denied on June 25, 2025, as untimely.³ Seeking review of that ruling, Mr. Carter filed a supervisory writ in this Court asserting his constitutional right to appeal. Granting the writ, this Court observed:

A review of the record indicates that Mr. Carter did not intentionally waive his constitutional right to appeal. Accordingly, we grant Mr. Carter's writ application, reverse the district court's June 25, 2025 judgment which denied Mr. Carter's Motion For An Out of Time Appeal, and remand the matter for the district court to appoint counsel for Mr. Carter to pursue his appellate rights.

State v. Carter, 25-0434 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/6/25) (unpub.).

On October 1, 2025, Mr. Carter filed a motion for appeal, which the district court granted. This appeal, by appointed counsel, followed.

Facts

The following statement of the facts is based on the evidence presented at trial.⁴

The underlying offense occurred shortly before midnight on Monday, May 29, 2023, on Common Street in downtown New Orleans. The offense was captured on multiple surveillance cameras. The victims—Mr. Goldhahn and Mr. Ward—were Memphis, Tennessee residents. The victims were visiting New Orleans for the first time, celebrating their one-year anniversary as a couple, and staying in a downtown New Orleans hotel—the Moxy. The offense occurred on the final night of their trip.

On the day of the offense, the victims took a river boat cruise and then met one of Mr. Ward's colleagues on Bourbon Street. Just before midnight, the victims headed back to their hotel on foot—a six- to an eight-block walk. Unbeknownst to the victims, Mr. Carter—riding a Blue Krewe, rent-to-use bike—followed them from Bourbon Street to Common Street. When the victims reached Common Street, less than two blocks from their hotel, Mr. Carter hopped off the bike, approached them, and attacked them.

Mr. Carter first knocked down the larger victim—Mr. Goldhahn—and took Mr. Goldhahn's wallet from his pants’ pocket. Mr. Carter then attacked the smaller victim—Mr. Ward. Pulling Mr. Ward by the cross-body bag he was wearing, Mr. Carter dragged Mr. Ward down the street. Although the victims attempted to fight back, Mr. Carter ultimately ripped the cross-body bag off of Mr. Ward's body. Mr. Ward pleaded with Mr. Carter to at least let them keep their IDs so that they could make it home, but Mr. Carter said no. Mr. Carter then hopped back on the bicycle and fled, leaving the victims injured on the ground.

The victims’ injuries included a chipped front tooth, sustained by Mr. Goldhahn, and a chipped leg bone, sustained by Mr. Ward. After Mr. Carter fled, Mr. Goldhahn called 911. In the 911 call, he reported that he and his husband were “attacked from behind,” “ambushed,” and “shoved to the ground” resulting in them “bleeding out” and missing their wallets.

At the time of the offense, Mr. Ward was wearing a light green, Lululemon cross-body bag. According to Mr. Ward, the contents of his cross-body bag included, among other things, cosmetic items and credit cards. Mr. Ward's cross-body bag had no cash in it.⁵ According to Mr. Goldhahn, the items Mr. Carter took from his pockets included his wallet, lighter, and sunglasses. His wallet had less than $100 in cash in it.⁶ None of the victims’ property was returned to them.

According to Mr. Carter, he immediately used the cash that was in Mr. Ward's wallet—approximately $20—to buy food at Brother's. Mr. Carter then discarded the remainder of the victims’ property in a trash can.

On the morning after the offense, Det. Willyard, who was working in the Eighth District,⁷ was assigned the case. Det. Willyard began his investigation by reviewing RTCC camera footage and canvassing the area surrounding the crime scene for surveillance footage. Det. Willyard recovered footage from both the Roosevelt and the Wyndham hotels that documented the offense. The Roosevelt's footage showed the suspect approach the victims, shove one of the victims down, and hit the other one. The Wyndham's footage showed the events from a different angle. The RTCC's footage showed the suspect follow and stalk the victims for multiple, successive city blocks from Bourbon to Common Street.

