SUZANNE THERIOT v. DARREN THERIOT (2026)

This matter is before us on appeal by Darren Theriot from a judgment of partition of community property. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Suzanne Murzi and Darren Theriot were married on April 16, 2012.¹ Suzanne subsequently filed a petition for divorce on March 20, 2023, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 102, and a final judgment of divorce was signed on December 6, 2023. Thereafter, the parties filed sworn detailed descriptive lists, and a trial of the partition of the community of acquets and gains was held on October 31, 2024. At the conclusion of trial, the court permitted the parties to file post-trial memoranda in lieu of closing arguments. On March 11, 2025, the trial court issued a “Judgment of Partition” accompanied by its “Written Reasons for Judgment” allocating and assigning ownership of the parties’ assets and liabilities and ordering Darren to pay Suzanne $4,159.00 in attorney's fees associated with a motion to compel filed by Suzanne.

Darren now appeals, contending that the trial court: (1) erred in its allocation by failing to follow the procedures outlined in La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4); (2) erred in failing to apply the Sims ² formula in calculating Darren's share of Suzanne's retirement account; and (3) abused its discretion by awarding Suzanne attorney's fees for her motion to compel.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error Number One Partition of Community Property

In his first assignment of error, Darren contends that the trial court failed to allocate the assets and liabilities in compliance with La R.S. 9:2801, which resulted in an unequal net distribution between the parties.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 sets forth the procedure to be followed in partitioning community property and settling claims arising from the co-ownership of former community property. Williams v. Williams, 2006-2491 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/14/07), 970 So. 2d 633, 637. It is incumbent upon the trial court to follow the procedure outlined in the statute. See McElwee v. McElwee, 93-1010 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/17/94), 649 So. 2d 975, 977-978. When spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the matrimonial regime, or from the co-ownership of former community property following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a community property partition proceeding. La. R.S. 9:2801(A).

Both parties file sworn detailed descriptive lists and either traverse or concur in the inclusion or exclusion of each asset and liability and the valuation contained on the other party's list. See La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(l) and (2); Hardy v. Hardy, 2018-0487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/28/19), 273 So. 3d 448, 452. The court shall partition the community by valuing the assets as of the time of trial on the merits, determining the liabilities, and adjudicating the claims of the parties. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(a). The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(b). The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of the community assets and liabilities. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(c). In deciding to whom an asset or liability shall be allocated, the court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances the court deems relevant. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(c); Stockton v. Stockton, 2023-0145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/18/23), 377 So. 3d 282, 287. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801(A)(4) further provides that the trial court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall direct, in the event that the allocation results in an uneven net distribution. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(d).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 does not require that the trial court include the calculations used to determine the final allocation of assets, liabilities, and reimbursements in the judgment, as long as it is clear from the record that the assets were valued, the liabilities were determined, and the claims were adjudicated. In determining the final allocation, this court has previously looked to the trial court's oral reasons and spreadsheets regarding such values and calculations. See Hoover v. Hoover, 2010-1245 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/17/11), 62 So. 3d 765, 768. Therefore, we rely on the trial court's written reasons to perform our review of its evaluations. If there is a conflict between the judgment and the reasons for judgment, the judgment controls. See Kyles v. Kyles, 2025-0526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/9/26), __ So. 3d __, __, 2026 WL 123278, *5.

The trial court is afforded a great deal of latitude in arriving at an equitable distribution of the assets between the spouses. Hardy, 273 So. 3d at 453. A trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations made in the course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities in the partition of community property may not be set aside absent manifest error or unless clearly wrong. Berthelot v. Berthelot, 2017-1055 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/18/18), 254 So. 3d 800, 806. In valuing assets, the trial court is not required to accept, at face value, the valuation placed on assets by either spouse. Stockton, 377 So. 3d at 287. If the trial court's valuations are reasonably supported by the record and do not constitute an abuse of discretion, its determinations should be affirmed. Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 816. Furthermore, the trial court's allocation or assigning of assets and liabilities in the partition of community property is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Stockton, 377 So. 3d at 287-288. Likewise, calculating reimbursements require factual determinations, and absent manifest error or an abuse of discretion, the trial court's decision should not be disturbed on appeal. Pierce v. Pierce, 2019-0689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/21/2020), 298 So. 3d 902, 911.

