STATE OF LOUISIANA v. FABIAN HARRISON (2026)

This appeal arises from the October 2, 2024, conviction of Fabian Harrison for vehicular homicide. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of imposing the requisite fine in accordance with La. R.S. La. R.S. 14:32.1(B).

BACKGROUND

On May 11, 2023, the state filed a bill of information charging defendant with one count of vehicular homicide under La. R.S. 14:32.1. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and a two-day trial ensued on October 1, 2024.

On October 2, 2024, after multiple witnesses testified, defendant moved for new counsel. The district court denied the motion, but appointed a public defender as “shadow” counsel for the remainder of the trial. Following the presentation of evidence on October 2, 2024, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged, finding defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of the offense was greater than 0.15, which was a contributing factor to the victim's death.

On October 9, 2025, defendant filed motions for a new trial; for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal; and for a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence. On January 10, 2025, the district court denied defendant's post-trial motions and imposed a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment with the first five years to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant filed and the court granted his motion for appeal on March 25, 2025.

TRIAL TESTIMONY

During trial, Natalia Carter testified that she was employed as the custodian of records for the Orleans Parish Communication District and authenticated the recorded 911 calls and corresponding incident recall sheet introduced by the state. On the recorded call, the caller stated he was driving toward the Westbank on US-90 and a brown pickup truck had exploded behind him and had hit other vehicles in the process. He was not sure what had happened but stated “I guess someone wasn't paying attention to the flashers flashing and rear ended them.”

Kayla Eppinatte was the key witness for the state. She testified that on November 13, 2022, she was driving her 2018 Yukon XL SUV in New Orleans with passengers, Trent Lawry in the front seat and Cayden Johnson in the backseat when she was involved in the traffic collision. She recalled the incident as follows:

I drove them down to Bourbon Street and we were leaving and we got back on [Interstate] ninety․on the ramp. And I couldn't even tell you exactly what the onramp was, but it was dark underneath there. And so, when we went to—I had a green light and so, when we're going onto the on ramp, I'm in the second lane from the right and I'm going up it and once I pass through the green light, I'm—I don't know exactly how far I was, but I noticed a tan car coming, like around, and then I seen (sic) the stalled car in front. And I'm trying to get over but I couldn't even get over all the way to the other lane before the tan car struck the stalled vehicle and then they struck me. The wreck struck me. I couldn't go any further into the right lane because I'd hit the concrete wall.

She clarified that the tan vehicle had “come from under the interstate or something, coming on the ramp with me. And when I saw it, it was like, right here at me.” She stated that the tan car rear ended the stalled vehicle, propelling it into her vehicle, which caused her to hit the concrete wall and “spin out of control.” Ms. Eppinatte could not describe the stalled vehicle because “[i]t was dark [and] there were no flashers on it.”

She further explained that the stalled vehicle caught fire when it was hit, then it “went forward and then made a ninety-degree cut to the right wall. And all the whole time it․felt like it kept exploding. Like, I felt like it exploded three times.” Ms. Eppinatte testified that she could see someone in the driver's seat “but [the vehicle] was so engulfed in flames” she was unable to determine whether the person was male or female.

Ms. Eppinatte denied that she had consumed any alcohol that night and denied suffering any serious injuries in the collision. She stated that she and another person at the scene unsuccessfully attempted to rescue the injured driver (the victim) from the flaming vehicle. Ms. Eppinatte testified that the driver of the tan car (the defendant) was “moaning and groaning,” and “he look[ed] like he was in bad shape” when the police pulled him from his vehicle.

Ms. Eppinatte testified that she did not recognize defendant in court and was unable to positively identify him as the driver of the tan vehicle. She also denied hitting either vehicle, stating instead, “[t]heir wreck hit me.”

