FLORIBEL MORENOBANEGAS v. LANCE LEWIS TRIPLE EXPRESS INC AND HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

This is a tort case involving an automobile accident. Appellant, Floribel Moreno-Banegas (“Ms. Moreno”), appeals the district court's April 28, 2025 judgment, which granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Lance H. Lewis (“Mr. Lewis”), Triple G. Express, Inc. (“Triple G.”) and Hartford Fire Insurance Company (“Hartford”) (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Appellees”), and dismissed all of Ms. Moreno's claims with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 22, 2022, Ms. Moreno was on her way to work traveling north in the right lane on Clearview Parkway (“Clearview”), a three-lane highway, toward the intersection of Airline Highway (“Airline”), in Metairie, Louisiana. At the same time, Mr. Lewis was operating a tractor-trailer rig and traveling in the middle lane on Clearview, alongside Ms. Moreno. As Mr. Lewis approached the intersection of Clearview and Airline, an SUV, traveling in the left lane and approaching a line of stopped traffic, abruptly changed from the left lane into the middle lane while travelling at an extremely slow rate of speed, directly in front of the tractor-trailer rig. In an attempt to avoid a serious accident, Mr. Lewis braked and swerved, moving his vehicle from the middle lane into the right lane where Ms. Moreno was traveling. This maneuver caused his vehicle to strike the left rear side of Ms. Moreno's vehicle.

On November 9, 2022, Ms. Moreno filed a Petition for Damages (the “petition”) in Orleans Parish Civil District Court against Appellees, alleging, among other things, that the accident was solely caused by Mr. Lewis's negligence. Ms. Moreno further alleged that Mr. Lewis was acting in the course and scope of his employment for Triple G, rendering Triple G vicariously liable for the negligent acts of Mr. Lewis under the doctrine of respondeat superior.¹ As a result of the collision, Ms. Moreno claimed to have suffered personal injuries and other damages. Mr. Lewis filed an Answer asserting general denials and the affirmative defense of the sudden emergency doctrine.²

After continued motion practice and witness depositions were completed, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Ms. Moreno's action. Appellees argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because Ms. Moreno could not meet her burden of proof on the issue of causation. They posited that Mr. Lewis made the best possible decision under the circumstances or, in the alternative, the accident in question was solely caused by the sudden emergency created by the SUV. In support of their motion, Appellees attached Mr. Lewis's deposition and excerpts from his affidavit; Ms. Moreno's deposition; dashcam footage from Mr. Lewis's tractor trailer; the deposition of Joseph Kresovsky (“Mr. Kresovsky”), Ms. Moreno's accident reconstruction expert; and the deposition of Eric Burson (“Mr. Burson”), Appellees’ accident reconstruction expert.

In opposition, Ms. Moreno contended that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding Mr. Lewis's conduct prior to the accident. Specifically, she argued that factual disputes existed as to whether Mr. Lewis: (1) was traveling at an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances; (2) failed to maintain proper attention to the roadway; (3) failed to use his turn signal prior to changing lanes, in violation of La. R.S. 32:104;³ (4) failed to ascertain that his lane change could be made safely pursuant to La. R.S. 32:79;⁴ and (5) failed to meet the heightened standard of care imposed on professional truck drivers. She attached to her opposition Mr. Lewis's deposition testimony, wherein he stated that he was unaware that Ms. Moreno's vehicle was traveling alongside his tractor-trailer, to support her argument that he failed to maintain proper attention to the roadway. Ms. Moreno also cited La. R.S. 32:104 and La. R.S. 32:79 in support of her arguments that Mr. Lewis failed to signal before changing lanes and failed to ascertain that his lane change could be made safely. Finally, Ms. Moreno relied on Mr. Lewis's deposition testimony to support her assertion that he failed to meet the heightened standard of care imposed on professional truck drivers. In sum, she avowed that Mr. Lewis's speed and inattentiveness created the sudden emergency situation that arose when the SUV suddenly entered his lane.