Appellate review of questions of law is simply a determination of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. The appellate court gives no special weight to the trial court's findings on legal issues. See Boyd v. Boyd, 2010-1369 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/11/11), 5 7 So. 3d 1169, 1174. A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. Kyles, ___So. 3d at ___, 2026 WL 123278 at *5. When such a prejudicial error of law skews the trial court's finding of a material issue of fact and causes it to pretermit other issues, the appellate court is required, if it can, to render judgment on the record by applying the correct law and determining the essential material facts de novo. Tanana v. Tanana, 2012-1013 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/31/13), 140 So. 3d 73 8, 741-742.

In its judgment of partition, the trial court allocated the following assets and indebtedness without providing an assigned value to each individual asset and liability, as follows:

ASSETS

Darren: (1) 2019 Dodge Ram truck

(2) South Louisiana Bank checking account

(3) all household items and tools in his possession

Suzanne: (1) 2015 Cadillac CTS

(2) Whitney Bank checking account

(3) Chase Bank savings account

(4) Terrebonne General Medical Center (“TGMC”) retirement account

(5) all household items and tools in her possession

INDEBTEDNESS

Darren: (1) 2019 Dodge Ram auto loan

(2) Home Depot credit card

(3) Discover credit card

(4) Sam's Club credit card

(5) PayPal account

(6) Shell credit card

(7) Mattress Firm/Synchrony account

(8) Consolidated Credit account

Suzanne: (1) the mortgage on the home at 233 Elm Drive in Raceland, Louisiana 3

SEPARATE PROPERTY

Suzanne: (1) the home at 233 Elm Drive

(2) White Oak Operating Company

(3) JP Morgan Chase Bank 50 Shares

(4) Edward Jones retirement account

SEPARATE LIABILITY 4

Darren: (1) Upgrade Loan from Cross River Bank

After allocating the assets and indebtedness, the trial court determined that Suzanne owed Darren an equalizing payment of $4,159.00, which it offset by ordering Darren to pay Suzanne $4,159.00 in attorney's fees for Suzanne's motion to compel discovery.⁵

In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court found that Suzanne and Darren were “highly incredible” witnesses. The trial court then divided the assets that it determined had value and the liabilities as follows:

Movable Community Assets to Suzanne: $51,144.86 (Cadillac, checking account, savings account, and TGMC retirement)

Movable Community Assets to Darren: $28,667.00 (2019 Dodge Ram Truck and South Louisiana Bank checking account)

Community Liabilities to Suzanne: $58,766.63 (mortgage)

Community Liabilities to Darren: $45,277.00(all other community liabilities)

Reimbursement owed Darren by Suzanne: $22,988.89

Reimbursement owed Suzanne by Darren: $18,159.04

Suzanne's assets + reimbursement - liabilities: $10,537.00

Darren's assets + reimbursement - liabilities: $6,378.00

Equalizing payment Suzanne owes Darren: $4,159.00

The trial court's judgment fails to assign values to the individual assets, liabilities, property, and indebtedness allocated, with the exception of the mortgage. For example, of the $51,144.86 in movable community assets awarded to Suzanne, the value of the Cadillac, checking account, savings account, and TGMC retirement is unclear. The same can be said for the movable community assets awarded to Darren. The trial court awarded debt of $45,277.00 to Darren, which represents “all other community liabilities,” without assigning a value to each of those liabilities. Moreover, although Darren contends that he is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the principal and escrow paid on Suzanne's separate property, the home, from the date of the marriage until the date the community terminated, we are unable to determine if this demand was factored into the court-ordered reimbursement owed Darren by Suzanne set at $22,988.89. Of that total, we are unable to determine if any reimbursement is owed for the home payments. The trial court failed to specifically identify the claims for which Suzanne and Darren were ordered to reimburse each other.