NOPD Detective Richard Chambers testified that he investigated the traffic collision in this case, which he stated “encompassed․all three travel lanes of US-90 at Tchoupitoulas․in the west-bound direction.” He described the victim's vehicle, a Ford Explorer Sport Trac, as “completely burned,” including the tires, explaining that “you could see the charred remains of the [victim]” inside. He also observed “a Malibu and a Yukon GMC” on the shoulder that had sustained damage, as well as multiple skid marks and various fluids spread across the highway. He stated that he observed no skid marks leading up to the collision point. Detective Chambers explained that skid marks are generally caused by either “braking or could be a rapid deceleration of the vehicle․in this case it would be contact with a vehicle that's stopped.”

Detective Chambers testified that defendant's vehicle sustained “inboard or inward intrusion” damage, in which “the front of the vehicle's pushed in towards the inner passenger compartment of the vehicle.” He stated that type of damage is usually sustained by “full contact front to rear [of] whatever vehicle it struck.” He further testified he attempted to retrieve the “event data recorder” from the victim's vehicle to determine the speed defendant was travelling when the collision occurred, but “the vehicle was so damaged that [he] could not get into the interior of the vehicle to retrieve that device.” He stated that the victim's vehicle had also sustained inboard damage “from the rear to the inner passenger compartment,” and the Yukon had sustained damage to the left front and left rear of the vehicle. He also testified that the posted speed limit at the location of the incident was fifty miles per hour.

Detective Chambers testified he determined defendant “crashed into” the victim's vehicle in the center lane of the highway, and that Ms. Eppinatte's vehicle “was struck by a vehicle, but we couldn't determine what vehicle.” He further testified that he obtained a search warrant for defendant's medical records from the hospital where he was treated following the crash, which reflected defendant's blood alcohol level was “0.155 grams percent.” He also stated that Ms. Eppinatte did not appear intoxicated or impaired when he questioned her, and a follow-up inquiry at the hospital that treated her revealed “no impairment found.”

Detective Chambers also testified that defendant provided a statement explaining he and a friend had patronized “a restaurant or bar” that evening and defendant was returning to his residence after dropping off his friend. Defendant “didn't recall anything in regards to the crash.”

On cross, Detective Chambers agreed that he observed damage to the front end of the victim's vehicle, although he did not know how it was caused. He also did not know how long the victim's vehicle was stopped on the highway before it was hit, and stated that no witness reported observing the victim's emergency flashers deployed. He further testified he did not attempt to access the event data recorder from Ms. Eppinatte's Yukon to determine how fast it was travelling at the time of impact, and he agreed that the coroner's report reflected that the victim's blood alcohol level was .142 percent. Detective Chambers also testified that he did not know how the victim ended up lying across both the driver and passenger seats, nor could he determine how or when the victim's car initially caught fire.

Dr. Cynthia Gardner was qualified by the district court as an expert in forensic pathology after stipulation by the parties, and testified she conducted the autopsy of the victim on November 14, 2022 and authored the corresponding report. Dr. Gardner testified that the victim sustained “thermal injury” on nearly his entire body, “charring through the soft tissues to the bone.” The victim's mouth, trachea, and lungs were coated in soot, indicating that he “was alive at the time of the fire and was breathing.” She also stated that the victim's left hand was “completely absent” and his left leg had been severed, although she explained it was not uncommon for limbs to detach “in a severely burned body.” Dr. Gardner denied observing any blunt force trauma, stating, “[t]he only injuries were related to the fire.” She testified that the “cause of death was due to thermal injuries and inhalation of super-heated gasses [or] smoke inhalation.”

