BAXTER v. STATE (2026)

Plaintiff appeals an amended judgment of the district court that sustained the peremptory exceptions raising the objections of prescription and no cause of action in favor of Defendants, State of Louisiana and Judge Adam Haney, and dismissed Plaintiff's claims against them. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Additionally, we deny the answer filed by Defendants in which they seek an award of costs.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On or about February 29, 2016, a child was born to Nichole Villanueva. Prior to the child's birth, Plaintiff (“Baxter”) accompanied Ms. Villanueva to Catholic Charities of East Baton Rouge (“Catholic Charities”) to inquire about the adoption process. It was during this visit that Ms. Villanueva informed Baxter that he was the child's father. Baxter allegedly informed Catholic Charities at that visit that he would not consent to surrendering his parental rights so that the child may be placed for adoption. Nevertheless, Ms. Villanueva executed an act of intent to surrender the child for adoption on or about February 16, 2016, and the child was released to Catholic Charities’ custody shortly after birth. According to Baxter, he was first served with the notice of intent executed by Ms. Villanueva in March 2016.

Baxter objected to the proposed adoption, and at an April 2016 hearing, he again objected before the presiding judge (“Judge Haney”). Judge Haney instructed Baxter to obtain counsel as well as a DNA test to establish paternity. At a second hearing in May 2016, Baxter informed Judge Haney that he could not afford an attorney but that he was able to obtain a DNA test to confirm he is the father of the child. Nevertheless, Judge Haney terminated Baxter's parental rights. Judge Haney then granted the adoption of the child.

That evening, Baxter took to social media to express his discontent with the proceedings. Thereafter, Baxter was arrested and convicted for public intimidation and retaliation pursuant to La. R.S. 14:122.¹ Baxter was subsequently released on probation, a condition of which was that he may not post about the adoption proceedings or Judge Haney on social media. During his release, Baxter began to inquire with Catholic Charities as to the wellbeing of the child. Catholic Charities informed Baxter that he need not reach out or provide any gifts and that the child was well cared for. Baxter violated the terms of his probation by posting on social media regarding the loss of his parental rights. As a result, Baxter was arrested again and was subjected to additional time on probation for this violation.² Baxter ultimately completed his sentence in September 2020.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 26, 2021, Baxter filed a federal civil rights lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana (“the MDLA suit”) against Catholic Charities, the State of Louisiana (“the State”), and Judge Haney.³ All of the federal claims brought by Baxter in the MDLA suit were ultimately dismissed pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(B)(1) & (6) motions, and the federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. As a result, the remaining state law claims were dismissed without prejudice by judgment dated November 17, 2022.

Thereafter, Baxter filed a petition for damages on December 19, 2022, and later an amended petition for damages on March 10, 2023, in state court against Catholic Charities, Judge Haney, and the State.⁴ Baxter specifically alleged that, during the April 22, 2016 hearing, he “was not fully informed of his right to due process”; his request for more time to seek counsel prior to granting the adoption of the child was wrongfully denied; his parental rights were terminated “without a true contradictory hearing or testimony ․ in violation of his due process and fundamental rights”; Judge Haney and/or his employees or agents “made [a] mockery of [his] circumstances in being incarcerated by posting taunting language on social media”; and he was wrongfully arrested and therefore was prevented from exercising his right to vote.

Baxter specifically stated that Judge Haney “inexcusably overstepped his authority[ ] when he terminated [Baxter's] parental rights”; Judge Haney “was biased toward the other parties in the action”; and upon information and belief, Judge Haney's bias was premised on “[Judge Haney's] own personal benefit in ruling in favor of [Catholic Charities].” Baxter then alleged Judge Haney “had an immediate interest and an undisclosed relationship” with Catholic Charities. According to Baxter's petition, all of the defendants “acted in concert in matters alleged herein” resulting in a “continued tort violation of his constitutional rights beginning in early 2016 until the present.” As to the State, Baxter alleged it is vicariously liable for the actions of its employees and that La. Ch.C. art. 1138 ⁵ is unconstitutional.

