BUTLER v. ST JAMES PARISH (2026)

Appellants/defendants, St. James Parish, the St. James Parish Council, and the St. James Parish Planning Commission (collectively “St. James”), appeal the trial court's January 2, 2025 judgment, issued following a bench trial on October 29 and November 25, 2024. The January 2, 2025 judgment granted the petition for declaratory judgment filed by appellees/plaintiffs, Genevieve Butler, Pastor Harry Joseph, Sr., Rise St. James, and the Louisiana Bucket Brigade, finding that the St. James Parish Council and the St. James Planning Commission violated the Louisiana Open Meetings Law under La. R.S. 42:11, et seq. The trial court also denied the petition for injunctive relief filed by the appellees/plaintiffs.

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment of January 2, 2025.

Procedural History

The petition, filed July 15, 2019, sought declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Louisiana Open Meetings Law (“OML”) by St. James. The petition alleged that St. James violated the OML by holding secret back-to-back “informational meetings” on May 14, 2019 to discuss a land use permit application submitted by Wanhua Chemical US Operations (“Wanhua”) for a proposed chemical plant in Convent, Louisiana. The petition alleged that these meetings, held without public notice, circumvented the OML.

Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court found that the St. James Planning Commission (“Planning Commission”) and St. James Parish Council (“Parish Council”) had intentionally structured the two meetings on May 14, 2019 in an effort to avoid a quorum while ensuring that the members could learn, discuss, and inquire privately about the Wanhua application. The trial court entered judgment in favor of appellees and against appellants as to appellees’ petition for declaratory relief that the meetings violated the OML. The trial court denied the appellees’ request for injunctive relief, finding that they had failed to establish irreparable harm.

Appellants, St. James Parish (the “Parish”), the Planning Commission, and the Parish Council, filed a timely appeal asserting that the trial court committed reversible legal error by finding that they violated the OML. Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's judgment finding a violation of the OML, and dismissal of appellees’ claims with prejudice.

Appellees contend that the trial court erred when it denied their request for injunctive relief and ask this court to modify that portion of the judgment by granting their request for a permanent injunction against future conduct by appellants that would circumvent the OML.

Facts

This litigation arises from the appellees’ opposition to the construction of a chemical plant in the Parish. In 2018, Wanhua began the process of applying to the Parish for approval to construct and operate a chemical facility that would make components of polyurethane in Convent, Louisiana. As part of the process, Wanhua had to apply for certain State approvals and permits. The Parish also required that Wanhua complete a land use application pursuant to the St. James Parish Code of Ordinances.

A. The Publicly Noticed Meetings of the Planning Commission and the Parish Council

Wanhua's land use application first appeared on the agenda of the Planning Commission on January 28, 2019. A Wanhua representative made a presentation on Wanhua's application at the public meeting held on that date.

On February 25, 2019, the Planning Commission held a public meeting and again included the application by Wanhua on its agenda. A Wanhua representative made another presentation on that date. Public comments were accepted and were addressed by the Wanhua representative.

On March 25, 2019, the Planning Commission held another public meeting and accepted public comments on Wanhua's application. A Wanhua representative made a presentation and addressed the public comments. Plaintiff Genevieve Butler attended this meeting and gave public comment in opposition to Wanhua's application.

On April 26, 2019, appellees submitted written comments about the Wanhua application to the Planning Commission. The comments argued that the Planning Commission should deny the Wanhua application because, inter alia, the application failed to include information required by the applicable St. James Parish Land Use Ordinance and did not allow the Planning Commission to fully evaluate the proposed project's physical and environmental impacts.

The land use application by Wanhua appeared on the agenda for the April 29, 2019 meeting of the Planning Commission. Nine public comments were made in opposition to Wanhua's application. Sharon Lavigne, founder of plaintiff, Rise St. James, spoke against the application at this meeting. During the meeting, the Planning Commission moved to table the agenda item relating to Wanhua's application until the next meeting on May 20, 2019.

At the regular meeting on May 20, 2019, the Planning Commission accepted additional public comment on Wanhua's application. Eight public comments were made against the application, and one public comment was made in favor. After all public comments were made, the Planning Commission voted and approved the application with certain conditions. The resolution that passed on May 20, 2019 indicated that public comment had been received and that based upon the concerns expressed at public hearings, the Planning Commission would require Wanhua to provide additional information to address concerns of potential impacts of the facility.

The Parish Council held additional public hearings on July 10, 2019, and again on July 24, 2019. At the July 24, 2019 regular council meeting, the Parish Council received additional information related to the Wanhua application. In light of the new information, the Parish Council remanded the application to the Planning Commission with instructions to consider the new information presented and to render a new decision.