After discovery deadlines had lapsed, Ms. Moreno filed a post-deposition affidavit from her expert, Mr. Kresovsky, who opined that Mr. Lewis should have reduced his speed as he approached the potential hazard, namely stopped vehicles in the left lane. In a reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, Appellees objected to the admissibility of this post-deposition affidavit, in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 966D(2).⁵

The district court heard arguments on the objection and the motion for summary judgment on April 17, 2025. Ruling from the bench, the district court sustained, in part, Appellees’ objection with respect to certain statements in Mr. Kresovsky's affidavit that were deemed to be new expert opinions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court informed the parties that it would issue its ruling on the motion for summary judgment within seven days. Following, on April 28, 2025, it issued a written judgment with reasons that granted Appellees’ motion, dismissing Ms. Moreno's claims against Appellees with prejudice.⁶ Specifically, the court found that Mr. Lewis's own negligence did not create the sudden emergency. This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court's standard of review for a grant of a summary judgment is de novo, and it employs the same criteria district courts consider when determining if a summary judgment is proper. Harris v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., LLC, 20-0248, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/26/21), 322 So.3d 397, 404 (quoting Madere v. Collins, 17-0723, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/28/18), 241 So.3d 1143, 1147.

DISCUSSION

In her appeal to this Court, Ms. Moreno assigns five errors.⁷ However, we find that the crux of Ms. Moreno's appeal hinges on three issues: (1) whether the district court erred by excluding certain statements from Mr. Kresovsky's affidavit; (2) whether the district court's reasons for judgment were internally inconsistent; and (3) whether the district court erred in failing to properly apply the sudden emergency doctrine. Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we will first set forth the law pertaining to summary judgment.

Summary Judgment

It is well-established jurisprudence that “[t]he summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. The procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” La. C.C.P. art. 966A(2). “The granting of summary judgment is contingent upon the pleadings, depositions, answers to discovery, admissions on file and affidavits demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Majoue v. Fish, 23-0549, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/8/24), 385 So.3d 321, 325 (quoting Reddick v. State, 21-0197, p. 6, 328 So.3d 504, 508). “Genuine issues are ones in which reasonable persons could disagree.” Id. “[I]f reasonable persons could only reach one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue, and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. “A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute.” Id.

The mover, on a motion for summary judgment, bears the burden of proof; however, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial then the mover is not required to negate all elements of the adverse party's claims. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 “first places the burden of producing evidence at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment on the mover (normally the defendant), who can ordinarily meet that burden by submitting affidavits or by pointing out the lack of factual support for an essential element in the opponent's case.” Majoue, 23-0549, p. 5, 385 So.3d at 325 (citing Babin v. Winn-Dixie La., 00-0078, p. 4 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 39). “At that point, the party who bears the burden of persuasion at trial (usually the plaintiff) must come forth with evidence (affidavits or discovery responses) which demonstrates he or she will be able to meet the burden at trial.” Id. “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided above, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided above, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” La. C.C.P. art. 967(B). “If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him.” Id.

“Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on the lack of proof of a material fact, ‘the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the evidence presented.’ ” Watson v. Smith, 17-0913, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/16/18), 247 So.3d 811, 814 (citations omitted). “Argument of counsel and briefs, no matter how artful, are not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citations omitted). This Court has previously held that “[w]hen the evidence presented is subject to different interpretations and the trier of fact must weigh contradictory testimony and assess witness credibility on a material fact, summary judgment is not proper.” Carlin v. Clear Blue Ins. Co., 22-0566, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/8/23), 357 So.3d 533, 539 (quoting Tate v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 05-0393, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/22/06), 929 So.2d 188, 193). With these precepts in mind we turn to our de novo review.

Exclusion of Expert Testimony

Ms. Moreno complains that the district court erred when it excluded statements 7, 11 and 13 of Mr. Kresovsky's post-deposition affidavit, finding that those statements contained new expert opinions and were inadmissible. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1636(A) mandates that when a court rules against the admissibility of any evidence, “it shall either permit the party offering such evidence to make a complete record thereof, or permit the party to make a statement setting forth the nature of the evidence.” Counsel for Ms. Moreno attempted neither and failed to proffer the excluded statements.

In Howell v. Overton this Court explained that “[t]he purpose of a proffer is to preserve excluded evidence and testimony so that it is available for appellate review.” 22-0695, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/23), 382 So.3d 149, 155 n.8 (citing Foley v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 06-0983, p. 30 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 144, 165). “Without the proffer, we have no way of knowing what that evidence would have been, and [the aggrieved party] is precluded from complaining that evidence was excluded.” Id. (citing McLean v. Hunter, 495 So.2d 1298, 1305 (La. 1986)). And although the excluded statements exist in the record and are quoted in Ms. Moreno's appellate brief, “evidence not properly offered cannot be considered even if it were physically placed in the record.” Med. Rev. Panel for Bush, 21-00954, p. 7 (La. 5/13/22), 339 So.3d 1118, 1124 (citing Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88). “Appellate courts are courts of record and may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record, or receive new evidence.” Id. Having no proffered evidence in the appellate record, this assigned error is not properly before this Court for review.