In response to Baxter's amended petition, the named defendants filed a number of exceptions. Pertinent to this appeal are the peremptory exceptions raising the objections of prescription and no cause of action filed by Judge Haney and the State (collectively “the State Defendants”).⁶ The State Defendants asserted that Judge Haney (and the State by virtue of being vicariously liable for Judge Haney's actions) enjoys absolute immunity from all of Baxter's claims as they are related to judicial acts. The State Defendants also argued that all of Baxter's claims are prescribed because they stem from the 2016 adoption proceeding, which occurred over six years prior to the date Baxter filed suit in state court.

Baxter filed an opposition to the exceptions filed by the State Defendants on January 30, 2024. Therein, Baxter asserted that the State Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity because Judge Haney's actions were “nonjudicial”—i.e., not executed in the judge's official judicial capacity. Additionally, Baxter stated that every day he endures the realization that he will never have a relationship with his child “acts as a fresh infliction of distress,” thereby constituting a continuing tort commencing the prescriptive period anew. Alternatively, Baxter argued that the last injury-causing event was his release from probation in September of 2020 or the onset of his extreme emotional distress over the situation later that year. Lastly, Baxter argued the prescriptive period was suspended pursuant to the third category of contra non valentem due to “Defendants’ strategy to obstruct justice and delay the pursuit of his claims” by allegedly inciting a “genuine fear that such legal actions might lead to an extension of his probation or even wrongful incarceration for a probation violation.”

All exceptions were ultimately heard on December 2, 2024. Neither the State Defendants nor Baxter offered any evidence in support of or in opposition to the State Defendants’ exceptions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court sustained the State Defendants’ objections of prescription and no cause of action. The district court signed a written judgment to that effect on December 19, 2024.⁷

Baxter appealed and assigned the following errors to the district court's judgment that sustained the State Defendants’ exceptions: (1) the district court erred in sustaining the exception raising the objection of prescription despite allegations of continuing torts; (2) the district court failed to consider whether the doctrine of contra non valentem suspended prescription while Baxter was on probation; (3) the district court failed to consider that the prescriptive period was suspended during the pendency of emergency orders of the Governor; (4) the district court erred in finding the State Defendants are immune from suit; (5) the district court erred in treating Baxter's probation under La. R.S. 14:122 as a bar to relief ⁸ ; (6) the district court erred by disregarding well-pled allegations of the petition as “conclusory”; and (7) the district court erred in refusing to provide Baxter an opportunity to amend his petition to cure any alleged defects. The State Defendants answered the appeal, requesting Baxter be assessed with all costs of the district court proceedings and the proceedings of this court.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Bias v. Haley, 2023-0281 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 383 So.3d 175,181. This court's appellate jurisdiction extends only to final judgments, which determine the merits in whole or in part, and to interlocutory judgments made expressly appealable by law. Bias, 383 So.3d at 181 (citing La. C.C.P. arts. 1841 & 2083).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1918 mandates that a final judgment be identified as such by appropriate language naming the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied, which should be determinable from the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Bias, 383 So.3d at 181. In the absence of such decretal language, the ruling is not a valid final judgment, and in the absence of a valid final judgment, this court lacks jurisdiction. Bias, 383 So.3d at 181.

The December 19, 2024 judgment (“the original judgment”) states only that the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action are sustained. On August 5, 2025, this court issued, ex proprio motu, a Rule to Show Cause Order noting the original judgment appears to lack decretal language “as it fails to name specific parties who the ruling is against and identify the relief awarded.” The parties were ordered to show cause by briefs whether the appeal should be remanded for the correction of the original judgment. This matter was ultimately remanded for the limited purpose of inviting the district court to correct the defects in the original judgment.

On October 29, 2025, the appellate record was supplemented with an amended judgment dated October 22, 2025 (“the amended judgment”). The amended judgment corrected all deficiencies noted in the Rule to Show Cause Order and most significantly, dismissed Baxter's claims against the State Defendants with prejudice. In light of the amended judgment, which we determine to be a valid, final judgment, we maintain the appeal.

OBJECTION OF PRESCRIPTION

Prior to July 1, 2024, La. C.C. art. 3492 provided that delictual actions were subject to a one-year liberative prescription, commencing from the day the injury or damage was sustained. Article 3492 was repealed by La. Acts 2024, No. 423, § 2, effective July 1, 2024. Because the tort claims in this case arose prior to this date, former Article 3492 applies in this matter.⁹ See McCray v. Arcosa Aggregates Gulf Coast, LLC, 2025-0198 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/10/25), 423 So.3d 270, 277, writ denied, 2025-01518 (La. 2/3/26), 425 So.3d 841.