While we are permitted to look to the trial court's written reasons for judgment, oral reasons for judgment, and spreadsheets provided by the trial court, the trial court herein only provided written reasons for judgment, wherein it set forth lump sum awards without assigning value to the individual assets and liabilities or indicating how those awards were calculated. See Kyles, ___ So. 3d at ___, 2026 WL 123278, at *5. Thus, in reviewing the trial court's judgment and written reasons for judgment, we are unable to determine what value was assigned to each item and whether that value was the value of the item at the time of trial. See La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(a). Moreover, in the absence of individual valuations on the assets and liabilities, we are unable to determine whether the trial court's valuations are reasonably supported by the record. See Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 816.

In light of the trial court's failure to provide itemized values of the assets, liabilities, and reimbursements, this court is forced to remand this matter to the trial court to properly assign a value to each asset and liability as of the time of trial and to properly partition the community property in accordance with the procedures set forth in La. R.S. 9:2801. See Kyles, ___ So. 3d at ___, 2026 WL 123278, at *5; McElwee, 649 So. 2d at 977-978; Corkern v. Corkern, 2005-2297 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/06), 950 So. 2d 780, 784, writ denied, 2006-2844 (La. 2/2/07), 948 So. 2d 1083. Before doing so, however, we will address the remaining assignments of error pertaining to the claims we are able to decide based on the record before us. See Kyles, ___ So. 3d at ___, 2026 WL 123278, at *5.

Darren contends that the judgment does not comply with La. C.C.P. arts. 1919 and 2089 in that it fails to include a legal description of the property awarded to Suzanne as her separate property, i.e., the home located at 233 Elm Drive in Raceland, Louisiana.⁶ We agree and direct the trial court to amend the judgment accordingly. Burch v. Burch, 51,780 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So. 3d 1138, 1143; cf. Sibley v. Sibley, 2014-0045, 2018-0208 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/19/14), 2014 WL 4667577, *4 (unpublished) (where this court amended the judgment to include the legal description of the former community home).

Assignment of Error Number Two Application of the Sims Formula

In this assignment of error, Darren contends that the trial court erred in failing to apply the Sims fixed-percentage formula to allocate Suzanne's retirement account with TGMC. Whether the trial court applied an incorrect principle of law is a legal error, which we review de novo. See Tanana, 140 So. 3d at 742.

The Sims fixed-percentage formula is used to apportion community interest in unmatured retirement accounts where the present value of the pension cannot be readily ascertained. See Blanchard v. Blanchard, 97-2305 (La. 1/20/99), 731 So. 2d 175, 179; LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 2012-1994 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/25/13), 2013 WL 3875044, *4 (unpublished); Hannan v. Hannan, 99-0842 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/12/00), 761 So. 2d 700, 704, writ denied, 2000-1723 (La. 9/29/00), 770 So. 2d 349.

On appeal, Darren contends that dividing the retirement account balance in half would not be fair to Darren and that application of the Sims formula would result in a more equitable division of the retirement proceeds. Suzanne contends that her retirement plan with TGMC is a 403(b) Defined Contribution Plan, not a Defined Benefit Plan, the latter of which would require application of the Sims formula, and that the trial court properly allocated the asset pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 9:2801,

We agree. Suzanne's retirement plan is a 403(b) Defined Contribution Plan, not an unmatured Defined Benefit Plan as contemplated by Sims. See Blanchard, 731 So. 2d at 179. The trial court allocated Suzanne's retirement funds pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2801, rather than applying the Sims formula, which is clearly permitted by the statute and applicable jurisprudence. See Legaux-Barrow v. Barrow, 2008-530 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1/27/09), 8 So. 3d 87, 90. In addition, the value of the retirement account was not in dispute at trial. Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in the methodology applied to allocate Suzanne's 403(b) Defined Contribution retirement plan.

While we find no error in the method by which the trial court allocated Suzanne's retirement account, because we must remand to the trial court to assign an individual value to each asset and liability as of the time of trial to properly partition the community property in accordance with La. R.S. 9:2801, we pretermit discussion of the propriety of the trial court's allocation of 100% of Suzanne's retirement account to Suzanne.

Assignment of Error Number Three Attorney's Fees for Motion to Compel

In his final assignment of error, Darren contends that the trial court erred in awarding Suzanne attorney's fees incurred in connection with the filing of her motion to compel.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1469, which governs motions to compel, provides, in part:

If the motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner.