On the next day, Wednesday, May 31, 2023, Det. Willyard spoke to the victims by phone. The victims echoed the statements they gave to the NOPD at the scene. Mr. Goldhahn told Det. Willyard that he had less than a hundred dollars cash in his wallet; whereas, Mr. Ward told him that there was no cash in his cross-body bag.

Det. Willyard also spoke to Blue Krewe's CEO (the “CEO”) and showed him the surveillance video. The CEO commented that given the bike the suspect was riding was missing a basket, it was likely the locking mechanism and GPS tracking had been removed from the bike. The CEO also informed Det. Willyard that the bike the suspect was riding likely was stolen. The CEO based this observation on the fact that Blue Krewe's bikes generally have a basket and headlight on the front of them.

Two days later, in the early morning hours of Friday, June 2, 2023, Det. Willyard was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle in the French Quarter near Royal Street and Iberville Street; he was in close proximity to the crime scene. Det. Willyard spotted a man riding a Blue Krewe bike with a missing basket and headlight. The man matched the suspect in the video footage. The man was wearing the same clothing as the suspect—a plain, black baseball cap; a dark-colored shirt; jeans; and the same distinct black shoes with a little white swivel. Believing the man might be the suspect, Det. Willyard called for backup and stopped the man. When Det. Willyard instructed the man to stop and put his hands up, the man complied. In so doing, the man revealed that he had a crack pipe in his hand. The man identified himself as Mr. Carter, and he was carrying an ID that confirmed his identity.

Det. Willyard charged Mr. Carter with not only theft of the blue bike, based on his conversation with the CEO, but also possession of foreign substances, based on the crack pipe he was holding when he was stopped. At the time of his arrest Mr. Carter did not have any stolen items on his person except for the blue bike, which is not at issue. A search incident to the arrest revealed a “push stick” used when smoking crack and some Odyssey House paperwork. Odyssey House is a local rehabilitation facility for people who have a drug addiction or mental health issues.

Following the arrest, Det. Willyard transported Mr. Carter to the Eighth District police station. Det. Willyard advised Mr. Carter of his Miranda rights. After Mr. Carter waived his rights, Det. Willyard interviewed him. The interview was captured on Det. Willyard's body cam. During the interview, Mr. Carter informed Det. Willyard that he was homeless, that he was living under the bridge by the Greyhound bus station, and that he obtained the blue bike from that location. Mr. Carter initially stated that he did not remember the incident because he was “high.” But, later in the interview, Mr. Carter recanted and provided unique details regarding the offense, including the color of the stolen cross-body bag. Mr. Carter also narrated the offense—stating that he put the bike down, walked across the street, and snatched the purse. Mr. Carter informed Det. Willyard that he targeted the victims because they appeared to be tipsy.

During the interview, Det. Willyard had Mr. Carter perform three acts: (i) identify himself in a still image taken from the surveillance footage that depicted the suspect on the blue bike—a self-confirmation photo; (ii) sign the back of the self-confirmation photo; and (iii) write an apology letter to the victims. Mr. Carter's apology letter stated:

Say I'm writing you guys this understandable notation asking you guys to forgive me for what I've done to you guys

Ok I do f․ apologize that I was stupid but the reason that I did that is because I am homeless and that I was really hungry

Please forgive me I'm looking at life. Please help me. Guys

May God Bless y'all two

Following the interview, Mr. Carter was arrested; and the clothing he was wearing was collected for evidence. Det. Willyard did not conduct any type of photographic line-up. But both victims identified Mr. Carter at trial as the person who attacked them.

DISCUSSION

Patent Error

In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920,⁸ all appeals are reviewed by this Court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one error patent. The district court failed to observe the mandatory twenty-four-hour sentencing delay required after denying Mr. Carter's post-trial motions pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 873.⁹ Although that article provides that sentencing may be imposed immediately following the district court's denial of a motion for new trial if the defendant expressly waives the delay, the sentencing transcript contains no indication that Mr. Carter waived the delay. The district court denied Mr. Carter's post-trial motions—post-verdict judgment of acquittal, for a new trial, and for arrest of judgment—and immediately thereafter sentenced Mr. Carter. The district court failed to ask Mr. Carter whether he was ready for sentencing or whether he waived the required twenty-four-hour delay.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a defendant's pronouncement of his readiness for sentencing may operate as an express waiver of the twenty-four-hour sentencing delay, but a defendant's mere participation in the sentencing hearing is insufficient to constitute an express waiver required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 873. State v. Kisack, 16-0797, p. 7 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1201, 1205. The Supreme Court also has held that “an error in failing to observe the statutory sentencing delay may still be found harmless.” Id. at p. 7, 236 So.3d at 1205-06.