On cross-examination, Dr. Gardner agreed that the absence of blunt force trauma indicated the victim was likely conscious immediately following the initial rear-end vehicle impact, and she could not determine “how long after the actual impact that the fire consumed him.” She also could not determine whether the victim's substantial inebriation affected his ability to exit his flaming vehicle.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record for errors patent, as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, reveals two which merit discussion.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 – Mandatory Sentencing Delay

First, the district court failed to observe the twenty-four-hour sentencing delay after denying defendant's motion for a new trial pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 873. That article provides that if a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is denied, unless the defendant expressly waives the delay or pleads guilty. Although the article provides that sentencing may be imposed immediately following the court's denial of a new trial motion if the defendant expressly waives the delay, the sentencing transcript contains no indication that the defendant waived the statutory twenty-four-hour sentencing delay.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a defendant's pronouncement of his readiness for sentencing may operate as an express waiver of the twenty-four-hour sentencing delay, but a defendant's mere participation in the sentencing hearing is insufficient to constitute an express waiver required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 873. State v. Kisack, 2016-0797, p. 7 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So. 3d 1201, 1205. The Kisack Court also held that “an error in failing to observe the statutory sentencing delay may still be found harmless.” Id. at 1204. However, the Kisack Court also noted “it is difficult to conclude the error is harmless [when the defendant] faced a sentencing range of 20 years to life and received the maximum sentence authorized for a fourth-felony offender for possession of a contraband cell phone.” Id. at 1206.

In State v. White, the Supreme Court opined that such an error in failing to observe the statutory sentencing delay is “harmless” when “there has been no objection raised regarding the sentence imposed, and no showing or suggestion that defendant was prejudiced[.]” State v. White, 404 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (La. 1981). In State v. Moffett, this Court found the same error “harmless” when “the sentence was imposed two months after the defendant's conviction, the defense counsel provided a letter of mitigation prior to sentencing, and the sentence imposed by the trial judge was half of the maximum sentence allowed by law.” State v. Moffett, 2017-0769, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/18), 247 So.3d 908, 911.

Here, defendant filed motions for a new trial; a post-verdict judgment of acquittal; and for a downward departure from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. Three months after his conviction, following the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence, the court immediately imposed sentence without asking whether defendant was ready for sentencing, or if he waived the required delays.

Defendant did not object to the trial court's imposition of the sentence without observing the mandatory delay, and numerous letters of mitigation had been introduced on defendant's behalf prior to sentencing. Moreover, the sentence imposed – fifteen years imprisonment with the first five years to be served without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence – is half of the maximum allowable sentence of thirty years imprisonment. See La. R.S. 14.32.1(B). Further, defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal.

Accordingly, we find the trial court's failure to observe the mandatory delay in imposing defendant's sentence to be harmless.

La. R.S. 14:32.1(B) – Mandatory Fine

La. R.S. 14:32.1(B) provides:

Whoever commits the crime of vehicular homicide shall be fined not less than two thousand dollars nor more than fifteen thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years. At least three years of the sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. If the operator's blood alcohol concentration is 0.15 percent or more by weight based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood, then at least five years of the sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

This Court has opined that “a reviewing court must remand cases for the imposition of a mandatory fine where the trial court failed to do so[.]” State v. Williams, 2024-0105, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/9/24), 400 So.3d 1194, 1199, citing State v. Williams, 2003-0302, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/6/03), 859 So.2d 751, 753.

Here, the jury found defendant's blood alcohol concentration was above 0.15 percent. However, the district court failed to impose the mandatory fine of “not less than two thousand dollars nor more than fifteen thousand dollars[,]” in accordance with La. R.S. 14:32.1(B). Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of imposing the requisite fine.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error Number 1 – Insufficient Evidence

Defendant first asserts that the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Specifically, defendant argues the state failed to prove that his blood alcohol level was a contributing factor to the victim's death as is required to convict him of vehicular homicide.

The Supreme Court provided the standard for review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979):

․the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. (Emphasis in original).

“Under the Jackson standard, the rational credibility determinations of the trier of fact are not to be second guessed by a reviewing court.” State v. Williams, 2011-0414 p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/29/12), 85 So. 3d 759, 771.

Conflicting statements as to factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency. State v. Jones, 537 So.2d 1244 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989). Such a determination rests solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Id. A trier of fact's determination as to the credibility of a witness is a question of fact entitled to great weight, and its determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence. State v. Vessell, 450 So.2d 938 (La. 1984).