On July 15, 2019, appellees filed their petition for alleged violations of the OML, seeking a reversal of the May 20, 2019 resolution of the Planning Commission; a remand of Wanhua's application to the Planning Commission; alternatively, that the grant of a land use permit to Wanhua be voided; a declaration that St. James had violated the OML; and a permanent injunction enjoining St. James from circumventing the OML.

On September 4, 2019, Wanhua advised the Parish that it was withdrawing its application for a land use permit.

B. The Meetings / Sessions on May 14, 2019

The parties stipulated that on May 14, 2019, there were two meetings held with members of the Planning Commission and the Parish Council. At that time, the Planning Commission consisted of ten members, and the Parish Council consisted of seven members. The meetings were structured in two separate sessions, one at 6:00 p.m. and one at 7:00 p.m., with different members of the Planning Commission and Parish Council attending each session. The parties stipulated that four members of the Planning Commission and three members of the Parish Council attended the 6:00 p.m. meeting, and that a different group of two members of the Planning Commission and two members of the Parish Council attended the 7:00 p.m. meeting. The parties further stipulated that no proxy voting procedure, voting procedure, polling, or secret balloting were taken by the Parish, the Parish Council, or the Planning Commission on May 14, 2019. This arrangement of the two sessions ensured that no quorum of either body was present at either of the sessions.

Blaise Gravois, Director of Operations for the Parish, testified that the Parish Council had decision-making authority over the Wanhua land use application, but the application went before the Planning Commission first. His intent in having the meetings was to address the issues that Councilmembers had on the Wanhua application. He testified that the Parish Councilmembers wanted to be in an environment where they could ask questions and get answers from the applicant “without being bombarded by any other opinion.” And he wanted the members of the Planning Commission and Parish Council to have the opportunity to ask their own questions so they could “be clear about the decision they needed to make.” He stated that the members of the Parish Council and Planning Commission asked him to put a meeting together where the members could gather information from Wanhua and that they did not want other people at the meeting, if possible. That is why it was not advertised as an open meeting. Mr. Gravois testified that the intent was “not to have a quorum” at either of the meetings of the Planning Commission or the Parish Council.

Mr. Gravois drafted an email and directed that it be sent to all Parish Councilmembers and Parish Commissioners. The email sent out on May 9, 2019 stated:

I am offering this Informational Meeting to allow Planning Commission members and members of the Parish Council to hear the results of these meetings and have the opportunity to ask your own Questions so everyone can be clear on the decision that has to be made. This is an Informational meeting only, no decisions will be made at this meeting. this [sic] meeting is for invited guest [sic] only, not open to the public.

We cannot have a quorum of the Planning Commission or the Parish Council. I am asking those that can attend to please confirm ASAP. Pick the 6 pm or 7 pm time slot. I will close a time slot when filled and move to the other time slot as needed.

Mr. Gravois testified that he did not notify the public about the informational meetings to be held on May 14, 2019. He also stated that no one who had not been invited attended either session of the May 14, 2019, although there were some who were invited who did not attend. An email dated May 14, 2019 from Mr. Gravois to Vic Franckiewicz, legal counsel for the Parish, and Bliss Higgins, Parish Environmental Consultant, included an attendance list for the informational meetings and stated that “[e]verything is set up to go.”

Representatives from Wanhua attended both sessions on May 14, 2019. They handed out written materials that included a list of areas of concern that had been raised by the public, such as health concerns, traffic impacts, and “hiding chemicals” from the Parish for discussion.

C. Additional Trial Testimony

Commissioner Dean Millet testified that the Planning Commission is an Advisory Committee to the Parish Council. He testified that it was his understanding that the Planning Commission meetings must be noticed to the public if there is a quorum. Their meetings are generally held at the Convent government building, but the May 14, 2019 meetings were held at the Convent Community Center. He testified that the meetings were informational meetings to allow the Wanhua representatives to provide information about the Wanhua proposal and let the Councilmembers become familiar with the process and general safety guidelines. He said that there were “quite a few questions” asked of the Wanhua representatives at the meetings. In his view, the meeting provided a better understanding of Wanhua's proposal. He stated that the meeting was not open to the public because the organizers of the meetings wanted to alleviate the potential for bickering.

