LOUIS JOSEPH RUFFINO AND ROSE RUFFINO INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPHINE RUFFINO v. GENERAL MOTOR COMPANY HOOD AUTO GROUP OF HAMMOND LLC HOOD MOTOR CO LLC ABC INSURANCE COMPANY DEF INSURANCE COMPANY GH INSURANCE COMPANY RST INSURANCE COMPANY UVW INSURANCE COMPANY AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

Plaintiffs/appellants, Louis Joseph Ruffino and Rose Ruffino, individually and on behalf of the estate of Josephine A. Ruffino (collectively, “plaintiffs”), appeal a June 4, 2025 judgment whereby the trial court sustained a peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action, a dilatory exception raising the objection of lack of procedural capacity, and a peremptory exception raising the objection of nonjoinder of an indispensable party, all filed by defendant/appellees, General Motor Company, Hood Motor Company, LLC, and Hood Auto Group of Hammond, LLC (collectively, “defendants”). As such, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against defendants without prejudice. For the following reasons, we reverse the portion of the judgment sustaining defendants’ exceptions of no right of action and lack of procedural capacity. Additionally, we affirm the portion of the judgment sustaining defendants’ exception of nonjoinder of an indispensable party. We also vacate the trial court's dismissal of the proceeding and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2013, Louis Joseph Ruffino (“Louis”) purchased a 2013 GMC Sierra pickup truck from Hood Motor Company, LLC, located in Amite, Louisiana. Sometime later, in 2017 or 2018, Louis brought his truck to Hood Auto Group of Hammond, LLC for repair work after striking a pole. On September 19, 2022, a fire occurred at 202 Cedar Street, Amite, Louisiana, a residence Louis shared with his sister, Rose Ruffino (“Rose”). On that day, around 1:30 a.m., Rose heard a noise coming from the residence's carport area, and alerted her brother, who then observed that his parked truck was on fire. As the fire was spreading beyond the truck and beginning to damage the residence, Rose called for first responders. The local fire department responded, extinguished the fire, and in their reported determined that the cause of the fire started in the “dash area, by the firewall area on the driver side of the 2013 GMC Sierra in the engine compartment.” As a result, the residence received “substantial” damage, rendering it uninhabitable. On September 13, 2023, Louis filed a Petition for Damages against defendants, as well as against several unknown insurance providers,¹ seeking recovery of a variety of special and general damages based on theories of negligence, product liability, failure to warn, and failure to remedy.

On December 18, 2023, Hood Auto Group of Hammond, LLC and Hood Motor Co., LLC, filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no right of action, no cause of action, and nonjoinder of an indispensable party.² As to the exception raising the objection of no cause of action, these defendants specifically asserted that Louis failed to “clearly define the nature, type, and location” of damage to both the truck and the residence, that the petition failed to reference the condition of the vehicle prior to the fire, and that the petition failed to sufficiently plead facts which could allow recovery of general damages. Next, in their exception raising the objection of no right of action, these defendants claimed Louis did not establish himself as a person with standing to seek recovery for the residence's property damage. These defendants noted that the property belonged to Louis’ mother – Josephine A. Ruffino – who died on July 18, 2022, and that no succession had been opened on her behalf. Lastly, in their exception raising the objection of nonjoinder of an indispensable party, these defendants argued that, because Louis was allegedly not the owner of the residence, if any actual owner of this property existed, they had to be named as a party to the lawsuit. A hearing was set on these exceptions, but, ultimately, did not take place.

A few days after Louis filed his Petition for Damages in September 2023, Rose likewise filed a lawsuit, alleging the same facts, claims, and theories of recovery as Louis. An Agreed Motion to Consolidate was filed by Louis and Rose and granted by the trial court on August 15, 2024. Thereafter, on November 7, 2024, plaintiffs filed an Unopposed Motion for Leave to Amend Petition, which was subsequently granted. Apart from identifying both Louis and Rose as plaintiffs, and providing updated service information for the defendants, plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition for Damages was essentially identical to Louis's original petition filed in September 2023, asserting no new factual allegations.

In response to plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition for Damages, defendants ³ filed a dilatory exception raising the objections of lack of procedural capacity, as well as peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no right of action and nonjoinder of indispensable party, all of which turned on plaintiffs’ alleged lack of ownership interest in the residence. Defendants generally asserted, across all three exceptions, that because the residence belonged to Josephine A. Ruffino, who is deceased, and since no succession was opened on her behalf, plaintiffs either lack procedural capacity or have no right of action to seek damages from the fire. Defendants supported these restated exceptions with three pieces of evidence: (1) Tangipahoa Parish Assessor's Office records, which identified the owner of the residence as Josephine Ruffino and Nunzio Ruffino, (2) Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court records, which do not reflect the opening of any succession for Josephine Ruffino, and (3) the pleadings from the Succession of Nunzio Joseph Ruffino, whereby Louis renounced his late father's estate. Based on these pieces of evidence, defendants requested to be dismissed from the litigation. The exceptions were set for hearing on March 17, 2025.

