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STATE IN the INTEREST OF J.E., M.E., N.E., N.E., V.E.
This juvenile/Children in Need of Care (“CINC”) case involves a family with five minor children designated as “in need of care” by the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The parents appeal the trial court's ruling to alter the goal of their children's permanency plans from reunification with the parents to adoption by the children's maternal grandmother, with a concurrent goal of reunification with the parents. The parents also appeal the trial court's ruling allowing the children to be vaccinated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The family in this case has been involved with DCFS since 2022, but this specific matter stems from an October 22, 2024 report of suspected neonatal neglect by the mother (C.E.), who had recently given birth to V.E.1 At the time of V.E.’s birth, V.E.’s urine tested positive for amphetamines. Furthermore, her meconium tested positive for marijuana and amphetamines. D.E., the father of V.E., is also a named party in this case. Together, C.E. and D.E. have four other minor children together, M.E., J.E., N.E., and N.E., and these other children are also in DCFS custody as a result of these continuing proceedings.
After receiving the report of V.E.’s prenatal drug exposure, DCFS proposed a safety plan that required C.E. to move into her mother's home with all five children. All parties agreed; however, C.E. ultimately failed to comply with this care plan. Therefore, DCFS then sought and received a verbal removal order for all five children on October 31, 2024.2 The children were placed with their maternal grandmother and have been living there since their removal from C.E.’s care.
An instanter hearing followed on November 4, 2024. The DCFS investigator testified regarding the children's welfare. Specifically, the investigator noted that the children's Medicaid coverage had lapsed and that the four older children were truant from school. Additionally, at the time of the investigation, D.E. was no longer living in the family home and was unable to provide a suitable alternative home for the children.
On November 8, 2024, a case plan was finalized that required C.E. to obtain employment, present for drug tests periodically, complete a domestic violence course, complete a substance abuse evaluation and mental health assessment through Tyler Behavioral Health Clinic (Tyler), and maintain suitable housing.
A case plan was also developed for D.E., that required him to complete a mental health and substance abuse assessment at Tyler and follow recommendations, obtain suitable housing, maintain employment, supply DCFS with his prescription for medical marijuana, present for scheduled visitation with the children, submit to periodic drug tests, and complete a course on domestic violence. At a hearing on January 29, 2025, the family was formally adjudicated as CINC.
On April 3, 2025, the DCFS foster care worker assigned to this matter, Djenaba Broussard, submitted to the court a report outlining the progress of each family member in their respective case plans. This report, along with the case plans for each family member, was filed into the record on April 17, 2025.
At the foster care review hearing, held on April 28, 2025, the court approved the November 8, 2024 case plans, finding them consistent with the children's health and safety. Additionally, Ms. Broussard testified and confirmed the findings in her April 3, 2025 report.
As to C.E., Ms. Broussard testified that she remained noncompliant with her case plan. For instance, C.E. refused to sign a consent form to allow DCFS to communicate with Tyler and furthermore failed to complete the substance abuse and mental health assessment of this facility. Additionally, C.E. had tested positive on certain drug screens and had not provided any prescriptions to account for these results. During a visit to C.E.’s home, Ms. Broussard offered to simply take a photograph of prescription bottles, but C.E. could not supply them. C.E. self-reported that she was receiving mental health treatment from a different facility (Alliance Healthcare), but DCFS had not received her records at the time of trial. Additionally, C.E. failed to obtain verified employment or any other source of income and had not begun the course on domestic violence.
As to D.E., Ms. Broussard testified that he was only partially compliant. She testified that D.E. had reported that he was employed but failed to submit any documentation to verify his income and employment. Additionally, though D.E. was living with C.E. at the time of the hearing, D.E. was known to intermittently leave the home for long stretches of time due to difficulties in the relationship with C.E. During these periodic absences, the family was left without a source of income and lacked his caretaking support. Finally, Ms. Broussard confirmed that D.E. had supplied her with his medical marijuana prescription as requested.