The Supreme Court has held that such an error in failing to observe the statutory sentencing delay is harmless when “there has been no objection raised regarding the sentence imposed ․ and no showing or suggestion that defendant was prejudiced[.]” State v. White, 404 So.2d 1202, 1204 (La. 1981). Additionally, “this Court has held that the trial court's failure to observe the required twenty-four hour delay is harmless error where the defendant does not complain of his sentence on appeal.” State v. Penn, 25-0191, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/10/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 371135, at *8.¹⁰

This Court, in a trio of cases, has found a trial court's failure to observe the twenty-four-hour sentencing delay harmless given the circumstances presented in each case:

• State v. Harrison, 25-0353, pp. 8-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/24/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 1142519, at *4—Error in failing to observe twenty-four-hour sentencing delay was harmless given defendant's sentence was imposed three months after his conviction; defense counsel introduced several letters of mitigation on defendant's behalf; the sentence imposed was half of the maximum allowable sentence; and defendant was not challenging his sentence on appeal;

• State v. West, 22-0721, pp. 20-21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/5/23), 371 So.3d 1, 14-15—Error in failing to observe twenty-four hour sentencing delay was harmless given “over four months elapsed between Defendant's convictions and his sentencing hearing, the trial court conducted a pre-sentence investigation, and both parties submitted pre-sentencing memoranda on the issue”; and

• State v. Moffett, 17-0769, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/18), 247 So.3d 908, 911—Error in failing to observe twenty-four hour sentencing delay harmless given “the sentence was imposed two months after the defendant's conviction, the defense counsel provided a letter of mitigation prior to sentencing, and the sentence imposed by the trial judge was half of the maximum sentence allowed by law.”

Likewise, we find the district court's failure to observe the twenty-four-hour sentencing delay in this case was harmless given the circumstances. First, the district court sentenced Mr. Carter four months after his conviction. Second, Mr. Carter failed to object to the district court's imposition of the sentences without observing the mandatory twenty-four-hour delay. Third, at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel introduced a mitigation letter and Mr. Carter made a statement; Mr. Carter's statement at the hearing that “what my sentence is, I can't do nothing but take it and roll with it” hinted that he was ready for sentencing. Fourth, the sentence imposed on each count—thirteen years imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence—is less than the maximum allowable sentence of twenty years imprisonment (with or without hard labor). La. R.S. 14:65.1 Finally, Mr. Carter does not challenge his sentence on this appeal. Given these circumstances, we find the district court's failure to observe the mandatory twenty-four-hour sentencing delay was harmless.

Assigned Error

On appeal, Mr. Carter's sole assigned error is as follows:

Purse snatching is a specific intent crime. Where the defendant presented convincing evidence that he was so intoxicated as to lack the ability to form the specific intent to commit the offense, it was error to deny the defendant's post-trial motions.

Sufficiency of the evidence—Standard of Review

Appellate courts review voluntary intoxication defenses under the sufficiency of the evidence framework because such defenses present a question for the trier of fact to resolve. See State v. Clarke, 21-01460, p. 1 (La. 6/29/22), 345 So.3d 1015, 1016 (observing “whether voluntary intoxication is sufficient to preclude specific intent in this case is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact”); State v. Delmore, 16-1614, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/17), 2017 WL 2399363, at *3 (observing that “[w]hether voluntary intoxication in a particular case is sufficient to preclude specific intent is a question to be resolved by the trier-of-fact” and citing State v. Davis, 92-1623 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 1012, 1020).

As this Court has observed, “[t]he standard of review that governs the determination of sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is stated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), and codified in La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B).” State v. Duncan, 24-0664, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/22/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 3706658, at *9.¹¹ “That standard ․ is that the appellate court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must determine that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471, 474 (La. 1983). This review must include the whole record, as a rational fact finder does. State v. Gibson, 15-0682, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 772, 780.

In State v. Brown, 12-0626, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 564, 570-71, this Court summarized the Jackson standard as follows:

In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. The reviewing court must consider the record as a whole. If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. The fact finder's discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.

Id. (internal citations omitted).¹² The Jackson standard applies to both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Dukes, 19-0172, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So.3d 745, 752.

Under the Jackson standard, “[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” State v. Richards, 11-0349, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/11), 78 So.3d 864, 869 (first citing State v. Cummings, 95-1377, p. 3 (La. 2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132; and then citing State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 968 (La. 1986)). “Conflicting testimony as to factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency.” State v. Jones, 537 So.2d 1244, 1249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (first citing State v. Converse, 515 So.2d 601, 604 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); and then citing State v. Delatte, 504 So.2d 1067, 1070 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987)). “The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a conviction.” State v. Wells, 10-1338, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So.3d 303, 306 (citing State v. White, 28,095, p. 14 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/8/96), 674 So.2d 1018, 1027). “Such a determination rests solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness.” Id. (citing Jones, 537 So.2d at 1249).

“To support a conviction for purse snatching, the State must prove: (1) a theft; (2) of anything of value; (3) contained within a purse or wallet at the time of the theft; (4) from the person of another or which is in the immediate control of another; (5) by use of force, intimidation, or by snatching; (6) but not armed with a dangerous weapon.” State v. Spurlock, 539 So.2d 977, 978 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted) (citing La. R.S. 14:65.1).

Before applying these principles, we address the preliminary question of whether, as Mr. Carter contends and the district court implicitly found in charging the jury on the voluntary intoxication defense, the crime of purse snatching is a specific intent crime. The relevance of this question is that the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication applies only to specific intent crimes. See Clarke, 21-1460, p. 4, 345 So.3d at 1018 (observing that “[v]oluntary intoxication can only be considered as a defense in cases where specific intent is a necessary element of the crime, and the defendant claims his intoxication precluded the capacity to form that intent”) (citing State v. Williams, 11-427, p. 10 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/12), 88 So.3d 1102, 1110)).

Purse Snatching—Specific Intent Crime

Criminal intent is classified as either specific or general. “Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). “General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(2). Absent a qualification, “the terms ‘intent’ and ‘intentional’ have reference to ‘general criminal intent.’ ” La. R.S. 14:11. “[I]t is not the potential for harm from the criminal conduct or the potential penalty the offender faces that define the requisite intent but rather the statutory language.” Clarke, 21-01460, p. 4, 345 So.3d at 1018.

The statutory language defining purse snatching is set forth in La. R.S.14:65.1, which provides:

Purse snatching is the theft of anything of value contained within a purse or wallet at the time of the theft, from the person of another or which is in the immediate control of another, by use of force, intimidation, or by snatching, but not armed with a dangerous weapon.

Although this definition does not expressly refer to intent, it incorporates the elements of the crime of theft.

Theft is a specific intent crime. See La. R.S. 14:67 (A) (defining theft as requiring “[a]n intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential.”); State in Int. of W.S., 18-0070, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/5/18), 250 So.3d 1060, 1063; State v. Mercadel, 2012-0685, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/24/13), 120 So.3d 872, 879. “The specific intent factor of the offense relates to permanently depriving the owner of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking.” Mercadel, 2012-0685, p. 10, 120 So.3d at 879-80. Simply stated, theft requires that the offender intend to “permanently deprive” the owner of his or her belongings.

Given purse snatching incorporates the elements of the specific intent crime of theft, we find purse snatching is a specific intent crime. Because theft is an essential element of the crime, purse snatching—like the crime of theft—requires a specific intent to permanently deprive an owner of his or her belongings. This finding is supported by the history of the crime of armed robbery.

