STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ARIDIES CAIN (2026)

A grand jury indicted the defendant, Aridies Cain, with two counts of first degree murder (counts one and two), violations of La. R.S. 14:30, and one count of attempted first degree murder (count three), a violation of La. R.S. 14:30 and La. R.S. 14:27. The defendant initially pled not guilty but later changed his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After the trial court appointed a sanity commission, the parties stipulated that two physicians had found the defendant competent to proceed to trial; based on that stipulation and the physicians’ reports, the trial court deemed him competent to proceed to trial. After a trial, a jury unanimously found the defendant guilty as charged on each count. The trial court thereafter denied the defendant's motions to reconsider sentence, for new trial, for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, and in arrest of judgment. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on counts one and two, and to forty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count three, to be served concurrently.¹ He now appeals, raising three counseled and two pro se assignments of error. After review, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 4, 2020, shortly after 6:00 p.m., personnel of the Tangipahoa Parish Fire District, Acadian Ambulance, and the Amite City Police Department responded to an incident at 207 Bourgeois Street, in Amite, Louisiana. When they arrived, one of the victims, later identified as Adrian Cyprian, was lying in the front yard, covered in blood and suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. Two additional victims, later identified as Terrence Foster, Jr., and Alvin Henderson, Jr., were found inside the house with apparent gunshot wounds and were deceased. Mr. Cyprian was transported to the hospital. While at the hospital, Mr. Cyprian was shown a photographic lineup and identified the defendant as the shooter.²

Around the time of the reported shootings, George Martinez, a nearby resident, called 911 after discovering an unfamiliar man, later identified as the defendant, in his yard, claiming that someone was trying to kill him. Officer Christian James of the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office responded to the Martinez residence, arrested the defendant, and transported him to the Amite City Police Department. After being advised of his Miranda 3 rights, the defendant gave a recorded interview during which he admitted to being in a confrontation at the Bourgeois Street residence. The defendant claimed he had to defend himself and stated that one of the shooting victims pointed a gun at him. The interview ended when the defendant invoked his right to counsel.

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TWO

In counseled assignment of error number one, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence under State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-81 (La. 1993) and in imposing life sentences on counts one and two. In counseled assignment of error number two, he argues the life sentences are unconstitutionally excessive.

The trial court sentenced the defendant on September 19, 2023. On August 22, 2023, nearly one month prior, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied as it was premature.⁴ After sentencing, he did not object to the sentences or file a motion to reconsider sentence.⁵

Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(A)(1), in felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition of sentence, or within such longer period as the trial court may set at sentence, the State or the defendant may make or file a motion to reconsider sentence. But, under La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E), a defendant's failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence, or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, shall preclude him from raising an objection to the sentence. One purpose of the motion to reconsider sentence is to allow the defendant to raise any errors that may have occurred during sentencing while the trial judge still has the jurisdiction to change or correct the sentence. State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La. 1993) (per curiam). The defendant may point out such errors or deficiencies or may present argument or evidence not considered in the original sentencing, thereby preventing the necessity of a remand for resentencing. Id.; State v. Cook, 2011-2336 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/12), 2012 WL 2061518, *2, writ denied, 2012-1463 (La. 1/11/13), 106 So.3d 548. It is well settled that an objection to a sentence or a motion to reconsider sentence filed before the sentence is imposed is premature. Cook, 2012 WL 2061518 at *2.

As indicated above, the record shows the defendant did not make or file a timely oral or written motion to reconsider sentence pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1 after his sentencing. The defendant's failure to do so precludes him from arguing that his sentences are excessive on appeal. Thus, the defendant is procedurally barred from having counseled assignments of error numbers one and two reviewed. State v. Poindexter, 2010-1767 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/6/11), 2011 WL 2616845, *2.

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

In counseled assignment of error number three, the defendant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him immediately following the denial of his post-trial motions, with no waiver of delays.

Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 873, if a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled, unless the delay is expressly waived. The defendant is correct in that, herein, the trial court erred by sentencing him immediately after ruling on his motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment without obtaining an express waiver of the sentencing delay.⁶

Nevertheless, while the defendant's explicit waiver of the delay is required, the trial court's failure to observe the statutory sentencing delay is subject to a harmless error analysis. State v. Kisack, 2016-0797 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1201, 1205-06 (per curiam), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1160, 138 S.Ct. 1175, 200 L.Ed.2d 322 (2018); State v. Williams, 2019-0362 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/26/20), 2020 WL 913674, *10, writ denied, 2020-00555 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So.3d 527. Absent a showing that prejudice resulted from the trial court's failure to observe the statutory delay, reversal of a prematurely imposed sentence is not required. State v. Seals, 95-0305 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 368, 380, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1199, 117 S.Ct. 1558, 137 L.Ed.2d 705 (1997); see also State v. Augustine, 555 So.2d 1331, 1333-34 (La. 1990) (indicating that the failure to observe the twenty-four hour delay provided in La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 may be considered harmless error where the defendant could not show that he suffered prejudice from the violation and sentencing is not raised on appeal). Where a mandatory life sentence is imposed or when the defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal and does not claim prejudice due to the lack of the delay, this Court has found harmless error. For example, see State v. Tate, 2024-0344 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/13/24), 405 So.3d 993, 1002.

Herein, on appeal, the defendant does not challenge the sentence imposed by the trial court on count three. Further, as noted, the sentences challenged on appeal in this case, on counts one and two, are mandatory life sentences. See La. R.S. 14:30(C)(2). Therefore, any error in the trial court's failure to observe the twenty-four-hour delay is harmless in this case and does not require a remand for resentencing. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 921; Seals, 684 So.2d at 380 (noting no prejudice could possibly have resulted from the trial court's failure to observe the delay, because, the sentence the judge was required to impose would have been the same, delay or no delay). Counseled assignment of error number three lacks merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In pro se assignment of error number one, the defendant argues the State failed to respond to his motion for bill of particulars and motion for discovery and inspection. He argues the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing or order the State to respond. He claims he is entitled to a new trial.

Louisiana Constitution Article I, § 13 provides that, in a criminal prosecution, an accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. See a/so La. C.Cr.P. art. 464.⁷ Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure article 465 authorizes the use of specific short-form indictments in charging certain offenses, including the offenses charged in the instant case, first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. La. C.Cr.P. art. 465(A)(7) and (31). The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of the short forms. See State v. Campbell, 2006-0286 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 810, 870, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1040, 129 S.Ct. 607, 172 L.Ed.2d 471 (2008). When those forms are used, it is intended that a defendant may procure details as to the statutory method by which he committed the offense through a bill of particulars. La. C.Cr.P. art. 465, comment (a); Campbell, 983 So.2d at 870. The function of a bill of particulars is to inform the defendant more specifically of the nature of the charge against him. State v. Carter, 2024-0486 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/9/24), 2024 WL 4117260, *1, writ denied, 2024-01237 (La. 12/27/24), 397 So.3d 1224. It cannot be used as a device to secure the details of the State's evidence or collateral information. Id.; see also State v. Vaccaro, 411 So.2d 415, 422 (La. 1982) (noting that the defendant is entitled to know what the State intends to prove but cannot use the bill of particulars as a “fishing expedition” to discover details of the State's evidence).

Here, the record shows that, on August 21, 2020, the defendant filed a motion for bill of particulars, a motion to produce and for discovery, and a motion and order to assign pretrial motions for contradictory hearing. On September 16, 2020, the State filed a response to discovery motions stating all discoverable information in the possession of the State was attached thereto and that information later obtained by the State would be furnished by supplement. Thereafter, on October 19, 2020, the State filed a supplemental response. On November 5, 2020, the defendant filed additional motions, including a motion for bill of particulars, discovery, and inspection, a motion for exculpatory evidence, and two motions to quash indictment.⁸ Between January 4, 2021, and August 10, 2023, the State filed over twenty additional sets of supplemental responses. The record reflects that all motions were satisfied by August 1, 2022. The trial commenced on August 15, 2023.

The defendant now argues the State “failed to say what items, whether inculpatory, or exculpatory [were] in its possession[.]” He further claims the State's “[f]ailure to provide [him] with requested information adversely affected his substantial right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” Initially, we note defense counsel did not object to the bill of particulars, including any alleged failure to provide requested information or any timeliness issue. To preserve the right to seek appellate review, a party must state an objection contemporaneously with the occurrence of the alleged error, as well as the grounds for that objection. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A); State v. Bedwell, 2018-0135 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/18), 2018 WL 3080356, *5, writ denied, 2018-1247 (La. 1/18/19), 262 So.3d 288.

