ROBERT HAYLOCK ROBCO REALTY LLC v. PAIGE WILKINSON THE LOUNGE MILAN LLC (2026)

Gregory S. Marsiglia, Esq. (“Appellant”) seeks review of the trial court's June 12, 2025 judgment finding him in contempt and imposing $12,925 in sanctions and attorney fees. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises from a lessor-lessee dispute and subsequent eviction judgment, which lessees did not know was later suspended until after they vacated. Robert Haylock and Robco Realty, LLC (“Plaintiffs”) leased a property to Paige Wilkinson and The Lounge Milan, LLC (“Appellees”). Appellees operated a bar on the property. Plaintiffs filed an Application for Rule for Possession of Premises on March 10, 2025, alleging that Appellees were “in default for operating a business at the leased premises without the required licenses and permits, failing to pay rent, failing to pay rent timely, [and] failing to file and pay sales tax and returns.” Constable Lambert Boissiere, Jr. served Appellees with the Rule for Possession of Premises on March 13, 2025, via tacking. The pleading specified that the hearing would occur on March 19, 2025.

On March 17, 2025, Appellant, counsel for Plaintiffs, proposed a settlement agreement to counsel for Appellees. This proposal required Appellees to vacate the premises immediately in exchange for waiver of all claims of rent and damages as well as whatever inventory and property remained at the leased premises. Counsel for Appellees explained that Appellees would agree to a consent judgment so long as Plaintiffs would give them at least 10 days to vacate. After Appellant rejected this counterproposal, Appellees filed a Dilatory Exception of Prematurity along with a supporting memorandum. Appellees asserted that the Plaintiffs’ eviction proceedings were “premature due to the lack of requisite notice as mandated by both the lease agreement and Louisiana law.”

The negotiations between Appellant and counsel for Appellees continued throughout the day on March 18, 2025, the day before the scheduled hearing on the Rule for Possession. Ultimately, the parties reached an agreement that Plaintiffs would not file suit for damages against Appellees so long as Appellees vacated by March 31, 2025. Appellant articulated the final settlement on the eviction as follows: “Unless [Appellee] defaults in their settlement agreement, [Plaintiffs] will refrain from executing the writ of eviction or a writ of possession until after March 31, 2025.” These settlement negotiations occurred via email.

On March 19, 2025, at 10:54 a.m., counsel for Appellees forwarded the email chain between himself and Appellant to the trial judge's law clerk. Appellant was not copied on this email. Counsel for Appellees stated: “Please see below an email chain between myself and [Appellant], settling this matter. [Appellees] qre [sic] allowed to stay in the property until March 31, 2025.”

Plaintiff Robert Haylock on behalf of Robco Realty, LLC was present at the March 19, 2025 hearing on the Rule for Possession. Appellant and Appellees were absent. The following exchange occurred between Plaintiff and the court:

THE COURT:

Before you get started, Mr. Haylock, the Court wants to put on the record that an email was received from the attorney for [Appellees] [․] indicating that the attorney was ill but that you-all had conversation. Your counsel and their counsel had come to an agreement.

MR. HAYLOCK:

I'm here for an eviction. She's six months behind. Last payment I received was a bad check. She's made no effort to get caught up, and she's operating unlawfully with no permits in existence, selling store-bought booze from behind the counter. So I'd like to give her an eviction.

THE COURT:

But you-all made an agreement that she would have until March 31st to leave?

MR. HAYLOCK:

Correct. I would like the 24 hours. Part of the agreement included letting her stay unless she breached the agreement.

THE COURT:

Letting her stay unless she breached the agreement?

MR. HAYLOCK:

Right. The 24 hours will give me some leverage, but we've agreed for her to stay until the 31st.

THE COURT:

No. If that was the agreement and you're acknowledging that there was an agreement, then the Court is going to allow her to leave by March 31st.

MR. HAYLOCK:

That's fine.

THE COURT:

Okay. So based on the information provided by [Appellant] and [Appellees’] counsel by email, I'm going to grant the rule for possession and [Appellees] will have until March 31st at 6:00 p.m. to vacate.

MR. HAYLOCK:

Thank you.

As demonstrated by this exchange, the trial court's consent judgment paralleled the terms of the email exchange between Appellant and counsel for Appellees.

