WALLACE DRENNAN INC v. LATOYA CANTRELL IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS CLINTON RICK HATHAWAY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS (2026)

Appellants, defendants LaToya Cantrell, in her official capacity as the Mayor of New Orleans, Clinton “Rick” Hathaway, in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Public Works, City of New Orleans, and the City of New Orleans (collectively referred to as “the City”), seek review of a May 27, 2025 district court judgment, making the Alternative Writ of Mandamus issued by the district court to the City peremptory and ordering the City to immediately pay Appellee, plaintiff Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. (“WCD”) statutory interest totaling $750,966.53 for the late payment of invoices on six public works contracts pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191. The district court additionally ordered that WCD was due attorney's fees and costs to be determined at a future hearing. Finding no error, we affirm and remand this matter for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter is the second iteration of a statutory interest payment dispute between the parties. The parties’ initial dispute occurred prior to 2022, when they began negotiations over statutory interest payments allegedly due to WCD for 29 late-paid pay applications related to street paving public works contracts RR067, RR109, RR118 and RR133. Unable to fully settle their dispute, they instead agreed that WCD would file a mandamus petition against the City to resolve WCD's statutory interest claims for seven invoices due pursuant to the RR133-Pines Village Group contract as a test case with the intent of later resolving WCD's remaining interest claims against the City.¹

Drennan I: RR133

In 2022, WCD filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking statutory interest awards against the City for seven late-paid RR133 invoices pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(B). Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. Cantrell, 23-0193, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/25/23), 376 So.3d 969, 971 (“hereinafter “Drennan I”). As previously stated, the district court noted that the parties agreed to WCD's filing of a writ of mandamus to resolve the parties’ statutory interest dispute “for [the] alleged untimely payments.” Id., at p. 7, 376 So.3d at 975. The district court determined that “because [the City's contracted engineer, All South Consulting Engineers, LLC] ‘acted as the City's agent for purposes of receiving [WCD's] invoices, and because the City expressly directed that the invoices be delivered to All South’, that the ‘forty-five day period for payment began when [WCD] delivered its invoices to All South.’ ” Id., at p. 4, 376 So.3d at 973 ((second and third alteration in original). The record provided that WCD was required to submit its invoices to [All South], which in turn was required to review and deliver WCD's invoices to the City. Id., at p. 1, 376 So.3d at 971. While WCD also uploaded its invoices to the City's online accounting portal, BRASS, it was not a contractual requirement. Id., at p. 2, 376 So.3d at 971.

The district court granted WCD's writ of mandamus in part, holding that statutory interest was due on one unreasonably-delayed paid invoice. However, the district court denied interest payments for the six remaining late-paid invoices, finding the City had reasonable cause to delay making those payments. Id., at p. 3, 376 So.3d at 972.

On appeal, this Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment, finding that WCD was entitled to statutory interest payments for all seven of the late-paid invoices. Id., at p. 19, 376 So.3d at 982.² The Drennan I Court determined the City “lacked reasonable cause to delay payment” for the six invoices the district court found were unreasonably delayed. Id.

Present Dispute: RR061, RR067, RR109, RR115, RR118 and RR133

The instant dispute results from allegedly delinquent invoice payments the City made to WCD on six public works street paving contracts: 1) RR061- Gentilly Woods, Group F; 2) RR067- Leonidas-Hollygrove, Group A; 3) RR109- Lower Ninth Ward Northwest, Group B; 4) RR115- Lower Ninth Ward, South Group E; 5) RR118- Marleyville-Fountainbleau, Group C; and 6) RR133- Pines Village, Group A. It is undisputed that the City paid the contractual sums due to WCD.