Mr. Clyde Cooper was a Councilmember of the Parish Council during 2018 and 2019, and left office in January 2024. He confirmed that the email notice of the May 14, 2019 meetings that was sent to the Planning Commission and the Parish Council included language stating: “This is an Informational Meeting only, no decisions will be made at this meeting, this meeting is for invited guest [sic] only, not open to the public․ We cannot have a quorum of the Planning Commission or the Parish Council.” He could not recall any other emails concerning Parish Council meetings that instructed that a council meeting was not open to the public. He could not recall that the Parish Council had ever held meetings at the Convent Community Center before. He testified that the representatives from Wanhua presented information and answered questions at the meeting he attended.

Some of the individual plaintiffs testified as to their concerns about St. James holding “secret meetings” that were not noticed to the public. Ms. Lavigne testified that members of Rise St. James regularly attend Planning Commission meetings when they are aware of chemical plants such as Wanhua's application being on the agenda. She testified that even though Wanhua withdrew its application, she was still concerned because if “secret meetings” happened once, they could happen again.

Ms. Butler testified that she wanted to know the process and procedure for having a chemical plant in Convent. She said she was concerned because if an informational meeting was held on May 14, 2019 without notice, it could happen again in the future because it has happened in the past. Her concern with Wanhua's application was trying to know what chemicals would be brought into her community, what the impact on the environment would be, and what the community's response would be if there was an incident.

Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Appellate courts review a trial court's findings of fact under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Oubre v. Burl, 23-421 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/29/23), 369 So.3d 1287, 1289, writ denied, 23-1191 (La. 8/31/23), 369 So.3d 796. Where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review. Id. at 1290.

Appellate review of questions of law is simply a review of whether the trial court was legally correct or incorrect. Id. Where the dispositive facts in a case are not in dispute, an appellate court reviews the case de novo. Angelica v. Wilkerson, 24-332 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/9/25), 411 So.3d 837, 845. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed by this court under a de novo standard of review. Descendants Project v. Port of South Louisiana, 24-121 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/20/24), 391 So.3d 777, 780, writ denied, 24-926 (La. 11/6/24), 395 So.3d 1172.

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in its application of the law to the facts, and that the dispositive facts of the case are not in dispute. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in its interpretation of La. R.S. 42:14(B), and that the trial court erred in its factual findings that appellants used a prohibited means to circumvent the integrity of the OML.

By contrast, the appellees argue that this appeal raises several contested issues of fact chiefly revolving around whether appellants intended to circumvent the intent of the OML, and that questions of fact should be reviewed for manifest or “clear” error.

The parties stipulated to some but not all of the facts. The trial court heard testimony and received exhibits from the parties. Accordingly, we review the trial court's factual findings for manifest error.

B. The Louisiana Open Meetings Law

The OML for Louisiana is contained in Title 42, Chapter 1-A of the Revised Statutes. The public policy regarding the OML is set forth in La. R.S. 42:12, which provides:

A. It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens be advised of and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy. Toward this end, the provisions of this Chapter shall be construed liberally.

B. Further, to advance this policy, all public bodies shall post a copy of this Chapter.

The definitions for this chapter are set forth in La. R.S. 42:13(A), which define a meeting, public body, and quorum as follows:

(2) “Meeting” means the convening of a quorum of a public body to deliberate or act on a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power. It shall also mean the convening of a quorum of a public body by the public body or by another public official to receive information regarding a matter over which the public body has supervision, control, jurisdiction, or advisory power.

(3) “Public body” means village, town, and city governing authorities; parish governing authorities; school boards and boards of levee and port commissioners; boards of publicly operated utilities; planning, zoning, and airport commissions; and any other state, parish, municipal, or special district boards, commissions, or authorities, and those of any political subdivision thereof, where such body possesses policy making, advisory, or administrative functions, including any committee or subcommittee of any of these bodies enumerated in this paragraph.

(4) “Quorum” means a simple majority of the total membership of a public body.

La. R.S. 42:13(B) further provides that “[t]he provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to chance meetings or social gatherings of members of a public body at which there is no vote or other action taken, including formal or informal polling of the members.”

The requirements for meetings under the OML are set forth in La. R.S. 42:14, which provides in pertinent part:

A. Every meeting of any public body shall be open to the public unless closed pursuant to R.S. 42:16, 17, or 18.

B. Each public body shall be prohibited from utilizing any manner of proxy voting procedure, secret balloting, or any other means to circumvent the intent of this Chapter.

C. Appellants’ Assignments of Error

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that the informational meetings/sessions held on May 14, 2019 constituted a violation of La. R.S. 42:14(B).

The parties stipulated at trial that four Planning Commissioners and three Councilmembers attended one informational meeting, while a different group of two Planning Commissioners and two Councilmembers attended a second, separate meeting.