The objection of prescription may be raised by peremptory exception. La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(1). Normally, the exceptor bears the burden of proof regarding the exception raising the objection of prescription; however, if prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, the burden shifts to the adverse party to show suspension, interruption, or renunciation. Bezou v. Bezou, 2015-1879 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/16), 203 So.3d 488, 495, writ denied, 2016-1869 (La. 12/5/16), 210 So.3d 814.

The standard of review of a judgment pertaining to an exception raising the objection of prescription turns on whether evidence is introduced at the hearing of the exception. Mitchell v. Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic, L.L.C., 2021-00061 (La. 10/10/21), 333 So.3d 368, 373; see also La. C.C.P. art. 931 (allowing the introduction of evidence to support or controvert a peremptory exception). If no evidence is submitted at the hearing, the exception must be decided upon the facts alleged in the petition with all of the allegations accepted as true. In that case, the reviewing court is simply assessing whether the district court was legally correct in its finding. Mitchell, 333 So.3d at 373. No evidence was introduced by either party at the hearing on the State Defendants’ exceptions; therefore, we must accept as true the facts alleged in the amended petition and apply the de novo standard of review. See Damond v. Marullo, 2019-0675 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/22/20), 307 So.3d 234, 240, writ denied, 2020-01243 (La. 3/23/21), 312 So.3d 1104.

In this case, prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings. The last action of the State Defendants alleged by Baxter in his amended petition occurred in 2016, when Judge Haney terminated Baxter's parental rights and authorized the child's adoption.¹⁰ This took place approximately five years prior to Baxter filing the MDLA suit and six years prior to the state court suit.¹¹ Therefore, the burden of proof is on Baxter to show suspension, interruption, or renunciation of prescription. See Bezou, 203 So.3d at 495. Louisiana law recognizes several jurisprudential exceptions to prescription, two of which Baxter maintains apply here: the continuing tort doctrine and contra non valentem.

Continuing Tort Doctrine

Application of the continuing tort doctrine requires the operating cause of the injury to be a continuous one resulting in continuous damage. Benson v. State, Department of Revenue through Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control, 2017-0081 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/17), 227 So.3d 847, 850. In other words, where the cause of injury is a continuous one giving rise to successive damages, prescription does not begin to run until the conduct causing the damage is abated. Benson, 227 So.3d at 850 (citing South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 418 So.2d 531, 533 (La. 1982)). However, if the operating cause of the injury is discontinuous (not a continuous one of daily occurrence), there are a multiplicity of causes of action and of corresponding prescriptive periods. Benson, 227 So.3d at 850. Further, in cases in which a plaintiff has suffered some but not all of his damages, prescription runs from the date on which he first suffered actual and appreciable damage, even though he may thereafter come to a more precise realization of the damages he has already incurred or incur further damage as a result of the completed tortious act. Mulkey v. Century Indemnity Company, 2018-1551 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/7/19), 281 So.3d 717, 723, writs denied, 2019-01576, 2019-01534 (La. 11/25/19), 319 So.3d 857, 283 So.3d 495.

In order to allege a continuing tort, a plaintiff must allege both continuous action and continuous damage. Harris v. Breaud, 2017-0421 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/27/18), 243 So.3d 572, 580. A continuing tort is occasioned by unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of an original, wrongful act. Harris, 243 So.3d at 580. The inquiry is essentially a conduct-based one, asking whether the tortfeasor perpetuates the injury through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts. Typically, courts have found torts to be continuous in nature when each individual act would not necessarily give rise to a cause of action; rather, it is the cumulative effect of regularly occurring or continuous actions that results in successive damages from day to day. Harris, 243 So.3d at 580.

Since Baxter did not introduce any evidence at the hearing, we must accept the allegations of his amended petition as true. Damond, 307 So.3d at 240. Baxter alleged he learned he was the father of the child, accompanied the child's mother to Catholic Charities, and objected to the adoption of the child in 2016. In that same year, Judge Haney terminated Baxter's parental rights and granted adoption of the child. All actions of the State Defendants described in Baxter's amended petition concern these 2016 events.¹² Nevertheless, Baxter argues that the ongoing unconstitutional deprivation of his parental rights is a continuous action causing continuous damage “that renews each day he is denied the ability to parent his daughter.”

