G.D. v. MOORE III (2026)

The plaintiff, G.D.,¹ pro se, appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing his claims and granting exceptions in favor of Hillar C. Moore, III (“Moore”) in his capacity as District Attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

G.D. commenced this matter in 2020 with the filing of a “Self-Represented Litigant Petition for Name Change the of Minor,” [sic] naming Moore as a defendant, and seeking to change the name of his biological child, born July 27, 2019. According to G.D., he and the child's mother were married, but separated, when his child was born.² G.D. argues his child was not given his surname as authorized under La. R.S. 40:34.2 ³ and instead was given his wife's surname without his consent. The trial court denied his petition. G.D. appealed, contending that the name change should be granted. This Court dismissed the appeal, finding the judgment was not a final judgment. See G.D. v. Moore, 2020-1227 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 323 So. 3d 394.

On December 21, 2021 G.D. filed a new petition, “Self-Represented Litigant Petition for Name Change the of Minor Child,” [sic] against Moore, once again asking that his child's name be changed to have his surname, among other relief. On July 11, 2022, he filed a “Supplemental Petition,” citing La. R.S. 13:4751(C)(4)⁴ and seeking to unilaterally change his child's name and set the matter for contradictory hearing. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petition, and the child's surname was changed via judgment dated August 22, 2022.

The Louisiana Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Records and Statistics (“the Bureau”) refused to amend the child's birth certificate in accordance with the August 22, 2022 judgment. On April 19, 2024, G.D. filed a “Motion and Order to Reopen Case, Join Parties and Enforce Judgment.” This time, in addition to Moore, G.D. named Baton Rouge General Medical Center (“BRGMC”) and the Bureau as defendants. According to G.D.’s motion, the Bureau was added because of “its refusal to abide by its own laws” and BRGMC was added because “the source of the error most likely initiated at the [hospital] where the child was born.” G.D. argued that the defendants were solidary obligors liable for damages, penalties, attorney fees, court costs, expenses, reimbursement, and awards allowed under Louisiana law.

Pertinent herein, on July 9, 2024, Moore filed a “Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action” in response to the “Motion and Order to Reopen Case, Join Parties and Enforce Judgment,” seeking to dismiss G.D.’s claims against him. Additionally, on August 5, 2024, Moore filed a “Peremptory Exception of Nonjoinder of a Party Under Article 641,”⁵ asking that G.D. be ordered to join the mother of the minor child as a defendant and, alternatively, that this matter be dismissed without prejudice until G.D. properly joins and serves the child's mother. BRGMC also filed dilatory exceptions of nonconformity of the petition, vagueness and ambiguity, improper joinder of parties and peremptory exceptions of nonjoinder of required party, and no cause of action. Moore's exceptions were heard on December 16, 2024. On December 17, 2024, the trial court signed a written judgment sustaining Moore's exceptions. The trial court orally ruled on BRMGC's peremptory exceptions the same day and signed a separate judgment pertaining to BRMGC on January 31, 2025.⁶

On January 16, 2025, G.D. filed a Motion for Devolutive Appeal from the December 17, 2024 judgment. On August 22, 2025, this Court issued an interim order and noted the December 17, 2024 judgment failed to identify the name of the party against whom the relief is awarded. This Court invited the trial court to amend its judgment.

On September 10, 2025, the trial court signed an amended judgment which sets forth:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney's Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action is GRANTED against plaintiff, Godwin Dike.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney's Peremptory Exception of Nonjoinder of a Party Under Artiste 641 is GRANTED against plaintiff, Godwin Dike.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BUREAU OF VITAL RECORDS AND STATISTICS be joined as a defendant in this matter and be subpoenaed for the court date to be heard as to why petitioner's request to amend his minor child's birth certificate pursuant to this court's order was denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that court costs be defer to the merits.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECRIED that all claims of plaintiff Godwin Dike against Hillar C. Moore, III, District Attorney are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Here, the amended judgment granted Moore's peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and nonjoinder of a party. The trial court dismissed G.D.’s claims against Moore, making it a final and appealable judgment under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(A)(1). See e.g. Harris v. Polito, 2025-0393 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/30/25), 2025 WL 1796264, *1 (unpublished). We note that the costs were “deferred to the merits.” Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 2088(A)(10) provides that the trial court has jurisdiction in this case over matters not reviewable under the appeal, including the right to set and tax costs, expert witness fees, and attorney fees. See Jones v. Citizens for a New Louisiana, 2024-00945 (La. 12/27/24), 397 So. 3d 842, 846.

On appeal, G.D. argues that the trial court erred in granting the peremptory exception of no cause of action in favor of Moore; the trial court erred when it “stayed silent” on Moore's peremptory exception of nonjoinder of a party under article 641; and finally, Moore failed to submit a Rule 9.5 Certificate to the trial court and this was in error.⁷

LAW AND ARGUMENT

As stated, G.D.’s biological child was not given G.D.’s surname. G.D. argued that his child should have his surname from her birth as required by La. R.S. 13:4751(C)(4). He maintained that he could petition for a name change alone as permitted by La. R.S. 40.34.2(2). After a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on August 22, 2022, ordering that the name of the child be changed to reflect G.D.’s surname and further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that information be furnished to the Bureau of Vital Statistics with respect to [the minor child]⁸ , so that the birth records on file with the Department of Health can be made to reflect the result of this judgment.

In his brief, Moore acknowledges that the District Attorney was a named defendant in the name-change suit, and party to the August 22, 2022 hearing. However, Moore argues that since G.D. seeks enforcement of the August 22, 2022 judgment, the District Attorney is no longer a necessary party. Moore notes the District Attorney's Office plays no part in the petition for a name change, other than to conduct a criminal background check on the person requesting the name change. The District Attorney's office did not object to the name change initially submitted by G.D. and in its answer G.D.’s various filed petitions, it confirms that “the office records do not reflect that [G.D.] is wanted for a crime within the district or that the name change is sought for any criminal purpose.” Moore argues that the criminal background check is the extent of the District Attorney's involvement.

No Cause of Action

As used in the context of the peremptory exception, a “cause of action” refers to the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff s right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. The peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action is used to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. The purpose of the exception of no cause of action is not to determine whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail at trial, but to only ascertain if a cause of action exists.

The exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, and, for purposes of resolving the issues raised by the exception, the well-pled facts in the petition must be accepted as true. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. Because the exception raises a question of law and the trial court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition, a judgment sustaining a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action is reviewed by an appellate court de novo. See Benoist v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 2022-0878 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 364 So. 3d 1162, 1165 (internal citations omitted.) While the District Attorney is a necessary party when a petition for a name change is filed pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4752,⁹ G.D. is no longer asking for a name change. Instead, G.D. seeks to enforce the August 22, 2022 judgment. Moore is not necessary in G.D.’s enforcement efforts. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err sustaining Moore's peremptory exception raising an objection of no cause of action. Because the grounds of the objection cannot be removed by amendment of the petition, the action against Moore “shall be dismissed” pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art 934.¹⁰

Nonjoinder Under Article 641

G.D. argues that the trial court was “silent” on Moore's peremptory exception of nonjoinder of a party under La. Code Civ P. art. 641. In his exception, Moore averred that the mother of the child is indispensable and should be made a party. According to the amended judgment, the trial court granted Moore's peremptory exception of nonjoinder. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Rule 9.5 Certificate

G.D. argues that Moore failed to include a Rule 9.5 Certificate with Moore's proposed December 17, 2024 judgment and this omission amounted to manifest error by the trial court. A proposed judgment must contain a certificate verifying its delivery to the other attorneys or parties and stating whether any opposition was received. In re Interdiction of DeMarco, 2009-1791 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/07/10), 38 So. 3d 417, 423-24. Herein, it is undisputed that the trial court's judgment, failed to comply with the requirements described above. However, this Court has found a trial court's error in signing a judgment that does not comply with Rule 9.5 to be harmless error when the judgment submitted comports with the trial court's factual findings and oral reasons. DeMarco, 38 So. 3d at 424. We find that the December 17, 2024 judgment comports with the oral reasons stated on December 16, 2024. As such, we do not find error for this omission.

Consolidation

G.D. asked this Court to consolidate the instant appeal with a separate appeal arising out of the January 31, 2025 judgment pertaining to G.D.’s claims against BRMGC. The motion is denied, as there is no pending appeal from the January 31, 2025 judgment before this Court.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's September 10, 2025 judgment sustaining the peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and nonjoinder under article 641 filed by Hillar C. Moore, III as District Attorney, and dismissing with prejudice G.D.’s claims against Hillar C. Moore, III as District Attorney. Costs of this appeal are to be borne by appellant, G.D.

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The initials of the minor child and the minor child's parents are used to protect and maintain the privacy of the minor child involved in this proceeding. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-1 and Rule 5-2.

2.   G.D. was not at the hospital when the baby was delivered.

3.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:34.2 states, in pertinent part:(2) Surname.(a) Unless otherwise provided by law and except as provided in Subparagraph (c) of this Paragraph, if the child is born to a mother who either is married or was married within three hundred days prior to the birth of the child, the surname of the child shall be recorded in accordance with the following requirements:(i) If the mother is married at the time of the birth of the child, and if the mother was not married to another man within three hundred days prior to the birth of the child, the surname of the child shall be the surname of the current husband of the mother.

4.   Louisiana Stat. Ann. § 13:4751(C)(4) states: The petition may be signed by either the mother or the father acting alone if a child has been given a surname which is different from that authorized in R.S. 40:34.2.

5.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 641 states:A person shall be joined as a party in the action when either:(1) In his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the action and is so situated that the adjudication of the action in his absence may either:(a) As a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.(b) Leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations.

6.   Only the judgment against Moore is before us on appeal.

7.   G.D. raised assignments of error with respect to BRMGC, however as noted they are not a party in the instant appeal.

8.   The minor child is referred to by their initials to preserve their anonymity.

9.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4572 provides: “The proceedings shall be carried on contradictorily with the district attorney or district attorney pro tem of the parish in which the application is made, who shall represent the state, and who shall be served with a copy of the petition and citation to answer the same.”

10.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art 934 states:When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.

BALFOUR, J.

Penzato, J. concurs.