La. C.C.P. art. 1469(4).

On January 11, 2024, Suzanne filed a motion seeking to compel Darren to respond to and/or produce outstanding discovery. Therein, Suzanne requested that Darren be ordered to pay the expenses associated with the filing of the motion, including attorney's fees, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1469. The motion was heard on March 6, 2024.⁷ Thereafter, a judgment was signed on March 21, 2024, ordering Darren to “provide complete and full verified answers to discovery to Suzanne” no later than April 8, 2024. The judgment further provided that the trial court would pretermit the issue of attorney's fees and court costs on the motion to compel until May 1, 2024. At the May 1, 2024 hearing, Suzanne's counsel advised the court that the motion to compel had been satisfied and the trial court ordered Darren to pay the costs for filing the motion to compel. The trial court subsequently signed a judgment on May 16, 2024, casting Darren with all court costs on Suzanne's motion to compel.⁸ Although the record does not contain a transcript of the May 1, 2024 hearing, the minute entry and May 16, 2024 judgment contain no mention of Suzanne's request for attorney's fees, which had been deferred to the May 1, 2024 hearing.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 2024, Darren filed a motion to compel contending that Suzanne's discovery responses were deficient and requesting that she be compelled to produce responses and pay an award for expenses, attorney's fees, and court costs associated with the filing of his motion. Darren's motion to compel was heard on July 9, 2024, at which time Darren's counsel advised the court that the motion to compel had been satisfied. Thereafter, a judgment was signed on July 15, 2024, deeming Darren's motion to compel satisfied, and deferring the issues of attorney's fees and costs associated with the filing of his motion to the trial of the partition of community property.

While the transcript of the partition trial is silent as to Darren's claim for attorney's fees and costs, in her post-trial memorandum Suzanne indicated that the issue of attorney's fees and costs associated with Darren's motion to compel were pretermitted until the partition trial for the court to consider in its final ruling. However, in its written reasons for judgment, the trial court failed to address Darren's claim for attorney's fees and costs associated with his motion to compel. Instead, the trial court stated that it had “pretermitted the issue of attorney's fees associated with the motion to compel filed by Suzanne.” The trial court then ordered Darren to pay Suzanne $4,159.00 in attorney's fees associated with Suzanne's motion to compel “[i]n lieu of ordering Suzanne to make an equalization payment” to Darren.⁹

Although, generally, silence in a judgment of the trial court as to any issue, claim, or demand placed before the court is deemed a rejection of the claim and the relief sought is presumed to be denied, L.J.D. v. M.V.S., 2016-0008 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/25/17), 212 So. 3d 581, 584, there is no indication that Darren's claim for attorney's fees and costs associated with his motion to compel was before the court at the partition trial. The transcript of the trial is silent as to any such claim. In fact, at the commencement of the hearing, the court stated:

We have one matter on the docket today. It is 146826, Suzanne Theriot versus Darren Theriot. All right, set today for a community property partition trial.

Because Darren's claim for attorney's fees was not taken up along with the trial of the partition, even though it was pretermitted until such time, this claim still remains.

Moreover, to the extent that the trial court awarded attorney's fees resulting from Suzanne's motion to compel, there is also no evidence in the record before us that Suzanne's claim for attorney's fees associated with her motion to compel was before the court at the partition trial. Although the March 21, 2024 judgment explicitly pretermitted the issue of attorney's fees and court costs on Suzanne's motion to compel until May 1, 2024, without the benefit of the transcript of the May 1, 2024 hearing, we are unable to determine if the trial court addressed attorney's fees along with the court costs at the May 1, 2024 hearing. Again, the May 16, 2024 judgment resulting from the May 1, 2024 hearing is silent as to attorney's fees. In fact, Suzanne's post-trial memorandum specifically identified the issues that were pretermitted until the partition trial, stating:

Those issues are:

a.) Court Cost and Attorney Fees for the Declaratory Judgment signed on May 16, 2024;

b.) Court Cost and Attorney Fees for the Defendant's [Darren's] Motion to Compel Signed on July 15, 2024.

