ERICA SULLIVAN v. SHERIFF DANIEL EDWARDS ATLANTIC SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY CORRECTHEALTH TANGIPAHOA LLC (2026)

Plaintiff, Erica Sullivan, appeals a judgment rendered by the trial court sustaining an exception of prematurity filed by defendant, CorrectHealth Tangipahoa, LLC (“CHT”), dismissing her claims against it without prejudice. For the following reasons, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2021, Mrs. Sullivan filed a petition for damages, naming as defendants Sheriff Daniel Edwards, Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company, and CHT. In the petition, Mrs. Sullivan averred that on April 9, 2021, she was booked into the Tangipahoa Parish Jail, which was operated by Sheriff Edwards and was under the care, custody, and control of the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office for failure to appear on a charge. Mrs. Sullivan further averred that during booking, she reported she had a seizure condition that required medication, Keppra, but she did not have her medication with her. Mrs. Sullivan alleged CHT was the medical provider at the Tangipahoa Parish Jail, through a contract with the Tangipahoa Parish Government, and the prison nursing staff knew or should have known from her prior incarceration and medical records that she was prescribed Keppra.

According to her petition, Mrs. Sullivan had multiple seizures on April 11, 2021, and initially, neither the prison employees nor the prison medical staff rendered aid to her. Mrs. Sullivan indicated that at some point, three nurses and one guard checked on her, found her clean clothing, and brought her to the nurses’ station.¹ Mrs. Sullivan stated that the nurses informed her that she would be released and that they contacted her husband to ask him to meet her at Lallie Kemp Regional Medical Center where she would be transferred. According to Mrs. Sullivan, the prison employees sent her to the bathroom unattended to change into her street clothes even though she could barely walk. She averred that when she was exiting the bathroom, she suffered another seizure, causing her to fall or slip on the floor and break her right leg.

In her petition, Mrs. Sullivan alleged that after she fell, the prison employees called Acadian Ambulance to transport her to North Oaks Medical Center. Mrs. Sullivan averred that once she arrived at the medical center, the medical staff administered Keppra to her through an IV line. She alleged that on April 12, 2021, she underwent two surgeries to repair her broken leg. Mrs. Sullivan contended she would never be able to perform the same physical activities that she was able to perform before the fall, and she alleged she suffers from bouts of depression and memory loss. She set forth three claims for relief: 1) denial of medical treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ² ; 2) negligence of the medical staff; and 3) respondeat superior.

On August 23, 2022, CHT filed exceptions raising the objections of prematurity and no cause of action and a memorandum in support thereof.³ CHT argued Mrs. Sullivan's medical malpractice claim was premature as she failed to present her claims to a medical review panel before filing suit. CHT asserted it was a qualified health care provider covered by the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”) and Mrs. Sullivan's claims were covered under the LMMA. CHT further argued Mrs. Sullivan had no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she could not establish the deprivation of her constitutional right was pursuant to a custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision. CHT attached to its memorandum the petition for damages, two certificates of CHT's enrollment in the Patient Compensation Fund under La. R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq.,⁴ and a judgment granting an exception of prematurity in favor of CHT in an unrelated case.

Mrs. Sullivan opposed the objection raising the exception of prematurity,⁵ asserting that the undisputed fact was that all health care complained of in the petition was that health care which was exclusively provided at the prison; the Legislature enacted specific rules that applied to all prisoners whether in a Department of Public Safety and Corrections institution or a parish prison; the rules governing prisoners required that she file an administrative remedy procedure in accordance with the procedures established by the prison; and that she complied with that procedure.

After CHT filed the exceptions raising the objections of prematurity and no cause of action, Mrs. Sullivan entered a stipulation with CHT dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference in violation of constitutional rights, rendering CHT's exception of no cause of action moot. Following a hearing on May 15, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment on November 22, 2024, sustaining the exception raising the objection of prematurity and dismissing Mrs. Sullivan's claims against CHT without prejudice.⁶ It is from this judgment Mrs. Sullivan appeals.⁷

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. Where the jail provides a prisoner a written grievance procedure that requires her to file a grievance for a medical complaint, the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding that the prisoner was instead required to file a petition for review with the [m]edical [r]eview [p]anel․

2. Where [CHT] failed to prove a contract and failed to show coverage during the applicable policy period, the trial court erred in finding [the] [L]MMA applies․

3. Where the [Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA)] is the more specifics statute on point for a medical complaint, [vis-a-vis] the PLRA and [the] [L]MMA, the trial court erred in finding the [LMMA] applies․

APPLICABLE LAW

The dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity is provided in La. Code Civ. P. art. 926; Wilson v. St. Helena School Board, 2018-1532 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/3/19), 393 So.3d 358, 360. The exception raising the objection of prematurity questions whether the cause of action has matured to the point where it is ripe for judicial determination. An action will be deemed premature when it is brought before the right to enforce it has accrued. La. Code Civ. P. art. 423; Id.