At 1:38 p.m. that same day, counsel for Appellees forwarded to Appellant his email to the judge's law clerk, writing “See below my email [t]o the court.” Shortly thereafter, Appellant responded and alleged that counsel for Appellees had taken part in improper ex parte communication on a substantive matter in violation of Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(b). Appellant characterized the forwarding of their email chain to the law clerk as an intentional attempt to influence the court on a substantive matter behind his back. He also stated that a settlement agreement is inadmissible in evidence and thus should not have become part of the court record. Lastly, he asserted that this amounted to a violation of the substantive terms of the agreement, placing Appellees in default and allowing for the execution of the writ of eviction before the agreed upon date of March 31.

On March 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that the March 19, 2025 judgment was contrary to law and based upon documents inadmissible in evidence. This Motion further alleged that the judgment was based upon an improper ex parte communication, namely, the aforementioned forwarded email chain.

On March 24, 2025, the court granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial. The hearing on this Motion was set for April 10, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. The court handwrote on the order granting the Motion: “The execution of the eviction warrant shall be suspended until hearing for new trial.”

On March 31, 2025, at about 3:00 p.m., Plaintiffs changed the locks to the property. Appellees believed the March 19, 2025 order was still in effect and vacated on this date. Plaintiffs and Appellant served Appellees with the Motion and Order for New Trial via tacking service, so Appellees did not realize the eviction warrant was suspended until around April 3, 2025.

On April 7, 2025, Appellees filed and re-urged the dilatory exception of prematurity along with a supporting memorandum. Again, the Appellees alleged that the Rule for Possession was premature, since Plaintiffs did not give Appellees the required notice. Additionally, Appellees filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion for New Trial, alleging that this Motion was “procedurally improper, factually moot, and legally baseless.”

On April 10, 2025, the day of the scheduled hearing, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss the Motion for New Trial. The court signed the order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss on April 10, 2025, thereby effectively reinstating the March 19, 2025 final judgment on Plaintiffs’ Rule for Possession.

On April 15, 2025, Appellees filed a Motion for Sanctions and Contempt, alleging that “Plaintiffs’ willful disobedience of the March 24 court order constitutes constructive contempt.” Appellees averred that their eviction on March 31, 2025, resulted in “lost business and [being] denied lawful possession by being prematurely locked out in direct violation of a court order.” Appellees also asserted that Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial was filed to improperly harass and cause unnecessary expense and that it lacked legal support or evidentiary basis.

In concluding their Motion, Appellees prayed that the court hold Plaintiffs and Appellant in contempt and impose sanctions and attorney fees (for the entirety of the proceedings since the filing of the original Rule for Possession on March 10, 2025) under La. C.C.P. art. 863, La. R.S. 13:4611, La. C.C.P. art. 224(2), and La. C.C.P. art. 4731(C)(3).

On June 12, 2025, the court heard the Motion for Sanctions and Contempt. During the hearing, the court discounted several of Appellant's arguments: first, that counsel for Appellees violated Louisiana Rule of Conduct 3.5(b) in forwarding the email chain; and second, that the March 24, 2025 order and accompanying handwritten sentence was directed only to Appellees as lessees and did not impose an obligation on Plaintiffs as lessors. The court also did not allow Appellant to call Plaintiff Mr. Haylock as a witness to establish the purported discrepancy between their understanding of the settlement agreement and the court's ultimate judgment.

On July 15, 2025, the court granted the Motion for Sanctions and Contempt in favor of Appellees, giving the following reasoning:

It is the Court's opinion that Plaintiffs and [Appellant] were in constructive contempt of this Court's order, by inaction, when they allowed the [Appellees] to vacate the property and physically changed the locks on March 31st at 3:00 p.m. (and not 6:00 p.m. as indicated on the final Judgment for the Rule for Possession), knowing that all parties had been ordered to show cause on all issues, including move-out, on April 10th, 2025. Based on that determination, this Court does impose sanctions under Article 863, Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4611, Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure [sic], Article 224(2), and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, Article 4731C.(3) [sic], and holds Plaintiffs, Robert Haylock; Robco Realty, LLC; and, [Appellant], in contempt and award [sic] fees for the entirety of these proceedings, since the filing of the original Rule for Possession on March 10th. The Court also finds that both Plaintiffs and [Appellant] will be bound jointly, and severally, in solido.

(Emphasis in original). The court imposed $12,925 in sanctions and attorney fees. This appeal followed. Plaintiffs have already paid their two-thirds share of the $12,925; only Appellant appeals the June 12, 2025 judgment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Appellant submits multiple assignments of error on appeal, summarized as follows:

1. The trial court erred in finding Appellant in contempt under La. C.C.P. art. 224(2) where the only purported wrongdoing was inaction, not action in defiance of an order directed to Appellant, and in the absence of any evidence of his inaction.

2. The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees as sanctions without any evidentiary basis to support either the contempt finding or the fee amount awarded.

