STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHRISTOPHER BELL JR (2026)

The defendant, Christopher Bell, Jr., was charged by amended bill of information with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (counts one and two), in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1; and obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence (counts three and four), in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1) and (B)(2). He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on counts one and two and fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor on counts three and four.

The State subsequently filed a habitual offender bill of information, and the trial court adjudicated the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender on all four counts, vacated all prior sentences, and sentenced him to concurrent terms of fifty years at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence on each count.¹ On appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's convictions, vacated his habitual offender adjudication and sentences, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. State v. Bell, 2023-1082 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/19/24), 389 So. 3d 196.

On remand, the State filed a new habitual offender bill of information seeking to enhance counts three and four only. The trial court adjudicated the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender with respect to counts three and four and sentenced him to concurrent terms of fifty years at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.² The trial court did not impose sentences on counts one and two. The defendant now appeals, alleging the trial court erred in adjudicating him a fourth-felony habitual offender. For the following reasons, we affirm his habitual offender adjudication, affirm his enhanced sentences on counts three and four, and remand for the trial court to impose sentences on counts one and two.

FACTS

This court set forth the pertinent facts in the defendant's prior appeal as follows:

On May 26, 2019, Deputy Don Powers with the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office observed the defendant make an illegal U-turn, at which point Deputy Powers activated his lights and attempted to pull the defendant over. However, the defendant then sped up, turned onto a side road, and drove behind a fence. The defendant was subsequently arrested, and a search of the nearby area revealed two firearms found underneath a camper trailer located to the left of the defendant's vehicle. The defendant was later charged with two counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and two counts of obstruction of justice for his attempt to hide the firearms underneath the trailer.

Bell, 389 So. 3d at 197.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in adjudicating him a fourth-felony habitual offender. Specifically, he contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to use the same predicate offenses (aggravated battery and aggravated criminal damage to property) to support his convictions for possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (counts one and two) and as prior convictions in the habitual offender bill filed against him.³

We first note the defendant failed to file a motion to quash the habitual offender bill of information prior to the adjudication hearing. Generally, any challenge to a prior conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1)(b); see also State v. Hall, 94-3147 (La. 6/2/95), 654 So. 2d 1085 (per curiam) (observing that the defendant remained bound by his failure to raise his present complaint at the time he was adjudicated a habitual offender); State v. Dahlem, 2013-0577 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/18/14), 148 So. 3d 591, 599, aff'd, 2014-1555 (La. 3/15/16), 197 So. 3d 676. Accordingly, this court: could find the defendant did not properly preserve for appellate review the argument he raises challenging his habitual offender adjudication. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A); State v. Cockerham, 2017-0535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/17), 231 So. 3d 698, 707-08, writ denied, 2017-1802 (La. 6/15/18), 245 So. 3d 103 5; Dahlem, 148 So. 3d at 599.

Moreover, even if this issue was properly preserved for our review, we do not find the trial court erred in adjudicating the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender. The defendant was initially charged by amended bill of information with two counts of possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, and two counts of obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence, in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1) and (B)(2). For the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charges (counts one and two), the State provided the following in the bill of information:

[1. Count 1 -] CHRISTOPHER BELL JR., on or about May 26, 2019, by having previously been convicted of Aggravated Battery on or about April 18, 2005 under Docket Number 388802, in the 22nd Judicial District Court in St. Tammany Parish and also having been convicted of Aggravated Battery on or about June 30, 2014 under Docket Number 546728, in the 22nd Judicial District Court in St. Tammany Parish, and possessing a firearm ․ to-wit: a 9mm pistol.

[2. Count 2 -] CHRISTOPHER BELL JR., on or about May 26, 2019, by having previously been convicted of Aggravated Battery on or about April 18, 2005 under Docket Number 388802, in the 22nd Judicial District Court in St. Tammany Parish and also having been convicted of Aggravated Battery on or about June 30, 2014 under Docket Number 546728, in the 22nd Judicial District Court in St. Tammany Parish, and possessing a firearm ․ to-wit: a 40 caliber pistol.

The habitual offender bill of information alleged the defendant was a fourth-felony habitual offender pursuant to the following prior convictions:

1. In the 22nd JDC, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana for the crime of Aggravated Battery on April 18, 2005, under case number 388802;

2. In the 22nd JDC, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana for the crime of Illegal Possession of Stolen Things over $1500 on May 16, 2013, under case number 532682;

3. In the 22nd JDC, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana for the crime of Possession of Schedule II to wit: Cocaine on May 16, 2013, under case number 533138;

4. In the 22nd JDC, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana for the crime of Aggravated Criminal Damage to Property on June 30, 2014, under case number 546728[.]