As to each parent's compliance with their assigned case plans, Ms. Broussard testified that D.E. and C.E. had resumed living together and that they had recently moved into a new home that was suitable for the children, though they failed to provide a copy of the lease for the home to Ms. Broussard. Furthermore, she testified that the parents attended their designated visits with the children and that these visits went well.
Additionally, Ms. Broussard testified that even though the children were thriving in the maternal grandmother's care, they suffered lingering medical issues that had persisted since the family's previous involvement with DCFS. For example, DCFS discovered that the parents allowed Medicaid coverage for the four older children to lapse and they were also truant in school. It was also discovered during the children's dental appointment that one child had nine cavities, and another child had eleven cavities. Additionally, one child suffered nerve damage because of untreated cavities. Ms. Broussard testified that these dental problems and cavities had been discovered the previous year, but the parents had failed to attend the follow-up appointment to treat the cavities. Furthermore, the child with nerve damage also exhibited symptoms of an autoimmune disease that had not been evaluated.
The trial court ultimately determined C.E. and D.E. were noncompliant with their case plans and ordered them to come into compliance. The court specifically noted C.E.’s total non-compliance and the failure of D.E. to provide a safe environment for the children. However, the permanency goal at this time remained reunification with the parents.
At the July 28, 2025 permanency hearing, Ms. Broussard again testified regarding the compliance and progress of C.E. and D.E. in their respective assigned case plans.3
Ms. Broussard testified that C.E. had not made significant progress in her case plan. Specifically, C.E. lacked a source of income and employment and failed to complete the mental health and substance abuse assessment at Tyler. Additionally, C.E. failed to complete the domestic violence course.4 C.E. had also failed to comply with the drug screen requirements. In fact, C.E. tested positive on her drug screens on December 11, 2024 (methamphetamines, buprenorphine, marijuana), and February 5, 2025 (buprenorphine and marijuana). At that time, C.E. did not supply any prescriptions that would have accounted for the positive screens. C.E. furthermore failed to present for drug testing on April 1, 2025, and May 13, 2025. C.E. presented for a drug screen on June 12, 2025, and tested positive for amphetamines; however, she supplied a valid prescription for the amphetamines at that time. As for adherence to the visitation schedule, C.E. missed one visit with her children, and did not supply Ms. Broussard with any explanation as to why she missed that visit.
Ms. Broussard testified that D.E. was also noncompliant in that he had not yet verified his income and employment. At the time of the hearing, it was also unclear whether or not D.E. had completed the mental health and substance abuse assessments that had been ordered; however, Ms. Broussard testified that neither had been received by DCFS.5 Finally, D.E. had not made any significant progress in completing his domestic violence course.
Ms. Broussard testified that the parents has demonstrated only minimum compliance with their respective plans, and that the family has been under DCFS supervision for several years and continues to decline, and it appears that DCFS was involved with the older children in 2022 and 2023, when the parents only demonstrated minimal compliance. Ms. Broussard did note that D.E. and C.E. were compliant with some aspects of the case plans. For instance, C.E. was compliant by obtaining suitable housing. D.E. had resumed living with C.E. and was compliant regarding his drug screens (yielding positive for only his prescription marijuana). However, DCFS argues that this was an attempt by the parents to comply with their case plans at the last minute.
Following the hearing, the trial court found, based on the family's prior history and involvement with DCFS, that the court would accept DCFS's recommendation that the permanency goal would be changed from reunification with the parents to adoption with a concurrent goal of reunification with the parents. The parents’ attorneys both objected. The juvenile court also gave permission to the maternal grandmother to vaccinate the children, while the children were in DCFS custody.
