LEBLANC v. DG LOUISIANA LLC (2026)

In this action for negligence, Jamie LeBlanc appeals the granting of summary judgment in favor of the merchant, DG Louisiana, LLC (“Dollar General”), upon finding that Ms. LeBlanc could not prove the mandatory temporal element of her cause of action under La.R.S. 9:2800.6. Ms. LeBlanc also appeals the trial court's ruling that denied her motion for sanctions. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

According to Ms. LeBlanc's deposition, on September 18, 2016, she entered the Dollar General, located at 814 Fortune Road, Suite 105, in Youngsville, Louisiana, to shop for deodorant for her daughter. She testified that when she turned down the aisle for the deodorant, she slipped in what she thought may have been blue liquid laundry detergent or dishwashing liquid. Ms. LeBlanc testified that when she slipped, she did not fall to the ground; rather, she was caught from behind by her daughter, who had been walking behind her, and caught in the front by an older woman who was proceeding towards her down the aisle. Although Ms. LeBlanc testified that she briefly spoke with the older woman who caught her, she did not ask for her name or any contact information.

After the slip, Ms. LeBlanc informed a Dollar General employee, who was working the register at the front of the store, of her slip and the substance on the floor. Although he was the only employee working at that time, Ms. LeBlanc testified that he left the register to place a wet floor sign near the liquid and then returned to the register to continue checking out the line of customers. Specifically, Ms. LeBlanc testified as follows:

Q. And immediately after you told the [Dollar Store employee], that you described as a middle-age white man, he went out and put a wet floor cone or a flip sign? Do you remember what it was?

A. I believe the flip sign.

Q. When he did that, you weren't in the area anymore, you were –

A. I was by the register.

Q. Did he indicate to you about the substance at all? Did he tell you or confirm it's dishwashing liquid, or anything like that?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did he say anything about it?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you have any idea how long it had been on the floor?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see it before you fell in it?

A. No, sir.

Q. And there was no wet floor signs or cones, right?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you slipped, other than the lady that was coming towards you, was [sic] there any other customers in the immediate area?

A. I don't believe there was anybody down those aisles except for us.

Q. So you don't know exactly how it got there, correct?

A. No, sir.

Q. And you don't know how long it was there?

A. No, sir.

Q. And so after that, you came to the store, you filled this out, and then you started going to the chiropractor, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

As Ms. LeBlanc was purchasing the deodorant, the Dollar Store employee informed her that she would need to return to fill out a report when his manager was there. Ms. LeBlanc testified that she returned to Dollar General two days later to complete the Incident Report. Ms. LeBlanc testified that she was treated by her chiropractor from September 22, 2016, until the time of her neck surgery, which was on June 28, 2017. On January 30, 2017, Ms. LeBlanc filed suit against Dollar General, alleging that she suffered injuries to her neck, back, and shoulder.

Dollar General answered the petition on March 13, 2017, denying any negligence and/or fault on its part or any of its employees, and alleged that it “neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the existence of a ‘liquid substance’ in the aisle where [Ms. LeBlanc] allegedly slipped, but did not fall.” Dollar General also requested a trial by jury. On September 3, 2024, the parties filed a consent motion to set a jury trial on June 30, 2025.

On February 6, 2025, Dollar General filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that “Dollar General did not have any notice of the liquid on the floor of the aisle, and as such, Ms. LeBlanc is not entitled to any damages as a result of her slip.” In support of its motion for summary judgment, Dollar General attached Ms. LeBlanc's petition for damages and her June 18, 2020 deposition. In its memorandum, Dollar General argues that Ms. LeBlanc cannot prove the second requirement of the merchant liability statute that requires Ms. LeBlanc to show that, “[t]he merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence.” La.R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2). Dollar General argues that “it is undisputed that Ms. LeBlanc cannot prove that the blue liquid existed on the floor of the store for any period of time” and, thus, she is unable to “prove the temporal element of constructive notice.” Additionally, Dollar General argues that because it had “no knowledge of the liquid until after Ms. LeBlanc informed the employee, Dollar General cannot be said to have failed in its exercise of reasonable care.”

