CLARK v. COTTON (2026)

Defendants, David Stottlemire, CRST Expedited, Inc., and Ace American Insurance Company, appeal the jury verdict and denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (alternatively, motion for new trial or remittitur). For the following reasons, we affirm the verdict and the trial court's ruling.

FACTS

A multi-vehicle collision on Interstate 10 brought traffic to a near standstill. Charlie Clark and his passenger, Colby Lawson, were in Clark's pickup truck stopped in the right lane. David Stottlemire and Chrishaun Cotton were driving 18-wheeler rigs behind Clark. According to Cotton, Stottlemire's rig jumped into the left lane in front of him, forcing him to the shoulder, where he struck the left side of Stottlemire's rig. He then veered in front of Stottlemire and violently crashed into Clark's vehicle, knocking it off the road.

Stottlemire had been warned of the traffic situation via radio twenty to thirty miles before the crash. He testified that he did not lock his brakes, but body camera footage from the investigating officer showed him admitting he had locked his brakes to avoid colliding with the slowed traffic. Stottlemire also claimed he activated his flashers and was stopped for thirty seconds before the accident. A third-party witness, who contradicted both statements, said his flashers were not activated, and his rig was moving at the time of impact.

Clark and Lawson's lawsuit was tried to a jury. It found Stottlemire twenty-five percent at fault and Cotton seventy-five percent at fault. The jury awarded these damages:

 Charlie Clark

Past Medical Expenses - $160,728.42

Future Medical/Life Care Expenses - $514,000.00

Future Lost Earning Capacity - $740,000.00

Past Physical Pain and Suffering - $250,000.00

Future Physical Pain and Suffering - $1,300,000.00

Past Mental Anguish - $403,000.00

Future Mental Anguish - $1,200,000.00

Past Loss of Enjoyment of Life - $250,000.00

Future Loss of Enjoyment of Life - $1,000,000.00

Permanent Impairment/Disability - $250,000.00

 Colby Lawson

Past Medical Expenses - $13,252.19

Future Medical/Life Care Expenses - $275,000.00

Future Lost Earning Capacity - $1,500,000.00

Past Physical Pain and Suffering - $75,000.00

Future Physical Pain and Suffering - $500,000.00

Past Mental Anguish - $250,000.00

Future Mental Anguish - $500,000.00

Past Loss of Enjoyment of Life - $200,000.00

Future Loss of Enjoyment of Life - $500,000.00

Permanent Impairment/Disability - $150,000.00

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trier of fact has much discretion to assess facts and render an award because it is in the best position to see the evidence firsthand and evaluate witness credibility. Jeffries v. Prime Ins. Co., 21-161 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/21), 334 So.3d 761. The appellate court must bear “in mind that if a trier of fact's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even if convinced that if it had been sitting as trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Mistich v. Volkswagen of Ger., Inc., 95-939, p. 5 (La. 1/29/96), 666 So.2d 1073, 1077. “[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether the trier of fact was wrong but whether the factfinder's conclusions were reasonable.” Id. To reverse a factfinder's determination, the Louisiana Supreme Court has a two-part test: “(1) the appellate court must first find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the factfinder is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).” Id. at 1077–78.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Defendants allege:

1. The trial court should have overturned the verdict because a juror should have been disqualified due to her criminal history and her “current and material relationship with plaintiffs’ attorneys;”

2. The trial court erred by agreeing with the jury that Stottlemire was twenty-five percent at fault; and

3. The trial court should have reduced the damage awards.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Juror issue

Juror, Tonia Brandy, failed to disclose her 2018 federal felony conviction during voir dire. Defendants claim this conviction and her supervised release through 2022 disqualified her from serving on this jury in March 2025. The trial judge read the qualifications to the prospective jurors, including that they could not be “on probation or parole for a felony offense within the five-year period immediately preceding [their] service on this jury.” Defendants also claimed that Brandy had an impermissibly close relationship with one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys. She had attended school with the attorney three decades prior and had recently “loved” a post on his firm's Facebook page.