C.E. and D.E. appealed both rulings on July 31, 2025.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The Appellants, C.E. and D.E., (“parents”) list two assignments of error:
1. The juvenile court erroneously changed the goal to adoption.
2. The juvenile court erroneously granted the caretaker's request to vaccinate the children.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parents’ assignments of error require review under the manifest error standard as they involve factual findings regarding parental rehabilitation prospects and the appropriateness of medical decisions over parental objection. An appellate court's review of a trial court's permanent placement determination is governed by the manifest error standard. State in Int. of P.F., 50,931 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So.3d 745. When the primary case plan goal is changed to adoption, the manifest error standard of review applies to the trial court's determination. State in Interest of R.B., 19-254 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So.3d 737, writ denied, 19-1781 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So.3d 1053.
A two-part inquiry is necessary to reverse the trial court's determination when the manifest error standard of review applies: (1) the appellate court must examine the record to determine whether a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the trial court's finding of fact, and (2) the appellate court must further decide that the record also establishes that the trial court's finding was clearly wrong. Id.
Louisiana Children's Code Article 1036(C) provides the proof necessary to establish lack of compliance by a parent with a case plan as follows:
In accordance with Article 1015(6), lack of parental compliance with a case plan may be evidenced by one or more of the following:
(1) The parent's failure to attend court-approved scheduled visitations with the child.
(2) The parent's failure to communicate with the child.
(3) The parent's failure to keep the department apprised of the parent's whereabouts and significant changes affecting the parent's ability to comply with the case plan for services.
(4) The parent's failure to contribute to the costs of the child's foster care, if ordered to do so by the court when approving the case plan.
(5) The parent's repeated failure to comply with the required program of treatment and rehabilitation services provided in the case plan.
(6) The parent's lack of substantial improvement in redressing the problems preventing reunification.
(7) The persistence of conditions that led to removal or similar potentially harmful conditions.
(8) (a) The parent's failure to provide a negative test result for all synthetic or other controlled dangerous substances, except for any drug for which the parent has lawfully received a prescription, at the completing of a reasonable time.
(b) For the purposes of this Article, “controlled dangerous substance” shall have the meaning ascribed in R.S. 40:961.
Mere cooperation by a parent is not the sole focus of a permanency plan. The court must assess whether the parent has exhibited significant improvement in the particulars that caused the State to remove the child from the parent's care. Stability in the home environment and relationships are considerations in the permanency plan determination. “A parent who asserts an intention to exercise his or her parental rights and responsibilities must take some action in furtherance of the intention to avoid having those rights terminated.” State in Int. of E.M.J., 52,082, p. 10 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 249 So.3d 170, 176.
A trial court's factual determinations regarding medical decisions for children are part of this review. State ex rel. G.P.D. v. M.F.L.P., 02-840 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/02), 832 So.2d 1196 (holding that a termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because the record demonstrated that the child experienced developmental difficulties as a result of neglect).
LAW AND ARGUMENT
Because the parents jointly appeal the decision of the trial court, their assignments of errors and arguments will be addressed together.
Assignment of Error Number One : Permanent Placement Determination
Parents’ Arguments:
The parents argue that La.Ch.Code art. 702 provides that reunification should remain the permanent plan as long as a parent is compliant with the case plan and working to address the root causes of their children's foster care placement. In this case, the parents contend that the only allegations of neglect pertained to C.E.’s use of drugs while pregnant with V.E. The parents argue that this prenatal neglect was erroneously imputed to justify removal of the older children. However, the parents concede that the removal of the older children to DCFS custody is res judicata.
As to D.E., the parents argue that he is a non-offending parent who is in substantial compliance with his case plan. They note that when V.E. was born, D.E. and C.E. were separated. There were never any allegations that D.E. had been using or supplying C.E. with the drugs found in V.E.’s system. Moreover, D.E. himself has only ever tested positive for marijuana, for which he has a valid prescription.
The parents note that D.E. has visited with his children at every opportunity and maintained employment. D.E. also provided proof of his marijuana prescription to DCFS, as required by his case plan. Ms. Broussard testified at the permanency hearing that D.E. had self-reported attending “an assessment” at Tyler and had signed a consent to release information, but she had not received information from Tyler to confirm that D.E. had undergone a substance abuse and/or mental health evaluation.