In the defendant's prior appeal, this court found the State could not rely on the aggravated battery conviction under docket number 388802 or the aggravated criminal damage to property conviction under docket number 546728 “as both a predicate to the instant firearm offenses and a prior conviction for purposes of enhancing those same offenses under the habitual offender law[.]” Bell, 389 So. 3d at 200. On remand, the State remedied this error by not seeking to enhance the defendant's sentences for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (counts one and two). Instead, the State sought to adjudicate the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender on the obstruction of justice convictions (counts three and four) based on the same prior convictions as set forth in the original habitual offender bill, namely: (1) aggravated battery under docket number 3 88802; (2) illegal possession of stolen things over $1500 under docket number 532682; (3) possession of cocaine under docket number 533138; and (4) aggravated criminal damage to property under docket number 546728.

On appeal, the defendant argues the State could not rely on the same predicate offenses of aggravated battery and aggravated criminal damage to property to support his convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (counts one and two) and then as prior convictions to adjudicate him a fourth-felony habitual offender on counts three and four. We disagree.

The defendant's sentences for his felon in possession of a firearm convictions were not enhanced under the habitual offender bill using the same predicates, which would constitute a prohibited double enhancement. See State v. Daniels, 2018-0770 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/21/18), 2018 WL 6718514, *4 (unpublished). The defendant's sentences for his felon in possession of a firearm convictions were not enhanced at all. Instead, the predicate felonies used to establish the felon in possession of a firearm convictions were used in the habitual offender proceeding to enhance two obstruction of justice sentences.4 This is permissible under the prevailing jurisprudence. State v. Foster, 2009-0617 (La. 11/25/09), 23 So. 3d 885, 885-86; Daniels, 2018 WL 6718514 at *4.

The supreme court has addressed the issue of double enhancement in a litany of cases, beginning with State v. Sanders, 337 So. 2d 1131 (La. 1976), overruled in part by, State v. Baker, 2006-2175 (La. 10/16/07), 970 So. 2d 948, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 830, 129 S. Ct. 39, 172 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2008). In Sanders, the defendant had previously been convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of attempted simple burglary. Sanders was then convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, based on proof of his second armed robbery conviction and his attempted simple burglary conviction. Id. at 1132. The State then sought to enhance the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon sentence and relied on all three prior convictions in the habitual offender bill of information. Alleging double-enhancement, Sanders filed a motion to quash, which was granted by the trial court. Ultimately, the supreme court found that a sentence under La. R.S. 14:95.1 could not be enhanced under the habitual offender statute, because La. R.S. 14:95.1 provided explicit sentences for enhanced punishment, precluding enhancement under any other statute, particularly La. R.S. 15:529.1. Id. at 1134-35.

4 We note that Bell's aggravated battery conviction (2005) and his aggravated criminal damage to property conviction (2014) were not obtained on the same day and are not considered a single conviction, unlike his aggravated battery conviction (2014) and his aggravated criminal damage to property conviction (2014), which are considered to be a single conviction. See Bell, 3 89 So. 3d at 200 (“the defendant's 2014 convictions should be considered a single conviction, in that the charges appear to have arisen from a single act, and no evidence was introduced to the contrary”).

The supreme court revisited the issue of double enhancement in Baker, 970 So. 2d 948. In Baker, the defendant was previously convicted of aggravated battery and illegal possession of stolen things. Baker was subsequently convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on his aforementioned predicate conviction of aggravated battery. Id. at 948-49. The State then sought to enhance the defendant's possession of a firearm by a convicted felon sentence, relying on his conviction for illegal possession of stolen things. The defendant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender, and he appealed, arguing his adjudication as a habitual offender after he had been convicted a felon in possession of a firearm constituted “double jeopardy.” Id. at 949. The supreme court held that its determination in Sanders that a sentence imposed under La. R.S. 14:95.1 may not be further enhanced under the habitual offender statute was in error and overruled the case to the extent that it stood for that proposition. Baker, 970 So. 2d at 957. The court further affirmed Baker's adjudication and sentence as a habitual offender and found no fault with the State's use of the illegal possession of stolen things conviction as a prior felony. Id. at 955.