The “deprivation” Baxter experiences every day that he is without his child is the continuing effect of a prior decision of Judge Haney to terminate Baxter's parental rights. Baxter's amended petition does not include allegations of new conduct after his parental rights were terminated. We find the operating cause of Baxter's injuries is not continuing, and there is no continuing tort. Therefore, we find no merit to Baxter's contention that his suit has not prescribed due to operation of the continuing tort doctrine.

Contra Non Valentem

Contra non valentem, a jurisprudentially created exception to prescription adopted to “soften the harshness of prescriptive statutes,” generally means that prescription does not run against a person who could not bring his suit. Mitchell, 333 So.3d at 374 (quoting Carter v. Haygood, 2004-0646 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d 1261, 1268). Determinations as to whether contra non valentem applies to suspend prescription generally proceed on an individual, case-by-case basis. Mitchell, 333 So.3d at 374. Louisiana law recognizes four categories of contra non valentem that operate to prevent the running of prescription. It is the third category—where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action, see Mitchell, 333 So.3d at 374—that Baxter asserts is applicable.

The third category of contra non valentem applies in cases in which a defendant has committed acts such as concealment, fraud, misrepresentation, or other ill practices that reasonably tend to hinder, impede, or prevent the plaintiff from asserting his cause of action or “when the defendant has done some act effectually to lull the victim into inaction and prevent him from availing himself of his cause of action.” In re Medical Review Proceedings of Poree, 2024-01590 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1159, 1160-61 (per curiam) (quoting Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2009-2368 (La. 10/19/10), 48 So.3d 234, 251-52). The equitable nature of the circumstances in each individual case determines whether the doctrine is to be applied. In re Poree, 406 So.3d at 1161.

Baxter argues that he was unable to file sooner because his ability to pursue relief was “directly obstructed by Defendants’ misconduct.” Baxter maintains that he was wrongfully arrested “merely for expressing discontent on social media, jailed under a statute later held unconstitutional, and then forced to serve two additional years of probation under that unconstitutional law.” Baxter alleges that while he was on probation, he was expressly warned not to speak publicly about his case and lived under the constant fear that any action—including pursuing litigation—could be construed as a violation leading to reincarceration. Baxter asserts that this conduct “created an environment in which he could not reasonably assert his rights” until his release from probation in September 2020.

Baxter's amended petition did not contain any allegations of actions on behalf of the State Defendants that would reasonably tend to hinder, impede, or prevent him from filing suit. Additionally, courts have held allegations of fear of potential actions by defendants that would hinder, impede, or prevent the plaintiff from asserting his or her cause of action, without more, is insufficient to suspend the prescriptive period under the third category of contra non valentem. See Doe v. Doe, 95-0006 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95), 671 So.2d 466, 470, writ denied, 95-2671 (La. 1/12/96), 667 So.2d 523; G.B.F. v. Keys, 29,006 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/22/97), 687 So.2d 632, 636, writ denied, 97-0385 (La. 3/21/97), 691 So.2d 94. Accordingly, we find contra non valentem does not apply to suspend prescription under the facts of this case.

Suspension by Emergency Proclamation

Baxter also argues that prescription was suspended by Emergency Proclamation Number 170 JBE 2021 issued by Governor John Bel Edwards. Louisiana Civil Code article 3472.1 states, in pertinent part:

[I]n the event the governor, in response to a state of emergency or disaster, issues an executive order or proclamation ․ that purports to suspend or extend liberative prescriptive or peremptive periods in all or part of the state, the executive order or proclamation shall have the effect of suspending only those liberative prescriptive or peremptive periods that would have otherwise accrued during the period of time specified in the order or proclamation or, if no period of time is specified, during the duration of the effectiveness of the executive order or proclamation. Upon the termination of the period of suspension, liberative prescription or peremption commences to run again and accrues upon the earlier of thirty days after the expiration of the period of suspension or in accordance with the period of time as calculated pursuant to Article 3472.