The City awarded the aforementioned six contracts to WCD from 2017 to 2021. Coinciding with the award of these contracts, the City also awarded bid contracts to various engineering firms to serve as the “engineer” or “consultant” (hereinafter referred to as “City Engineer”) of the project. The City Engineers were responsible for providing professional engineering and/or design and construction management services for various city-wide street improvements. See also La. R.S. 38:2211(A)(6). Additionally, each City Engineer had to obtain “all data and furnish all services required during the construction stage, maintain all records necessary during the construction stage, ensure compliance with plans and specifications, and prepare partial and final payment to the contractor for the [Department of Public Work's] approval.” The contracts specified that the City Engineers review quantities and pay applications for the contractor's invoicing and recommend payment.³

Following Drennan I, the parties were unable to resolve WCD's statutory interest claims for 22 pay applications involving projects RR067, RR109, RR118 and RR133. WCD asserts that it also discovered that it had additional pay application statutory-interest claims against the City due under project RR133, as well as new pay application claims under projects RR0061 and RR115. The parties agree that the City paid WCD the invoiced amounts for each contract. Only the amount of statutory interest due for each late-received contract payment is at issue.

In November 2024, WCD filed the instant petition for mandamus followed by an amended petition in February 2025, seeking statutory interest awards for allegedly late-paid invoices made pursuant to all six of the aforementioned projects. In April 2025, the district court issued an Alternative Writ of Mandamus to the City setting an April 22, 2025 trial date, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3865.⁴ The hearing was later reset to May 7, 2025.

At trial, Walter Drennan, III— the president of WCD— was the only witness who testified. The parties introduced various exhibits at trial, including the contracts for all six projects, some of the project's invitations to bid or ITBs, contracts between the City and the City Engineer for the projects, WCD's March 21, 2024 demand letter for statutory interest payments addressed to the City's legal department, and spreadsheets from each party detailing what interest amounts were due.

When the trial concluded, the district court ruled in WCD's favor and ordered the parties to jointly prepare the judgment with a spreadsheet calculating their joint total interest calculation. Judgment was later rendered making the Alternative Writ of Mandamus peremptory and ordering the City to immediately pay WCD statutory interest totaling $750,966.53 for the alleged late payment of invoices on six different Public Works Act projects. This timely appeal followed.

In its appeal, the City contests $420,303.06 of the district court's $750,966.53 award to WCD, asserting that the district court erred by improperly ordering it to pay WCD statutory interest pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(B). The City raises the following three assignments of error: 1) the district court erred in failing to consider the express contract provisions of RR061, RR115, and RR118, outlining invoicing and payment procedures for the public works projects at issue; 2) the district court erred in considering statutory interest claims related to RR133 that should have been brought in WCD's previous mandamus action—Drennan I— and are accordingly barred by La. R.S. 13:4231; and 3) the district court erred by ordering the City to “immediately pay” WCD unappropriated sums.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

“A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is directed at a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law.” Crooks v. State Through Dep't of Nat. Res., 22-625, p. 3 (La. 1/1/23), 359 So.3d 448, 450 (citing Jazz Casino Co. v. Bridges, 16-1663 (La. 5/3/17), 223 So.3d 488, 492). The Louisiana Supreme Court further explained:

“A ‘ministerial duty’ is one ‘in which no element of discretion is left to the public officer,’ in other words, ‘a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoag [v. State, 04-0857, p. 7 (La. 12/1/04), 889 So.2d 1019, 1024)]. “If a public officer is vested with any element of discretion, mandamus will not lie.” Id.

Id.

Appellate courts apply a mixed standard of review in mandamus matters. BRC Constr. Grp., LLC v. New Orleans Reg'l Transit Auth., 24-0657, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/1/25), 414 So.3d 908, 911. A district court's ruling on a writ of mandamus is subject to an abuse of discretion review. Drennan I, at p. 5, 376 So.3d at 973. Moreover, a district court's findings of fact are reviewed under a manifest error standard of review.⁵

This Court recently explained that pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(A), a public entity is statutorily required to promptly tender payments to its contractors and is subject to mandamus proceedings when it fails to do so:

According to La. R.S. 38:2191(A), the public entity “shall promptly pay all obligations including approved change orders, arising under public contracts when the obligations become due and payable under the contract.” The word “shall” expresses that the public entity has a mandatory duty to pay all obligations when they become due and payable. Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. St. Charles Par., 16-177, p. 10 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/22/16), 202 So.3d 535, 544. If the public entity were to fail in paying their obligation, then La. R.S. 38:2191(D) “subjects the public entity to mandamus to compel the payment of the sums due under the contract.” Id. Determining whether an obligation is due and payable depends on the terms of the contract.

[M]andamus relief under La. R.S. 38:2191 is available only when there is no discretion left to the public entity as to whether payment is due and payable under the terms of the contract and, conversely, that “reasonable cause” for nonpayment exists when the terms of the contract do not mandate payment under the circumstances of the particular case.

BRC Constr. Grp., LLC., at pp. 6-7, 414 So.3d at 912-13 (alteration in original)(citation omitted). “Mandamus relief under La. R.S. 38:2191 is available only when there is no discretion left to the public entity as to whether payment is due and payable under the terms of the contract.” Drennan I, at pp. 6-7, 376 So.3d at 974 (citation omitted).

INVOICING AND PAYMENT PROCEDURES FOR RR061, RR115 and RR118

The City asserts that the district court erred in failing to consider RR061, RR115 and RR118's contractual provisions outlining the applicable invoicing and payment procedures. It further contends that the district court misapplied this Court's analysis in Drennan I to the instant matter. We disagree.

The invoice provisions for all three of the aforementioned public works contracts provided:

The Contractor must submit invoices monthly (unless agreed otherwise between the parties to this Contract) to the City electronically, via its supplier portal, for goods and/or services provided under this Contract no later than 10 calendar days following the end of the period covered by the invoice. Untimely invoices may result in delayed payment for which the City is not liable. At a minimum, each invoice must include the following information: contract or purchase order number issued by the City, and the name of the city department to be invoiced. The City may require changes to the form or the content of the invoice. The City may also require additional supporting documentation to be submitted with invoices.

It is clear that WCD was required to submit its invoices or pay applications electronically through the BRASS system to receive payment pursuant to the terms of public works contracts for RR061, RR115 and RR118.

At trial, Mr. Drennan testified that he was knowledgeable of the City's policies and procedures for submitting pay applications. He explained that on each of WCD's projects the City was represented by a consulting engineer (“City Engineer”), who designed the project and served as the project administrator and as WCD's contact person:

He's basically the city's representative. [He's] our point of contact. He handles all pay applications, all paperwork, submittals. He has a representative in the field that monitors the quantity of work done. He has a project manager assigned to the project to manage the project, which he works with our project manager.

***

He basically approves the pay application. Our project manager and the [C]ity's [E]ngineer project manager [sic] meets or discuss [sic] it over e-mail or the phone. They agree on the quantities for a month. And then our project manager sends a final invoice to the [C]ity's [E]ngineer with all the required paperwork and our signature. (Emphasis added.)

Mr. Drennan further testified that the City directed or “told” WCD to first submit each pay application to the respective City Engineer, on each of the projects, for approval. According to Mr. Drennan, upon the City Engineer's approval of WCD's pay application, the City Engineer submits it to the City— where different individuals, such as personnel from Sewerage and Water Board and/or the City's project manager— sign the application. He stated that WCD is removed from the payment process once the pay application is received by the City Engineer. WCD later receives the invoice back from the City Engineer with all the necessary signatures, which it then uploads into BRASS. On cross-examination, he testified that WCD would upload its invoices into BRASS “[o]nly when permitted by the City or instructed to.” The City did not present any witnesses to controvert Mr. Drennan's testimony.

At the conclusion of trial, the district court gave its oral reasons for its judgment, relying heavily upon Mr. Drennan's testimony in finding WCD's invoices were deemed submitted when presented to the City Engineer:

[T]his Court finds that the receipt of the certified request for payment is upon the submission of Drennan's invoices to the city's engineer based on the testimony provided by Mr. Drennan citing the [C]ity's directives and furthered by the fact that if the Court were to find and hold that the receipt is upon the uploading of the invoice into BRASS, as per the contract's provision, it would defeat the intent behind the statute by allowing the city, at their sole discretion and control for the processing of the submission before its approval for the upload to BRASS, allowing the [C]ity to take as long as they deem necessary in the approval and processing period, which should be taking place within the 45-day window as intended and not to begin a new 45-day window at the [C]ity's discretion. (Emphasis added.)