Suzanne gave no indication in her post-trial memorandum that the issue of attorney's fees for her motion to compel had been pretermitted to the partition trial and was before the court at that time.

Even if we were able to determine that the issue of attorney's fees for Suzanne's motion to compel was before the court, La. C.C.P. art. 1469(4) requires that after a motion to compel is granted, “the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees ․ .” The trial court did not conduct a hearing regarding the attorney's fees associated with Suzanne's motion to compel. There was no discussion of attorney's fees at the partition trial and the record is devoid of any evidence that justifies the trial court's award of $4,159.00 in attorney's fees.

Thus, based on the record presented and applicable law, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Suzanne attorney's fees in the amount of $4,159.00 and vacate the award. See Ambrose v. Generation Holdings, LLC, 2024-0300 (La. App. 4th Cir. 7/12/24), 398 So. 3d 664, 669-670.

CONCLUSION AND DECREE

Based on the above and foregoing reasons, the portion of the March 11, 2025 judgment of partition ordering Darren to pay Suzanne $4,159.00 in attorney's fees for her motion to compel discovery is vacated.

We further remand this matter to the trial court to properly assign a value to each asset and liability as of the time of trial and to indicate the claims for which Darren and Suzanne are being reimbursed in accordance with the procedures set forth in La. R.S. 9:2801.

We further instruct the trial court, on remand, to amend the judgment to include a legal description of the home located at 233 Elm Drive in Raceland, Louisiana, in compliance with the requirements of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1919 and 2089.

In all other respects, the March 11, 2025 judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed one-half to the appellant, Darren Theriot, and one-half to the appellee, Suzanne Murzi.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Since the divorce, Suzanne reverted to using her maiden name, Murzi.

2.   Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978).

3.   Prior to the partition trial before us, the trial court determined that the home at 233 Elm Drive was Suzanne's separate property. On February 26, 2024, Darren filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment declaring the matrimonial home at 233 Elm Drive a community asset. While the property was Suzanne's separate property upon entering their marriage, Darren alleged that when the parties refinanced the home it became community property. Following a hearing on May 1, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment on May 16, 2024, declaring that the home was the separate property of Suzanne. The May 16, 2024 judgment was not appealed and Darren does not dispute the allocation of the home to Suzanne as her separate property in this appeal. He does contend herein, however, that because the home was allocated to Suzanne as her separate property, he should be entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the amount of principal paid on the house from the date of the marriage, April 16, 2012, to the date of the termination of the community, March 20, 2023. We are unable to determine from the judgment or reasons for judgment if the amount of reimbursement owed to Darren from Suzanne includes this amount.

4.   Darren testified that he took out a loan from Cross River Bank prior to the filing of divorce, which he conceded was his separate debt.

5.   In its reasons for judgment, the trial court determined that in lieu of ordering Suzanne to make an equalization payment of $4,159.00 to Darren, Darren was ordered to pay Suzanne $4,159.00 in attorney's fees associated with Suzanne's motion to compel discovery offsetting any amounts owed between the parties. The trial court explained, “The equalization payment and attorney's fee payment balance each other out, so that neither party must make any payment to the other.”

6.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1919 provides as follows:All final judgments which affect title to immovable property shall describe the immovable property affected with particularity. This article does not apply to judgments in succession proceedings recognizing heirs or legatees and sending them into possession.Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2089 provides as follows:All judgments and decrees which affect title to immovable property shall describe with particularity the immovable property affected.

7.   A transcript of the March 6, 2024 hearing is not found in the record before us on appeal.

8.   The May 16, 2024 judgment also deferred the issue of attorney's fees for a petition for declaratory judgment filed by Darren.

9.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 provides for the partition of community property or the settlement of claims arising from the matrimonial regime or co-ownership of property. As previously set forth herein, La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(d) provides that “[i]n the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall direct.” The procedural posture of this case prevents us from opining on whether the trial court's discretionary authority under La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(d) permits an award of attorney fees to a party “in lieu” of an order that the party pay an equalizing sum of money. See Licciardi v. Licciardi, 2017-0015 (La. 2/10/17), 210 So. 3d 797, Genovese, J., dissenting.

MILLER, J.