Reasons for Judgment

In her brief to this Court, Ms. Moreno quotes extensively from the district court's reasons for judgment, arguing that that the district court misinterpreted portions of Mr. Kresovsky's testimony and that the judgment is internally inconsistent. This Court has invariably adhered to the tenet that a “district court's oral or written reasons for judgment form no part of the judgment, and ․ appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment.” Sunset Harbor, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, 23-0379, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/29/23), 378 So.3d 157, 163 (quoting Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571, 09-0584, 09-0585, 09-0586, p. 77 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572). “[O]ften judgments are upheld on appeal for reasons differing from those assigned by the district court.” Id., 23-0379 at p. 7, 378 So.3d at 163. As will be more fully discussed below, we agree with the final judgment of the district court, but will pretermit any discussion of the court's reasons for arriving at its conclusion.

Cause-in-Fact/Sudden Emergency Doctrine

The tort claims asserted by Ms. Moreno are based in negligence; therefore, she must establish that Mr. Lewis was negligent pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2315.⁸ “The standard negligence analysis used in determining whether to impose liability under La. C.C. art. 2315 is the duty-risk analysis.” Aguiluz v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 24-0759, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/14/25), 414 So.3d 939, 943. In Harris v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., LLC, this Court explained that a plaintiff must prove five elements to prevail under a negligence claim, which are:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element);

(2) the defendant failed to conform his conduct to the appropriate standard (the breach of duty element);

(3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element);

(4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and

(5) actual damages (the damages element)[.]

20-0248, p. 20, 322 So.3d at 411 (quoting Chanthasalo v. Deshotel, 17-0521, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/17), 234 So.3d 1103, 1107-08). “If the plaintiff fails to prove any one element by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant is not liable.” Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 22-00849, pp. 5-6 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467, 473 (quoting Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller Corp., 21-209, p. 11 (La. 10/10/21), 333 So.3d 384, 395). “A preponderance of the evidence burden requires a plaintiff to show the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.” Rosen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 12-0284, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/14/12), 104 So.3d 633 (quoting Stuart v. New City Diner, 99–2270, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/00), 758 So.2d 345, 347–48). The only element at issue in this case is the cause-in-fact element. This element “requires a determination of whether the harm would have occurred but for the defendant's alleged substandard conduct, or, when concurrent causes are involved, whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” Young v. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 20-0526, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 318 So.3d 887, 892 (citation omitted).

“The sudden emergency doctrine provides that ‘a driver without sufficient time to weigh all the circumstances and whose actions did not contribute to the emergency cannot be assessed with negligence ․’ ” Hernandez v. Northland Ins. Co., 24-0271, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/7/24), 402 So.3d 8, 14 (quoting Causey v. New Orleans Reg'l Transit Auth., 18-0983, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/20/19), 267 So.3d 187, 190). “The jurisprudence also recognizes that ‘the sudden emergency doctrine does not apply to situations in which the party asserting the doctrine was also negligent.’ ” Id. (quoting Waters v. Oliver, 16-1262, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/22/17), 223 So.3d 37, 46).

As previously noted, Ms. Moreno argues that Mr. Lewis was traveling at an excessive rate of speed for the traffic conditions, that he was inattentive and that he made an improper lane change, which caused him to strike her vehicle. She further argues that the district court misapplied the sudden emergency doctrine, contending that the court erred by not considering Mr. Lewis's actions prior to the sudden emergency. Ms. Moreno urges that as a result of Mr. Lewis’ own negligence, he is precluded from invoking the doctrine because he caused or contributed to the emergency situation.

In support of her contention that Mr. Lewis's alleged excessive speed and inattentiveness to the roadway prohibits him from invoking the sudden emergency doctrine, Ms. Moreno relies on the case of Stapleton v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp. 627 So.2d 1358, 1361 (La. 1993). In Stapleton, the defendant was a professional truck driver traveling on icy roads at a high rate of speed when he lost control of his truck in a curve and could not stop. The Supreme Court held that the sudden emergency doctrine did not apply to the defendant because “the inescapable fact is that [defendant] was travelling at an excessive speed for the prevailing weather conditions” Stapleton, 627 So.2d at 1361. The Court fixed the defendant's fault at 75%, the highest percentage awarded in the case.