Generally, a judgment sustaining an exception raising the objection of prematurity and dismissing a cause of action on that basis is reviewed under the manifest error standard of review. N'Dakpri v. Louisiana State Board of Cosmetology, 2023-1213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/24), 392 So.3d 407, 415, writ denied, 2024-00932 (La. 11/6/24), 395 So.3d 1176. However, where a purely legal question is presented, the judgment is reviewed de novo. Id. On the trial of a dilatory exception, such as prematurity, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the objection pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 930. Where no evidence is introduced at the hearing, the trial court must render its decision on the exception based upon the facts as alleged in the petition, and all allegations therein must be accepted as true. N'Dakpri, 392 So.3d at 415.

The exception raising the objection of prematurity is the proper procedural mechanism for a qualified health care provider to invoke when a medical malpractice plaintiff has failed to submit the claim for an opinion by a medical review panel before filing suit against the provider. Prejean v. Rodrigue, 2023-0646 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/23), 381 So.3d 98, 102.

If a lawsuit against a health care provider covered by the LMMA has been filed in district court and the claim has not been first presented to a medical review panel in accordance with La. R.S. 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) of the LMMA, La. R.S. 40:1231.1, et seq., the exception raising the objection of prematurity must be sustained, and the suit dismissed. Prejean, 381 So.3d at 102. The burden is on the defendant to prove prematurity and initial immunity from suit as a qualified health care provider under the LMMA. Id. The defendant must also show he is entitled to a medical review panel because the allegations fall within the LMMA. Id.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1231.2(A) sets forth the requirements for a health care provider to qualify for the protections and benefits of the LMMA as follows:

To be qualified under the provisions of this Part, a health care provider shall:

(1) Cause to be filed with the board proof of financial responsibility as provided by Subsection E of this Section.

(2) Pay the surcharge assessed by this Part on all health care providers according to R.S. 40:1231.4.

(3) For self-insured health care providers, initial qualification shall be effective upon acceptance of proof of financial responsibility by and payment of the surcharge to the board. Initial qualification shall be effective for all other health care providers at the time the malpractice insurer accepts payment of the surcharge.

DISCUSSION

Mrs. Sullivan's assignments of error one and three are intertwined and, therefore, are considered together. In Mrs. Sullivan's first assignment of error, she contends that where the jail provides a prisoner a written grievance procedure that requires her to file a grievance for a medical complaint, the trial court erred in finding that the prisoner was instead required to file a petition for review with the medical review panel.⁸ In her third assignment of error, she contends that where the PLRA is the more specific statute on point for a medical complaint, the trial court erred in finding the LMMA applies.

In accordance with the PLRA, La. R.S. 15:1181 et seq., a prisoner suit is defined as “any civil proceeding with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison[.]” La. R.S. 15:1181(2). Prisoner suits are subject to the administrative procedures of Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (“CARP”), which must be exhausted prior to filing suit in district court. La. R.S. 15:1184(A)(2); Prejean, 381 So.3d at 103. The administrative remedy procedure set forth in CARP is the formal grievance mechanism that all offenders committed to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) or a sheriff must use before they may proceed with a suit in federal or state court. Id. Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1171(B):

The department or sheriff may also adopt, in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, administrative remedy procedures for receiving, hearing, and disposing of any and all complaints and grievances by adult or juvenile offenders against the state, the governor, the department or any officials or employees thereof, the contractor operating a private prison facility or any of its employees, shareholders, directors, officers, or agents, or a sheriff, his deputies, or employees, which arise while an offender is within the custody or under the supervision of the department, a contractor operating a private prison facility, or a sheriff. [Footnote omitted.]

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:703(C) governs actions by prisoners to recover damages or losses when a contract for health care services is entered with the prison to provide health care services to inmates. It provides:

When a physician has been appointed or a contract for health care services for prisoners has been entered into in accordance with this Section, any action by a prisoner or his representative to recover damages or any other losses, including those for the death of the prisoner, as a result of the actions or inactions of the physician or health care provider in the performance or nonperformance of health care services shall be governed by the provisions of R.S. 40:1231.1 et seq. The term “health care provider” as used in this Subsection shall be as defined in R.S. 40:1231.1.

A health care provider is defined by La. R.S. 40:1231.1(10) as “a person, partnership, limited liability partnership, limited liability company, corporation, facility, or institution licensed or certified by this state, state agencies, or a state board to provide health care or professional services․”

The procedures adopted by the sheriff provide the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs for medical malpractice complaints arising while they are within the custody of the sheriff. Prejean, 381 So.3d at 104. However, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:703(C) provides for actions by prisoners to recover damages or losses when a contract for health care services is entered with the prison to provide health care services to inmates. In determining the applicability of laws, the more specific governs over the more general. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission, 96-0793 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/14/97), 696 So. 2d 1021, 1027, writ denied, 97-2069 (La. 12/19/97), 706 So. 2d 451, and writ denied, 97-2062 (La. 12/19/97), 706 So.2d 452.

