PARKER v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICE OF MOTOR VEHICLES (2026)

The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles (the State), appeals the district court's judgment ordering the reinstatement of a Class A Commercial Driver's License (CDL) to a driver who refused to submit to a chemical test for intoxication after his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). For the following reasons, we reverse and render.

BACKGROUND

On April 28, 2024, Raynard M. Parker was arrested in East Baton Rouge Parish for first offense DWI in violation of La. R.S. 14:98. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Parker possessed a Class A CDL. After the reading of his rights, Mr. Parker was asked to submit to a test for intoxication by providing a breath sample for the Intoxilyzer 9000, but he refused. As a result, the State suspended Mr. Parker's driving privileges for one year pursuant to La. R.S. 32:661(C)(1)(b) and La. R.S. 32:667,¹ and disqualified his CDL for one year pursuant to La. R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(d)² and49 C.F.R. § 383.51,³ under state and federal implied consent laws.

Mr. Parker timely requested and was granted an administrative hearing to contest the suspension of his driving privileges and disqualification of his CDL. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:668(A) limits the scope of an administrative hearing following the revocation or suspension of a driver's license to the determination of:

(1) Whether a law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person ․ had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state ․ while under the influence of ․ alcoholic beverages ․ .

(2) Whether the person was placed under arrest.

* * *

(5) Whether he refused to submit to the [approved chemical] test upon the request of the officer.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the suspension of Mr. Parker's license and the statutory disqualification of Mr. Parker's CDL in accordance with state and federal law.⁴

On September 27, 2024, Mr. Parker filed a petition for judicial review in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Iberville against the State, appealing the adverse judgment of the ALJ. A bench trial was held on April 3, 2025, wherein the following evidence was offered, filed, and introduced: (1) Arrestee's Rights Form concerning Mr. Parker's refusal to submit to the test for intoxication; (2) Affidavit for Search Warrant by the arresting Baton Rouge Police Officer Corey Hatfield in order to obtain a blood test for scientific testing of Mr. Parker's blood alcohol concentration (BAC); (3) Form indicating Mr. Parker's refusal of the Intoxilyzer 9000 test for his BAC; (4) Official Certification of Mr. Parker's driving history; (5) Office of Motor Vehicles history search of Mr. Parker's driving license details, including first offense violation of implied consent laws by refusing to be tested on April 28, 2024; (6) Affidavit of Probable Cause for Mr. Parker's arrest for first offense DWI on April 28, 2024; (7) Uniform Traffic Summons issued to Mr. Parker on April 28, 2024; and (8) Uniform DWI Arrest Citation issued to Mr. Parker on April 28, 2024.

At the trial, Officer Hatfield testified that the details of his interaction with Mr. Parker are contained in his affidavit for a search warrant for a blood test, which was admitted into evidence. Officer Hatfield is part of the DWI Task Force with the Baton Rouge Police Department. Officer Hatfield stated that he first came into contact with Mr. Parker at 2:25 a.m. on April 28, 2024, after being dispatched to the location where the sole occupant of the vehicle, Mr. Parker, was sleeping in his parked vehicle with the engine running and lights on. The vehicle was in a parking lot adjacent to a police station where officers had observed Mr. Parker asleep in the driver's seat for quite some time with the vehicle's transmission in drive. The vehicle had jumped onto a curb and was close to a tree.

When Officer Hatfield arrived and spoke with Mr. Parker, he could smell a strong odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Parker who had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. Additionally, Mr. Parker was unable to keep his balance and he was swaying. Mr. Parker was advised of his Miranda rights, which he indicated he understood. Mr. Parker voluntarily admitted to Officer Hatfield that he had been drinking too much at a party so he had pulled his vehicle over to get some rest in the parking lot before driving home. When Mr. Parker performed poorly on a horizontal gaze nystagmus test and standard field sobriety tests, Officer Hatfield advised Mr. Parker that he was being placed under arrest for suspicion of DWI. Mr. Parker was transported to the police station for processing, but he refused to provide a breath sample for the Intoxilyzer 9000 in violation of Louisiana's implied consent law. After Mr. Parker was transported to a hospital for the blood draw, he was transported home.

Mr. Parker testified at trial that he had been to a party where he had a “couple of drinks” and while on his way to his girlfriend's house he purposely decided to stop to take a nap. He parked his vehicle in a convenience store parking lot near a police station because it was a safe spot to park. He stated that his vehicle was in park, but he left the vehicle running because it was hot. Mr. Parker stated that he was asleep when the police officers woke him, and that his eyes were red and he was disoriented because he had been sleeping for about two hours.

At the conclusion of trial, the district court rendered judgment in favor of Mr. Parker and against the State.⁵ The district court reversed the administrative decision of the ALJ and reinstated Mr. Parker's Class A CDL along with all of his commercial driving privileges, reasoning that Mr. Parker had not refused to submit to the breath test “while operating a motor vehicle,” because his vehicle was parked when he was found by the police. The State filed a suspensive appeal, asserting that the district court erred in finding that Mr. Parker's refusal to submit a breath sample after his arrest for DWI did not begin a mandatory one-year statutory disqualification of CDL driving privileges. Thus, the State maintains it was error for the district court to reinstate Mr. Parker's CDL driving privileges.

DISCUSSION

The Louisiana Legislature has created a series of provisions relating to the suspension and restriction of commercial driving privileges. La. R.S. 32:414.2, et seq. The thrust of these statutes is to provide stronger penalties for commercial drivers who commit certain enumerated offenses, including DWI. See Griffin v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, 2012-1554 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/22/13), 2013 WL 1189365, *2 (unpublished). In order to promote safety on Louisiana highways, the legislature also enacted the implied consent law, which addresses the testing of persons suspected of operating motor vehicles while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled dangerous substances. See Gray v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Through Office of Legal Affairs, 2016-0612 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/17/17), 217 So.3d 412, 415, writ denied, 2017-1013 (La. 10/9/17), 227 So.3d 831. When a law enforcement officer places a person under arrest for DWI and the person refuses to submit to an approved chemical test for intoxication, the officer is required to seize the driver's license of the person under arrest. Further, the State is authorized to suspend the person's driving privileges for one year from the date of suspension for the refusal. See La. R.S. 32:667. When the driver possesses a CDL, in addition to suspending his personal driving privileges, the State is mandated to disqualify the person's CDL for a minimum period of one year for the first offense of refusal to submit to an alcohol concentration or drug test. See La. R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(d).

In a recent decision, Roland v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2024-00865 (La. 5/9/25), 408 So.3d 926, 930, the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the appropriate standard of review when the applicability of La. R.S. 32:414.2 is based on the determination of a mixed question of fact and law. The supreme court recognized that the correct standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law is the manifest error standard of review, which requires great deference to fact and credibility determinations. The issue to be resolved by a reviewing court under the manifest error standard of review is not whether the fact finder was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993).

Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the fact finder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. However, where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Id. Nonetheless, the supreme court has emphasized that the reviewing court must always keep in mind that if the factual findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the finder of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id. at 882-883.

In Roland, the district court made a factual finding that the officer did not have an objectively reasonable basis to make a traffic stop due to bright lights emitting from all sides of a vehicle in violation of state law. See Roland, 408 So.3d at 930. The supreme court found that the officer's testimony clearly established that he had an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity occurred at the time of the traffic stop, and the driver did not present any contrary evidence. Therefore, the supreme court found the district court was clearly wrong. Because the traffic stop was reasonable, there was no ground to exclude evidence of the actions that occurred after the traffic stop. Id. Since the driver in Roland was the holder of a CDL and he had refused to submit to an alcohol concentration test while operating a vehicle, the supreme court found that the driver was subject to an automatic mandatory disqualification of his commercial driving privileges for one year under La. R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(d). Thus, the supreme court found that the district court had erred in reinstating the driver's commercial driving privileges. Roland, 408 So.3d at 930-931.

In this case, the district court made a factual finding that Mr. Parker had not been operating a motor vehicle when he refused to submit to the Intoxilyzer 9000 breath test after his arrest. We must determine if this factual finding is clearly wrong based on the totality of the evidence in the record. The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Parker was found sleeping in the driver's seat of his vehicle while parked in a convenience store parking lot. The vehicle was pulled over a curb, was stationary near a tree, with the engine running and the lights on. It is disputed whether the vehicle's transmission was in the “drive” or “park” position. Additionally, the evidence is clear that Mr. Parker admitted to Officer Hatfield and at trial that he had been drinking alcohol before driving to the parking lot where he stopped to nap before going to his girlfriend's house. Given this evidence and our review of the entire record, we find the district court was clearly wrong in determining that Mr. Parker was not operating a vehicle.

