LYLE DUFRENE AND DEBORAH DUFRENE v. FEDNAT INSURANCE COMPANY FORMERLY MAISON INSURANCE COMPANY AND LOUISIANA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF FEDNAT INSURANCE COMPANY FORMERLY MAISON INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

In this suspensive appeal, the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA) seeks review of the trial court's June 9, 2025 judgment in favor of residential property owners, Lyle and Deborah Dufrene, for Hurricane Ida damage. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

BACKGROUND

Lyle and Deborah Dufrene built their family home in Pontchatoula, Louisiana, in 1986. On the night of August 29, 2021, the Dufrenes were home when Category 3 Hurricane Ida blew into Pontchatoula, bringing sixteen inches of rain and “monster winds.” A “huge [oak] tree landed across the [Dufrenes’] house.” The root ball of the massive tree was 10 feet across and the stump itself was 8-10 feet wide. The sounds were “unbelievable” and everything went dark as the house lost electricity. The Dufrenes were terrified and thought they were “actually going to die.” Mrs. Dufrene could hear water running everywhere, “coming down the walls” throughout the house. The next day, the Dufrenes saw the extent of the damage to their house and property. The extensive damage ultimately led them to reside in a camper trailer on their property for over a year. Multiple trees were down, the carport patio cover was down, and the roof on the house and shed were destroyed, all of which resulted in major structural issues and moisture intrusion, which made the house unlivable.

At the time of the hurricane, the Dufrenes were insured by FedNat Insurance Company (formerly Maison Insurance Company), but FedNat became insolvent on September 27, 2022, a little over a year after the storm. On December 27, 2022, the Dufrenes filed a petition against FedNat, claiming that FedNat's adjustment of their property loss and damages due to Hurricane Ida was unreasonably low for their uninhabitable home. The Dufrene's also named LIGA as a defendant, alleging that “LIGA has a statutory obligation to [them] under LIGA law.” LIGA does not dispute its legal status in the litigation.¹

After a bench trial on March 19 and 20, 2025, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Dufrenes and against LIGA for a total damage award of $209,962.71, inclusive of $99,933.46 for personal contents loss (Coverage C), plus all post-insolvency costs and judicial interest from the date of demand. A judgment to this effect was signed on June 9, 2025. LIGA filed a timely suspensive appeal on July 9, 2025. In this appeal, LIGA contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the Dufrenes had met their burden of proving both Coverage C damages and that the damages exceeded the Coverage C limits. LIGA does not contest any other damage award, but does assign error to the trial court's award of judicial interest. They contend that the law applying to LIGA, La. R.S. 22:2055(6)(b)(viii), does not allow any claim for interest on covered claims.

DISCUSSION

An insurance policy is a conventional obligation that constitutes the law between the insured and the insurer, and the agreement governs the nature of their relationship. Supreme Services and Specialty Co., Inc. v. Sonny Greer, Inc., 2006-1827 (La. 5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634, 638. The policy should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or a strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by its terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion. Carrier v. Reliance Ins. Co., 99-2573 (La. 4/11/00), 759 So.2d 37, 43. If the insured shows that coverage applies, then the insurer has the burden to prove an exclusion bars coverage. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 2000-0947 (La. 12/19/00), 774 So.2d 119, 124, corrected on rehearing, 2000-0947 (La. 3/16/01), 782 So.2d 573 (per curiam).

The homeowner's insurance policy at issue had a policy limit of $115,000.00 for Coverage C losses of personal property. LIGA does not assert that an exclusion bars coverage in this case or that it never received a satisfactory proof of loss during the claims adjustment process. Rather, LIGA contends that the Dufrenes did not provide sufficient evidence with appropriate documentation at trial to substantiate that their personal property losses exceeded the Coverage C policy limit as the trial court found. In short, LIGA contends that the Dufrenes did not prove the value of the personal property that was allegedly lost or destroyed.

To collect under their insurance policy for their contents loss, the Dufrenes were required to prove their claim of personal property losses by a preponderance of the evidence, that is to show the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. See Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So.2d 1002, 1005 (La. 1993); Barr v. Schexnayder, 2015-0267 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/15), 2015 WL 6840147, *4 (unpublished); LaHaye v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 So.2d 460, 466 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So.2d 391 (La. 1991). This is a question of fact for the trial court's determination and is reviewed by appellate courts under the manifest error standard. See Stobart v. State through Dept, of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). The manifest error test dictates that a reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court's finding was clearly wrong. Id. Additionally, proof by direct or circumstantial evidence is sufficient to constitute a preponderance of the evidence. Morgan v. American Fire and Indem. Co., 506 So.2d 785, 787 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 512 So.2d 458 (La. 1987). A fact established by direct evidence is one that has been testified to by witnesses as having come under the cognizance of their senses. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is evidence of one fact, or of a set of facts, from which the existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred. Cross Gates, Inc. v. Rouses Enterprises, L.L.C., 2018-0465 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/12/18), 267 So.3d 1164, 1168 n.8.