State v. Wells, 2010-1338, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So. 3d 303, 306. “The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a conviction.” Id. The finder of fact must determine, from facts gleaned from direct evidence and inferred from circumstantial evidence, considering the relative strength and weakness of each inference and finding, whether this body of preliminary facts excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So. 3d 745, 753; State v. Rose, 2005-0396, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/13/07), 955 So. 2d 270, 272.

It is also well settled that “[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” State v. Richards, 2011–0349, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/11), 78 So. 3d 864, 869, citing State v. Cummings, 668 So.2d 1132 (La. 1996). “Upon review of the record as a whole, if rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence must be adopted.” State v. Bradley, 2018-0734, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/15/19), 272 So. 3d 94, 97, citing State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1310 (La. 1988).

When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence “must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.” Id. La. R.S. 15:438 is an evidentiary guideline for appellate review, and is not a separate test from the Jackson v. Virginia test. State v. Brown, 2012-0587, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/13) 157 So. 3d 616, 621; State v. Mack, 2013-1311, p. 9 (La. 5/7/14), 144 So. 3d 983, 989.

La. R.S. 14:32.1 defines vehicular homicide as

the killing of a human being caused proximately or caused directly by an offender engaged in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle․ whether or not the offender had the intent to cause death or great bodily harm, whenever any of the following conditions exists and such condition was a contributing factor to the killing:

(2) The operator's blood alcohol concentration is 0.08 percent or more by weight based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.

(4) The operator is impaired by alcoholic beverages.

To obtain a conviction for vehicular homicide, the state must prove:

1) the killing of a human being; 2) caused proximately or caused directly by an offender engaged in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle; 3) a prohibited degree of intoxication; and 4) a link between the intoxication and the killing. Most importantly, the link between the intoxication and the killing does not have to be a “proximate cause,” but simply a “contributing factor.”

State v. Leger, 2017-2084, p. 10 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609, 615-16. Proximate cause is “one that directly produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred,” and a “contributing cause” is a “a factor that - though not the primary cause – [which] plays a part in producing a result.”

This Court has opined that:

A causal relation between the defendant's conduct and the harm for which the prosecutor seeks to impose criminal sanctions is an essential element of every crime. Causation is a question of fact which has to be considered in the light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the ultimate harm and its relation to the actor's conduct. M. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law, §§ 5, 5.2 (1978). A defendant should not be held responsible for remote and indirect consequences which a reasonable person could not have foreseen as likely to have flowed from his conduct or from those consequences which would have occurred regardless of his conduct. Id.

State v. Vidrine, 2019-0906, p. 28 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/20), 298 So. 3d 781, 797, quoting State v. Kalathakis, 563 So. 2d 228, 231 (La. 1990); see also Leger, 2017-2084, p. 13, 284 So. 3d at 617.

Defendant in this case relies primarily on State v. Bailey, 2004-1571, p. 11 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/6/05), 905 So. 2d 303, 310. In Bailey, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal found the facts of that case “precluded the state from proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the intoxication of the defendant combined with her operation of the vehicle cause[d] [the victim's] death. Rather the accident was unavoidable.”

Defendant also relies on State v. Archer, 619 So. 2d 1071, 1074-75 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), wherein the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal concluded “the state did not sufficiently establish that defendant's unlawful blood alcohol concentration combined with his operation of the van to cause the victim's death.”

Although the facts of Bailey and Archer are similar to this case, those cases were decided prior to the 2008 amendment to the vehicular homicide statute which added “the causation-qualifying phrase: ‘whenever any of the following conditions exist and such condition was a contributing factor to the killing[.]’ ” State v. Leger, 2017-2084 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609, 615. [Emphasis ours]. Stated differently, the 2008 amendment codified the standard that “the link between the intoxication and the killing does not have to be a ‘proximate cause,’ but simply a ‘contributing factor.’ ” Id. at 616. Accordingly, Bailey and Archer are distinguishable as to the law of this case, and the more current vehicular homicide statute controls.