Further, as noted in footnote 8, at the hearing on his motions to quash, defense counsel only raised an argument regarding the jury pool and withdrew and/or abandoned the other arguments raised in the written motions to quash. As the proponent of the motions, it was incumbent on the defendant to argue and obtain a ruling on the motions prior to proceeding to trial. This Court may consider any outstanding motion or argument abandoned. See State v. Austin, 2011-0122 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/10/11), 99 So.3d 1008, 1009, n.2.

Because the defendant failed to object to the bill of particulars or the State's responses, and failed to argue that he was not informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him, he waived any error and such was not preserved for appeal. Moreover, the record herein reflects the State provided or made available for inspection police records, medical records, forensic reports, laboratory reports, photographs, autopsy photographs, and autopsy reports in its possession. Thus, the record shows the defendant was well informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. See La. Const. art. I, § 13; Carter, 2024 WL 4117260 at *1. Considering the foregoing, we find no merit in pro se assignment of error number one.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In pro se assignment of error number two, the defendant argues the grand jury indictment was not returned in open court, as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 383.

Louisiana Code Criminal Procedure Article 383 provides:

An indictment is a written accusation of crime made by a grand jury. It must be concurred in by not less than nine of the grand jurors, indorsed “a true bill,” and the indorsement must be signed by the foreman. Indictments shall be returned into the district court in open court; but when an indictment has been returned for an offense which is within the trial jurisdiction of another court in the parish, the indictment may be transferred to that court.

The failure of a defendant to object to alleged deficiencies in an indictment and to file a motion to quash the indictment on that basis waives those errors. State v. Hawkins, 2016-0458 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/17/17), 219 So.3d 1133, 1141, writs denied, 2017-1183, 2017-1280 (La. 5/18/18), 242 So.3d 575.

Here, the record contains an indictment in proper form ⁹ that was indorsed a true bill, signed by the foreman of the grand jury, and states it was returned in open court on July 20, 2020. As the minutes do not go back to the date of the indictment, the minute entries do not confirm or deny that the indictment was returned in open court. Nonetheless, the defendant did not assert this ground in his motions to quash nor raise the argument at the pretrial hearing. Thus, he waived error, if any, on this ground. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 521(A) and 535; State v. Fort, 2014-1195 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/9/15), 2015 WL 1019523, *7, writ denied, 2015-0760 (La. 5/2/16), 206 So.3d 876.¹⁰ We find no merit in pro se assignment of error number two.

PATENT ERROR REVIEW

This Court routinely reviews the record for patent error under La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), whereby we are limited in our review to errors discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence. State v. Emerson, 2023-0120 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/23), 375 So.3d 1027, 1030. In this case, we note non-reversible patent errors.

Initially, we note the grand jury indictment in this case does not state the statutory citation for an attempt, La. R.S. 14:27, in listing the offense charged on count three, attempted first degree murder. Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 464, the indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute that the defendant is alleged to have violated. An error or omission of the proper citation for the offense is an error patent, discoverable by an inspection of the pleadings. See State v. Jones, 2015-0757 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/15), 2015 WL 6951576, *2. However, as La. C.Cr.P. art. 464 also provides, error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. Here, while the statutory citation was erroneously omitted, the indictment clearly described the charge on count three as the attempted first degree murder of Adrian Cyprian. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate the citation omission misled the defendant to his prejudice. Therefore, we cannot say that this error misled the defendant so as to warrant reversal. State v. Patterson, 540 So.2d 515, 516, n.1 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989).

Further, we note the minutes and the transcript in this case indicate the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period to seek post-conviction relief, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 914 or 922. Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(D), the trial court is required to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for applying for post-conviction relief. A trial court's failure to advise the defendant under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 constitutes patent error. State v. Evans, 2023-1223 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/2/24), 395 So.3d 886, 894.