3. The fee award was excessive and includes fees not directly attributable to Appellant's supposed contempt.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When a district court holds a party in civil contempt, the appellate court will review the ruling under a manifest error standard and, if sufficient evidence was presented, the appellate court will only reverse the ruling if it can find that the district court abused its discretion.” Marullo v. Extreme Motor Sports of New Orleans, LLC, 2023-0157, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/25/23), 376 So. 3d 964, 968 (citing Streiffer v. Deltatech Constr., LLC, 2019-0990, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/25/20), 294 So. 3d 564, 573).

Regarding review of an award of attorney fees, this Court has previously explained:

A trial court's award of attorney fees is reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard. Covington v. McNeese State Univ., [20]12-2182, p. 6 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So. 3d 343, 348. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that in applying the standard, “the role of the reviewing court is not to determine what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather it is to review the exercise of discretion by the trier-of-fact.” Id., [20]12-2182, p. 11, 118 So. 3d at 351. The trial court's factual findings used to determine the award are reviewed pursuant to the manifest error/clearly wrong standard. Stobart v. State, Dep't of Trans. & Dev., 617 So. 2d 880, 882 (La. 1993).

Greenblatt v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 2019-0694, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/19), 287 So. 3d 763, 771-72.

DISCUSSION

Finding of Contempt

The trial court found Appellant in contempt of court pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 224(2), which states:

A constructive contempt of court is any contempt other than a direct one.

Any of the following acts constitutes a constructive contempt of court:

․

(2) Wilful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court[.]

Appellees assert that Appellant choosing tacking service for the Order and Motion for New Trial evidenced an intent to defy the trial court's March 24, 2025 suspension of the eviction warrant because Appellant must have known that the Order and Motion (and attached instruction to suspend the eviction) would not be served before March 31, 2025, the date by which the court originally ordered Appellees to vacate in its March 19, 2025 order. By failing to timely inform Appellees of the suspended eviction judgment, Appellees argue that Appellant willfully disobeyed the court's order and was thereby in constructive contempt of court.

Appellant argues on appeal that the court did not give him a direct order to inform Appellees of the suspension of the eviction warrant; as such, he cannot be held in contempt for “willful disobedience” of a nonexistent order. Put another way, he argues that one can only be held in contempt for action in defiance of an order, not inaction.

We find Appellant's argument regarding inaction erroneous. This Court efficiently described “constructive contempt” in Johnson v. Johnson:

Contempt of court is “any act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or respect for its authority.” La. C.C.P. art. 221. Direct contempt of court is either a contempt committed in the presence of the court or a party's failure to comply with a subpoena or summons. La. C.C.P. art. 222. Constructive contempt is “any contempt other than a direct one.” La. C.C.P. art. 224. Constructive contempt includes a party's willful disobedience of a lawful judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 224(2). In order to hold a party in constructive contempt, the trial court must find that the party committed the violation “intentionally, purposely, and without justifiable excuse.” State through Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. Child Support Enf't v. Knapp, 2016-0979, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/12/17), 216 So. 3d 130, 140 (quoting Burst v. Schmolke, 2010-1036, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/6/11), 62 So. 3d 829, 833).

2023-0566, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/7/24), 390 So. 3d 914, 915-16 (emphasis added). The inclusion of “or omission” in the La. C.C.P. art. 221 contempt definition makes clear that a failure to do something can indeed serve as the basis of a contempt finding.

However, the mover must prove that the party committed the violation “intentionally, purposely, and without justifiable excuse” through evidence introduced at a contempt hearing. The burden of proving contempt depends on the nature of the proceeding. This Court has explained:

“Contempt of court proceedings are either criminal or civil” in nature. To determine the nature of a contempt proceeding, the appellate court must look to “the nature of the punishment imposed—that is, whether the punishment is remedial or punitive.” In a civil suit, a contempt proceeding is civil in nature if the purpose of the proceeding is to force compliance with a court order, but it is criminal in nature if the purpose is to punish disobedience of a court order. Civil contempt is remedial in nature and is imposed for the benefit of the complainant, whereas criminal contempt is punitive in nature and meant to vindicate the authority of the court.

Sutton v. Adams, 2024-0287, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/21/25), 414 So. 3d 857, 862 (internal citations omitted). In the case sub judice, the contempt proceeding was civil in nature because the only relief provided was attorney's fees and court costs that were to be paid to Appellees; the court did not impose a punitive fine for the benefit of the court. See Marullo, 2023-0157, pp. 4-5, 376 So. 3d at 968.

