STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ALBERT MARSHALL (2026)

Relator, the State (“the State”), seeks review of the trial court's March 5, 2026 ruling, which granted the motion to correct an illegal sentence filed by Respondent-Defendant, Albert Marshall (“Defendant”). For the following reasons, we grant the State's writ application; vacate the trial court's ruling; and reinstate the originally-imposed concurrent sentences of twenty years Defendant received pursuant to his guilty plea for armed robbery with a firearm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July of 2023, a grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging Defendant with several offenses, including: six counts of armed robbery with a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3,¹ and two counts of illegal possession of stolen things, in violation of La. R.S. 14:69.²

The minute entry, dated May 8, 2015, obtained from the Clerk Connect – Orleans Parish system indicates that Defendant pled guilty to all the charges. The minute entry states:

THE DEFENDANT, ALBERT B MARSHALL APPEARED FOR PRE-TRIAL HEARING WITH COUNSEL, DAN ENGELBERG DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY FOR COUNT 1 RS 14 64.3 PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED. FOR COUNT 2 RS 14 64.3 PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED. FOR COUNT 3 RS 14 64.3 PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED. FOR COUNT 4 RS 14 64.3 PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED. FOR COUNT 5 RS 14 64.3 PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED. FOR COUNT 6 RS 14 64.3 PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED. FOR COUNT 8 RS 14 69(B)(1) PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED. FOR COUNT 7 RS 14 69(B)(3) PLED GUILTY AS CHARGED. ALBERT B MARSHALL DEFENDANT WAIVED DELAYS. SENTENCE: AS TO COUNT 1, 20 YEARS, AT DOC AT HARD LABOR. CONCURRENT WITH THESE COUNTS: WITH ALL COUNTS IN THIS MATTER. CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. **THE COURT ORDERS CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED FROM 12/19/11 THRU 3/1/13 AS THIS CASE IS A REINSTITUTION OF CASE # 510-677. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: THE JUDGE ISSUED AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT FROM POSSESSING OR PURCHASING A FIREARM. (LA R.S. 13:753A(5)) AS TO COUNT 2, 20 YEARS, AT DOC AT HARD LABOR. CONCURRENT WITH THESE COUNTS: WITH ALL COUNTS IN THIS MATTER. CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: THE JUDGE ISSUED AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT FROM POSSESSING OR PURCHASING A FIREARM. (LA R.S. 13:753A(5)) AS TO COUNT 3, 20 YEARS, AT DOC AT HARD LABOR. CONCURRENT WITH THESE COUNTS: WITH ALL COUNTS IN THIS MATTER. CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: THE JUDGE ISSUED AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT FROM POSSESSING OR PURCHASING A FIREARM. (LA R.S. 13:753A(5)) AS TO COUNT 4, 20 YEARS, AT DOC AT HARD LABOR. CONCURRENT WITH THESE COUNTS: WITH ALL COUNTS IN THIS MATTER. CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: THE JUDGE ISSUED AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT FROM POSSESSING OR PURCHASING A FIREARM. (LA R.S. 13:753A(5)) AS TO COUNT 5, 20 YEARS, AT DOC AT HARD LABOR. CONCURRENT WITH THESE COUNTS: WITH ALL COUNTS IN THIS MATTER. CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: THE JUDGE ISSUED AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT FROM POSSESSING OR PURCHASING A FIREARM. (LA R.S. 13:753A(5)) AS TO COUNT 6, 20 YEARS, AT DOC AT HARD LABOR. CONCURRENT WITH THESE COUNTS: WITH ALL COUNTS IN THIS MATTER. CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: THE JUDGE ISSUED AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT FROM POSSESSING OR PURCHASING A FIREARM. (LA R.S. 13:753A(5)) AS TO COUNT 8, 10 YEARS, AT DOC AT HARD LABOR. CONCURRENT WITH THESE COUNTS: WITH ALL COUNTS IN THIS MATTER. CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: THE JUDGE ISSUED AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT FROM POSSESSING OR PURCHASING A FIREARM. (LA R.S. 13:753A(5)) AS TO COUNT 7, 10 DAYS, AT OPP. CONCURRENT WITH THESE COUNTS: WITH ALL COUNTS IN THIS MATTER. CONCURRENT WITH THESE CASES: WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE. CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: THE JUDGE ISSUED AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANT FROM POSSESSING OR PURCHASING A FIREARM. (LA R.S. 13:753A(5)) STATE AGREED NOT TO FILE MULTIPLE BILL. CASE CLOSED, THIS DEFENDANT.