Thereafter, on March 19, 2025, Ms. LeBlanc filed a motion for sanctions for Dollar General's spoilation of evidence. Ms. LeBlanc argues “Dollar General either deleted, damaged, or otherwise failed to save the full video of the subject incident[,] which would have shown that Dollar General is liable for the incident and injuries at issue.” Ms. LeBlanc also argues that “Dollar General violated its own standard operating procedures by failing to obtain the name, phone number, or account of a key eyewitness who saw Ms. LeBlanc's incident.” Ms. LeBlanc argues that “Dollar General's conduct warrants the imposition of sanctions in the form of jury instructions[,] which supply an adverse inference that the evidence at issue would have been favorable to Mrs. LeBlanc's case.”

In her memorandum in support of sanctions for Dollar General's spoilation of evidence, Ms. LeBlanc argues that prior to the hearing on her motion to compel, she entered into a consent judgment with Dollar General that compelled it to produce, by November 30, 2017, “[p]hotographs, audio and video tapes, surveillance, and recordings of [Ms. LeBlanc], the incident, and/or the location/scene of the incident at the Dollar General store on September 18, 2016 beginning at 12:01 a.m. until 11:59 p.m.” However, she argues Dollar General “provided only partial, glitchy, and incomplete footage - conveniently omitting the critical moments showing how the hazardous liquid ended up on the floor and how long it remained there.” Ms. LeBlanc alleges that Dollar General has not offered an “adequate explanation for why the remaining footage was not produced” and has deprived her “of critical evidence that would have established how long the liquid substance remained on the floor prior to her incident or what caused it to spill.” Further, Ms. LeBlanc argues that Dollar General violated its own standard operating procedure when its employee failed to obtain the witness's name, phone number, and her account of the incident.

On April 4, 2025, Ms. LeBlanc filed an opposition to Dollar General's motion for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence will prove that the blue liquid existed on the aisle floor for a sufficient period of time necessary to constitute constructive knowledge. Ms. LeBlanc argues that “Dollar General's corporate representative admitted that a spill occurred in the aisle where [she] slipped and that the blue liquid was present on the floor for “some period of time prior to the incident.” Specifically, in response to Ms. LeBlanc's counsel's questions, Dollar General's corporate representative, Holly Chaisson, testified in her deposition as follows:

Q ․ You saw him [Dollar General's employee] with the paper towels?

A Yeah.

Q Would that be indicative of [sic] there was a spill for him to clean up the spill?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Now, again, after reviewing the video and knowing what the procedure is for SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] 118, would you agree that the liquid that the cashier cleaned up following Jamie's slip was present in the aisle for some period of time prior to her fall -- her slip?

A I mean, I don't know how long, but it was there.

Q Yeah. I'm not asking you how long. It could have been minutes. It could have been whatever, but would you at least agree that based on this video, that the spill where she fell was there for some period of time prior to her slip?

A Yes.

In response to Dollar General's counsel's questions, Ms. Chaisson testified as follows:

Q Okay. I had deposed Ms. Le[B]lanc and she had testified in her deposition that she was probably in the store about five minutes before the incident she described, okay. And she also indicated that she has no idea how long the substance was on the floor. Is there any way you could tell by this video or any video how long a substance was on the floor?

A No.

Q Okay. As a company representative, did Dollar General have any knowledge of any substance on the floor before her fall?

A No.

Q Okay. She testified there was a small blue liquid, small puddle of blue liquid. That's what she testified in her deposition. Any idea where that blue liquid came from?

A No.

Q Okay. Do y'all sell blue liquid at Dollar General?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what is your blue liquid in the form of, what type of product?

A It could be dishwashing liquid or laundry detergent.

Ms. LeBlanc argues that Ms. Chaisson's “admission satisfies the temporal element required under La. R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2)[,]” and that she only needs to demonstrate that the hazard existed for “some period of time” before her slip. She argues that it is “the role of the trier of fact to determine whether the length of time is sufficient to satisfy the constructive knowledge requirement of the ‘Merchant Liability Act.’ ” Additionally, Ms. LeBlanc argues there is a question of fact as to whether Dollar General exercised reasonable care under La.R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(3) when it had only one employee working the cash register at the time of the incident.

In support of her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Ms. LeBlanc attached the following exhibits: (1) her June 18, 2020 deposition; (2) her January 30, 2017 petition for damages; (3) the March 6, 2024 deposition of Dollar General's corporate representative, Ms. Chaisson; (4) Dollar General's November 29, 2017 supplemental answers to interrogatories and requests for production; and (5) her August 31, 2017 motion to compel discovery and for attorney fees.