While the district court's oral reasons form no part of its judgment, which we review here, the district court's oral reasons provide insight into the district court's rationale for its ruling. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571, p. 77 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572. The district court's reasoning reflects that it considered both the applicable contractual provisions and Mr. Drennan's testimony in its ruling. Mr. Drennan's testimony is consistent with the above-stated invoice provisions insofar as the parties agree that WCD must upload its pay applications into BRASS. The record reflects that WCD did upload its invoices into BRASS. However, Mr. Drennan's testimony adds that the invoices were deemed submitted for payment when delivered to the City Engineer for review for each of the projects at issue.

This Court recognizes that “parol or extrinsic evidence is generally inadmissible to vary the terms of a written contract unless the written expression of the common intention of the parties is ambiguous.” Campbell v. Melton, 01-2578, p. 6 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So.2d 69, 75 (citation omitted). “A contract is considered ambiguous on the issue of intent when either it lacks a provision bearing on that issue, the terms of a written contract are susceptible to more than one interpretation, there is uncertainty or ambiguity as to its provisions, or the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the language employed.” Id. (emphasis added].

As stated above, the City's engineering contracts obligate City Engineers to prepare partial and final payment to Contractors for the Department of Public Work's approval, and “review quantities and pay applications” for the Construction Contractor's invoicing and “recommend payment.” (Emphasis added). Here, Mr. Drennan's testimony corroborates the contractual terms of the City's engineering contracts revealing the parties’ actual practice required contractors to submit pay applications to the City Engineer for review and approval for payment prior to uploading invoices to BRASS. Why would the City award a bid contract to and retain an engineering company at all if it did not intend for it to oversee contractor's work and payment applications? Although the City's contracts with WCD lack a provision regarding the City Engineer's initial review of pay applications, the district court had a reasonable basis to conclude that the City's contracts with WCD were ambiguous pursuant to Campbell, and that the parties agreed to this practice.

At trial, the City chiefly relied upon the wording of its contracts requiring WCD to electronically upload its invoices into the City's supply portal, BRASS. Mr. Drennan admitted this was required of WCD. Nevertheless, the City did not present additional evidence or witnesses to rebut Mr. Drennan's testimony regarding the City Engineer's required review of pay applications before WCD could upload the application to BRASS. Nor did the City rebut his testimony that if WCD did otherwise, the application would be deemed non-compliant, and therefore rejected. Appellate courts must render judgments based upon the record on appeal. In re Melancon, 05-1702, p. 7 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So.2d 661, 666 (citing La. C.C.P. art. 2164; Hazey v. McCown, 01-0929, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 932, 936). Arguments are not evidence. Id. (citations omitted).

“When reviewing facts, if there are two permissible views of the evidence, a factfinder's choice between them can never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Goldstein v. Chateau Orleans, Inc., 20-0401, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/12/21), 331 So.3d 1027, 1034 (citations omitted). An appellate court cannot reverse a lower court's decision when a “factfinder's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety,” “even if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Id., at pp. 6-7, 331 So.3d at 1034 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Applying Goldstein, we find the district court considered the record and found Mr. Drennan's testimony compelling. The district court did not fail to consider the applicable contractual provisions nor does the record indicate that it conflated the unique facts of this matter with those of Drennan I. The district court made its own factual determination. Nowhere in its oral reasons did the district court state that it relied upon Drennan I in reaching its judgment at trial. Lastly, the district court's reference to the applicable invoice provision on the record necessarily means that the Court did not “fail to consider” the contractual provisions in reaching its judgment. This assignment of error is meritless.

RES JUDICATA

The City asserts that the district court erred in considering WCD's RR133 claims because WCD should have raised all of its RR133 claims in Drennan I, but WCD only raised seven statutory interest claims in that litigation. The City maintains that because WCD's claims pursuant to the RR133 contract existed at the time of Drennan I’s filing those claims are barred by res judicata pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4231.⁶ Additionally, the City asserts that WCD's exhibit D of its Amended Petition, summarizing WCD's understanding of the parties’ pre-Drennan I agreement, provided that the parties agreed to litigate all RR133 related invoices, not only the seven that WCD contested.

Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4231 states in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:

1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.

․

3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

Moreover, La. R.S.13:4232(A), entitled Exceptions to the general rule of res judicata, provides:

A. A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff:

(1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the judgment;

(2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice; or,

(3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action.