We apply the de novo standard of review because the determination of which statute applies is a question of law. See Crosby as Trustee of Aaron Guidry Trust v. Crosby Enterprises, LLC, 2023-1338 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/9/24), 395 So.3d 296, 300. In the instant case, no evidence was introduced at the hearing on the exception raising the objection of prematurity. As there was no evidence introduced at the hearing, the trial court should have rendered its decision on the exception based upon the facts as alleged in Mrs. Sullivan's petition, and all allegations therein should have been accepted as true. See N'Dakpri, 392 So.3d at 415. In Mrs. Sullivan's petition, she alleged CHT was the medical provider at the Tangipahoa Parish Jail, through its contract with the Tangipahoa Parish Government. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1171(B) encompasses claims against “the state, the governor, the department or any official or employees thereof, ․ a sheriff, his deputies, or employees․” As Mrs. Sullivan alleged in her petition that CHT was an independent contractor and not an employee of sheriff, we find the PLRA and the jail's grievance procedures do not apply to Mrs. Sullivan's claim against CHT.

In Mrs. Sullivan's second assignment of error, she contends that where CHT failed to prove the existence of a contract and failed to show coverage during the applicable policy period, the trial court erred in finding the LMMA applied.

As stated above, Mrs. Sullivan alleged in her petition that the Tangipahoa Parish Government had a contract with CHT to provide health care services at the Tangipahoa Parish Jail. However, CHT, as the exceptor, maintained the burden of showing that it was a qualified health care provider. See Prejean, 381 So.3d at 102. Enrollment certificates submitted by a defendant would generally be prima facie evidence of enrollment with the Patient Compensation Fund as a qualified health care provider. Bickham v. Louisiana Emergency Medical Consultants, 2008-1645 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/27/09), 2009 WL 839045 *4, writ denied, 2009-0936 (La. 6/5/09), 9 So.3d 876. CHT, however, did not offer the enrollment certificates or any other exhibits in support of its exception into evidence at the hearing on the exception raising the objection of prematurity. Counsel for Mrs. Sullivan attempted to offer into evidence her brief and the exhibits attached to her memorandum. There was no colloquy between the trial court and opposing counsel regarding the evidentiary offering, and the trial court never made a ruling admitting the exhibits into evidence. Therefore, the exhibits attached to Mrs. Sullivan's memorandum were not properly and officially introduced into evidence for the exception raising the objection of prematurity. See Denoux v. Vessel Management Services, Inc., 2007-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88 (“Evidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record. Documents attached to memoranda do not constitute evidence and cannot be considered as such on appeal ”).

As there was no evidence introduced at the hearing, CHT failed to show it was a qualified health care provider under the LMMA at the time of the incident. Therefore, CHT failed to show that Mrs. Sullivan's claims fell under the LMMA, and CHT failed to show Mrs. Sullivan's prematurely instituted her suit for damages. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in granting CHT's exception raising the objection of prematurity.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's November 22, 2024, judgment sustaining the exception raising the objection of prematurity filed by defendant, CorrectHealth Tangipahoa, LLC, and dismissing the claims of plaintiff, Erica Sullivan, without prejudice. Costs of this appeal are assessed to CorrectHealth Tangipahoa, LLC.

REVERSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The petition does not clearly set forth when the nurses and guard checked on Mrs. Sullivan, found her clean clothing, and brought her to the nurses’ station.

2.   Civil action for deprivation of rights is governed by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, which provides:Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

3.   Sheriff Edwards filed a separate exception raising the objection of prematurity. The matter was continued multiple times and the record on appeal does not reflect whether that exception was resolved.

4.   Pursuant to 2025 La. Acts No. 342, § 1, effective August 1, 2025, Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.41 was redesignated as Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1231.1.

5.   Mrs. Sullivan also opposed CHT's exception raising the objection of no cause of action.

6.   Although the judgment states the hearing was held on February 15, 2023, the transcript and minute entry indicate the hearing was held on May 15, 2023.

7.   Mrs. Sullivan initially sought supervisory review of the trial court's November 22, 2024 judgment granting the exception raising the objection of prematurity filed by CHT. This court granted the writ application for the limited purpose of remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to grant Mrs. Sullivan an appeal pursuant to the pleading that notified the trial court of Mrs. Sullivan's intention to seek writs. Sullivan v. Edwards, 2024-1301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/29/25), 2025 WL 326756 * 1 (unpublished).

8.   Mrs. Sullivan contends for the first time on appeal that “by failing to give clear notice of any alternative requirement, [CHT] waived any purported right to demand that a medical review panel be convened.”

FIELDS, J.