After a hearing on April 21, 2025, the trial court denied Ms. LeBlanc's motion for sanctions and granted Dollar General's motion for summary judgment, which dismissed the matter with prejudice. In his oral reasons, the trial judge stated the following regarding the motion for sanctions:

BY THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Domengeaux, your [sic] asking me to sanction for a jury instruction with a presumption that there [is] no video footage or insufficient video footage and that there is no witness statement presumption that was, I am trying to get it right. That the presumption would be that it existed and that, that's the reason you don't have it is cause there is information on there that would be detrimental to the defendant's case. You received, and when I say you, I mean your client cause I realize that you were still in law school when all this occurred but your client did receive some video footage, okay. So it's not like they didn't give you anything. They gave you what they had ․ So you received, your client received the recording that they [had] during that twenty-hour period. And for me to issue that presumption I would have to assume that there is something on there that's not on there. You know, you don't have I mean there is you had, they answered your response with before the video you got was turned over befored [sic] they overwrote it. They had to because if they overwrote[,] you wouldn't have anything. It wasn't, it may not have produced but it was preserved before it was overwritten, cause by now it's been overwritten a long time. So, if you would of asked for it and they wouldn't have it would have been overwritten because they didn't preserve it, they preserved what they had. It's not what you want and I don't blame you. I understand that. You know you would want, you would want a spot right on the floor for a twenty-four hour period to see what exactly was there, how it got there, and how long it was there, but they don't have footage of that, they don't have, you know, quite frankly, I've been in Dollar General, I am surprised that you can see anything in that video because everything [is] always so cluttered in there. I don't know where their cameras are to be able to get a view of the floor. And as far as for the [employee] and the Dollar General policy, they also have a policy that employees have to wash their hands after they go to the restroom and I don't know if they all abide by tha[t] but that's not against the law if they don't, that just means that they may get fired. So this person, did they take a statement, doesn't seem like they did. Now again if this employee would of gotten a name and a phone number and a statement and then they would of discarded it then you might have a presumption that, yea, they knew it was bad. But again[,] we don't know what that witness would of said. So again, I am assuming that it's bad, and I can't do that, you know that's not what the burden is. I can't guess at what that might be. So for those reasons I am going to deny the Motion for Sanctions, you are not getting an instruction.

Regarding the motion for summary judgment, the trial judge orally granted the motion upon finding no material issues of fact as to whether the merchant, Dollar General, “either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition which caused the damage prior to the occurrence.”

Ms. LeBlanc now appeals this final judgment, alleging the following three assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Dollar General had constructive notice under La.R.S. § 9:2800.6(B)(2). The record shows a spill occurred in the aisle where Mrs. Le[B]lanc slipped, the liquid was on the floor for some undetermined period of time prior to the slip, four employees were scheduled to work on the date of the incident but only the cashier was present, and employees were expected to monitor for hazards while stocking and walking the aisles. These facts create a triable issue as to whether Dollar General, exercising reasonable care, should have discovered the spill.

2. The trial court committed legal error by construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, Dollar General, instead of the non-movant, Mrs. Le[B]lanc, and placing the burden of Mrs. Leblanc to “convince the court” that Dollar General had actual knowledge or that Dollar General created the hazard.

3. The trial court erred in assuming that the surveillance cameras at the Dollar General store were motion-sensored and did not record continuously. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying Mrs. Le[B]lanc's motion for sanctions for Dollar General's spoilation of evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The summary judgment procedure is expressly favored in the law and “is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2). Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 06-363 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544. After an adequate opportunity for discovery, “summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3).

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment rests with the mover. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). As further stated in La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1):

[I]f the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Thus, the party opposing summary judgment must produce competent evidence setting “forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial[;]” he cannot rely “on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art. 967(B).

DISCUSSION:

In her first assignment of error, Ms. LeBlanc argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Dollar General had constructive notice under La.R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2). In response, Dollar General argues that Ms. LeBlanc is unable to prove that it created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition that caused the damage, prior to the occurrence.

In Louisiana, slip and fall actions against merchants are governed by The Merchant Liability Statute, La.R.S. 9:2800.6, which provides as follows:

A. A merchant owes a duty to persons who use his premises to exercise reasonable care to keep his aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition. This duty includes a reasonable effort to keep the premises free of any hazardous conditions which reasonably might give rise to damage.