In a civil contempt proceeding, the mover must prove the contempt through a preponderance of the evidence. When a district court holds a party in civil contempt, the appellate court will review the ruling under a manifest error standard and, if sufficient evidence was presented, the appellate court will only reverse the ruling if it can find that the district court abused its discretion.

Sutton, 2024-0287, p. 6, 414 So. 3d at 863 (citations omitted). Thus, we must review the trial court's ruling to determine whether Appellees presented sufficient evidence at the contempt hearing for the trial court to find that Appellant willfully disobeyed the March 24, 2025 judgment.

“Courts cannot consider evidence that has not been properly and officially offered and introduced.” Marullo, 2023-0157, p. 5, 376 So. 3d at 968 (citing Landis Constr. Co., L.L.C. v. State, 2015-1167, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/29/16), 199 So. 3d 1, 2-3). “A court may not consider exhibits filed in the record which were not filed and admitted into evidence at a hearing. Moreover, it is axiomatic that ‘[a]ppellate courts are courts of record and may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record, or receive new evidence.’ ” Succession of Feingerts, 2017-0265, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/21/17), 234 So. 3d 1081, 1089 (alteration in original) (quoting Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2007-2143, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So. 2d 84, 88).

“Arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Woodland Borrow Pits, LLC v. Woodland Plantation, LLC, 2024-0841, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/16/25), 418 So. 3d 497, 509 (citing Taylor v. Joseph, 2024-0461, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/25), 408 So. 3d 269, 277). “Document s that are attached to memoranda but not formally introduced are not evidence.” Marullo, 2023-0157, p. 5, 376 So. 3d at 968 (citing Landis Constr. Co., 2015-0157, p. 3, 199 So. 3d at 2-3). “Exhibits attached to a pleading are considered a part of that pleading.” Id. (citing La. C.C.P. art. 853). “However, pleadings and attachments to motions are not evidence.” Id. (first citing Andrews v. Marts, 2022-0576, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/15/22), 356 So. 3d 1059, 1063; and then citing Succession of Feingerts, 2017-0265, p. 11, 234 So. 3d at 1089). “When a motion that must be proven is presented to the court, the mover bears the burden of presenting the evidence.” Succession of Feingerts, 2017-0265, p. 11, 234 So. 3d at 1089.

The trial court found that “Plaintiffs and [Appellant] were in constructive contempt of this Court's order, by inaction, when they allowed the [Appellees] to vacate the property and physically changed the locks on March 31 at 3:00 p.m.” However, nothing was introduced into evidence to show this occurred, nor did the parties stipulate to it. Rather, Appellees merely introduced this point in their memorandum supporting the Motion for Sanctions and Contempt and through argument of counsel at the contempt hearing.

Because Appellees failed to properly offer and introduce into evidence proof of the event at issue on March 31, 2025, and in the absence of a stipulation by the parties that the event indeed occurred, the trial court should not have considered it. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment of contempt, finding manifest error due to insufficient evidence.

Notwithstanding the insufficient evidence to find Appellant in contempt, we find it important to note that, as Appellees argue, it was indeed improper for Appellant to serve the Order and Motion for New Trial upon Appellees via tacking. Prior to the March 24, 2025 order suspending the eviction warrant, Appellant had been in regular communication with counsel for Appellees through email. However, Appellant chose tacking service for the Order and Motion for New Trial. Regarding the tacking procedure of service, La. C.C.P. art. 4703 provides:

If the premises are abandoned or closed, or if the whereabouts of the lessee or occupant is unknown, all notices, process, pleadings, and orders required to be delivered or served on the lessee or occupant under this Title may be attached to a door of the premises, and this shall have the same effect as delivery to, or personal service on, the lessee or occupant.

(Emphasis added).

In French Quarter Realty v. Gambel, this Court echoed its previous finding that the “tacking” procedure “is a special procedure involving the possession of specific premises which is only authorized under conditions where it seems to be the only practical or workable method of effecting service.” 2005-0933, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/28/05), 921 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (quoting Ernest Joubert Co. v. Tatum, 332 So. 2d 553, 554 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1976)).

In the instant case, the property was not abandoned or closed, Appellees’ whereabouts were not unknown, and tacking was not the only practical or workable method of effecting service. Appellant had already established regular lines of communication with counsel for Appellees by email. Thus, there was no reason for Appellant to choose the tacking method of service, especially considering that the suspension of the eviction judgment was such a time-sensitive matter.