Additionally, Ms. Moreno cites Davis v. Witt, for the proposition that Mr. Lewis was held to a higher standard of reasonableness because he was a professional truck driver. 02-3102, pp. 13-14 (La. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1119, 1128-29. In Witt, the defendant was a professional trucker who hauled a pole trailer that included poles, which extended seventeen feet beyond the trailer's rear axle. Id., 02-3102 at p. 2, 851 So.2d at 1122. Despite the knowledge that it was illegal to do so, the defendant proceeded to travel with such a load at night. Id. The Supreme Court held that “with [defendant's] knowledge and training as a professional truck driver, he is held to a high standard of care to the motoring public.” Id. at p. 14, 851 So.2d at 1128. The Court further held that the record evidence “clearly supports ․ that defendant's actions were so knowingly reckless and unreasonable it rendered his conduct unforeseeable.” We find the cases cited by Ms. Moreno are highly distinguishable from the instant case. Rather, the facts of this case are more analogous to the facts presented in Hernandez v. Northland Ins. Co.

In Hernandez, the defendant, while operating an 18-wheeler, struck the rear end of the plaintiff's vehicle. Hernandez, 24-0271, p. 1, 402 So.3d at 10. The plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant for damages asserting that the defendant had sufficient time and space to react to their lane change. In response, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiffs would not be able to carry their burden of proof. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs filed an appeal. This Court held that the sudden emergency doctrine was properly applied. Hernandez, 24-0271. p. 10, 402 So.3d at 14. The Court reasoned that the video evidence established that the defendant was traveling in the right lane of the interstate at the proper rate of speed when plaintiffs merged directly in front of the defendant's 18-wheeler. Id. at p. 10, 402 So.3d at 15. Although the defendant applied his breaks, the collision occurred within two seconds and the defendant had no time to react. This Court further reasoned that the defendant could not have changed lanes in order to avoid the collision because there was a vehicle traveling immediately to his left.

Our Supreme Court has made clear that “a driver confronted with a sudden emergency, such as a vehicle turning in front of him, is only required to act as a reasonable man would in similar circumstances.” Patterson v. Smith, 469 So.2d 1138, 1139 (La. 1985) (first citing Ward v. Aucoin, 222 So.2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir.1969)); (then citing Vordenbaumen v. Sweeney, 169 So.2d 165 (La. App. 1st Cir.1964)); Kirby v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 110 So.2d 182 (La. App. 1st Cir.1959). That said, “a motorist faced with a sudden emergency not of his own creation is not held to the same degree of care and calm judgment ordinarily demanded of a motorist, and he will not be penalized for failure to make the wisest selection of all possible evasive measures.” Id. (citing McMorris v. Hanover Ins. Co., 175 So.2d 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).

In the case sub judice, there is no dispute that when confronted with a sudden emergency situation, Mr. Lewis's maneuver led to the collision with Ms. Moreno's vehicle. The more pertinent question for this Court to consider is whether a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether he caused the sudden emergency. Both experts agreed in their reports and in their deposition testimony that at the time the SUV pulled in front of Mr. Lewis, Mr. Lewis was not exceeding the posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour and that his reaction time was much better than an average response time under the circumstances. Using the dashcam footage as a guide, Ms. Moreno's expert, Mr. Kresovsky, testified that Mr. Lewis was traveling at a speed of 41 miles per hour when the SUV pulled in front of him. In the following colloquy, Mr. Kresovsky responding to deposition questions, attested:

Q: So Mr. Lewis was not exceeding the speed limit; is that correct?

A: That's correct.

* * *

Q: And my assumption is, it's not in your expert report, that you have no issue with the speed at which his tractor-trailer was traveling immediately prior to that phantom SUV pulling out in from of him; is that correct?

A: I have no issue with his speed, no.

Q: You have no issue with his perception-reaction time, correct?

A: No, it was very quick.

Under oath, Mr. Burson confirmed that he agreed with these assessments.

By contrast, Ms. Moreno testified in her deposition and repeated in her affidavit that she believed Mr. Lewis was travelling too fast for the traffic conditions. However, she has offered nothing by way of evidence, save her self-serving testimony, to substantiate that claim. In fact, Ms. Moreno testified that she did not see any of the events leading to the collision with her vehicle, i.e. the SUV abruptly changing lanes directly in front of the tractor-trailer rig driven by Mr. Lewis, or the actions Mr. Lewis undertook to prevent a catastrophic accident. This Court has previously explained that “[m]ere conclusory allegations, improbable inferences and unsupported speculation cannot support a summary judgment, even if contained in an affidavit.” Harris, 20-0248 at p. 8, 322 So.3d at 405 (citing Sears v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 06-0201, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/18/06), 943 So.2d 1219, 1228). Furthermore, “[w]hile credibility determinations are not permitted at the summary judgment stage, our jurisprudence has held that a court's finding that an affidavit is self-serving is not the same as a finding based upon the affiant's credibility.” Williams v. Touro Infirmary, 23-0180, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/23), 382 So.3d 345, 356 (quoting Hardison v. Byrne, 15-0111, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/15), 182 So.3d 1110, 1116).