Later, and due to a scheduling conflict with defendants’ counsel, defendants filed a Motion to Continue the Hearing Date, which was granted and set for April 28, 2025. However, plaintiffs subsequently filed their own Motion to Continue due to their counsel's scheduling conflict, and this motion was contested and opposed by defendants. Ultimately, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion, and the matter was reset for May 27, 2025. Additionally, the trial court allowed plaintiffs’ an opportunity to amend their petition for damages. On May 5, 2025, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Petition for Damages, which contained many of the same allegations as the previous two petitions, but included the following paragraphs:

Plaintiffs are major individuals domiciled in Tangipahoa Parish, Louisiana, and are the biological children and sole heirs of the late Josephine A. Ruffino. As such, they are universal successors under Louisiana Civil Code Articles 880-888 and are entitled to assert all claims belonging to or arising through their deceased mother. Under La. C.C.P. art. 681, an action may be brought by any party with a real and actual interest in the litigation. As universal successors and lawful heirs, Plaintiffs acquired ownership of the property at 202 Cedar Street, Amite, Louisiana, upon their mother's death. This confers upon them a real and actual interest in all claims for damages stemming from the destruction of that property.

Nunzio Joseph Ruffino, late father of the Plaintiffs Louis and Rose Ruffino and late husband to the now deceased Josephine A. Ruffino, died on March 16, 2010 and named his son Louis Joseph Ruffino as beneficiary of his estate. On December 12, 2017 Louis Ruffino renounced his right to Nunzio Joseph Ruffino's estate; however, Louis Ruffino only renounced the community property his father Nunzio bequeathed under his November 2007 Last Will and Testament. At no time has Louis Ruffino renounced the estate, and the rights therein, of his mother Josephine A. Ruffino.

Josephine A. Ruffino, the wife of Nunzio Ruffino, died intestate on July 18, 2022. At all relevant times, Josephine A. Ruffino was an owner of the property at 202 Cedar Street, Amite, Louisiana. Her death conferred upon Plaintiffs rights as direct heirs, including rights in the property in question.

Additionally, Plaintiffs responded to Defendants’ various exceptions, generally asserting the same argument as set forth in the new paragraphs found in their Second Amended Petition for Damages; namely, that as Josephine Ruffino's “universal successors [․] [they] have the procedural capacity and legal interest to bring this action.”

The exceptions came for hearing on May 27, 2025, at which time the trial court sustained all of defendants’ exceptions and dismissed “all claims and causes of action brought by all Plaintiffs” without prejudice. A judgment to this effect was signed on June 4, 2025. Thereafter, plaintiffs timely filed a Motion for Devolutive Appeal resulting in the instant appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Plaintiffs set forth the following four assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in sustaining the Dilatory Exception of Lack of Procedural Capacity where [p]laintiffs, as alleged universal successors of the decedent, sufficiently alleged heirship and standing under Louisiana law, and where controlling jurisprudence holds that heirs may sue in their individual capacities without an opened succession.

2. The trial court erred in sustaining the Peremptory Exception of No Right of Action by improperly resolving factual disputes, specifically heirship, property ownership, and the status of succession rights, that must be accepted as true at the exception stage and reserved for trial.

3. The trial court erred by sustaining the Peremptory Exception of Nonjoinder of Parties and dismissing the suit, rather than ordering the joinder of any alleged indispensable party as mandated by La. Code Civ. P. arts. 641, 645, 933, and 934.

4. The trial court erred in dismissing [p]laintiffs’ claims without granting [p]laintiffs an opportunity to cure any procedural defects, specifically by opening a succession for Josephine A. Ruffino, despite Louisiana law requiring that curable defects be remedied through amendment or additional action rather than dismissal.

DISCUSSION

From the outset, we note that the crux of this appeal turns on the question of whether plaintiffs owned or otherwise had any real interest in the residence. At this stage of the litigation, defendants do not contest Louis’ ownership interest in the truck, or the circumstances surrounding the fire's spreading from the truck to the house. Moreover, we note that the fire, and any resulting claims thereof, occurred after plaintiffs’ mother, Josephine, passed away.