With regard to the robbery offenses, the plea form provides that Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the crime of armed robbery; “underst[oo]d that the sentencing range in this case is 15-99,”³ and that he “underst[oo]d that [his] sentence in this case will be “20 years” for “count 1-6” to be served concurrently with all counts and for any other offenses.⁴ The State contends that at the top of the plea form there is a handwritten notation that provides that the State agreed not to file a multiple bill. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years in accordance with the guilty plea form and the minute entry.

In 2015 and in 2016, Defendant attempted to obtain a copy of his guilty plea/Boykin transcript. Correspondence from the trial court, in August 2016, indicates that a “request has been made for production of transcript of your Guilty Plea and Sentencing Colloquy” and that “[o]nce completed, the documents will be sent directly to you.” The letter further stated “[i]f this Court can be of further assistance please contact us.” The plea transcript was never produced.

According to the record, Defendant did not request further assistance from the trial court until November 2025, when Defendant filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In the motion, Defendant argued that he was “indicted and convicted of only La. R.S. 14:64.3,” which provides a five-year enhancement of a sentence where a firearm is used in the commission of an armed robbery under La. R.S. 14:64. (emphasis in original). Defendant claimed that when a defendant is “charged with the enhancement of using a firearm in the commission of an armed robbery, he must be charged separately with violations of La. R.S. 14:64 and La. R.S. 14:64.3.” Defendant maintained that because the record shows he only pled guilty to the five-year firearm enhancement (and not the underlying offense of La. R.S. 14:64), his sentence is illegal and should be vacated.

The State opposed the motion, arguing that the sentences are legal because plea for armed robbery with a firearm “necessarily entails a plea to armed robbery (10-99 years) and a plea to the relevant firearm enhancement (an additional 5 years).” The State thus claimed that the twenty years Defendant received falls within the legal sentencing range. The State also contended that the motion filed by Defendant could be construed as an application for post conviction relief and should be denied as untimely.

The record provides that the motion was set for hearing but continued so the trial court could obtain a copy of Defendant's plea transcript. However, the trial court was unable to locate the transcript and on February 9, 2026, the trial court reset the matter for March 5, 2026. The parties submitted supplemental briefing to the trial court on February 27, 2026.

At the March 5, 2026 hearing, after considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court granted the motion to correct illegal sentence and resentenced Defendant to five years for counts one through six. The trial court stated, in relevant part:

This is the problem I'm having is that quite frankly as a Judge, I don't understand this Boykin. They have different crimes in different places.5 Granted they have the time that he is serving, but I don't even know that [La. R.S. 14:]63.3 has 20 years associated with it. Then if we go look at the minutes from this case, the minutes are only going to reflect that he was sentenced on a firearm enhancement and he got 20 years on the firearm enhancement, which I think we can all agree is an illegal sentence.

․

In all the years that I've practiced, I've never seen that happen where a person gets sentenced on the firearm enhancement and not the underlying charges as well.

․

[W]e are going to correct the illegal sentence. This Court is going to deem that this sentence is, in fact, illegal, and I'm going to sentence him to the five years max that I can sentence him.

The State's timely writ application follows.

