DUNN v. JEFFERSON PARISH FIRE DEPARTMENT (2026)

This is a worker's compensation case arising from a claim by retired fireman John Dunn for temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits for hearing loss due to purported exposure to injurious noises while employed for over thirty years with the Jefferson Parish Fire Department (“JPFD”). Mr. Dunn appeals a May 28, 2025 judgment of the worker's compensation court that dismissed his claims as prescribed. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

On September 6, 2024, Mr. Dunn filed a disputed claim for compensation with the Office of Workers’ Compensation wherein he stated that he had sustained substantial hearing loss over time due to excessive noise, sirens, explosions, and other occupational conditions over the course of more than thirty years working with the Jefferson Parish Fire Department. Mr. Dunn claimed to be entitled to temporary total disability (TTD) and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits “as a result of his profound hearing loss which led to his retirement from the Fire Dept.” Mr. Dunn attached to his claim form various medical records, including some documenting hearing examinations performed at the East Jefferson Ear, Nose, and Throat Clinic in August of 2023.

In response to this claim, defendant JPFD filed an answer generally denying the allegations. JPFD also filed a peremptory exception of prescription in which they argued that, even accepting the allegations in Mr. Dunn's petition as true, because he had retired on September 17, 2021, the filing of his disputed claim for compensation on September 6, 2024 fell outside the one-year prescriptive period set forth in La. R.S. 23:1031.1.

A hearing on the peremptory exception was held on May 14, 2025; neither party introduced evidence at that time. The judge took the matter under advisement, and on May 28, 2025 issued a written judgment in favor of JPFD and dismissing Mr. Dunn's claim with prejudice. Mr. Dunn's timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Mr. Dunn argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment in favor of the defendants because none of the three elements required for the running of prescription under La. R.S. 23:1031.1 had accrued before the suit was filed. We consider this assignment of error in our discussion below.

DISCUSSION

The Workers’ Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of protecting workers from the economic burden of work-related injuries. Butler v. Par. of Jefferson, 06-669, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/30/07), 951 So.2d 1218, 1222. An employee who suffers a work-related injury that later develops into a disability has a viable cause of action. Id. The determination of whether a claimant is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits is based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Butler v. Jefferson Par. Fire Dep't, 15-659, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/24/16), 186 So.3d 1231, 1235. An appellate court cannot set aside the factual findings of the workers’ compensation judge unless those findings are clearly wrong, and the judge has committed manifest error. Id.

The prescription of occupational disease claims in workers’ compensation cases is regulated by La. R.S. 23:1031.1(E), which states:

E. All claims for disability arising from an occupational disease are barred unless the employee files a claim as provided in this Chapter within one year of the date that:

(1) The disease manifested itself.

(2) The employee is disabled from working as a result of the disease.

(3) The employee knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that the disease is occupationally related.

All three of these elements must be satisfied before prescription begins to run on an occupational disease claim. Bynum v. Capital City Press, Inc., 95-1395, p. 6 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So.2d 582, 586. The party urging prescription bears the burden of proof at trial of the exception; however, if the petition is prescribed on its face, the burden is on the plaintiff to show the action is not prescribed. Knight v. Imperial Trading Co., 19-41, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/19), 274 So.3d 807, 810.

On appeal, Mr. Dunn argues that there's nothing in the record to establish that he suffered hearing loss except for an April 26, 2024 questionnaire from his doctor assigning 40% hearing loss approximately four months before the filing of the suit. We disagree.

In her written reasons for judgment, the workers’ compensation judge specifically found that Mr. Dunn's claim had prescribed based on the statements he made in his Form 1008 claim for compensation and the attached medical records, which included the record of an August 19, 2023 visit to the East Jefferson Ear, Nose, and Throat Clinic that noted hearing loss due to loud noise exposure. The judge observed that, following this visit, Mr. Dunn made a workers’ compensation claim for medical benefits, and considered such action proof that Mr. Dunn was aware that his employment may have been the cause of his hearing loss.

Upon review, we find no manifest error in the judge's finding that claimant's disability date was, at the latest, August 19, 2023, and that, at that time, claimant had stopped working, the disease had manifested itself, and he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the disease was occupationally related. Because the disputed claim for compensation was not filed until September 6, 2024, more than one year later, the peremptory exception of prescription was properly sustained. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

I agree with both the writer's analysis and the outcome in this case and write separately only to underscore that, although the rules of evidence and procedure are relaxed in workers’ compensation cases,¹ these cases are still lawsuits to be conducted in conformity with accepted standards of practice and procedure.² In this matter, both parties attached exhibits to their briefs on JPFD's exception of prescription, yet neither filed those exhibits into the record at the hearing. No further evidence was necessary because prescription was apparent on the face of the claim (Form 1008). Even so, the dispute could have been more easily resolved had ordinary evidentiary and procedural practices been followed. The same could be said for an increasing number of compensation cases that come to us for resolution—to the point of pandemonium. Relaxed rules doesn't mean no rules. Flexibility is meant to promote efficiency and fairness; not to excuse failures to follow the fundamental rules of practice and procedure. Consistent adherence to baseline standards would help minimize avoidable disputes and promote confidence in judicial outcomes. We should endeavor accordingly.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See La. R.S. 23:1317(A) (“The workers’ compensation judge shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence or procedure other than as herein provided, but all findings of fact must be based upon competent evidence ․”).

2.   See Eugene-Robinson v. E. Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 17-433 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/17), 237 So.3d 93, 96 n.1 (“We also recognize that under La. R.S. 23:1317, the workers’ compensation judge ‘shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence or procedure other than as herein provided, but all findings of fact must be based upon competent evidence.’ We are further mindful of the Louisiana Supreme Court's pronouncement that ‘[w]hile ․ the rules of evidence and procedure are relaxed in workers’ compensation proceedings, such proceedings are nonetheless lawsuits to be conducted in conformity with the accepted standards of practice and procedure.’ ” Taylor v. Tommie's Gaming, 04-2254 (La. 5/24/05), 902 So.2d 380, 383).See also Chapman v. Lalumia, 154 So.2d 93, 95 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1963) (“While the technical rules of evidence and procedure may be relaxed somewhat in a compensation case, such a case is nevertheless a lawsuit and the rules of practice prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure and the jurisprudence may not be disregarded entirely.”)

MARCEL, J.