Based upon these undisputed facts, the trial court found that there were not enough Planning Commissioners or Councilmembers in attendance at either session to meet the requirements for a quorum. Thus, the trial court concluded that there was no quorum present at either of the two informational meetings on May 14, 2019, and that “a quorum could not have been present simultaneously as a simple majority would have required six or more members of the Planning Commission or four or more members of the Parish Council.”

Because there was no quorum when considering the meetings separately, the trial court next considered appellees’ argument that the meetings were a type of “walking quorum” in violation of La. R.S. 42:14(B). After considering all of the evidence presented, the trial court found that St. James had violated La. R.S. 42:14(B) because the successive meetings held with members of the Planning Commission and Parish Council, outside the purview of the public, constituted a walking quorum. The trial court reasoned:

The Court finds that Plaintiffs established by a preponderance that the Planning Commission and Parish Council intentionally structured meetings to avoid a quorum, while ensuring successive meetings allowed all members to learn, discuss, and inquire privately, so they could “be clear on the decision to be made.” Furthermore, the meetings were not noticed to the public as evidenced by Mr. Gravois’ email which stated that the sessions were invite only and were “not open to the public.” At trial, Mr. Gravois confirmed that his email instructions were complied therewith and no uninvited guests, i.e. the public, were in attendance at the meetings. Notice was not published on the Parish's website nor the door of either Council's chambers, nor on the door of the Convent Community Center, the location where the meetings were held. Although Mr. Gravois testified that the doors to the building were not locked, the public did not receive notice of these meetings until months later, in response to a public records request. Additionally, there was no meeting to apprise the public of the information obtained or deliberations had at the meetings prior to the Planning Commissions’ vote to conditionally approve the Land Use Permit on May 20, 2019.

With this background, we consider whether appellants’ actions violated La. R.S. 42:14(B), i.e., whether appellants used “any other means to circumvent the intent of [the OML].” Much of the parties’ briefing focuses on whether the May 14, 2019 sessions constituted a “walking quorum.” The Open Meetings Law does not use that term though, and La. R.S. 42:14(B) does not require a specific finding that a walking quorum occurred. Rather, the “walking quorum” concept has developed as a judicially created roadmap that may assist courts in determining whether successive, structured interactions were utilized as a means to circumvent the intent of the OML.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeal has defined a “walking quorum” as “a meeting of a public body where different members leave the meeting and different members enter the meeting so that while an actual quorum is never physically present an actual quorum during the course of the meeting participates in the discussion.” Mabry v. Union Par. Sch. Bd., 42,856 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/08), 974 So. 2d 787, 789 (citing Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90–349, July 26, 1990).

The Office of the Louisiana Attorney General has indicated that one common way in which public bodies may violate the OML is through a “walking” or “rolling quorum.” La. Att'y. Gen. Op. No. 19-0128 (July 20, 2020), 2020 WL 4530384 at *1 (Baier). This Attorney General opinion stated that “[a] ‘walking’ or ‘rolling’ quorum is a procedural device used to have conversations with a quorum of the public body through multiple smaller conversations of less than a quorum.” Id. The opinion further stated that “[a] ‘walking’ or ‘rolling’ quorum is unlawful because while no conversation has occurred with an actual quorum physically present at a single location, a quorum effectively participates in a discussion of an issue.” Id. The Attorney General opinion concluded that “a walking quorum and violation of the OML occurs if members of the governmental body gather in numbers that do not physically constitute a quorum at any one time but who, through successive gatherings, secretly discuss a public matter with a quorum of the body with the intent to circumvent the Open Meetings Law as prohibited by La. R.S. 42:14(B).” Id. at *2.

While the Mabry case and the Attorney General opinion are useful as an analytic framework, the statutory inquiry remains whether the appellants intended to circumvent the OML. A formal determination that a “walking quorum” occurred is not required. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the record independently supports the trial court's findings because appellants’ actions clearly showed an intent to circumvent the OML.

Mr. Gravois acknowledged, and the email confirmed, that the meetings were intentionally set up so as not to have a quorum. And no notice of the May 14, 2019 meetings was provided to the public, either through official public notice or by simply informing members of the public. The email notification sent to the members of the Planning Commission and the Parish Council explicitly stated that the successive meetings were “for invited guests only,” and were “not open to the public.” In addition, the May 14, 2019 meetings were held at the Convent Community Center, a location not typically used for such meetings, instead of the Convent government building. And most importantly, the meetings were scheduled only six days before the vote set for May 20, 2019, “so everyone can be clear on the decision that has to be made.”

As discussed above, the provisions of the OML are to be construed liberally, so that “citizens be advised of and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.” La. R.S. 42:12(A).

The structured exchange of information and questioning of the applicant, coupled with the distribution of written materials addressing public concerns, demonstrates that the May 14, 2019 sessions were not chance encounters or social gatherings that falls under the exception to the OML set forth in La. R.S. 42:13(B). Rather, they were convened to privately advance the members’ understanding of, and preparation for, a pending public decision, outside the presence of the public.

As such, we cannot say that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that appellants took very specific steps “to circumvent the intent of” the OML and that the successive meetings on May 14, 2019 were in violation of La. R.S. 42:14(B).

C. Appellees’ Request for Future Injunctive Relief

Appellees filed an answer to the appeal seeking a modification of the trial court's judgment to permanently enjoin appellants from engaging in conduct that violates the OML. Appellees argue that the trial court erred in limiting the relief granted to declaratory relief.

Appellants respond that appellees have not proved irreparable harm and have not presented support for their position that they are entitled to a permanent injunction without a showing of irreparable harm.

La. R.S. 42:26 of the OML provides the remedies for violations of an enforcement proceeding under the OML and provides:

A. In any enforcement proceeding the plaintiff may seek and the court may grant any or all of the following forms of relief:

(1) A writ of mandamus.

(2) Injunctive relief.

(3) Declaratory judgment.

(4) Judgment rendering the action void as provided in R.S. 42:24.

(5) Judgment awarding civil penalties as provided in R.S. 42:28.

B. In any enforcement proceeding the court has jurisdiction and authority to issue all necessary orders to require compliance with, or to prevent noncompliance with, or to declare the rights of parties under the provisions of this Chapter. Any noncompliance with the orders of the court may be punished as contempt of court.

C. If a party who brings an enforcement proceeding pursuant to R.S. 42:25 prevails, the party shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and other costs of litigation. If such party prevails in part, the court may award the party reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate portion thereof.

D. If the court finds that the proceeding was of a frivolous nature and was brought with no substantial justification, it may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.

(Emphasis added.)

In support of their contention that they are entitled to a permanent injunction under La. R.S. 42:26, appellees cite Jurisich v. Jenkins, 99-076 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So.2d 597, 599 and South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 555 So.2d 1370, 1373 (La. 1990), and argue that a showing of irreparable injury is not necessary when the deprivation of a constitutional right is involved.

Appellees’ reliance on Jurisich and South Central Bell, however, is misplaced because these cases involve the issuance of preliminary injunctions, rather than a permanent injunction. A preliminary injunction is essentially an interlocutory procedural device designed to preserve the status quo between the parties pending a trial on the merits. Pappas v. Hand Surgical Assocs., Ltd., 22-407 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/29/23), 364 So.3d 495, 501.

Furthermore, La. R.S. 42:26 specifically states that the trial court may grant injunctive relief and/or a declaratory judgment when the OML is violated. There is no requirement that the trial court grant both.

The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent the occurrence of future acts that may result in irreparable injury, loss, or damage to the applicant. Smith v. St. John the Baptist Par., 24-491 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/30/25), 412 So.3d 1122, 1127; Bernhard MCC, LLC v. Zeringue, 19-529 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/20), 303 So.3d 372, 377, writ denied, 20-1172 (La. 12/8/20), 306 So.3d 434. A permanent injunction is issued after trial and is an extraordinary remedy appropriately ordered only to prevent damage that is likely to occur in the future rather than to punish for past damage. Davas v. Saia, 23-90 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/6/23), 376 So.3d 288, 292 (citing Fondel v. Fondel, 20-221 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/10/21), 312 So.3d 1180, 1186).

The trial court found that the successive meetings held on May 14, 2019 were not held with “ill-intent.” The testimony of individual plaintiffs that they were concerned that if St. James had secret meetings once, it could happen again, is not sufficient to support a permanent injunction. See Enwefa v. Bd. of Supervisors of S. Univ. & A & M Coll., 24-1029 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/14/25), 410 So.3d 992, 997 (It is insufficient for plaintiffs to show they fear unlawful acts will be committed in order to support the issuance of an injunction against future unlawful actions.) And there is no evidence in the record to suggest that St. James will likely violate the OML in the future. As the trial court stated in its judgment, the appellants are now “well aware” of what constitutes a violation of the OML.

Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred or abused its discretion and find no reason to disturb the trial court's denial of a permanent injunction against appellants.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment of January 2, 2025.

AFFIRMED

SCHLEGEL, J.