DISCUSSION

In its writ application, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting “relief in any form” from Defendant's “negotiated 20-year concurrent sentences.”⁶

La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) provides that an “illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review.” “A claim that a sentence is illegal is primarily restricted to those instances in which the term of the prisoner's sentence is not authorized by the statute or statutes which govern the penalty authorized for the crime for which the prisoner has been convicted.” State v. Mead, 2014-1051, p. 3, (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/22/15), 165 So.3d 1044, 1047 (emphasis removed) (citations omitted). Therefore, “a sentence is illegal when its duration falls outside of the statutorily-provided sentencing limits for the offense of which the prisoner has been convicted.” Mead, 2014-1051, p. 4, 165 So.3d at 1047 (citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2 A(1)).

“An application for post conviction relief will ordinarily not be considered if it is filed more than two years after a defendant's conviction and sentence become final.” Mead, 2014-1051, p. 9, 165 So.3d 1044 at 1050; La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) (“[n]o application for post conviction relief ․ shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final”).

Further, there is a legal presumption that judicial proceedings are regular. State v. Lamizana, 2021-0409, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/23/24), 409 So.3d 7, 14 (citing La. R.S. 15:432, which provides that “[a] legal presumption relieves him in whose favor it exists from the necessity of any proof ․ such is the presumption attaching to the regularity of judicial proceedings”). Generally, the “party seeking relief bears the burden of proof.” Id. (citing La. R.S. 15:439, which states that “[t]he burden of proof is upon him alleging the existence of a fact”). Additionally, a defendant bears the burden of showing entitlement to post conviction relief. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2.

La. R.S. 14:64 governs armed robbery offenses and provides:

A. Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon

B. Whoever commits the crime of armed robbery shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

La. R.S. 14:64.3(A) provides for the enhancement of the sentence for armed robbery and states:

When the dangerous weapon used in the commission of the crime of armed robbery is a firearm, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for an additional period of five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The additional penalty imposed pursuant to this Subsection shall be served consecutively to the sentence imposed under the provisions of R.S. 14:64.

This Court has recognized that the “charge of armed robbery with a firearm (La. R.S. 14:64.3) is not distinct from armed robbery (La. R.S. 14:64); it simply subjects the defendant to a five-year sentence enhancement based on the use of a firearm during the commission of the offense.” State v. Myles, 2023-0585, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/5/24), 384 So.3d 938, 943, writ denied, 2024-00291 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So. 3d 603, and writ denied sub nom. State v. Smith, 2024-00258 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So. 3d 609 (citing State v. Durant, 2000-1246, p. 2, n. 1 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/00), 776 So.2d 1265, 1267 n. 1).

La. R.S. 14:64.3 thus requires that the trial court impose “an additional period of five years imprisonment” to be “served consecutively to the sentence imposed under R.S. 14:64” “when the dangerous weapon used in the commission of the crime of armed robbery is a firearm.” Defendant therefore could not have pled guilty to the firearm enhancement set forth in La. R.S. 14:64.3 without first pleading guilty to armed robbery. Moreover, armed robbery is subject to a sentence of 10 to 99 years and with a firearm enhancement subject to an additional 5 years. Thus, the twenty-year sentences Defendant received for six counts of armed robbery with a firearm fall within the legal sentencing range. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting Defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence. Accordingly, we grant the writ application, vacate the trial court's ruling, and reinstate Defendant's originally-imposed (and bargained for) concurrent sentences of twenty years imprisonment for armed robbery with a firearm.

WRIT GRANTED; RULING VACATED; ORIGINAL SENTENCES REINSTATED

I find no error in the trial court's correcting Respondent's illegal sentence arising out of the sentence imposed for Respondent's guilty plea to six counts of violations of the firearm enhancement statute.

La. R. S. 14:64.3; La. R.S. 14:64

Respondent's counseled motion to correct an illegal sentence avers that he pled guilty on May 8, 2015, solely to the firearm enhancement statute—La. R.S. 14:64.3—and not armed robbery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:64. The minute entries introduced into evidence at the hearing of Respondent's motion to correct an illegal sentence document that Respondent pled guilty to six counts of violating the armed robbery firearm enhancement statute. He was sentenced to twenty years on each count, to run concurrently, without any reference in the minute entries to La. R.S. 14:64, the armed robbery statute.

