DONALD ADAMS v. NEW ORLEANS FIRE DEPARTMENT (2026)

This appeal arises from the 48-hour suspension of firefighter Donald Adams (“Adams”), for leaving his assignment without approval (i.e., “freelancing”) during a call for service.

Facts

On March 17, 2024, firefighters from Engine Company 20 were called out to the Second City Courthouse on Morgan Street in Algiers. The firefighters involved were Captain Randolph Edwards (“Edwards”), Anthony Donseroaux (“Donseroaux”), Milton Smith (“Smith”) and Adams. It was the third callout to this address that day. On the two prior occasions, the team was not able to get into the courthouse. On this third occasion, a building representative was present and let the men in. They searched the building and found no evidence of fire. They were unable to stop the alarm. While awaiting someone from the alarm company to stop the false alarm, Edwards, who was the ranking firefighter on the scene, began a conversation with the building representative on matters unrelated to the fire call.

Approximately 10 to 15 minutes after the building was searched, the captain and other firefighters walked outside and saw Adams talking to Smith, the firetruck operator. The building representative commented that the two firefighters by the truck were ready to leave. Edwards then walked to the truck and chastised Adams for leaving the scene inside the building and informed him that he should stay next to his captain.

Edwards alleges that Adams told him, “you think you're in charge of f*****g E20 but you're not in charge.” Adams alleges that he said, “you think you're in charge of E20 but it's a team.” Neither Smith nor Donseroaux heard the profanity that Edwards described but both witnesses testified that the conversation was heated. Smith, who was outside at all times, explained that he called Adams to the truck to ask if the inspection revealed anything.

After the incident, Edwards asked every member of the team to write a Special Report (statement) regarding the call out.

Edwards completed a Documentation of Disciplinary Action (“DDA”) form charging Adams with violating NOFDRR57 of the New Orleans Fire Department (“NOFD”) Rules and Regulations. RR 57 provides that, “At fire scenes or emergency calls, members shall not perform tasks without direction or orders from command or perform tasks that do not support incident objectives (i.e. freelancing).” The form is signed by Captain Edwards as the “Initiating Officer/Supervisor,” Adams as the “Employee,” and the “District Chief/Supervisor” in Adams’ chain of command. These signatures are dated March 20, 2024. The reports were sent up the chain of command to First Platoon Deputy Chief David Castle (“Castle”), who received them on March 23, 2024. He was the disciplinary review officer responsible for coordinating documentation and scheduling hearings. Castle set a pre-disciplinary hearing for April 16, 2024, and issued a notice of the hearing to Adams. Neither Castle nor any other officer ever provided Adams a “Notification of a Formal Investigation” as is customary in such matters.

After the pre-disciplinary hearing, another officer, District Chief Thomas Ussin (“Ussin”), re-wrote the reports submitted by firefighters Donsereaux and Smith. Both firefighters testified before the Civil Service Commission (“CSC”) and acknowledged that they signed the re-written statements and that the information contained in them was correct.

Castle completed his investigation and on April 22, 2024, he issued a letter to Adams informing him that he was suspended for 48 hours for violating fire department policy. The letter advised Adams that, “Specifically, on March 20, 2024,[sic]¹ while on an incident investigating an alarm you exited the building without the captain's permission while the rest of the crew remained inside to confirm the alarm status and mitigate the incident.”

Adams appealed the NOFD decision to the CSC.

Prior proceedings

Adams argued, and the CSC found, that NOFD initiated its formal investigation on March 20, 2024, and that Adams was not provided the protections afforded by the Firefighters Bill of Rights at the time the investigation began. The CSC also found that Ussin's correction and re-writing of the special reports by two of the witnesses constituted investigation. The CSC concluded that the investigation violated the Firefighters Bill of Rights, La. R.S. § 33:2181, because Adams was not given his rights before beginning the investigation and because the notice of the investigation did not identify Ussin as an investigator. Accordingly, the CSC concluded that the disciplinary action was an absolute nullity.

On August 22, 2025, NOFD timely filed a Motion for Appeal of the CSC's July 31, 2025 decision.

Assignments of error

1. The CSC erroneously found that NOFD violated La. R.S. § 33:2181 by failing to identify a person conducting the investigation.