Again, both Ms. Moreno and Appellees attested that Mr. Lewis reacted in a span of 0.9 seconds, which is 0.6 seconds less than the average reaction time. Indeed, Ms. Moreno's expert testified that Mr. Lewis's perception-reaction time was “very quick.” In response to the assertion that Mr. Lewis failed to check his mirrors, Mr. Kresovsky concluded that regardless of whether or not Mr. Lewis checked his mirrors the outcome would not have changed. Mr. Kresovsky testified that Mr. Lewis had a decision to either steer left, keep going straight or steer to the right when the white SUV pulled out in front of him. It was Mr. Kresovsky's opinion that Mr. Lewis made the best choice considering it was the least impactful under the circumstances. Moreover, the video evidence confirms that Mr. Lewis was traveling approximately 41 miles per hour—below the posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour—in the middle lane when the SUV abruptly merged directly in front of him, leaving him almost no time to react.

Consequently, based on our de novo review, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment. We find that the accident at issue was caused as a result of the sudden emergency created when the SUV abruptly merged directly in front the tractor-trailer driven by Mr. Lewis. Despite this, we find that Mr. Lewis's reaction time of 0.9 seconds—remarkably above the average response time—and his actions were reasonable under the circumstances. We find no error in the district court's judgment.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The doctrine of respondeat superior—as codified in La. C.C. art. 2320—provides, in pertinent part:Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.* * *In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the masters or employers ․ might have prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it.The master is answerable for the offenses and quasi-offenses committed by his servants, according to the rules which are explained under the title: Of quasi-contracts, and of offenses and quasi-offenses.

2.   The sudden emergency doctrine will be more fully discussed infra.

3.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:104 provides:A. No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is in proper position upon the roadway as required in R.S. 32:101, or turn a vehicle to enter a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.B. Whenever a person intends to make a right or left turn which will take his vehicle from the highway it is then traveling, he shall give a signal of such intention in the manner described hereafter and such signal shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.C. No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided herein to the driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such signal.D. The signals provided for in R.S. 32:105(B) shall be used to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes or start from a parked position and shall not be flashed on one side only on a parked or disabled vehicle, or flashed as a courtesy or “do pass” signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear.

4.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:79 provides:Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules, in addition to all others consistent herewith, shall apply.(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.(2) The department may erect signs directing slow moving traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction, and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of such signs.

5.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966D(2) provides:The court shall consider only those documents filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment but shall not consider any document that is excluded pursuant to a timely filed objection. Any objection to a document shall be raised in a timely filed opposition or reply memorandum. The court shall consider all objections prior to rendering judgment. The court shall specifically state on the record or in writing whether the court sustains or overrules the objections raised.

6.   The notice of judgment was mailed on May 1, 2025.

7.   Ms. Moreno assigns five assignments of errors which are listed below:1. The district court erred in applying summary judgment law by: (1) weighing evidence and making factual findings on genuine issues of material fact about which reasonable persons could disagree concerning the causes of the accident; and (2) by failing to recognize that all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence should be made in favor of Ms. Moreno, as the party opposing summary judgment.2. The district court erred in failing to properly apply the sudden emergency doctrine by: (1) finding that Mr. Lewis acted reasonably under the circumstances, without regard to the higher standard of care required of Mr. Lewis as a professional truck driver; and (2) considering only actions taken by Mr. Lewis after the sudden emergency arose, and by disregarding his negligent actions which occurred before he encountered the sudden emergency, which actions were causes of the accident.3. The district court erred in rendering a judgment which is internally inconsistent on whether Mr. Lewis breached his duty of care. The trial court granted summary judgment despite also finding that Plaintiff had established genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) whether Mr. Lewis was traveling at an excessive speed for the traffic conditions; (2) whether Mr. Lewis was inattentive before the emergency arose; and (3) whether Mr. Lewis made an improper lane change into Plaintiff's lane of travel.4. The district court erred by misinterpreting the testimony of Ms. Moreno's expert witness, Joseph Kresovsky, which the trial court erroneously used to grant the motion for summary judgment.5. The district court erred by excluding from the summary judgment evidence, certain statements of expert witness Joseph Kresovsky.

8.   Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 provides in pertinent part that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”

Judge Paula A. Brown

JENKINS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS