PROPERTIES v. DUDLEY DEBOSIER PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION AND JAMES PELTIER (2026)

In this lease dispute, the landlord appeals from a judgment finding that the landlord had breached its warranty of peaceful possession and, as a result, the tenant was released from its obligations under the lease. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On April 16, 2019, Dudley DeBosier, a Professional Law Corporation (DeBosier), entered into a commercial lease agreement as the tenant renting office space in Denham Springs, Louisiana. The landlord was A.R.F. Properties, L.L.C. (ARF).¹ The term of the lease was to run through April 30, 2024; however, DeBosier gave ARF notice of its termination of the lease agreement via letter dated and delivered on July 27, 2023. DeBosier paid rent through September of 2023 and vacated the leased premises on September 30, 2023, taking with it a digital business sign it had purchased and installed in the parking lot at the leased location.

Starting in late Spring of 2023, DeBosier experienced significant disruptions to its law office business. This was due to excessive noise coming from a fairly new neighboring tenant, Denham Springs Martial Arts (DSMA), as well as parking issues. DeBosier documented the disruptions to the operations of its law office, which were caused by the noise emanating from DSMA's use of the adjacent space. The tenants shared a common wall. DeBosier communicated with ARF on multiple occasions, including June 6 and 29, 2023, and throughout July 2023 regarding the noise problem. Despite the complaints by DeBosier, the disruptions continued escalating until DeBosier felt compelled to give notice of its termination of the lease and to relocate its office space to another location in Denham Springs at the end of September 2023.

ARF then filed this lawsuit against DeBosier, seeking damages for alleged unpaid rent (October 2023 through April 2024), late fees and various other maintenance charges, replacement costs for the digital sign, repair costs for a damaged floor at the leased premises, attorney fees pursuant to the lease agreement, and costs. DeBosier reconvened for claims of damages due to ARF's breach of contract, specifically ARF's failure to maintain the warranty of peaceful possession and the cost of relocating its offices.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial on April 9, 2025. The trial court took the matter under advisement after the trial and ordered post-trial memoranda. On May 7, 2025, the trial court issued written reasons for its judgment and signed a judgment on June 18, 2025, consistent with those reasons. The trial court found that ARF had breached its warranty of peaceful possession that was explicitly included in the lease agreement. Due to the breach, the trial court ruled that DeBosier was “absolved of its obligations” under the lease. The trial court also denied all of ARF's claims for damages associated with DeBosier's termination of the lease. The trial court denied DeBosier's claim for moving expenses associated with its relocation. Additionally, the trial court expressly found the witnesses for DeBosier to be credible. As for the dispute over the digital sign, the trial court recognized that the parties had resolved the ownership issue and ordered DeBosier to be reimbursed $10,000.00 for the cost of the sign and for DeBosier to return the software needed to operate the sign that had already been returned to ARF.

It is from this judgment that ARF suspensively appeals. ARF argues that the trial court erred: (1) in finding that ARF owed a warranty of peaceful possession to DeBosier; (2) in failing to find that DeBosier did not give ARF adequate notice and an opportunity to cure the noise disturbance; (3) in denying ARF's request for attorney fees as provided for in the lease; and (4) in requiring ARF to pay a portion of the price of the digital sign. DeBosier did not file an answer to the appeal.²

DISCUSSION

A lease is a synallagmatic contract by which one party, the lessor, binds himself to give to the other party, the lessee, the use and enjoyment of a thing for a term in exchange for a rent that the lessee binds himself to pay. La. Civ. Code art. 2668.³ The term of the lease may be agreed to by the parties or fixed by law; thus, agreement as to the term is not an essential element of a lease. Constantin Land Trust v. Pitre Industries, L.L.C., 2016-0993 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/10/17), 225 So.3d 1089, 1094, writ denied, 2017-1644 (La. 11/28/17), 23 0 So.3d 224. The burden of proof in an action for breach of contract is on the party claiming rights under the contract. Medtron Software Intelligence Corp. v. Metairie Gastroenterology, APMC, 2018-1427 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/19), 278 So.3d 1016, 1022.