Defendants overplay their hand on this issue. First, “probation or parole” is not “supervised release.” A lay person can be excused for not equating the two. Second, “[t]o warrant a new trial based on juror disqualification, a party must show the exercise of reasonable diligence to discover the disqualification before verdict.” Shepherd v. AIX Energy, Inc., 51,965, p. 33 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 249 So.3d 194, 217, writ denied, 18-1266 (La. 11/5/18), 255 So.3d 1050. Defendants made no such showing. The moving party must show that he examined the juror in voir dire, “touching his qualifications, and that he answered falsely.” State v. Baxter, 357 So.2d 271, 274 (La.1978). This was not done. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Brandy testified she did not think she was on parole or probation. She said, “I answered everything that I could ․ truthfully.”

In Shepherd, the defendant discovered after trial that a juror was not a resident of the parish and did not meet the statutory qualifications. The second circuit found the defendant waived the issue by not asking about the juror's residence during voir dire. The court stressed that, as a civil matter, only nine jurors were required to reach a verdict and, since the verdict was unanimous, the court held, “[a]ny error with regard to one juror would be harmless.” Shepherd, 249 So.3d. at 218. Likewise, the defendants here did not pursue any line of questioning in voir dire that would have brought the issue to light. Accordingly, they waived the issue. Also, the unanimous verdict in this case rendered any error involving a single juror harmless.

Next, we address the narrative that Brandy “had a current and material relationship with plaintiffs’ attorney[.]” This turned out to be a tease.

In the search for substance on this issue, we find nothing. Brandy had no direct communication with any attorney. She was in school with the attorney thirty-three years ago. She “loved” two of the law firm's Facebook posts, one of which was post-verdict. At the post-trial hearing, when the trial court invited Defendants’ counsel to question her about what they described as “serious concerns regarding [her] impartiality as a juror,” counsel chose to pass. We are left to imagine what she would have said. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial on this juror-related issue.

Stottlemire's fault

We review the assessment of fault as a factual determination under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. Courville v. Allstate Ins. Co., 16-556 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/8/17), 215 So.3d 310. Importantly, when testimony conflicts, “reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.” Rosell v. Esco, 549 So.2d 840, 844. (La.1989). Where multiple permissible views of the evidence exist, the jury's choice of those views cannot be manifestly erroneous. Watson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La.1985).

This second assignment of error plays out much like the first. It does not withstand modest scrutiny. Stottlemire's actions, based on his own comments and witnesses at the scene, made him culpable in this accident. He received a radio warning about stalled traffic twenty to thirty miles ahead. He admitted locking his brakes to avoid hitting the stopped traffic. According to Cotton, Stottlemire's rig jumped in front of him, forced him onto the shoulder, and set in motion the chain of events that led to the crash into Clark.

Accident reconstruction expert, Jeffery Suway, testified about body camera footage, photos and videos of the scene, his own inspection, drone and aerial images, GPS data, and the physical evidence left behind. In his opinion, consistent with the testimony of Cotton and another third-party witness, Stottlemire's truck was not stopped when Cotton's truck struck it.

Louisiana law requires a commercial driver's license to operate an 18-wheeler when used in commerce in this state. La.R.S. 32:408(B)(2). Such a license requires knowledge beyond that required for driving a personal vehicle. La.R.S. 32:408. “Professional truck drivers, trained to operate vehicles towing trailers, are sophisticated users ․” Mallery v. Int'l Harvester Co., 96-321, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/96), 690 So.2d 765, 768, writ denied, 97-1323 (La. 9/5/97), 700 So.2d 512. Consequently, professional truck drivers are superior actors in the eyes of the law. Davis v. Witt, 02-3102 (La. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1119. Therefore, they are “held” to a high standard of care to the motoring public. Id. at 1129.

Weighing the credibility of Stottlemire and other witnesses, the jury could have reasonably found Stottlemire inattentive and negligent in creating a hazard made worse by Cotton's negligence. The jury's finding that Stottlemire was twenty-five percent at fault for this incident was not clearly wrong.