“Armed robbery used to be a specific intent crime when it required proving a ‘theft’ from the victim—i.e., ‘an intent to deprive the victim permanently of his or her personal possessions.’ ” United States v. Lanaute, 169 F.4th 641, 644 n.2 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting State v. Smith, 07-2028, p. 10 n.2 (La. 10/20/09), 23 So.3d 291,

298). But, “the legislature substituted ‘taking’ for ‘theft,’ [in a 1983 amendment to La. R.S. 14:64] thus making it ‘a general intent crime.’ ” Id. By analogy, given purse snatching requires proving a “theft” from the victim, it is a specific intent crime. See State v. Johnson, 461 So.2d 1273, 1277 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (observing that an essential element of purse snatching crime is the specific intent to deprive the victim of something of value).

Given our finding that purse snatching is a specific intent crime, the defense of voluntary intoxication potentially was available to Mr. Carter. Indeed, the district court, at Mr. Carter's request, instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication was an available defense.¹³

Intoxication Negating Mental State

The law concerning voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense is codified in La. R.S. 14:15(2), which provides:

The fact of an intoxicated or drugged condition of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime is immaterial, except as follows:

* * * * * *

(2) Where the circumstances indicate that an intoxicated or drugged condition has precluded the presence of a specific criminal intent or of special knowledge required in a particular crime, this fact constitutes a defense to a prosecution for that crime.

The burden of proving voluntary intoxication falls on the defendant. State v. Mickelson, 12-2539, p. 7 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.3d 178, 183 (citing State v. Smith, 94-2588, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/27/96), 672 So.2d 1034, 1038). The defendant must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was in fact intoxicated at the time of the offense.” State v. Mack, 45,552, p. 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/11/10), 46 So.3d 801, 803 (citing State v. Hall, 43,920, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/25/09), 4 So.3d 295, 299). “[T]hereafter, [the burden] falls to the state to negate that defense by showing beyond a reasonable doubt that specific intent was present despite the defendant's alleged intoxication.” Mickelson, 12-2539, p. 7, 149 So.3d at 183 (citing Smith, 94-2588, p. 5, 672 So.2d at 1038). “Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions.” Id. at p. 6, 149 So.3d at 182-83 (first citing State v. Broaden, 99-2124, p. 18 (La.2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 362; and then citing State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126, 1127 (La.1982)). “Specific intent may be formed in an instant.” Id. at p. 6, 149 So.3d at 183.

Mr. Carter argues that both at the time of the offense and when he was arrested a few days later, he was high on crack cocaine. According to Mr. Carter, his voluntary intoxication—drug addiction—negated the specific intent required to commit purse snatching. He contends that his extreme voluntary intoxication raised sufficient reasonable doubt that the district court should have granted his post-trial motions. In support, Mr. Carter cites the following five factors:

• [Mr.] Carter ambushed these two men and then went to Brother's to buy chicken because he was so desperate and so hungry.

• He never denied that it was him on the surveillance footage. [Mr.] Carter just did not really remember the incident or who he was when in the throws [sic] of his crack addiction. He was unable to form specific criminal intent.

• [W]hen giving his statement to police he was nodding off and had to be told by [Det.] Willyard to open his eyes.

• The apology letter showed that [Mr.] Carter did not desire any criminal consequence but rather was desperate with hunger and beholden to the crushing yoke of his crack addiction․ [The apology letter] showed a man who had no specific criminal intent to cause harm to the two victims.

• In closing argument, defense counsel pointed out to the jury that the appellant [Mr.] Carter did not even remember or resemble the man on the surveillance video footage.

The gist of Mr. Carter's argument is that his severe crack addition, alone, established his voluntary intoxication defense. This argument is unpersuasive. Voluntary intoxication is an affirmative defense only if it actually prevented the defendant from forming the specific intent required to commit the crime. See La. R.S. 14:15(2). “[T]he fact that Defendant was high is not sufficient to negate specific intent. Defendant's intoxication must be so severe that it precluded an ability to form specific intent in order for his intoxication to be an affirmative defense.” State v. Johnson, 18-523, p. 11 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d 1034, 1044 1044 (first citing La. R.S. 14:15(2); and then citing Mickelson, 12-2539, p. 6, 149 So.3d at 183). Thus, Mr. Carter's reliance on his drug addict status is misplaced.