Where factual findings are pertinent to the interpretation of a lease, those factual findings are not to be disturbed unless manifest error is shown. Constantin Land Trust, 225 So.3d at 1094. However, when appellate review is not premised upon any factual findings made at the trial court level, but is, instead, based upon an independent review and examination of the lease on its face, the manifest error rule does not apply. In such cases, appellate review of questions of law is simply whether the trial court was legally correct. Id. In this case, the trial court made factual determinations based upon the credibility of the witnesses, as well as legal determinations regarding the provisions in the lease agreement and based on the law.

The lease agreement in this case contained a warranty of peaceful possession clause. That provision specifically states:

35. QUIET ENJOYMENT: Provided [DeBosier] performs all of its covenants and obligations hereunder, [ARF] covenants that [DeBosier] shall have the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of the Leased Premises and that [ARF] will defend [DeBosier] in the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of the Leased Premises against the lawful claim of all persons claiming by, through or under [ARF]. All obligations of [DeBosier] under this Lease are material and of equal importance. [Emphasis added.]

Additionally, the lease agreement at Paragraph 39 provides that the governing law of the lease is controlled by the laws of the State of Louisiana.

Louisiana Civil Code article 2682 outlines the lessor's principal obligations, including a specific obligation to the lessee to protect the lessee's peaceful possession for the duration of the lease and to maintain the thing leased in a condition suitable for the purpose of which it was leased. See La. Civ. Code art. 2682(2) and (3). The lessor warrants the lessee's peaceful possession of the leased thing against any disturbance caused by a person who asserts ownership, or right to possession of, or any other right in the thing. La. Civ. Code art. 2700. If a disturbance is such that the lessee can no longer use the leased premises for the intended use, the lessor has breached its obligation to maintain the lessee in peaceful possession. Constantin Land, 225 So.3d at 1093, citing McCurdy v. Bloom's Inc., 39,854 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/05), 907 So.2d 896, 901. Additionally, the lessee's right of peaceable possession is a matter of public policy and may not be waived. See Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Kennedy, 2003-0166 (La. App. 1 Cir 7/2/03), 859 So.2d 74, 80, writ denied, 2003-2201 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So.2d 430.

When the words of a contract of lease are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. Civ. Code art. 2046. The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning. La. Civ. Code art. 2047. Words susceptible of different meanings must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the object of the contract. La. Civ. Code art. 2048. A provision susceptible of different meanings must be interpreted with a meaning that renders it effective and not with one that renders it ineffective. La. Civ. Code art. 2049. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. Civ. Code art. 2050. Common intent is determined, therefore, in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain, and popular meaning of the words used in the contract. Lobell v. Rosenberg, 2015-0247 (La. 10/14/15), 186 So.3d 83, 89.

When a lessor breaches its obligation to afford its tenant peaceable possession of the leased premises, the tenant is relieved of its obligation to pay rent beyond actual occupancy of the premises, and the lease is considered terminated. Young v. Eddy, 86 So.2d 243, 244 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1956). Moreover, our jurisprudence has long recognized that when a lessor allows one of its tenants to disturb the peaceable possession of the other tenants, then the lessor has breached the obligation to maintain the other tenants in peaceable possession of the leased property. See Essen Development v. Marr, 95-1344 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/30/95), 687 So.2d 98, 99-100 (finding that a tenant's peaceable possession of an apartment was disturbed by another tenant's barking dog); see also Moity v. Castille, 469 So.2d 503, 505-506 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1985) (barricading and padlocking the gate to leased property was a breach of duty to maintain peaceable possession/use of the leased pasture land); Gayle v. Auto-Lec Stores, 174 La. 1044, 142 So. 258, 259 (1932) (a disturbance caused by a dance studio above a lessee's retail business was deemed to be a breach of the lessor's duty to maintain the lessee's peaceable possession). But see Credithrift of America, Inc. v. Sinclair, 430 So.2d 822, 824-825 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1983) (mere proximity of adjacent adult bookstore was not disruptive enough to constitute a disturbance of peaceable possession).