The finder of fact should assess the credibility of witnesses, expert or lay, to determine the most credible and realistic evidence. LaHay, 570 So.2d at 466. In reaching conclusions, the finder of fact need not accept all of the testimony of any witness as being true or false and may believe and accept any part or parts of a witness's testimony and refuse to accept any other part or parts thereof. Id. See also Petras v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association, 2024-585 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/23/25), 414 So.3d 11, 20. A trier of fact can accept or reject uncontroverted testimony in its discretion. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2017-1202 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/13/18), 250 So.3d 267, 269). It is well settled in Louisiana that the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight, and we may not substitute our own evaluations and inferences for the reasonable evaluations and inferences of the trial court, unless those conclusions are clearly erroneous. Harrigan v. Freeman, 498 So.2d 58, 64 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1986).

Further, where a home and its contents are destroyed, the insureds are not required to secure original receipts from the stores where the items were purchased. Crayton v. Sentry Ins. Co., 612 So.2d 767, 772 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992), writs denied, 614 So.2d 83, 84 (La. 1993). To so require would place an almost impossible burden on the claimant and prevent recovery by most claimants under any insurance policy. Id. However, the absence of even a minimum amount of detail or specificity regarding the extent of damages suffered precludes an award. Morgan, 506 So.2d at 787. Proof of the items lost need not necessarily be in writing or in any other formal style. The Hut of Louisiana, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 372 So.2d 687, 688 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1979); Warner v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 543 So.2d 511, 517 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989).

In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court stated:

The Court finds [the Dufrenes] met their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence they sustained loss caused by Hurricane Ida. [Mrs. Dufrene] testified regarding the force of the winds on the night Hurricane Ida struck [their] home and provided that winds from the storm caused large oak trees to fall, breaking through their roof and causing rainwater to flow into the home. Mrs. Dufrene further testified almost all contents of her home were ruined as a result, far exceeding the Dufrene's $115,000.00 policy limit for contents. According to her testimony the damage sustained to the home was so significant the Dufrenes lived in a camper for a year following the storm until their home was habitable. The Court finds Ms. Dufrene credible. (Emphasis added.)

The trial court went on to find both of the Dufrenes’ expert witnesses credible, and ultimately gave more weight to their testimony over the testimony of LIGA's experts. Additionally, the trial court stated that the “combined testimony” of the Dufrenes’ expert witnesses regarding causation, along with Mrs. Dufrene's testimony on the damage to the home on the night of the storm and the photographic evidence of the storm damage led the trial court to conclude the damage was caused by the hurricane. The trial court further found that the costs to repair/replace said damage were not rebutted by LIGA's experts. Finally, the trial court noted that there was no evidence of third-party error in defense of the Dufrenes’ claims.

We have carefully reviewed the trial testimony and the evidence admitted into the record, specifically as it relates to the Dufrenes’ loss of personal property. The only testimony was from Mrs. Dufrene, who testified that on the night of the hurricane and after the tree fell on the house, she could hear water coming down the walls in every room. She also stated that water continued to seep down the walls into the floor months later. Mrs. Dufrene explained that FedNat hired a mitigation company, GLOW Emergency Restoration Services (GLOW), to remove and store their undamaged property, but that GLOW mishandled the contents by placing them with damaged/wet contents packed into a bedroom in the house. However, neither the Dufrenes nor LIGA included GLOW as a party to this lawsuit. Mrs. Dufrene stated that their ruined personal property remains in that bedroom and neither she nor her husband has the physical ability to take care of it. Mrs. Dufrene testified further that all of their property in the attic was destroyed, including holiday decorations and a lifetime of family keepsakes. Mrs. Dufrene answered affirmatively that even if GLOW had itemized the damaged contents as they should have done, the total loss would have been in excess of $115,000.00. She clarified that there was nothing left in the house after the storm and subsequent clean up, as far as the “stuff” in a house like clothing, bedding, mattresses, decorations, knick knacks, appliances, etc.