Addressing this issue of voluntary intoxication, the following facts and circumstances are relevant:

• [T]he defendant's mind and reason were so intoxicated and overthrown so as to render the defendant utterly incapable of forming the requisite specific intent;

• [T]he quantity of intoxicants the defendant consumed prior to committing the crime charged;

• [T]he length of time over which the defendant consumed intoxicants prior to committing the crime charged;

• [T[he defendant's conduct as perceived by others at or around the time the defendant committed the crime charged;

• [T]he presence of an odor of alcohol or other intoxicant at or around the time the defendant committed the crime charged;

• [T]he results of any blood tests or other tests to determine the quantity of alcohol or other intoxicant the defendant consumed; [and]

• [T]he defendant's ability to recall significant events related to the crime with which the defendant is charged.

191 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 119 (Originally published in 2021),

Although Mr. Carter suggests that his mind and reason were so intoxicated and overthrown by his drug addiction so as to render him incapable of forming the requisite specific intent, he fails to offer any evidence to establish this fact. Furthermore, the evidence that was introduced does not establish how much, if any, drugs Mr. Carter had consumed on the day of the offense or over what period. Mr. Carter's drug addiction is supported only by the crack pipe and the Odyssey House paperwork found on his person when he was arrested multiple days after the offense. While Mr. Carter may have been intoxicated and suffering from a lifelong drug addiction, he failed to introduce any evidence of his intoxication at the time of the offense.

Insofar as Mr. Carter's actions before and during the offense, his actions were documented on video that the jury was able to view. The video footage documents Mr. Carter riding the blue bike and following the victims for multiple city blocks, getting off the bike and attacking the victims, and getting back on the bike and fleeing the crime scene. According to the victims, the only statement Mr. Carter made to them during the attack was “no” in response to their request to keep their IDs.

Insofar as the post-arrest interview, Det. Willyard testified that Mr. Carter's state of mind was “good enough” to recall unique details regarding the offense and that “his state of mind ․ was perfectly fine.” Indeed, Det. Willyard testified that Mr. Carter was able to paint a picture of the offense for him. And the jury was able to view Det. Willyard's body-cam video of the interview. Mr. Carter's ability to recall the unique details of the offense, as reflected in his post-arrest interview, undermines any intoxication defense.

Moreover, the sequence of events establishes that Mr. Carter was able to form the specific intent required for purse snatching—an intent to permanently deprive the victims of their belongings. First, he targeted the victims because they appeared “tipsy” and, thus, easy targets. Second, he followed and stalked the victims for multiple city blocks, as depicted by the RTCC footage. Third, he took deliberate actions that suggest a clear purpose in carrying out the offense; as Mr. Ward testified, “[i]t was a very well thought out plan because he waited until the perfect moment” to attack them, after following and stalking them for multiple city blocks. Fourth, he physically attacked both victims, starting with tackling the larger victim from behind, then dragging the smaller victim by the cross-body bag strap up to sixty feet. Fifth, he had the stated purpose of taking the victims’ property—a wallet and cross-body bag—to acquire cash, which he used to buy food. Sixth, he walked back to the bike and immediately fled the scene. Finally, he threw away the victims’ belongings.

Taken together, Mr. Carter's actions demonstrate that, even assuming he was intoxicated at the time of the offense, he possessed the requisite specific intent and desired the specific consequences of purse snatching. Stated otherwise, the evidence reflects that Mr. Carter acted in a calculated way before, during, and after the offense. Moreover, Mr. Carter's stated motive—taking the victims’ belongings to obtain money to buy food—reflects a rational and purposeful intent and defeats any intoxication defense.

Applying the Jackson standard and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude the jury reasonably could have found that Mr. Carter's voluntary intoxication, even if proven, did not preclude the presence of specific intent to commit purse snatching—the intent to permanently deprive the victims of their belongings—and that the State proved all the elements of purse snatching beyond a reasonable doubt.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's purse snatching convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   La. R.S.14:65.1 provides:A. Purse snatching is the theft of anything of value contained within a purse or wallet at the time of the theft, from the person of another or which is in the immediate control of another, by use of force, intimidation, or by snatching, but not armed with a dangerous weapon.B. Whoever commits the crime of purse snatching shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than two years and for not more than twenty years.