Appellant knew that the matter at hand was time-sensitive. Appellant should have informed counsel for Appellees of the notice of suspension before Appellees vacated. That said, Appellant's improper choice of service alone does not amount to evidence of his intent to defy the court's order. And, regardless, Appellees failed to properly offer and introduce the service instructions into evidence for the court's consideration in judging whether Appellant acted in constructive contempt.

Therefore, in reversing the trial court's judgment finding Appellant in constructive contempt, we simply hold that Appellees did not offer sufficient evidence at the contempt hearing to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Appellant willfully disobeyed the trial court's March 24, 2025 suspension of the eviction warrant.

Award of Sanctions and Attorney Fees

We reverse the attorney fees imposed pursuant to per La. R.S. 13:4611(1)(g), which provides, in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided for by law:

(1) The supreme court, the courts of appeal, the district courts, family courts, juvenile courts and the city courts may punish a person adjudged guilty of a contempt of court therein, as follows:

․

(g) The court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a contempt of court proceeding provided for in this Section.

As previously noted, a trial court's award of attorney fees is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, while the trial court's factual findings used to determine the award are reviewed pursuant to the manifest error/clearly wrong standard.

Considering our finding that Appellees should not have been the “prevailing party” in the contempt proceeding given the lack of properly-introduced evidence, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees per La. R.S. 13:4611(1)(g) and reverse.

We also reverse the trial court's imposition of attorney fees and sanctions pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863(D), finding that Appellant did not file Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial frivolously. Article 863(D) provides, in pertinent part:

B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or certificate, except as otherwise provided by law, but the signature of an attorney or party shall constitute a certification by him that he has read the pleading, and that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, he certifies all of the following:

(1) The pleading is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.

(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the pleading has evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or factual assertion, is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual assertion is warranted by the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

This Court is not inclined to restrict parties from litigating their cases in a particular way. Appellant permissibly raised an issue with counsel for Appellees’ ex parte email to the trial court judge's law clerk. Without reaching the merits of whether this was indeed a “substantive” ex parte communication prohibited by Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(b), Appellant's argument in favor of this possibility was warranted by existing law and/or had evidentiary support. Similarly, we do not believe Appellant should be penalized for withdrawing the Motion for New Trial before the hearing on the Motion. An attorney is at liberty to litigate his case the way he sees fit, absent proof of improper intent.

Finding manifest error in the underlying factual finding that the Motion for New Trial was filed frivolously, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863(D). Thus, we reverse any sanctions and attorney fees awarded pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863(D).

Additionally, we reverse the trial court's imposition of costs and attorney fees pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 4731(C)(3), which provides:

(3) The court may award costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party for actions brought pursuant to this Article.

Based on a plain reading of the Article, it does not apply to the case at hand. The Article is entitled “Rule to show cause why possession should not be delivered; abandonment of premises; federally declared disasters,” and the preceding subparts read as follows:

A. If the lessee or occupant fails to comply with the notice to vacate required under this Title, or if the lessee has waived his right to notice to vacate by written waiver contained in the lease, and has lost his right of occupancy for any reason, the lessor or owner, or agent thereof, may cause the lessee or occupant to be cited summarily by a court of competent jurisdiction to show cause why he should not be ordered to deliver possession of the premises to the lessor or owner.

The rule to show cause shall state the grounds upon which eviction is sought.

B. After the required notice has been given, the lessor or owner, or agent thereof, may lawfully take possession of the premises without further judicial process, upon a reasonable belief that the lessee or occupant has abandoned the premises. Indicia of abandonment include a cessation of business activity or residential occupancy, returning keys to the premises, and removal of equipment, furnishings, or other movables from the premises.

Subpart (A) pertains to a lessor who must file a rule to show cause against a lessee who has lost his right of occupancy and who fails to comply with a notice to vacate (or has waived his right thereof). As for subpart (B), this Court explained in Indulge Island Grill, L.L.C. v. Island Grill, L.L.C. that it codified “the exception to the rule against a landlord's use of self-help in the eviction process when the lessee abandons the leased premises.” 2016-1133, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/10/17), 220 So. 3d 154, 158.

Considering and applying this context to the case at hand, Appellees are not the “prevailing party” contemplated by the language in subpart (C)(3). Rather, the “prevailing party” under this article could only be lessors who have given notice and lawfully retaken possession after their lessees lost the right of occupancy or abandoned the premises. The circumstances of the case sub judice do not warrant an award of costs or attorney fees under this article. Consequently, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees under La. C.C.P. art. 4731(C)(3).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasoning, we reverse the trial court's finding of contempt and imposition of sanctions and attorney fees.

REVERSED

Judge Rachael D. Johnson

ATKINS, J., CONCURS AND ASSIGNS REASONS.