B. In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a person lawfully on the merchant's premises for damages as a result of an injury, death, or loss sustained because of a fall due to a condition existing in or on a merchant's premises, the claimant shall have the burden of proving, in addition to all other elements of his cause of action, all of the following:

(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable.

(2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence.

(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. In determining reasonable care, the absence of a written or verbal uniform cleanup or safety procedure is insufficient, alone, to prove failure to exercise reasonable care.

C. Definitions:

(1) “Constructive notice” means the claimant has proven that the condition existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered if the merchant had exercised reasonable care. The presence of an employee of the merchant in the vicinity in which the condition exists does not, alone, constitute constructive notice, unless it is shown that the employee knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the condition.

(2) “Merchant” means one whose business is to sell goods, foods, wares, or merchandise at a fixed place of business. For purposes of this Section, a merchant includes an innkeeper with respect to those areas or aspects of the premises which are similar to those of a merchant, including but not limited to shops, restaurants, and lobby areas of or within the hotel, motel, or inn.

“Failure to prove any of the requirements enumerated in La.R.S. 9:2800.6 will prove fatal to a plaintiff's case.” Rowell v. Hollywood Casino Shreveport, 43,306, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/24/08), 996 So.2d 476, 478.

The Louisiana Supreme Court thoroughly discussed La.R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2) in White v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 97-393, pp. 4-7 (La. 9/9/97), 699 So.2d 1081, 1084–86, stating (emphasis added) (footnote omitted):

The requirement of Section (B)(2) is that the merchant created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition prior to the occurrence. That is clear and unambiguous. Constructive notice, at issue here, is defined by Section (C)(1). The definition is likewise clear and unambiguous. There is a temporal element included: “such a period of time ․[.]” The statute does not allow for the inference of constructive notice absent some showing of this temporal element. The claimant must make a positive showing of the existence of the condition prior to the fall. A defendant merchant does not have to make a positive showing of the absence of the existence of the condition prior to the fall. Notwithstanding that such would require proving a negative, the statute simply does not provide for a shifting of the burden.

Though there is no bright line time period, a claimant must show that “the condition existed for such a period of time ․[.]” Whether the period of time is sufficiently lengthy that a merchant should have discovered the condition is necessarily a fact question; however, there remains the prerequisite showing of some time period. A claimant who simply shows that the condition existed without an additional showing that the condition existed for some time before the fall has not carried the burden of proving constructive notice as mandated by the statute. Though the time period need not be specific in minutes or hours, constructive notice requires that the claimant prove the condition existed for some time period prior to the fall. This is not an impossible burden.

․

The statute is clear. To prove constructive notice, the claimant must show that the substance remained on the floor for such a period of time that the defendant merchant would have discovered its existence through the exercise of ordinary care. Plaintiff presented absolutely no evidence that the liquid was on the floor for any length of time. This complete lack of evidence falls far short of carrying the burden of proving that the liquid had been on the floor for such a period of time that the defendant should have discovered its existence.

In this case, both Ms. LeBlanc and Ms. Chaisson testified that they did not know how the liquid got on the floor or how long it had been there before Ms. LeBlanc slipped on it. Additionally, the record is void of any evidence to support that Dollar General created the condition and/or that it had notice of the liquid prior to Ms. LeBlanc's slip. Therefore, the issue is whether Ms. LeBlanc provided positive evidence showing that the blue liquid existed for some period of time, and that such time was sufficient to place Dollar General on notice of its existence. In its motion for summary judgment, Dollar General points to the lack of evidence regarding this essential element, and offers Ms. LeBlanc's deposition testimony that she did not know how long the substance had been on the floor prior to her slip. Although Ms. LeBlanc offers the deposition testimony of Ms. Chaisson when she answered “Yes” upon being asked whether the liquid was present for “some period of time,” we find it worth reiterating exactly what Ms. Chaisson testified to regarding the length of time the liquid was on floor prior to Ms. LeBlanc's slip:

Q [Ms. LeBlanc's Counsel] Okay. Now, again, after reviewing the video and knowing what the procedure is for SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] 118, would you agree that the liquid that the cashier cleaned up following Jamie's slip was present in the aisle for some period of time prior to her fall -- her slip?

A I mean, I don't know how long, but it was there.

Q Yeah. I'm not asking you how long. It could have been minutes. It could have been whatever, but would you at least agree that based on this video, that the spill where she fell was there for some period of time prior to her slip?

A Yes.

․

Q [Dollar General's Counsel] Okay. I had deposed Ms. Le[B]lanc and she had testified in her deposition that she was probably in the store about five minutes before the incident she described, okay. And she also indicated that she has no idea how long the substance was on the floor. Is there any way you could tell by this video or any video how long a substance was on the floor?

A No.

Q Okay. As a company representative, did Dollar General have any knowledge of any substance on the floor before her fall?

A No.

Q Okay. She testified there was a small blue liquid, small puddle of blue liquid. That's what she testified in her deposition. Any idea where that blue liquid came from?

A No.

After reviewing the depositions as a whole, it is evident that neither Ms. LeBlanc nor Ms. Chaisson were able to testify how long the blue liquid was on the floor prior to Ms. LeBlanc's slip and/or how the liquid got on the floor. Although Ms. Chaisson responded with a mere “Yes” when asked if the liquid was there at some time prior to the slip, we find this testimony insufficient to “show that the substance remained on the floor for such a period of time that the defendant merchant would have discovered its existence through the exercise of ordinary care.” White, 699 So.2d at 1086. “Mere speculation that a dangerous condition could have existed for some time period ‘falls [far] short of the factual support required to establish that plaintiff will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial.’ ” Guidry v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 19-1999 p. 2 (La. 2/26/20), 289 So. 3d 1026, 1027 (quoting Babin v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 00-78, p. 5 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 40). “A claimant who simply shows that the condition existed without an additional showing that the condition existed for some time before the fall has not carried her burden of proving constructive notice as mandated by the statute.” Otero v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 25-232, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/10/25), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––. Because Ms. LeBlanc failed to present evidence that the liquid was on the floor for any length of time prior to her slip, we agree with the trial judge that she failed to create an issue of fact regarding constructive notice.

In her second assignment of error, Ms. LeBlanc argues the trial court committed legal error when it construed the evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, Dollar General, instead of her, the non-movant, and placed the burden on her to “convince the court” that Dollar General had actual knowledge or that it created the hazard. Ms. LeBlanc argues that instead of evaluating whether genuine fact issues existed, the trial court improperly weighed the evidence. For the following reasons, we find no merit to this assignment of error.

Dollar General, as the mover of the motion for summary judgment, had the obligation to point out the absence of factual support for one of more elements of Ms. LeBlanc's claim under La.R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2). As such, Dollar General argued that Ms. LeBlanc failed to provide any evidence whatsoever to prove that it “either created or had actual constructive notice of the condition which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence” as required by La.R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2). In support of this argument, Dollar General provided Ms. LeBlanc's deposition wherein she admits that she cannot prove the temporal elements of constructive notice.

Once Dollar General pointed out the absence of factual support related to La.R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2), Ms. LeBlanc had the burden of producing evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. For Ms. LeBlanc to carry the burden of proving the constructive notice or temporal element, she had to present positive evidence of the existence of the condition prior to the accident. See Lidell v. Savaski, 24-5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/9/24), 398 So.3d 741; David v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 19-36 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/2/19), 282 So.3d 329. As stated in Lidell, 398 So.3d at 744 (internal citations omitted):

Whether the period of time is sufficiently lengthy that a merchant should have discovered the condition is necessarily a fact question; however, there remains the prerequisite of showing some time period. A claimant who simply shows that the condition existed without an additional showing that the condition existed some time before the fall has not carried the burden of proving constructive notice as mandated by the statute. Though the time period need not be specific in minutes or hours, constructive notice requires the claimant prove the condition existed for some time period prior to the fall.

Like the trial court, we, too, find that Ms. LeBlanc failed to introduce sufficient evidence to show that the blue liquid existed for “some time period” prior to her slip. White, 699 So.2d at 1084. Accordingly, we find that Ms. LeBlanc e is unable to meet her burden of proof on the required elements of her claim under La.R.S. 9:2800.6.

In her third assigment of error, Ms. LeBlanc contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for sanctions due to spoliation of evidence, seeking an adverse evidentiary presumption. She argues the trial judge “erred in assuming that the surveillance cameras at the Dollar General store were motion-sensored and did not record continuously” and thus “erred in denying [her] motion for sanctions for Dollar General's spoilation of evidence.” In response, Dollar Store argues that it “produced all of the surveillance video captured within the time period specified” and that “the record is devoid of any evidence, other than Ms. LeBlanc's own innuendo and speculation, that [it] destroyed the related video surveillance.”