The damage awards

In Lantier v. Caskey, 19-687, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/12/20), 308 So.3d 758, 766–67, we summarized our appellate role in reviewing damages:

General damages are reviewed for an abuse of discretion because the [jury] “is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility and see the evidence firsthand.” Bouquet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 08-309, p. 4 (La. 4/4/08), 979 So.2d 456, 459. “The role of an appellate court in reviewing a general damages award is not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact.” Cormier v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 17-104, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/17), 228 So.3d 770, 776, writ denied, 17-2138 (La. 2/9/18), 237 So.3d 491. The trier of fact has great, even vast discretion in awarding general damages. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994).

․ Additionally, in reviewing a general damage award, “a court does not review a particular item in isolation; rather, the entire damage award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and if the total general damage award is not abusively high, it may not be disturbed.” Pennison v. Carrol, 14-1098, pp. 14-15 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/15), 167 So.3d 1065, 1078, writ denied, 15-1214 (La. 9/25/15), 178 So.3d 568.

“General damages are inherently speculative [and] cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty[.]” Baack v. McIntosh, 20-1054, p. 10 (La. 6/30/21), 333 So.3d 1206, 1214. To find an abuse of discretion, “the award or apportionment must be so high or so low in proportion to the injury or fault that it ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” Riley v. Maison Orleans II, Inc., 01-498, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/25/02), 829 So.2d 479, 487, quoting Moore v. Healthcare Elmwood, Inc., 582 So.2d 871, 879 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1991), writs denied, 02-2646, 02-2653 (La. 12/19/02), 833 So.2d 345, 348. Awards of special damages are also reviewed under the manifest error standard. Kaiser v. Hardin, 06-2092 (La. 4/11/07), 953 So.2d 802.

Recently, in Pete v. Boland Marine & Manufacturing Co., LLC, 23-170 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So.3d 636, our supreme court provided the method to review an award of general damages for abuse of discretion of the fact finder. It held that “to determine whether a trier of fact abused its discretion in its award for general damages, an appellate court is to consider the particular facts and circumstances of a case, in conjunction with a review of prior awards” and that this review “applies to claims of excessiveness as well as insufficiency in an award.” It then explained how the analysis is to be performed:

We do not abandon the two-step analysis for the appellate review of a general damage award but modify the analysis as follows. The question of whether the trier of fact abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages remains the initial inquiry. However, to evaluate this issue, an appellate court is to include a consideration of prior awards in similar cases, as well as the particular facts and circumstances of the case under review. If an abuse of discretion is found, the court is to then also consider those prior awards to determine “the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.” Jones, [22-841], p. 16, 359 So. 3d at 464.

Id. at 644. We thus look to awards in factually similar cases in our review for abuse of discretion.

In Levine v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 23-488, p. 16 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/24), 381 So.3d 908, writ denied, 24-426 (La. 6/19/24), 386 So.3d 310, we affirmed an award of $3,231,941.87 in general damages, for a plaintiff who underwent three surgeries including a lumbar fusion, implantation of a spinal cord stimulator, and a shoulder surgery. At the time of trial, he was scheduled to undergo a cervical fusion, and the evidence showed he struggled with activities of daily living. He also suffered a head injury causing chronic headaches and dizziness which would affect him for the rest of his life. He lost his job and would never again be able to work as a police officer, causing him to suffer from severe depression with suicidal thoughts. The Levine court found, “Based on the totality of the circumstances, particularly Plaintiff's physical, mental, and life altering injuries, we cannot say that the jury abused its discretion[.]” Id. at 921. Additionally, the Levine court went on to state the following regarding the range of awards for comparable injuries:

Plaintiff also adjusted the damage awards in a number of factually similar cases to apply inflation and cost of living increases to calculate more accurate current-day numbers. For example, in cases involving serious cervical and lumbar injuries similar to Plaintiff's injuries, the general damage awards were adjusted to levels within the range of $1,000,000.00 to $4,400,000.00.

Id.

Likewise, here, we do not find the damage awards abusively high. Clark felt immediate burning pain in his neck and back after the impact. He underwent an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at the C6-7 level and carpal tunnel release surgery. He was hesitant to drive anywhere after the accident and could not sleep well. At the time of trial, he had neck pain radiating into his shoulder, numbness in his fingers, and pain in his lumbar spine.

Clark's treating orthopedic surgeon testified Clark would need a lumbar fusion in the next one to three years. Because of Clark's age and the predictable and expected stress the fusion will put on the adjacent discs, Clark will need two additional surgeries during his lifetime. These surgeries would provide some relief, but they will cause pain and suffering particularly during recovery. He will have additional pain and suffering when an adjacent level exceeds its capacity for increased strain.

Clark suffered anxiety wondering how he would provide for his family in the future without being able to return to work as a pipefitter. The stress and worry caused difficulties in his relationship with his wife and led to divorce. He can no longer enjoy his old hobbies because of his pain and physical limitations. According to experts, he has a forty-percent total-body disability. As he was only in his early forties at the time of trial, he will face a prolonged period of future pain and mental anguish.

Lawson reported anxiety and upper to mid-back pain in the emergency room after the accident. His physician noted multiple lumbar disc herniations and spasms in the lumbar spine region upon exam, with symptoms worsening over time. He worked through pain and had pain every night after working offshore. Since the wreck, he cannot pick up his dog or feed his animals.

Lawson's treating physician said he will need a T12-Ilium Posterior Decompression/Fusion surgery to fuse his entire lumbar spine. This surgery requires a two-year recovery period. It would leave him with zero mobility in his lumbar spine. His ability to move freely through everyday tasks would be significantly impacted, ranging from difficulties with personal hygiene to decreased sexual function.

Lawson worries about the strain his injury is putting on his marriage, both emotionally and sexually. Without surgery he risks paralysis and loss of bowel function. Hunting was his life before the wreck, but now he has had to modify what he does. He hunts little and goes to fewer locations because of his injuries. His doctors assigned him a thirty-percent total-body disability. He was forty-four years old at the time of trial, so he has a long life ahead of him in which he will experience pain and mental anguish from this crash. Based on this evidence, we find the jury did not abuse its discretion in its general damages award.

Next, Defendants argue that awards for future medical expenses are speculative and question whether they will be incurred. This was a credibility and factual determination by the jury which we will not disturb. The record has ample medical testimony supporting both plaintiffs’ need for future medical treatment.

Lastly, regarding loss of earning capacity, the jurisprudence states:

Loss of earning capacity refers to a person's potential and is not necessarily determined by actual loss. Damages may be assessed for what the injured plaintiff could have earned despite the fact that he may never have seen fit to take advantage of that capacity. Such damages are calculated on the person's ability to earn money rather than on what he actually earned before the injury.

Awards for loss of future income are inherently speculative, and are intrinsically insusceptible of being calculated with mathematical certainty.

Starr v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 46,226, p. 21 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/17/11), 70 So.3d 128, 141 (citations omitted), writs denied, 11-1625, 11-1835, 11-1952 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So.3d 388, 386, 387, and writs denied, 12-2146 (La. 10/12/12), 98 So.3D 877.

Clark worked as a pipefitter making as much as $138,000.00 annually. He took leave from that work when his wife was on bedrest during pregnancy. At the time of the accident, he planned to return to pipefitting. His treating physician, however, ruled out his return to pipefitting. Clark's economist said that, given his limitations, the present value of loss of earning capacity was $2,739,734, far above the jury's award of $740,000.

Lawson earned $187,000.00 per year plus benefits before the accident. Given his post-surgery limitations, Lawson's total loss of earning capacity will be $3,365,042, according to the economist who testified. The jury awarded Lawson $1,500,000. We find this sum reasonable.

Based on the lay and expert witness testimony and factual and credibility determinations of the jury, we find the jury did not abuse its discretion in making its loss of earning capacity awards. Likewise, we find the trial court did not err in denying Defendants’ post-trial motions.

DECREE

We affirm the jury's damage awards and the judgment of the trial court denying Defendants’ requested post-trial relief. Defendants, David Stottlemire, CRST Expedited, Inc., and Ace American Insurance Company, shall bear the costs of appeal.

AFFIRMED.

DAVIS, Judge.