Here, eyewitness Kayla Eppinatte's trial testimony is pivotal to understanding the defendant's actions immediately preceding the accident. First, Eppinatte testified she viewed the victim's stalled vehicle on the road and was able to maneuver around said vehicle without initiating a collision. Eppinatte further testified “I seen (sic) the stalled car in front of me”. Moreover, although defendant's vehicle pushed the victim's vehicle into Mrs. Eppinatte's vehicle, causing her to spin out of control and crash into the concrete barrier, Mrs. Eppinatte maintained the wherewithal to attempt to provide any assistance she could to the victim after the accident. Eppinatte further testified she had not consumed any alcohol prior to the accident, and NOPD Detective Chambers stated she did not appear impaired or intoxicated when he responded to the scene. Mrs. Eppinatte's medical records from the hospital immediately after the accident revealed “no impairment found”. Eppinatte testified that when the responding officers pulled defendant from his vehicle “he look[ed] like he was in bad shape.”

Unlike Ms. Eppinatte, the defendant's BAC was .155 grams percent when the hospital drew his blood around 3:26 a.m., approximately forty-five (45) minutes after the accident occurred. Also unlike Mrs. Eppinatte, defendant was evidently unable to maneuver around the victim's stalled vehicle. Moreover, an investigating officer dispatched to the scene testified that defendant provided a statement wherein he indicated he “didn't recall anything in regards to the crash.”

Although there are similarities between Mrs. Eppinatte's and defendant's experience on the night of the accident, there is one marked difference – Eppinatte was sober; defendant consumed more than the legal limit of alcohol. Both Eppinatte and defendant entered the onramp to US90 at Carondelet, defendant behind Eppinatte. Eppinatte merged to the middle lane with defendant following course. When Eppinatte saw the stalled vehicle and avoided colliding with it, defendant apparently was unable do the same. An investigating officer also testified there were no skid marks observed before the location defendant's vehicle collided with the victim's vehicle, indicating the defendant did not even attempt to apply the breaks prior to the collision.

Reviewing this case under the Jackson standard wherein “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt[.,]” this Court believes a rational trier of fact could have found defendant's consumption of alcohol on the night of the accident to be “a factor that - though not the primary cause – play[ed] a part in producing a result.” State v. Leger, 2017-2084, p. 10 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609, 615-16. Here, that result was the victim's death. As we have noted, following 2008 legislative amendment to vehicular homicide statute, “the link between the intoxication and the killing does not have to be a ‘proximate cause,’ but simply a ‘contributing factor.’ ” Id.

Accordingly, we find no merit to defendant's first assignment of error.

Assignment of Error No.: 2 – Insufficiency of Counsel

This Court finds no merit to this assignment of error at this time. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that the “benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”

Generally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are more properly raised in an application for post-conviction relief where the district court can conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the matter, if one is warranted. See State v. Leger, 05–0011, p. 44 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 142; see also State v. Small, 13–1334, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/27/14), 147 So.3d 1274, 1283. Nevertheless, where the record contains evidence sufficient to decide the issue, and it is raised on appeal by an assignment of error, courts may consider the issue in the interest of judicial economy. See Leger, 05–0011, p. 44, 936 So.2d at 142.

State v. Paulson, 2015-0454, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/30/15), 177 So.3d 360, 367.

This Court agrees with the Paulson Court. Here, defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is more properly raised in an application for post-conviction relief where, if warranted, a full evidentiary hearing on the matter can be conducted.

DECREE

Considering the foregoing, we affirm defendant's conviction for vehicular homicide and remand the case to the district court for the limited purpose of imposing the requisite fine under La. R.S. 14:32.1(B).

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR IMPOSITION OF FINE

Judge Daniel L. Dysart