Thus, the parents argue that D.E. was only noncompliant with regard to the proof of his employment and the completion of the domestic violence course. Furthermore, the parents contend that it was not through the fault of D.E. that DCFS had neither the mental health evaluation nor the substance abuse assessment, as Ms. Broussard acknowledged that he signed a consent to release the information. The parents argue that because D.E. was the non-offending parent and has followed his case plan and was “making significant, measurable progress toward achieving its goals and correcting the conditions requiring the child to be in care,” the trial court erroneously changed D.E.’s case plan goal to adoption.
As to C.E., the parents argue that she has also consistently visited the children and that the visits have gone well. The parents acknowledge that DCFS has referred C.E. to Tyler for mental health and substance abuse evaluations, but they note that she is currently being treated by a different mental health treatment facility and has signed a release of her medical records to DCFS. The parents also concede that C.E. has failed to complete a course on domestic violence and a substance abuse evaluation. However, the parents argue that reunification should remain as the permanent plan as long as C.E. is complying with the case plan and making progress toward “correcting the conditions requiring the child to be in care,” as required by La.Ch.Code art. 702(C)(1).
Finally, the parents contend that because both C.E. and D.E. are making progress towards addressing the issues which caused the removal of V.E. and their other children from their custody, the court erroneously changed the goal.
State's Arguments:
The State argues that the trial court's determination was correct as to D.E. because he is an offending parent who is only in partial compliance with his case plan. The State notes that at the time of V.E.’s birth, C.E. and D.E. were separated, each facing longstanding, unaddressed issues that included mental health challenges, issues with substance abuse, and domestic violence concerns. Indeed, these issues precipitated the earlier involvement of DCFS, and the parents have demonstrated only minimal effort in remedying the causes for state involvement.
The State argues that the factual record demonstrates D.E.’s mere partial compliance with his case plan. He has provided documentation for a valid medical marijuana prescription to account for his positive drug screens and has participated in child visits consistently and appropriately. However, D.E. has failed to provide a safe and stable home environment, whether cohabiting with C.E. or living independently. The State argues that D.E. has not addressed the essential requirements of his plan, i.e., he has failed to participate in mental health and substance abuse assessments (or has failed to make them available to DCFS when requested), he has failed to provide verification of his income and employment, and he has failed to complete the domestic abuse course. The State contends that D.E.’s compliance is self-reported and not substantiated by concrete actions or documentation.
The State concedes that D.E.’s compliance surpasses C.E.’s but argues that D.E. has not substantially complied with his case plan and falls short of the bar set by La.Ch.Code art. 702(C)(1), namely, “significant measurable progress” in his case plan. Neglect and abandonment remain core concerns, and D.E. contributed to the children's circumstances by failing to secure stable living conditions and by abandoning the family at a critical juncture during these proceedings.
As to C.E., the State argues that she is an offending parent who is non-compliant with her case plan, noting that the children entered state custody following the discovery of newborn V.E.’s drug exposure in October 2024. The State contends that C.E.’s neglect extended to the other four children in the home, compounded by longstanding domestic abuse concerns and unaddressed mental health and substance abuse issues.
The State argues that C.E. is only compliant with regard to visitation with the children and that she has been unable to secure or maintain stable, safe housing and a source of income. Additionally, C.E. has failed to complete the required mental health and substance abuse assessments and failed to account for positive drug screens. The State underscores that C.E.’s urine samples on December 11, 2024, and February 5, 2025, tested positive for buprenorphine and marijuana, and she subsequently failed to attend drug screens in April 2025 and May 2025. Although C.E. eventually provided DCFS with copies of valid prescriptions before the July 28, 2025 permanency hearing, no documentation was provided for earlier positive screens.