No Right of Action

The peremptory exception pleading the objection of no right of action challenges whether a plaintiff has an actual interest in bringing the action. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 927(A)(6). Whether a person has a right of action depends on whether the particular plaintiff belongs to the class in whose favor the law extends a remedy. In other words, the exception questions whether the plaintiff has an interest in judicially enforcing the right asserted. Whether a plaintiff has a right of action is a question of law. Therefore, it is reviewed de novo on appeal. To prevail, the defendant must show that the plaintiff does not possess an interest in the subject matter of the suit. Estate of Mayeaux v. Glover, 2008-2031 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/12/10), 31 So.3d 1090, 1093, writ denied, 2010-0312 (La. 4/16/10), 31 So.3d 1069. Evidence supporting or controverting an objection of no right of action is admissible. Jackson v. Slidell Nissan, 96-1017 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/97), 693 So.2d 1257, 1261. Furthermore, as is customary on considering of an objection of no right of action, the averments of fact in the pleadings will be taken as true in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Horrell v. Horrell, 99-1093 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/6/00), 808 So.2d 363, 368, writ denied, 2001-2546 (La. 12/7/01), 803 So.2d 971.

Herein, defendants contend that plaintiffs lack any real or actual interest in the residence and, further, that plaintiffs failed to put forth any evidence establishing that Josephine's death conferred upon them a one-quarter interest in the residence. We disagree. A succession occurs at the death of a person, La. C.C. art. 934, and “[i]mmediately at the death of the decedent, universal successors acquire ownership of the estate[.]” La. C.C. art. 935. (emphasis added). The decedent's possession is transmitted to the universal successors ⁴ with all of its defects as well as its advantages. They may institute all actions that the decedent could have brought unless the estate is under administration, in which case the succession representative is the proper party plaintiff or defendant and the successors need not be joined. La. C.C. art. 935, comment (d). As stated by this court, at the death of the deceased, the property is vested in the heirs immediately by operation of law. This article incorporates the maxim “le mort saisit le vif” so that the legal personality of the deceased descends instantaneously upon the heirs independent of any action on their part. Seizin, the faculty of claiming and exercising possession, is acquired by either the forced heirs, the universal legatee, or the legitimate heirs at the moment of death. Jones v. McDonald's Corp., 618 So.2d 992, 996 (La. 1993). As otherwise and more recently stated by this court, “it is now well-settled that an heir can sue directly without having been recognized as such by a court; all that is required is that he furnish satisfactory evidence of his right to inherit. Thus, subject to the requirement of submitting proof of his status, a universal successor has the right to institute suit prior to the opening of the succession.” Sherar v. Besse, 2007-2003 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/12/09), 2009 WL 24613 03, *5, writ denied, 2009-1993 (La. 11/20/09), 25 So.3d 799; see also Montana v. Jordan, 2013-1410 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/26/14), 13 5 So.3d 1212, 1215 (“[t]he immediacy of the acquisition of her ownership allows [for a plaintiff] to exercise rights with respect to her interest in a thing of the estate as well as in the estate as a whole prior to the judicial appointment of a succession representative.”)

After reviewing the record in this case, we find that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition for Damages, along with the documentation submitted with their opposition to defendants’ various objections, is prima facie evidence of their right to inherit an interest in the property and the right to bring the instant action. Plaintiffs established they are the sole children of Nunzio and Josephine Ruffino and that no succession action has been opened on behalf of Josephine Ruffino. No controverting evidence was adduced,⁵ and defendants had the burden of proving that the plaintiffs had no interest in the subject matter of the instant suit. Defendants failed to discharge this burden.

Lack of Procedural Capacity

The dilatory exception of lack of procedural capacity raises the issue of want of capacity of the plaintiff to institute and prosecute the action and stand in judgment and/or challenges the authority of a plaintiff who appears in a purely representative capacity. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 926(A); Mt. Zion Baptist Association v. Mt. Zion Baptist Church #1 of Revilletown Park, 2016-0151 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/31/16), 207 So.3d 414, 417, writ denied, 2016-02109 (La. 2/3/17), 215 So.3d 697. “Lack of capacity” is not synonymous with no right of action. Lack of procedural capacity is a dilatory exception that tests a party's legal capacity to bring a suit. The determination of whether a party has the procedural capacity to sue or be sued involves a question of law, which is reviewed under the de novo standard of review to determine whether the ruling of the trial court was legally correct. Id.; see also Woodard v. Upp, 2013-0999 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/18/14), 142 So.3d 14, 18.