In this case, the trial court made a factual determination that ARF breached its obligation to protect DeBosier's peaceful possession of the leased premises for the duration of the lease term. Apparently, the trial court made this finding of fact based on the credible testimony of DeBosier attorney, Colt Fore, and DeBosier legal assistant, Kayla Autry. We find the record reasonably supports this conclusion. DeBosier was unable to operate its law firm in an environment that was interrupted by noise disturbances consisting of loud music and yelling coming from the martial arts studio tenant located adjacent to the law firm. DeBosier's attempts to remedy the disturbances by discussions with the owner of the martial arts studio failed. The summer classes offered at the martial arts studio increasingly disturbed DeBosier's court Zoom meetings and depositions, as well as phone calls and in-person meetings with clients. On numerous occasions, DeBosier notified ARF of the noise problem that was disrupting the law firm's operations, but the noise continued. Therefore, DeBosier was justified, pursuant to the law and the lease agreement, in terminating the lease based on the breach.

Appellate courts must give great weight to the conclusions reached by the trier of fact, and where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error. See Stobart v. State through Dept, of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). After reviewing the record in its entirety, we do not find that the trial court's evaluations of credibility and inferences of fact in evaluating the testimony are clearly wrong, even if there is a conflict in the testimony. While ARF contends that it did not receive adequate notice of the noise issues, the trial court did not find that to be true. We will not reweigh or reevaluate that reasonable factual determination, as we do not find it to be clearly wrong. Furthermore, ARF acknowledged that it attempted to remedy the noise disturbances emanating from DSMA, and it mistakenly believed that the problem was resolved.

As for ARF's argument that attorney fees are owed it pursuant to the lease provisions, we disagree. DeBosier did not breach the lease agreement in any way; therefore, the lease does not provide for attorney fees in favor of ARF. ARF was not successful in its attempt to collect the remaining rent and maintenance fees allegedly due after DeBosier terminated the lease. The trial court did not err in refusing to award attorney fees to ARF.

Finally, we find no error in the trial court's award of $10,000.00 to DeBosier toward the cost of the digital sign that DeBosier paid to have installed, removed, and then returned to ARF shortly before the trial. Paragraph 45 of the lease agreement clearly states, in pertinent part:

45. SIGNAGE: ․ Installation of Signage shall be [at DeBosier's] sole cost and expense. If DeBosier elects to install a digital or LED sign ․, then [ARF] agrees to contribute to the cost thereof on the following basis: [ARF] will pay Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) dollars or one-half (1/2) of the cost of such sign at the installation of such sign, whichever is less. ․ Upon termination of this Lease, by expiration or default by [DeBosier] or otherwise, such sign, all electrical components thereof and related thereto shall become the property of [ARF] and [DeBosier] shall have no right of reimbursement for the cost of such sign and [DeBosier] shall have no claim whatsoever related to or in connection with such sign. (Emphasis added.)

ARF's representing member, Joseph Failla, testified that the prior landlord did not pay the required $10,000.00 to DeBosier. The Chief Operating Officer for DeBosier, Nicole Broussard, also testified that DeBosier never received the required $10,000.00 for the digital sign. Given this uncontradicted testimony, the trial court did not err in ordering ARF to pay the agreed upon contribution toward DeBosier's initial expense for the digital sign. This was not an award amounting to a reimbursement for the full cost of the digital sign. This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth, we affirm the June 18, 2025 trial court judgment in its entirety. All costs of this appeal are assessed to A.R.F. Properties, L.L.C.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   ARF became the successor landlord under the lease in November of 2022, when it purchased the shopping center property that includes the office space at issue in this case. Co-defendant, James Peltier, signed the lease as guarantor on behalf of DeBosier.

2.   Since DeBosier did not file an answer to this appeal, we will not address its argument raised in its brief that the trial court erred in refusing to award damages to DeBosier for disruption of its business and the costs associated with DeBosier's office relocation. Our jurisprudence is well established that where a party to a proceeding has failed to appeal or answer the appeal, the court cannot revise the judgment for damages in favor of that party. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2133; Gillio v. Hanover American Ins. Co., 2016-0640 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/31/17), 212 So.3d 588, 591 n.2, writ denied, 2017-03 93 (La. 4/24/17), 219 So.3d 1098.

3.   According to Comment (b) of La. Code Civ. P. art. 2668, Revision Comments – 2004, a lease is a synallagmatic, or bilateral, contract ․ that is, “[a] contract ․ [by which] the parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the obligation of each party is correlative to the obligation of the other.”

WOLFE, J.