The State also notes that C.E. has neither started nor completed the domestic abuse course and contends that this pattern of noncompliance—ongoing positive drug screens, failure to engage in essential assessments or classes, and lack of housing or income stability—signals that visitation alone is insufficient to justify reunification.
The State argues that the parents erroneously claim that late-stage cooperation or sporadic visitation supports reunification. However, Louisiana law mandates a pattern of meaningful, consistent parental progress, not episodic or minimal efforts, as a prerequisite for reunification. State in Int. of E.M., supra. The trial court accordingly weighed the family's history appropriately, consistent with State ex rel. S.M.W., 00-3277 (La. 2/21/01), 781 So.2d 1223, which affirms that a child's need for permanence, stability, and safety may outweigh repeated, unproductive reunification attempts.
The State argues that appellate courts have made clear that stability and substantial compliance, rather than minimal or partial effort, are determinative. State in Int. of E.M., 51,511 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/2/17), 224 So.3d 1122, 1128. (“Stability in the home environment and relationships is a consideration in the permanency plan determination,” and compliance requires more than minimal effort).
In sum, the State argues that the evidence and controlling law firmly refute the parents’ arguments and support the juvenile court's ruling. That the trial court's decision is grounded in the statutory framework of La.Ch.Code art. 702, which requires the court to prioritize the child's safety and permanency over inconsistent parental efforts. The State further contends it has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the children currently in custody cannot be adequately safeguarded under parental care due to the parents’ minimal compliance and recurring pattern of noncompliance with agency case plans. The State argues the trial court properly relied on the demonstrated history of DCFS involvement in this case to support its finding that reunification goals are no longer viable, justifying modification of the permanency plan to adoption with a concurrent goal of reunification.
Analysis:
Permanency Placement Determination:
Louisiana Children's Code Article 702(C) provides that the court shall determine the permanent plan for the child that is “most appropriate and in the best interest of the child.” Article 702(C) sets out the priority of placement, as follows:
(1) Return the child to the legal custody of the parents within a specified time period consistent with the child's age and need for a safe and permanent home. In order for reunification to remain as the permanent plan for the child, the parent shall be in compliance with the case plan and making significant measurable progress toward achieving its goals and correcting the conditions requiring the child to be in care.
(2) Adoption.
(3) Placement with a legal guardian.
(4) Placement in the legal custody of a relative who is willing and able to offer a stable and safe home for the child.
Louisiana Children's Code Article 702(B) directs the court to establish a permanency plan that best serves the child's safety, welfare, and need for a permanent home. The statute permits reunification in circumstances where the parent complies with the case plan and makes significant, measurable progress toward correcting the conditions that precipitated removal.
Mere cooperation by a parent is not the sole focus of a permanency plan. The court must assess whether the parent has exhibited significant improvement in the particulars that caused the State to remove the child from the parent's care. Stability in the home environment and relationships are considerations in the permanency plan determination. A parent who asserts an intention to exercise his or her parental rights and responsibilities must take some action in furtherance of the intention to avoid having those rights terminated. State in Int. of E.M.J., 249 So.3d 170.
The jurisprudence makes clear that partial or sporadic compliance is inadequate; the court must focus on whether the parent has addressed the root causes for removal in a meaningful and sustainable way. See, e.g., State in Int. of K.A.S., 54,446 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 348 So.3d 853, writ denied, 22-1565 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So.3d 497, writ denied, 22-1580 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So.3d 504.
The Children's Code permits reunification as a permanency goal only if the parents have demonstrated compliance with the case plan. Notably, in this case, the record reflects that both C.E. and D.E. have not made meaningful progress on the root causes of DCFS's intervention, which include unaddressed substance abuse issues, a lack of housing and income stability, and untreated mental health issues. Furthermore, neither parent has completed the required domestic violence course to address the domestic violence issues in the family. Thus, we find the record shows that DCFS presented clear and convincing evidence that both D.E. and C.E. have failed to substantially comply with their individual court approved case plans as required under La.Ch.Code art. 702(C)(1).