Pertinent hereto is Proclamation Number 170 JBE 2021, which suspended the prescriptive periods while Louisiana was in a declared state of emergency due to Hurricane Ida making landfall on August 29, 2021.¹³ However, as previously noted, all allegations against the State Defendants occurred in 2016, and we found that prescription was not suspended. Therefore, applying the one-year prescriptive period that was in effect at the time of these 2016 actions, Baxter's causes of action prescribed long before 170 JBE 2021 went into effect on August 26, 2021. We find this argument meritless.

For the foregoing reasons, Baxter did not carry his burden of proof to establish suspension, interruption, or renunciation of prescription, and therefore, we find no error in the district court's judgment sustaining the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription filed by the State Defendants and dismissing all of Baxter's claims against them.¹⁴

OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND

Finally, Baxter asserts that he should have been given the opportunity to amend his petition to correct its deficiencies in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 934. Article 934 provides that when the grounds for the objection pleaded by peremptory exception may be removed by amendment, the court shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, the action shall be dismissed. See La. C.C.P. art. 934. The right to amend a petition following the sustaining of a peremptory exception is not absolute; amendment is not permitted when it would constitute a vain and useless act. Harrell-Bijou v. Guarino, 2023-0425 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/16/23), 379 So.3d 698, 705. Article 934 does not require that the plaintiff be provided the opportunity to speculate on unwarranted facts merely for the purpose of defeating the exception. The right to amend one's petition is qualified by the restriction that the objections to the petition be curable. The decision to allow amendment of a pleading to cure the grounds for a peremptory exception is within the discretion of the district court. Harrell-Bijou, 379 So.3d at 705.

In this case, it does not appear that the objections to the amended petition are curable, as every action of the State Defendants detailed in his amended petition occurred in 2016.¹⁵ Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's failure to allow amendment of the petition prior to dismissal of Baxter's claims against the State Defendants.

THE STATE DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER

The State Defendants filed an answer to Baxter's appeal pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2133. Therein, the State Defendants noted that the district court declined to tax costs against Baxter in contravention of La. C.C.P. art. 5188, which states, in pertinent part, “Except as otherwise provided by Articles 1920 and 2164, if judgment is rendered against a party who has been permitted to litigate without the payment of costs, he shall be condemned to pay the costs incurred by him ․ and those recoverable by the adverse party.” The district court authorized Baxter to proceed in forma pauperis per order dated January 30, 2023. As such, the State Defendants request that all costs of the district court proceedings be taxed against Baxter. In addition, the State Defendants seek appeal costs under La. C.C.P. art. 2164, arguing that Baxter's appeal is frivolous.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1920 and 2164, referenced in Article 5188, both allow the courts to render judgment for costs as it may consider equitable. Notably, La. C.C.P. art. 1920 has been liberally interpreted as granting broad discretion to the district court. Vicknair v. Plaisance, 2024-1169 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/21/25), 420 So.3d 726, 731-32. Therefore, on appellate review, only a showing of an abuse of discretion warrants reversal of the district court's cost allocation. Vicknair, 420 So.3d at 732. We find no such abuse of discretion in this case.

Likewise, under Article 2164, appeals are favored; it is within an appellate court's discretion to award or increase attorney fees for the expense of the appeal, and we will not award damages unless they are clearly due. See Benoist v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company, 2022-0879 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/1/23), 362 So.3d 957, 963. Under the facts of this case, we decline to assess appeal costs in this matter.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, the district court's October 22, 2025 amended judgment sustaining the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription filed by Defendants, the State of Louisiana and Judge Adam Haney, is affirmed. We decline to assess appeal costs in this matter.

AFFIRMED; ANSWER DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:122 states:A. Public intimidation is the use of violence, force, extortionate threats, or true threats upon any of the following persons, with the intent to influence his conduct in relation to his position, employment, or duty:(1) Public officer or public employee.(2) Grand or petit juror.(3) Witness, or person about to be called as a witness upon a trial or other proceeding before any court, board or officer authorized to hear evidence or to take testimony.(4) Voter or election official at any general, primary, or special election.(5) School bus operator.B. Retaliation against an elected official is the use of violence, force, extortionate threats, or true threats upon a person who is elected to public office, where:(1) The violence, force, or threat is related to the duties of the elected official.(2) Is in retaliation or retribution for actions taken by the elected official as part of his official duties.C. For purposes of this Section:(1) “Extortionate threats” occur when a person communicates an unlawful threat to harm another person with the intention to obtain anything of value or any acquittance, advantage, or immunity of any description and the person would not otherwise be able to lawfully secure such advantage willingly from the victim.(2) “True threats” occur when a person communicates a serious expression of an intent to commit an unlawful act of violence upon a person or group of persons with the intent to place such persons in fear of bodily harm or death. The person need not actually intend to carry out the threat.D. Whoever commits the crime of public intimidation or retaliation against an elected official shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or both.