2. The CSC erroneously concluded that the charge of misconduct was investigated by District Chief Thomas Ussin, when the person in charge of the investigation was Deputy Chief David Castle.

Standard of review

Before us is a case that requires a decision involving mixed legal and factual questions. In Smith v. Civil Service Commission, 2019-0393, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/27/19), 286 So. 3d 458, 460, we noted the applicable standard of review in circumstances such as these:

“Decisions of the [Civil Service] Commission are subject to appellate review on any questions of law or fact.” Winford v. Dep't of Police, 2009-0770, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/10), 33 So.3d 949, 951; La. Const. Art. X, Section 12(B); Walters v. Dep't of Police of New Orleans, 454 So.2d 106, 113 (La.1984). Further, on appeal, “[t]he appellate court reviews the Commission's findings of fact using the clearly wrong or manifest error standard of review.” Liang v. Dept. of Police, 2013-1364, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/20/14), 147 So.3d 1221, 1225. Further, “[a]n appellate court accords great deference to mixed questions of fact and law.” Orazio v. Dep't of Police, 2019-0230, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/19/19), 275 So.3d 340, 345, writ denied, 2019-01174 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So.3d 609, 2019 WL 5575363. Here, Appellant's assignment of error presents an interpretation of fact and law governed by the manifest error or clearly erroneous standard of review.

Following these principles, we will proceed by applying the manifest error or clearly erroneous standard of review.

Analysis and discussion

The outcome of this appeal rests on a definition of the word, “commencing” and the phrase “person conducting such investigation” as those terms are used in the La. R.S. § 33:2181. Neither of these terms of art are defined in the statute itself. The statute provides, in pertinent parts:

A. Unless context otherwise requires, the following terms when used in this Subpart shall be given the meanings assigned below:

․

(2) “Interrogation” includes but is not limited to any formal interview, inquiry, or questioning of any fire employee by the appointing authority or the appointing authority's designee regarding misconduct, allegations of misconduct, or policy violation. An initial inquiry conducted by the fire employee's immediate supervisors shall not be considered an interrogation.

․

B. Whenever a fire employee is under investigation, the following minimum standards shall apply:

(1) Prior to commencing a formal investigation of a fire employee, the appointing authority shall notify the employee in writing of the nature of the investigation, of the identity and authority of the person conducting such investigation, and of the specific charges or violations being investigated.

(2) The fire employee being investigated shall be informed in writing at the commencement of any interrogation of the nature of the investigation, of the identity and authority of the person conducting such investigation, of the identity of all persons present during such interrogation, and of the specific charges or violations being investigated. The fire employee shall be allowed to make notes.

C. No fire employee shall be disciplined, demoted, dismissed or be subject to any adverse action unless the investigation is conducted in accordance with this Subpart. Any discipline, demotion, dismissal or adverse action of any sort taken against a fire employee without complete compliance with the provisions of this Subpart is an absolute nullity.

(emphasis added).

In the absence of a statutory definition of the commencement of an investigation, we look to other sources. Other courts have cited, with approval, the definition provided by an opinion of the Louisiana Attorney General.² The opinion declares, in pertinent part, that, “an investigation begins when an authorized person within the police department begins to make inquiry or collect evidence concerning a situation with a law enforcement officer where the end result is ‘with a view to possible disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal.’ ”

From our circuit, the most prominent exploration of the phrase is found in Pitre v. Department of Fire, 2021-0632 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/22), 338 So. 3d 70. In that case, a firefighter was charged with making false statements relating to a workers’ compensation claim. On June 14, 2020, Pitre was present in a fire station when a fellow firefighter was injured. The injured person made a workers’ compensation claim. On June 17, Pitre made a Special Report recounting what he knew of the incident. The NOFD issued Pitre a “Notification of a Formal Investigation,”³ on July 8 telling him that NOFD was investigating his statements related to the fireman's injury and that he would be interviewed on that same day. In Pitre's interview, he was questioned about discrepancies between his Special Report NOFD's low-quality video of activities in the station at the time of the accident. On August 7, 2020, NOFD received an enhanced version of the video that clearly showed Pitre and some of his activities at the time in question. Later on August 7, Pitre was issued a second Notification of Formal Investigation.⁴ He was interviewed a second time on the day of the notice. In his second interview, he was questioned about the same topics as in the July 8 interview. NOFD charged Pitre with lying in his special report and continued to investigate his statement and his actions. At the conclusion of the investigation, on September 28, 2020, Pitre was terminated. Pitre appealed his termination arguing, among other things, that the investigation into his conduct was not resolved within 60 days of the commencement of the investigation as required by La. R.S. 33:2186(A).

Pitre's argument required the CSC and the court to determine when the investigation against him commenced. NOFD argued that the investigation did not begin until August 7 when it received the enhanced video. NOFD asserted that the July 8 interview was directed to Pitre's information as a witness to a fellow employee's injury, not his alleged deception.

The court found that the initial interview amounted to an interrogation, as that word is used in La. R.S. 33:2181. Because the interrogation on July 8 covered the same topics as the questioning on August 7, the court found that a fair interpretation of the statute as applied to those facts must lead one to conclude that NOFD's formal interrogation on August 7 constituted the commencement of the investigation into Pitre's alleged false statements. The court went on to hold that Pitre's termination was meted out more than 60 days after the commencement of the investigation and was therefore untimely and absolutely null.

The lesson we learn from Pitre is that we must consider the substance of the fire department's actions to determine what constitutes an investigation rather than relying on the titles of forms and names of procedures. This case is distinguishable from Pitre in that the firefighter's immediate supervisor was a witness to the actions that form the basis for the disciplinary action. Edwards began gathering evidence for the investigation on the same day that the events occurred. Within three days, Edwards had compiled statements from Adams and other witnesses and added his own statement to a package that was prepared for delivery to those who would make the ultimate decision on Adams’ discipline. To that extent, Edwards was an investigator in every meaningful sense of the word.

Deviation from procedural requirement of La. R.S. 33:2181, et seq

On March 20, 2024 (three days after the March 17 incident), Adams was presented a package accusing him of misconduct that named Superintendent Nelson as the “investigator” and Edwards as the “initiator” of the disciplinary complaint. Curiously, NOFD never gave Adams a Notification of a Formal Investigation. At no point in the investigation was Adams notified of his rights under the Firefighter's Bill of Rights. To the extent that the record in this case reveals the substance of the investigation we conclude that the investigators were Edwards and Castle. We disagree with the CSC's finding that Ussin was an investigator. If he were to be given a title, the title would necessarily be “Editor.” His only role in the proceeding was to correct the grammar and informality of language in the Special Reports written by Smith and Donseroaux. While we do not find that Ussin was an investigator who should have been named in any notice to Adams, we do find that his insertion into the process was inappropriate. As a best practice, the firefighter's reports should not have been edited. At a minimum, their initial unedited reports should have been provided to Adams at some point in the investigative process with an explanation of the editing process. Instead, the record indicates that Adams was not provided copies of the original reports even at the late point of the CSC hearing. Further, there is nothing in the record that explains a proper reason for editing the Special Reports. In testimony, Ussin said that the reports would have been “kicked back” if they were not edited. He never explained who would kick the reports back and for what reason.

Conclusion

We believe that Edwards’ initiation of a disciplinary procedure based on Adams’ actions was appropriate. In this case, it does not appear that there was an emergency in progress when Adams decided to walk away from the working group in the courthouse. However, it is the very nature of emergencies that they occur without warning. No one was injured and there was no loss of life or property in this situation. For that, everyone must be grateful to good fortune. In the business of protecting life and property, good fortune is never a substitute for safe procedure.

Having noted for the record this court's support for the intention of the disciplinary proceeding, we find that the decision of the CSC was not manifestly erroneous. We are constrained to hold that the strict statutory requirements of La. R.S. 33:2181 were not met in this process.

Decree

For the reasons stated above, we must affirm the decision of the CSC that determined Adams’ suspension is an absolute nulity for procedural reasons.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   As noted above, the incident in question occurred on March 17, 2024.

2.   The opinion, La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 08-0291 (Jan. 29, 2009), is directed to an investigation of a police officer, not a firefighter. However, the opinion specifically referenced the FBR and its reasoning and conclusion are applicable here.

3.   The subject of the investigation for which the notice was issued was the injured fireman's workers’ compensation claim.

4.   The second Notification indicated that Pitre, himself, was the subject of the investigation.

Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome

DYSART, J. DISSENTS WITH REASONS.