Considering the record establishes both C.E. and D.E.’s continued failure to properly address substance abuse issues, a lack of housing and income stability, and untreated mental health issues, despite being fully aware that these conditions were preventing Appellants’ reunification with their children, we find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that DCFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that both C.E. and D.E. failed to substantially comply with their individual court approved case plans. Additionally, over the two-year period of DCFS's intervention, both parents, C.E. and D.E., were provided with additional time to fully comply with their case plans, and, given the fact that both parents knew they were under scrutiny and an impending termination of their paternal “rights”, this still did not provoke full compliance by C.E. and D.E. See La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5). Therefore, we further find the trial court did not err in finding that there was no reasonable expectation of compliance in the near future by the parents.
Best Interests Determination:
The record shows, and as found by the trial court, DCFS also presented testimony and evidence that these children are currently living in a loving and stable home and environment where they are being well cared for, their needs are being met, and they are thriving. The evidence shows these five children are strongly bonded with their maternal grandmother in a suitable environment pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 702(B).
The parents assert that reunion is justified by late-stage cooperation or episodic visitation. However, the law requires a pattern of meaningful, consistent parental progress. State in Int. of E.M., 224 So.3d 1122. Additionally, Louisiana Children's Code Article 1037(B)(1), (emphasis added), provides, in pertinent part, “the consideration of the best interests of the child shall include consideration of the child's attachment to his current caretakers.”
Additionally, the record establishes that the parents have neglected the health of the children in numerous ways even after the beginning of DCFS's involvement in 2022. Multiple children had untreated cavities (with one child suffering nerve damage as a result). Furthermore, the parents failed to investigate a possible autoimmune disease in one child and autism in another. The parents also allowed Medicaid coverage to lapse for all the children. Finally, DCFS's involvement commenced as a result of V.E.’s drug exposure as a newborn after C.E. sought only cursory prenatal treatment.
While the parents have completed some components of their respective case plans, the trial court was well within its discretion to find that the family's history, the children's ages, and the children's need for permanence outweighs continued, unproductive reunification. See State ex rel. S.M.W., 781 So.2d 1223. Here, because D.E. and C.E. have failed to make significant, measurable progress toward their case plan goals, and because the children's best interests are paramount, and given this family's involvement with DCFS over the years, we find the trial court did not commit manifest error in modifying the permanency goal to adoption with a concurrent goal of reunification. The trial court's decision aligns with the statute's prioritization of the child's best interest by ensuring stability and safety while preserving the possibility of reunification if the parents achieve substantial progress.
In conclusion, based on the facts before this court, we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision to change the permanency goal to adoption, while still allowing parental visitation, with a concurrent goal of reunification. Thus, we find this assignment of error is without merit.
Assignment of Error Number Two: Vaccinations
Parents’ Arguments:
The parents argue that the trial court should have at least conducted a colloquy with the parents to determine whether the parents have a valid religious or philosophical opposition to the children being vaccinated. In support of their argument, the parents cite Miller v. Dicherry, 17-1656 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/29/18), 251 So.3d 428, wherein a trial court's authorization to vaccinate a child was upheld only after a colloquy was conducted and the mother failed to articulate a religious or philosophical aversion to the vaccines. Furthermore, the parents note that vaccination requirements at a daycare can be waived.