2.   At the trial of the exceptions, counsel for the State Defendants stated that Baxter “pled guilty to a violation of his outstanding probation for threatening his victim for a second time. So, his probation was extended [and] that is a second ․ conviction.”

3.   Baxter also named Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center (“OLOL”) as a defendant. Baxter's claims sounding in federal law against OLOL were dismissed with prejudice.

4.   Baxter named OLOL as a defendant in the state suit as well. The district court dismissed OLOL from the suit without prejudice at Baxter's request on March 14, 2023.

5.   According to La. Ch.C. art. 1138(A), at the hearing of opposition to adoption, the alleged or adjudicated father must establish his parental rights by acknowledging he is the father of the child and by proving that he has manifested a substantial commitment to his parental responsibilities and that he is a fit parent of the child. If the court finds that the alleged or adjudicated father has failed to establish his parental rights, it shall decree that his rights are terminated. La. Ch.C. art. 1138(D).

6.   Catholic Charities filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of res judicata and prescription. Baxter appealed the district court's decision on the exception raising the objection of prescription filed by Catholic Charities as well, which is the subject of docket no. 2025-0730, also issued on this date.

7.   Notice of judgment was mailed on January 17, 2025. Baxter filed a motion for appeal on January 27, 2025, which the district court granted on February 4, 2025. The district court provided written reasons at Baxter's request on January 27, 2025.

8.   Baxter contends La. R.S. 14:122 was repealed; however, he is incorrect. To the extent Baxter argues La. R.S. 14:122 is unconstitutional, no controlling authority has made such a finding. See State v. James, 2019-0715 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/6/19), 364 So.3d 52 (vacating defendant's conviction for violation of La. R.S. 14:122), rev'd, 2020-0068 (La. 4/27/20), 295 So.3d 388.

9.   If a cause of action does exist, which we assume only for purposes of determining the question whether the claim is prescribed, the action is subject to the rules of prescription of tort actions. Harvey v. Dixie Graphics, Inc., 593 So.2d 351, 353 (La. 1992).

10.   We note Baxter also claimed that the court staff made a mockery of his circumstances in being incarcerated by posting on social media; however, he did not state when this occurred.

11.   Until there is a decision by a federal court that it lacks jurisdiction, the federal suit interrupts prescription, and interruption continues as long as the federal suit is pending. See La. C.C. art. 3463(A).

12.   All references to “wrongful arrest” or “wrongful probation,” as well as the allegation that Baxter was denied the right to vote in 2019, relate to Baxter's assertion that La. R.S. 9:122 was declared unconstitutional rather than to any actions of the State Defendants. As discussed in footnote 8, supra, there has been no such declaration of unconstitutionality. Although there is one mention of “false representation” by “Defendants,” Baxter did not provide any further detail.

13.   Pursuant to La. C.E. art. 202(B), courts shall take judicial notice of proclamations of the governor if a party requests it and provides the court with the information it needs to comply with the request.

14.   Having found that the district court correctly sustained the State Defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, we pretermit discussion of the remaining assignments of error related to the State Defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action. See Cameron Parish Police Jury v. McKeithen, 2002-2242 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/30/02), 836 So.2d 181, 184-85, writ denied, 2002-2702 (La. 11/2/02), 828 So.2d 1106.

15.   As noted in footnote 10, supra, Baxter also claimed in his petition that the district court staff made a mockery of his circumstances in being incarcerated by posting on social media; however, he did not state when this occurred. The district court asked Baxter's counsel at the trial on the exceptions when these social media posts were posted, to which she stated, “I believe, in 2017 or ’18.” Therefore, as the district court acknowledged in its ruling, “procedurally, it would be barred” since the action was not filed until December 19, 2022.

EDWARDS, J.