An appellate court reviews a denial of a motion for sanctions under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard. Acosta v. B & B Oilfield Services, Inc., 12-122 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 91 So.3d 1263. Additionally, the “appellate standard of review for a trial court's decision of whether an adverse presumption for spoliation of evidence should be imposed is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” BancorpSouth Bank v. Kleinpeter Trace, L.L.C., 13-1396, p. 39 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/1/14), 155 So.3d 614, 640, writ denied, 14-2470 (La. 2/27/15), 159 So.3d 1067. This court addressed spoliation of evidence in Waterman v. Acadiana Mall CMBS, LLC, 18-793, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/27/19), 269 So.3d 789, 794, where it explained (alternation in original) (emphasis added):

The evidentiary doctrine of spoliation of evidence “refers to an intentional destruction of evidence for the purpose of depriving the opposing parties of its use in pending or anticipated litigation[.]” Walker v. Manitowoc Co., Inc., 16-897, p. 20 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/10/18), 259 So.3d 465, 478 (quoting Carter v. Hi Nabor Super Mkt., LLC, 13-0529, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/30/14), 168 So.3d 698, 703, writ denied, 15-0190 (La. 4/17/15), 168 So.3d 399). See also Temes v. Manitowoc Corp., 14-93 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/23/14), 181 So.3d 733. In the event a trial court determines that a suspect party failed to produce evidence within its control, the trial court may impose a sanction, including “an instruction to the jury that it may infer that the evidence was detrimental to that party.” Carter, 168 So.3d at 704. That adverse inference, however, is not applicable “when the party gives an adequate explanation for the failure to produce the evidence.” Id. On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of spoliation of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.

The trial judge stated in his oral reasons that although the video provided by Dollar General does not show “a spot right on the floor for a twenty-four hour period to see what exactly was there, how it got there, and how long it was there[,]” he found that the Dollar Store “preserved what they had” and timely produced the surveillance video footage to Ms. LeBlanc. We agree. Ms. Chaisson testified in her deposition that the Dollar Store turned over all the videos it had from that day when Ms. LeBlanc slipped in the aisle, and that although the videos do not have audio and may skip a lot, a third party controls the video surveillance of the store. Additionally, the trial judge stated that even assuming that the Dollar Store employee had gotten a witness's name, phone number, and/or a statement, and if in fact that was discarded, then Ms. LeBlanc “might have a presumption that, yea, they knew it was bad[;]” however, under these facts, “we don't know what that witness would of said” because the employee never spoke with her. It is also worth noting that Ms. LeBlanc's incident report stating that there was a witness to her slip was not filed with Dollar Store until September 20, 2016, two days after her slip in the aisle.

Although Ms. LeBlanc argues that the trial judge erred in assuming that the surveillance cameras at the Dollar General store were motion-sensored and did not record continuously, we note that “[a]ppeals are taken from the judgment, not the written [or oral] reasons for judgment.” Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n v. Olivier, 02-2795, p. 3 (La. 11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22, 24. In this case, the trial court's April 29, 2025 signed judgment ordered “Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions be ․ DENIED.” For Ms. LeBlanc to assert a claim for spoliation of evidence, she must allege that the Dollar Store intentionally destroyed evidence “for the purpose of depriving the opposing parties of its use in pending or anticipated litigation.” Carter v. Hi Nabor Super Mkt., LLC, 13-529, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/30/14), 168 So.3d 698, 703, writ denied, 15-190 (La. 4/17/15), 168 So.3d 399. Upon review of the evidence, we find Ms. LeBlanc failed to provide sufficient evidence that the Dollar Store intentionally destroyed evidence to hinder her ability to litigate the case. Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial judge's ruling that denied Ms. LeBlanc's motion for sanctions.

For these reasons, we hereby affirm the trial court's ruling that denied Ms. LeBlanc's motion for sanctions. We also affirm the trial court's judgment that granted Dollar Store's motion for summary judgment, which dismissed Ms. LeBlanc's case with prejudice. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff, Jamie LeBlanc.

AFFIRMED.

PERRET, Judge.