State's Arguments:
The State notes that a court-ordered vaccination is lawful and consistent with the child's best interest when parents have demonstrated neglect or refusal to fulfill essential medical duties, particularly because the children's health and safety is part of a permanency determination. See La.Ch.Code arts. 672(A) and 702(8). The State argues that the trial court correctly exercised this discretion based on ample evidence given that both D.E. and C.E. neglected to fulfill essential medical duties when the children were in their care. For instance, the State notes that C.E. had very limited prenatal care while pregnant with V.E., attending her prenatal visit on March 21, 2024, and not returning until 30 plus weeks into her pregnancy. The State further argues that the parents, D.E. and C.E., failed to maintain medical insurance and/or Medicaid coverage for all five children. Further testimony from the April 28, 2025 hearing demonstrated that D.E. and C.E. frequently failed to seek medical and developmental evaluations for the children despite obvious concerns. For example, the minor child, V.E., was born drug-exposed following the unaddressed substance abuse of C.E. Furthermore, D.E. and C.E. neglected to have one child evaluated after exhibiting behavior consistent with autism. Additionally, another child displayed symptoms of an autoimmune condition that went unaddressed. Finally, multiple children suffered untreated cavities, resulting in nerve damage to one child.
The State contends that the parents’ refusal to authorize immunizations could create barriers to school enrollment and medical treatment, as Louisiana law requires certain immunizations for daycare attendance unless a valid exemption applies. La.R.S. 17:170. The State argues that these uncontested facts establish a pattern of medical neglect, justifying the court's intervention to ensure proper healthcare access and compliance with mandatory vaccination requirements. DCFS policy echoes these principles, directing the agency to pursue judicial orders where parental refusal prevents the provision of medical necessary services. The Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services’ Foster Care Medical Services Policy (Policy No. 6-1105) directs the agency to seek judicial orders to provide medically necessary care when parental consent is withheld. See Policy No. 641.05. This authority is supported by La.Ch.Code art. 672(A), which empowers the court to order necessary medical treatment for children in state custody.
The State further argues that the trial court's authorization of vaccination was a lawful and necessary act within the courts authority to protect the child's health, welfare, and educational opportunities, and its ruling was consistent with statutory mandates, agency policy, and the overriding best interest of the child standard, and should be affirmed.
Analysis:
Louisiana Children's Code Article 672(A) provides that the court has the authority to order necessary medical care for children in state custody, particularly where parental consent is unavailable or unreasonably withheld. Further, Louisiana Children's Code Article 702(E) requires the court to protect the child's health and safety as part of every permanency determination. Additionally, Louisiana Revised Statutes 17:170 mandates immunization for attendance in daycare and school unless a valid exemption applies.
As noted by the State, DCFS presented testimony and evidence that the parents have neglected the health of the children in numerous ways even after the beginning of DCFS's involvement in 2022. Multiple children had untreated cavities (with one child suffering nerve damage as a result). Furthermore, the parents failed to investigate a possible autoimmune disease in one child and autism in another, and the parents also allowed Medicaid coverage to lapse for all the children. Finally, DCFS's intervention in this matter commenced as a result of V.E.’s drug exposure as a newborn after C.E. sought only cursory prenatal treatment.
Therefore, we find the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in allowing the maternal grandmother to vaccinate the children, and thus, we find this assignment is without merit.
DECREE
The parents/appellants, D.E. and C.E., raise two assignments of error by the trial court. We find no merit in the parents’ assignments of error and find no error in the trial court's judgment changing the goal of these children's permanency plan(s) from reunification to adoption. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
1. Initials are used throughout this opinion to protect and maintain the privacy of the minor children in accordance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 5–1 and Rule 5–2.
2. DCFS made reasonable efforts to develop a safety plan involving both C.E. and the paternal grandparents; however, these efforts were complicated when it was discovered that the paternal grandparents had a protective order against C.E. for harassment, making placement with them unworkable.
3. One other issue that was addressed was a possible autism diagnosis in one child; however, an evaluation had not been completed.
4. Ms. Broussard further noted that there was a prior history of domestic abuse between D.E. and C.E.
5. At the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Ms. Broussard and one of the attorneys:Q. Okay. And it's your understanding that [D.E.]’s done both assessments?A. It's my understanding – I know that he told me he did an assessment. I'm not quite sure what assessment he has performed, but he did sign a release, so soon as I get those records I will know exactly what assessment he has done.
ORTEGO, Judge.
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Docket No: 25-527
Decided: February 11, 2026
Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
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