2.   La. R.S. 14:15(2) is quoted elsewhere in this opinion.

3.   See La. C.Cr.P. art. 914(B)(1) (providing that “[t]he motion for an appeal must be made no later than [t]hirty days after the rendition of the judgment or ruling from which the appeal is taken”).

4.   At trial, the State presented four witnesses—the 911 custodian of records, Emma Skilbread; the two victims, David Goldhahn (“Mr. Goldhahn”) and Jacob Ward (“Mr. Ward”); and Detective Willyard (“Det. Willyard”) of the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”). The State introduced, among other things, the 911 call; surveillance footage from the Real Time Crime Cameras (“RTCC”), the Roosevelt Hotel, and the Wyndham Hotel; Det. Willyard's body-cam video of his post-arrest interview of Mr. Carter; the clothing, baseball cap, and shoes Mr. Carter was wearing when he was arrested; the still image from the surveillance video that Det. Willyard had Mr. Carter sign; and the apology letter that Det. Willyard had Mr. Carter write to the victims.

5.   At trial, Mr. Ward described the incident as follows:[W]e were almost back to the hotel and next thing I know I see my husband hit - - like hit [sic] face first into the pavement. He's tackled from behind by [the defendant], and then he starts to come after me and I'm like [sic] I'm not just giving him my bag right away. And I remember screaming at him not to take -- or why is he doing this, why is he doing this to us and pleading with him and asking him to just give us our IDs so we can get home. In the midst of it all he ends up ripping my bag off and I don't even know how many feet he had drugged [sic] me by this point because the Birkenstocks [shoes] that I was wearing, one of them was at least like [sic] fifty, sixty feet away from me at this point. So - - and like [sic] in the midst of it all, too, like, [sic] I hit the ground and I couldn't even stand. So I guess that's the moment when he was able to runaway [sic] with my bag.

6.   At trial, Mr. Goldhahn described the incident as follows:We were less than two blocks from our hotel where we were staying and I was attacked from behind out of nowhere and my face hit the pavement, my teeth cracked against the pavement. I'll never forget the feeling of ․ my teeth hit [sic] the pavement. And then a lot of it went blurry for me. I just remember hearing my husband yelling, why would you do this or something along those lines or why are you doing this.

7.   The Eighth District covered the downtown and French Quarter areas.

8.   An error patent is one “that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2).

9.   La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 provides:If a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days shall elapse between conviction and sentence. If a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled. If the defendant expressly waives a delay provided for in this article or pleads guilty, sentence may be imposed immediately.

10.   Cf. Kisack, 16-0797, pp. 7-8, 236 So.3d at 1206 (“it is difficult to conclude the error is harmless” when the defendant “faced a sentencing range of 20 years to life and received the maximum sentence authorized for a fourth-felony offender for possession of a contraband cell phone.”); State v. Francis, 19-0227, p. 1 (La. 4/29/19), 268 So.3d 289, 289 (failure to observe the delay is not a harmless error where defendant did not waive the delay and challenges his sentence).

11.   La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B) provides that “[a] post verdict judgment of acquittal shall be granted only if the court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, does not reasonably permit a finding of guilty.”

12.   Here, as the State contends, the evidence is almost entirely direct—Mr. Carter's statements in the post-arrest interview, the surveillance footage, and the victims’ testimony. Nonetheless, we note the principles governing circumstantial evidence are as follows:When circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. The elements must be proven such that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438. This is not a separate test from the Jackson reasonable doubt standard; rather, it is an evidentiary guideline to facilitate appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. All evidence, direct and circumstantial, must meet the Jackson reasonable doubt standard.Brown, 12-0626, pp. 7-8, 115 So.3d at 571 (internal case citations omitted).

13.   Although a defendant is required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 726 to give the state notice of its intent to invoke such an affirmative defense, the record does not reflect that such a notice was given.

Judge Rosemary Ledet