Here, the State used the defendant's prior convictions of aggravated battery and aggravated criminal damage to property to convict him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and then sought to use the same predicate convictions (aggravated battery and aggravated criminal damage to property) to adjudicate the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender on the obstruction of justice convictions

The supreme court addressed a situation almost identical to the instant case in Foster, 23 So. 3d 885. In Foster, the State used a single prior conviction, second offense possession of marijuana, in support of the defendant's conviction of third offense possession of marijuana and also to enhance his separate sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The trial court adjudicated Foster a third-felony habitual offender, and the second circuit vacated Foster's sentence, interpreting Baker as preventing the State from using the same underlying conviction to enhance two separate charges. The supreme court granted writs and clarified that “Baker considered the question of ‘double enhancement’ in the context of a single conviction[.]” Foster, 23 So. 3d at 885. It further held:

[D]ouble enhancement for purposes of Baker (i.e., enhancement of enhanced penalties) did not occur because the [S]tate used that conviction only once on the count charging third offense possession of marijuana (to enhance the status of the crime and punishment from a second to third offense) and only once on the separate conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, to enhance defendant's status from a second to third offender for sentencing purposes under the habitual offender law in La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Id. at 885-86.

Finally, in Daniels, 2018 WL 6718514, this court affirmed the habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentence of a defendant who had been convicted of attempted first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, among other offenses. The State sought to enhance Daniels's attempted first degree murder conviction using the same underlying felonies used to establish the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. Daniels argued that the State sought to use the same underlying set of prior convictions to obtain the felon in possession of a firearm conviction and then to enhance his habitual offender sentence in violation of Sanders. This court found the enhancement permissible because Daniels's sentence for his conviction of felon in possession of a firearm was not enhanced and the predicate felonies used to establish his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm were only used in the habitual offender proceedings to enhance his sentence for attempted first degree murder. Id. at *3-4.

Based on the prior holdings of the supreme court and this court, we find the State did not commit double enhancement in using the prior conviction of aggravated battery only once to support the defendant's convictions as a felon in possession of a firearm and only once to enhance the defendant's sentences for obstruction of justice. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So. 3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 3 85 So. 3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

As mentioned above, in the defendant's prior appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's convictions, vacated his habitual offender adjudication and sentences, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. See Bell, 389 So. 3d 196. The State abandoned its effort to adjudicate the defendant a habitual offender with respect to his possession of a firearm by a convicted felon convictions (counts one and two). Therefore, the trial court was required to impose new sentences on counts one and two on remand. The trial court failed to impose new sentences on those counts. Thus, we remand to the trial court so the defendant can be sentenced on counts one and two, should the State wish to pursue the matter. See State v. Robinson, 2023-0058 (La. App. 4th Cir. 9/4/24), 401 So. 3d 809, 823, writ not considered, 2024-01306 (La. 12/27/24), 397 So. 3d 1220, and writ denied, 2024-01198 (La. 2/25/25), 401 So. 3d 658, and cert. denied sub nom., Powell v. Louisiana, 145 S. Ct. 2806, 222 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (2025).

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant's habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentences on counts three and four are affirmed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of sentence on counts one and two.

HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AND SENTENCES ON COUNTS THREE AND FOUR AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE ON COUNTS ONE AND TWO.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note the trial court did not specify the sentences on counts one and two were to be served without the benefit of parole. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on habitual offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 are “those called for in the reference statute.” State v. Tate, 99-1483 (La. 11/24/99), 747 So. 2d 519, 520 (per curiam) (citing State v. Bruins, 407 So. 2d 685, 687 (La. 1981); see also State v. Thompson, 2025-0014 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/23/26), ___ So. 3d, ___, ____ n.3, 2026 WL 182149, *1 n.3. Possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies requires the sentence be served without the benefit of parole. See La. R.S. 14:95.1(B). However, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:301.1(A), habitual offender sentences are deemed to contain the benefits restriction by operation of law. See State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790, 799.

2.   The trial court committed the defendant to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections but did not specify the sentences were to be served at hard labor. However, a sentence committing a prisoner to the Department of Corrections is necessarily at hard labor. See La. R.S. 15:824(0(1); see also State v. Jacquot, 2023-1254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/24), 392 So. 3d 663, 666 n.1, writ denied, 2024-00979 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So. 3d 69.

3.   For clarity, we use “predicate” when referring to convictions used to prove the underlying charge and “prior” when referring to prior felony convictions included in the habitual offender bill. However, sometimes the convictions fall under both categories.

MILLER, J.