Pursuant to La. R.S.13:4232, a court's statutory discretion to grant relief from an earlier judgment for exceptional circumstances justifying relief from the res judicata effect of that judgment “must be exercised on a case-by-case basis, and such relief should be granted only in truly exceptional cases, otherwise the purpose of res judicata would be defeated.” Sutton v. Adams, 22-01677, 22-1674, 22-1672, pp. 9-10 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So.3d 1038, 1046.

It appears that exceptional circumstances existed under the unique facts of this matter where the parties agreed to submit to a test case, Drennan I, in an attempt to resolve their remaining pending disputes. WCD buttressed its argument by presenting Mr. Drennan's testimony and the March 21, 2024 demand letter. The City, however, did not present a rebuttal witness, a document showing the parties’ initial agreement, nor any other document to controvert WCD's evidence.

Moreover, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that contractors have the statutory right to raise separate causes of action against a public entity for each of their unpaid invoices pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191:

La. R.S. 38:2191 expressly contemplates the possibility of both ordinary and summary mandamus proceedings, as well as more than one mandamus or ordinary proceeding during the course of public contract performance. See St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Guy Hopkins Constr. Co., 16-907 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/5/17), 220 So.3d 6, 16, writ denied, 17-746 (La. 9/15/17), 225 So.3d 1088. Pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(A), all contracting public entities “shall” pay all obligations, progressive stage payments, and final payments when they become due and payable under the contract. Therefore, the contractor may file multiple ordinary or mandamus actions for multiple tardy progressive stage payments and may bring multiple demands for attorney's fees and statutory interest for each of those tardy progressive stage, final or change order payments.

Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. Kerner, 23-428, p. 15 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), 409 So.3d 893, 904, writ denied, 25-00090 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 570.⁷ Applying the Fifth Circuit's holding here, WCD had the right to raise multiple separate actions for each late-paid invoice. Therefore, res judicata does not bar WCD from raising separate actions to recover statutory interest.

In light of the parties’ agreement and Louisiana jurisprudence, the district court did not err in denying the City's res judicata exception. This assignment of error is without merit.

IMMEDIATE PAYMENT

The City asserts that it cannot be forced to make an “immediate payment” to WCD pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(D) because the City did not appropriate the statutory interest amounts WCD demanded. The City contends that the language of section D makes clear that mandamus proceedings provide a means to compel immediate payment of appropriated amounts from public entities.⁸ It further avers that the limitation of the mandamus remedy for statutory interest reflects the Louisiana Legislature's intent to “confine the court's authority to order payment for the appropriated amount.” Additionally, it relies upon other Louisiana laws generally requiring the Louisiana Legislature or the relevant political subdivision to appropriate funds before a judgment may be paid. See La. Const. art. 12, § 10(C) and La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2).

The City maintains that it paid WCD all of the amounts due under contracts RR061, RR115, RR118 and RR133, respectively. Therefore, the district court is precluded from demanding immediate statutory interest payments of unappropriated monies.

The record reflects that in both WCD's Petition for Mandamus and its Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus, WCD prayed for the district court to grant the writ and order the City to “immediately pay” the statutory interest due pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191. In the City's opposition to WCD's original petition, it argued that WCD was not entitled to utilize a writ of mandamus, pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(D), to recover attorney's fees and statutory interest due pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(B)(1) because the purpose of the statute is “to give contractors an avenue to quickly force payment of funds related to the work completed on a contract that were [sic] due and payable.” The City did not separately raise an exception to this effect.

Furthermore, the district court orally ordered WCD's counsel to prepare the judgment reflecting her oral disposition. The City admits in its briefing to this Court that it assisted in drafting the judgment at issue, which states the statutory interest payments are to be paid immediately.⁹

This Court's holding in Drennan I recognized that despite Section D's wording public entities may consent to mandamus proceedings to resolve statutory interest disputes arising from La. R.S. 38:2191. Indeed, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal cited Drennan I as an example of an instance where a public entity may agree to a mandamus proceeding:

We also acknowledge that in some instances, a public entity may agree to litigate statutory interest claims in a mandamus proceeding. See. e.g. Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. Cantrell, 23-193 [, p. 7,] (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/25/23), 376 So.3d 969, 975, as amended on rehearing (12/7/23) (the opinion does not indicate whether any amounts were appropriated for statutory interest, but simply states that the “parties do not dispute that a writ of mandamus was the appropriate method to obtain interest for alleged untimely payments.”). Further, if a contractor includes claims for unappropriated amounts in a Section 2191(D) mandamus proceeding, and the public entity does not object by raising a dilatory exception of unauthorized use of summary proceeding or improper cumulation of actions, then according to La. C.C.P. art. 926(B), the objection would be waived.