Generally, defendants claim that, because no succession has been opened for Josephine, “Louis and Rose have no right to sue as administrators or on behalf of an estate that does not exist.” We disagree. Following the same reasoning as set forth above, this court squarely addressed this issue in Sherar, stating that when a succession is not under administration, and no succession representative has been appointed, “the universal successors of the deceased [may] bring all actions that the deceased had a right to institute when the succession is not under administration.” Furthermore, this court directly held that the provisions of La. C.C. art. 935, supra, control over the provisions of La. Code Civ. P. art. 685 ⁶ when the succession is not under administration. Sherar, 2009 WL 2461303 at *5. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ dilatory exception raising the objection of lack of procedural capacity.

Nonjoinder of Indispensable Party

Lastly, defendants argue that, because the damaged residence is owned by Josephine and Christopher Brett Ruffino, Louis’ only son, and since Christopher was not made a party to the litigation, “complete relief could not be accorded below and the trial court properly sustained the [d]efendants’ peremptory exception for failure to join indispensable parties.” Briefly, indispensable parties to an action are those whose interests in the subject matter are so interrelated that a complete and equitable adjudication of the controversy cannot be made unless they are joined in the action. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 641. A party is indispensable only when the facts clearly establish that no complete and equitable adjudication of the controversy can be made in his absence. Goodwin v. Louisiana Department of Health, 2018-1405 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/31/19), 277 So.3d 816, 821.

In Blanchard v. Naquin, 428 So.2d 926, 928 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ denied, 433 So.2d 162 (La. 1983), several heirs were not named as defendants in an action in which the plaintiff sought to be declared the owner of a piece of immovable property. This court held that “[w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interests which would be affected by the declaration.” Further, “[i]n order for a court to grant the relief requested by the plaintiff, it is absolutely necessary that all heirs who purportedly obtained an interest in the property [․] be made parties defendant in these proceedings.” Id. Additionally, in Succession of Pedescleaux, 2019-0250 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2/7/20), 290 So.3d 749, 750, the Fifth Circuit found that a party seeking to have a marital domicile declared community property “necessitated the joinder of all parties who claim[ed] an interest in the [․] property from the Succession[,]” and that “[a] judgment declaring the real estate community property would necessarily affect the interests the decedent's children had in the property.” Id. at 751.

Here, for the plaintiffs to receive damages resulting from the residence burning, a determination of ownership must be made. As noted above, the crux of this appeal turns on the question of who has an ownership interest in the property at issue. Therefore, as instructed by Blanchard and Succession of Pedescleaux, all parties with an interest in the property should be joined to the proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sustaining the defendants’ peremptory exception of nonjoinder of an indispensable party, and Christopher should be joined to the proceeding. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 934; Succession of Pedescleaux, 290 So.3d at 752 (“[w]hen an appellate court recognizes that joinder of parties is required for proper adjudication of the matter, the appropriate court of action is to [․] remand the matter to the trial court for joinder of the absent parties[.]”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the portions of trial court's June 4, 2025 judgment sustaining defendants’ exceptions raising the objections of no right of action and lack of procedural capacity are reversed, and the portion of the judgment sustaining defendants’ peremptory exception of nonjoinder of an indispensable party is affirmed. Additionally, the trial court's dismissal of the proceeding is vacated, and we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein. Costs are assessed equally between defendants, General Motors, LLC, Hood Motor Co., LLC, and Hood Auto Group of Hammond, LLC, and plaintiffs, Louis Joseph Ruffino and Rose Ruffino, individually and on behalf of the estate of Josephine A. Ruffino.

JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSAL VACATED, AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Despite several amending petitions for damages, these unnamed insurance providers have never been updated or amended for known insurance providers.

2.   Defendant, General Motor Company, did not join in this initial pleading of these exceptions.

3.   All defendants – General Motors, LLC, Hood Auto Group of Hammond, LLC, and Hood Motor Co., LLC – joined in the filing of these exceptions.

4.   Louisiana Civil Code article 3506(3) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] successor is a person who takes the place of another.” Further, there are two kinds of successors, “the universal successor, such as the heir, universal legatee, and general legatee[,]” and that the “universal successor represents the person of the deceased and succeeds to his rights and charges.”

5.   We note that Louis renounced his late father's one-half interest in the community property regime; however, no evidence was introduced to suggest or establish that neither Louis nor Rose desired to renounce their mother's one-half interest in the community property regime.

6.   Louisiana Code Civ. P. art. 685 provides, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the succession representative appointed by a court of this state is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of the deceased or of his succession, while the latter is under administration. The heirs or legatees of the deceased, whether present or representative in the state or not, need not be joined as parties, whether the action is personal, real, or mixed.”

WOLFE, J.