Nonetheless, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-43, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Accordingly, this error is not reversible. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including an application that seeks an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

As noted by the majority, following sentencing, defense counsel withdrew as counsel of record and stated she wished to “waive” the motion to reconsider sentence. However, the State then asked the trial court to “table” the motion in the event that appellate counsel wished to argue said motion. Accordingly, at the State's behest, the parties agreed to continue the motion without date. Under these specific circumstances, I question the majority's conclusion that the defendant's “failure” to “make or file a timely oral or written motion to reconsider sentence ․ after his sentencing” precluded or barred the defendant from arguing that his sentences are excessive on appeal.

Nevertheless, I need not decide this issue, as, even assuming arguendo that the issue was sufficiently preserved for review, the trial court had no basis to deviate from the mandatory minimum life sentences. The only mitigating factors cited by the defendant are his “quite young” age at the time of the offenses, his claim that he was in fear for his life, and his “insignificant” criminal history, i.e., a prior conviction for a drug offense. Notably, the jury rejected the defendant's self-serving claim of self-defense. Further, the indictment, the police records, and the defendant's police interview indicate he was twenty-three years old at the time of the offenses, contradicting defense counsel's claim that the defendant was eighteen. In any event, the defendant failed to cite any unusual or exceptional circumstances to show that he is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign a sentence meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offenses, and the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, I concur in part with the majority opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The minutes do not indicate whether the trial court restricted benefits on counts one and two, but the sentencing transcript reflects that it did. It is well settled that the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

2.   Mr. Cyprian knew the defendant through his friends, Alvin Henderson, Jr. (one of the deceased victims) and Lawenza Perry, the owner of the Bourgeois Street residence. Mr. Perry had children with the defendant's sister, and the defendant sometimes lived at the Bourgeois Street residence.

3.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

4.   Also on August 22, 2023, the defendant filed his Dorthey motion to deviate from the life sentences mandated by La. R.S. 14:30(C)(2). The defendant argued the Dorthey motion prior to sentencing. In exceptional cases, Dorthey allows a sentencing court to reduce a mandatory sentence if it is found unconstitutionally excessive. See Dorthey, 623 So.2d at 1280-81. However, there is no language in Dorthey that dispenses with the requirement that the defendant file a timely motion to reconsider sentence pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1. See State v. Baranco, 2024-0790 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/25), 423 So.3d 1256, 1269, n.8, writ denied, 2025-01555 (La. 5/27/26), ___ So.3d ___, 2026 WL 1480686; State v. Tisdale, 2011-2159 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/12), 2012 WL 2061540, *5-6, writ denied, 2012-1548 (La. 1/25/13), 105 So.3d 64.

5.   After the sentences were imposed, defense counsel withdrew as counsel of record and stated she was waiving the motion to reconsider sentence. The State then asked the trial court to “table” the motion, and the parties agreed to continue it without date. After sentencing, the defendant did not refile or re-urge the motion to reconsider sentence.

6.   The defendant notes the trial court imposed the sentences immediately after ruling on all three post-trial motions, including a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. However, La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 does not require the trial court to observe a twenty-four-hour delay after the denial of a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. See State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 796-97 (en banc), writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177.

7.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 464 provides:The indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.

8.   One of the defendant's motions to quash indictment, in part, argued the indictment failed to place him on notice of the charges against him with sufficient specificity to permit him to prepare his defenses. The other motion to quash challenged the constitutionality of the composition of the grand and petit jury venire. At the pretrial hearing on the motions, defense counsel withdrew the first referenced motion to quash and only raised the argument regarding the composition of the petit jury venire, which the trial court denied.

9.   As discussed in the forthcoming patent error review section, this Court discovered a citation error in the indictment which we find did not prejudice the defendant.

10.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 535(C) states that a motion to quash on grounds other than those stated in Paragraphs A and B shall be filed in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 521. Failure to return the indictment in open court is not a ground listed in Paragraph A or B of La. C.Cr.P. art. 535. According to La. C.Cr.P. art. 521(A), “[p]retrial motions shall be made or filed within thirty days after receipt of initial discovery, unless a different time is provided by law or fixed by the court upon a showing of good cause why thirty days is inadequate.” (As amended by 2020 La. Acts No. 252, § 1). Because the ground asserted by the defendant is not listed in Paragraph A or B of Article 535, it had to be asserted within the time limitations provided for in Article 521, or it was waived. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 535(C) and (D); Fort, 2015 WL 1019523 at *6-7.

GREENE, J.

McClendon, C.J. concurs in part and assigns reasons.