We find that the trial court's award for Coverage C personal property losses is reasonably supported by the record. The trial court found Mrs. Dufrene to be a credible witness who acknowledged that everything she owned in her house was destroyed by Hurricane Ida and that the amount to replace her personal property exceeded the policy limits of $115,000.00. This evidence apparently satisfied the trial court that the value of the Dufrenes’ personal property loss exceeded the policy limits. LIGA did not present any evidence to the contrary. We find no manifest error or abuse of discretion in this determination and, we therefore, affirm that part of the trial court's judgment awarding the Dufrenes damages for personal property losses in the amount of $99,933.46.²

LIGA's other assignment of error concerns the trial court's award of judicial interest from the date of demand. This is a res nova issue that involves a purely legal question of the proper interpretation of LIGA law. LIGA is obligated to pay covered claims pursuant to La. R.S. 22:2058(A)(1)(a). Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:2055(6)(b)(viii) specifically excludes “[a]ny claim for interest” from the definition of a “[c]overed claim” to be paid by LIGA. This has been the law since 2010, when the legislature amended the definition section of the LIGA law by La. Acts 2010, No. 959, § 1, and provided that the amended law was to have prospective application only, effective July 6, 2010. Statutory interpretations are questions of law, which is the province of the judiciary. Southlake Development Co. v. Secretary of Dept, of Revenue and Taxation for State of La., 98-2158 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/5/99), 745 So.2d 203, 205, writ denied, 99-3405 (La. 2/4/00), 754 So.2d 235. An appellate court's review of questions of law hinges on whether the trial court's decision is legally correct or incorrect under the de novo standard of review. Id.

Our interpretation of the relevant statutory language is guided by well-established rules of statutory construction. Marco Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Development by and Through Wilson, 2021-0123 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/13/21), 329 So.3d 288, 299, writ denied, 2021-01195 (La. 11/10/21), 326 So.3d 1247. The starting point for interpretation of any statute must be the language of the statute itself. Id. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and its letter shall not be disregarded in search of the intent of the legislature. La. Civ. Code art. 9. Marco Outdoor Advertising, 329 So.3d at 299. It is presumed that every word was intended to serve some useful purpose and it is further presumed that the legislature enacted each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Id.

Applying these rules of statutory construction and interpretation to La. R.S. 22:2055(6)(b)(viii), we first note the use of the word “any” as an all-encompassing descriptor for the word “interest.” According to the plain and unambiguous language in the statute, LIGA cannot be held liable for payment of any claim for interest. The word “any” is broad and is not defined in the statute. Consequently, it must be given its generally prevailing meaning based on context and common usage. See La. Civ. Code art. 11; La. R.S. 1:3, Turner v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2017-1769 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/4/18), 252 So.3d 990, 994, writ denied, 2018-1127 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d 1299. The generally prevailing meaning of the word “any” is used to indicate something that is not particular or specific. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (merriam-webster.com). Thus, any claim for interest would include judicial or legal interest. We find that the trial court erred in ordering LIGA to pay interest from the date of judicial demand. Accordingly, that part of the judgment ordering LIGA to pay judicial interest is vacated.

In a novel argument, the Dufrenes argue that judicial interest is a separate obligation that is owed by LIGA pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1921, which provides that “[t]he court shall award interest in the judgment as prayed for or as provided by law.” A mandatory obligation is indicated by the use of the word “shall.” See La. R.S. 1:3. However, a generally recognized rule of statutory construction is that when two statutes applicable to the same subject appear to be in conflict, the statute that is more specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail, as an exception to the statute that is more general. Andre v. Construction Material Shop, 63 3 So.2d 1313, 1318 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994). Article 1921 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure is a general statute governing the award of judicial interest, unless otherwise “provided by law.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:2055(6)(b)(viii) is a more specific statute “provided” in the LIGA law and directed to interest claims against LIGA. Therefore, the more specific statute in the LIGA law controls over the more general statute in the code of civil procedure's article regarding interest. The Dufrenes’ reliance on Article 1921 is misplaced in this instance.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court's judgment against the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association and in favor of Lyle and Deborah Dufrene in all respects except for the award of interest from the date of judicial demand, which we vacate. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.

FOOTNOTES

1.   LIGA is the administrator of the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association Law found in La. R.S. 22:2051 et seq. From its inception as an association, LIGA has been characterized as a legal entity created in part to provide payment of covered claims to claimants and policyholders of insolvent insurers. See La. R.S. 22:2052 and 22:2056(A). The applicable law governing claims against LIGA is the law in effect on the date of the insurer's insolvency. Prejean v. Dixie Lloyds Ins. Co., 94-2979 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 303, modified on rehearing, 94-2979 (La. 9/15/95), 660 So.2d 836, 837. Since FedNat's insolvency was on September 27, 2022, we have reviewed, applied, and cited statutes in effect on that date.

2.   In its judgment, the trial court noted that the award accounted for all credits concerning payments that had been previously made to the Dufrenes for Coverage C losses.

WOLFE, J.