Although the majority agrees with the State that Respondent “could not have pled guilty to the firearm enhancement set forth in La. R.S. 14:64.3 without first pleading guilty to armed robbery,” the trial court noted, “we got confusion on the Boykin form itself.” The trial court acknowledged:

THE COURT:

This is the problem I'm having is that quite frankly as a Judge, I don't understand this Boykin. They have different crimes in different places. Granted they have the time that he is serving, but I don't even know that 63.3 has 20 years associated with it. Then if we go look at the minutes from this case, the minutes are only going to reflect that he was sentenced on a firearm enhancement and he got 20 years on the firearm enhancement, which I think we can all agree is an illegal sentence.

The State offered no objective evidence to rebut Respondent's position that the minute entries showed he pled guilty to the firearm enhancement statute only. In particular, despite Respondent's pro se requests, a copy of the sentencing/Boykin transcript was never produced. Therefore, notwithstanding the majority's implication of an armed robbery guilty plea, the express, documented record only supports that Respondent pled guilty to violating the firearm enhancement statute.

La. C.Cr. P. art. 930.8(A); La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A)

The trial court added that the conflicts on the Boykin form raised questions as to Respondent's intent and whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. The State countered that any argument as to whether Respondent's plea was “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made is a quintesential post-conviction relief argument.” Accordingly, the State indicated its intent to lodge a procedural objection to the timeliness of any post conviction relief application made by Respondent.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) provides in part, that “no application for post conviction relief ․ shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) establishes that an “illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review.” In the present matter, Respondent did not file an application for post conviction relief, but a motion to correct an illegal sentence arising out of his guilty plea to the firearm enhancement statute. Moreover, in response to the State's effort to characterize the relief sought by Respondent as an application for post conviction relief, the trial court stated:

The COURT:

In that case, we are going to correct the illegal sentence. This Court is going to deem that this sentence is, in fact, illegal, and I'm going to sentence him to the five years max that I can sentence him.

Respondent's motion to correct an illegal sentence is not subject to any time limitations and therefore was properly before the court for consideration.

Legality of Sentence

Louisiana Revised Statute 14:64.3(A) provides, in part, that: “[w]hen the dangerous weapon used in the robbery is a firearm, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for an additional period of five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” Therefore, the concurrent twenty-year sentences assessed for a violation of the armed robbery statute clearly exceeded the statutory sentencing limits imposed under the firearm enhancement statute.

Based on the foregoing, I find the trial court did not err in granting Respondent's motion to correct an illegal sentence and re-sentencing Respondent.

I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The count one of the robbery offense allegedly occurred on December 10, 2011; count two on December 16, 2011; count three on December 17, 2011; count four on December 17, 2011; count five on December 18, 2011; and count six on June 25, 2013.

2.   Both illegal possession of stolen goods occurred on December 19, 2011. The seventh count was illegal possession of stolen cell phone valued at less than five thousand dollars under La. R.S. 14:69(B)(1) and the eighth count was illegal possession of stolen motorcycle valued at fifteen hundred dollars or more under La. R.S.14:69(B)(3).

3.   The parties agree that the plea form should have provided a sentencing range of “15-104” rather than “15-99.”

4.   Defendant pled guilty to the other offense in exchange for 10 years on the violation of La.R.S. 14:69(B)(1), and 10 days on the violation of La. R.S. 14:69(B)(3). All sentences to be served concurrently and with credit for time served.

5.   The record reflects that the plea form lists “63.3” which is the crime of “[e]ntry on or remaining in places or on land after being forbidden,” rather than “64.3” for armed robbery/enhanced penalty for use of firearm.

6.   As noted in an earlier footnote, like in its opposition, State contends in its writ that Defendant's request could also be construed as an application for post conviction relief and should be denied as untimely and/or meritless.

Judge Karen K. Herman