Kerner, at p. 18, n.14, 409 So.3d at 906.

Here, the district court determined that the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Drennan established that the parties agreed to resolve WCD's pending statutory interest claims through mandamus proceedings. Moreover, the City's failure to raise a dilatory objection and its participation in drafting the judgment at issue belies its argument. This assignment of error is meritless.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the May 27, 2025 district court judgment, making its issuance of an Alternative Writ of Mandamus peremptory on behalf of WCD and ordering the City to pay statutory interest totaling $750,966.53 for its late payment of invoices pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191. This matter is remanded to the district court for determination of court costs and WCD's attorney's fees.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   WCD avers that three issues precluded the parties from reaching an agreement:1.) a disagreement over whether La. R.S. 38:2191(B)’s 45-day deadline for the City to pay WCD began to run when WCD submitted its invoices to the City's contracted engineer for the project or when each pay application was submitted to the City's online payment portal, BRASS;2.) a dispute over whether payments were deemed to be “made” when the City issued its checks to WCD or when the City delivered its checks to WCD; and3.) whether the City's logistical delays in tendering WCD's payments constituted “reasonable cause for payment delays,” pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2191(B).

2.   The Drennan I Court also granted rehearing to amend its opinion and held that for one of the disputed invoices the City had forty-five days from April 27, 2020, to render payment. Id., at p. 19, 376 So.3d at 982.

3.   The corresponding City Engineers in this matter were: RR061- Gentilly Woods, Group F- EJES Incorporated; RR067- Leonidas-Hollygrove, Group A- Waggoner Engineering, Inc.; RR109-Lower Ninth Ward, Northwest Group B- Burk-Kleinpeter, Inc.; Project RR115- Lower Ninth Ward, Group E- MSMM Engineering, LLC; RR118- Marleyville-Fountainbleau, Group C; Schrenk, Endom, & Flanagan, LLC; and RR133- Pines Village, Group A- All South Consulting Engineers LLC.

4.   “Upon the filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus, the court shall order the issuance of an alternative writ directing the defendant to perform the act demanded or to show cause to the contrary.” La. C.C.P. art. 3865.

5.   See also Id., at p. 5 n. 4, 376 So.3d at 973 (holding that the de novo standard of review is inapplicable to interest payments due under La. R.S. 38:2191, but it is applicable to contractors’ money judgment claims).

6.   The City raised this argument in its opposition to WCD's mandamus petitions and at trial.

7.   The procedural history of Kerner and the instant case differ because this case involves two separate mandamus proceedings whereas in Kerner, WCD first filed an ordinary proceeding followed by a mandamus proceeding.

8.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 38:2191(D) provides:Any public entity failing to make any progressive stage payments arbitrarily or without reasonable cause, or any final payment when due as provided in this Section, shall be subject to mandamus to compel the payment of the sums due under the contract up to the amount of the appropriation made for the award and execution of the contract, including any authorized change orders. (Emphasis added,)

9.   Furthermore, La. Dist. Ct. Rule 9.5, entitled Court's Signature; Circulation of Proposed Judgment; Request for Reasons for Judgment, provides in pertinent part:(a) All judgments, orders, and rulings requiring the court's signature shall either be presented to the judge for signature when rendered or, if presented later, contain the typewritten name of the judge who rendered the judgment, order, or ruling.(b) If presented later, the responsible attorney or the self-represented party shall circulate the proposed judgment, order, or ruling to counsel for all parties and to self-represented parties and allow at least five (5) working days for comment before presentation to the court. When submitted, the proposed judgment, order, or ruling shall be accompanied by a Rule 9.5(b) certificate stating: the date of mailing; the method of delivery of the document to other counsel of record and to self-represented parties; whether any opposition was received; and the nature of the opposition. (Emphasis added.)

Judge Rachael D. Johnson