In Wells v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles, 2018-1281 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/11/19), 281 So.3d 690, 695, this court held that in order to “operate” a vehicle, one must “exercise or have exercised some control or manipulation over the vehicle, such as steering, backing, or the physical handling of the controls for the purpose of putting the [vehicle] in motion.” The facts in Wells are similar to the facts in the case sub judice in that the CDL holder was observed as being the sole occupant of a vehicle in which he was sleeping, parked on the shoulder of a road, with the keys in the ignition, the engine running, and the lights on. The deputy who woke the driver, noticed an obvious odor of alcohol on the driver's breath. Upon questioning, the driver admitted that he had driven the vehicle from a family gathering after consuming multiple alcoholic beverages, and had pulled over to sleep. See Wells, 281 So.3d at 692. The issue for the district court in Wells was whether the arresting officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver “had been driving” or “was in actual physical control” of his vehicle on the public highways of the state while intoxicated, not whether the vehicle was actually located on the public highway when the officers encountered the driver. Wells, 281 So.3d at 694.

Similarly, in State v. Jones, 97-1687 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98), 714 So.2d 819, 820-821, writ denied, 98-1597 (La. 10/30/98), 723 So.2d 975, this court found that “operating” a vehicle was shown when an officer awoke a drunken driver, asleep at the wheel of a vehicle parked in a convenience store parking lot with its engine running. In Jones, 714 So.2d at 821, this court determined that it is not necessary that the driver's actions have any effect on the engine, nor is it essential that the vehicle actually move in order for the State to prove the element of operation.

We find that all of the factors for disqualification of Mr. Parker's CDL for one year were met when Mr. Parker committed a first offense refusal to submit to an alcohol concentration test after his arrest for first offense DWI. There is no requirement in the disqualification provision, La. R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(d), that the operation of the vehicle be on a public highway. Wells, 281 So.3d at 695. To be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle under La. R.S. 32:414.2(A)(4)(d), the State must establish a first reported refusal to submit to a chemical test in connection with an arrest of a CDL holder operating any motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Since all of the factors are met, the State was mandated to statutorily disqualify Mr. Parker's CDL for one year. The language of the statute is clear that a refusal alone results in the automatic disqualification of commercial driving privileges, regardless of any subsequent criminal filings or proceedings.⁶ Gray, 217 So.3d at 419. Therefore, the district court's ruling ordering that Mr. Parker's CDL be reinstated, must be reversed. See Wells, 281 So.3d at 695-696.

CONCLUSION

For the assigned reasons, we reverse the district court's December 29, 2025 judgment ordering the reinstatement of Raynard M. Parker's Class A Commercial Driver's License and all of his driving privileges. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles, and against Raynard M. Parker, reinstating the one-year statutory disqualification of Raynard M. Parker's Class A Commercial Driver's License. All costs of this appeal are assessed to appellee, Raynard M. Parker.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:661 and 32:667 outline the circumstances for the seizure and suspension of the driver's license of a person who is under arrest for DWI. While the State also seized and suspended Mr. Parker's personal driver's license, this appeal is limited to the disqualification of Mr. Parker's CDL.

2.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:414.2(A)(4)(d) provides that any person shall be disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a minimum period of one year for a “first offense of refusal to submit to an alcohol concentration or drug test, while operating a commercial motor vehicle or noncommercial motor vehicle by a commercial driver's license holder.”

3.   Similarly, federal law at 49 C.F.R. § 383.51 mandates a one-year suspension for a first-offense refusal to submit to an alcohol concentration or drug test in violation of the state's implied consent laws.

4.   The written decision of the ALJ is not a part of the record on appeal; however, the date of that decision was September 10, 2024.

5.   The district court amended the judgment two times in response to an interim order issued by this court that outlined decretal language deficiencies. When the second amended judgment was signed on December 29, 2025, and supplemented into the appellate court record, we determined that the judgment contained sufficient decretal language, and we maintained the State's appeal.

6.   The record is void of evidence concerning the outcome of the DWI charges against Mr. Parker; however, that is not relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Parker's CDL is disqualified.

WOLFE, J.