BOYD v. SHENTON (2026)

Plaintiff-appellant, Roslyn Boyd, appearing pro se in this domestic matter, seeks review of the trial court's May 27, 2025 final protective order issued against her and in favor of defendant, Ashley Shenton. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the protective order.

Background and Procedural History

This case involves Ashley Fallon Shenton and Paul Shenton, who were divorced in November 2023, and Roslyn Boyd, who is Mr. Shenton's current romantic partner. Mrs. Shenton was ordered to vacate the Laplace home she previously shared with Mr. Shenton on August 26, 2024. On that date, Mrs. Shenton and her boyfriend, Mason Vicknair, moved to Mrs. Shenton's father's house, which is across the street, and less than 100 feet away. A few days after Mrs. Shenton and Mr. Vicknair moved across the street, Mr. Shenton moved back into the former matrimonial domicile with Ms. Boyd. Verbal altercations between the parties, including purported threats of bodily harm, allegedly occurred during the housing transfer, as well as on several occasions at the Shenton children's activities after that date.

On December 4, 2024, Ms. Boyd filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse naming Mrs. Shenton as the defendant, alleging that Mrs. Shenton and her partner, Mr. Vicknair, were abusing and stalking Ms. Boyd while she lived with Mr. Shenton. In her Petition for Protection from Abuse, Ms. Boyd sought a Temporary Restraining Order and detailed numerous allegations against Mrs. Shenton and Mr. Vicknair.

The trial court entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Mrs. Shenton on December 4, 2024, finding that the allegations constituted an immediate and present danger of stalking. The TRO ordered Mrs. Shenton to refrain from contacting, stalking, or harassing Mrs. Boyd and ordered Mrs. Shenton not to go within 100 feet of Ms. Boyd. The TRO set an injunction hearing for December 12, 2024.

At the December 12, 2024 hearing, the trial court questioned Ms. Boyd about representing herself throughout the proceedings. Ms. Boyd indicated that she chose to represent herself. She then began calling witnesses, including Mr. Shenton and Mrs. Shenton, and asked about events surrounding the allegations in her Petition. The injunction hearing was not concluded on December 12, 2024. On December 16, 2024, the trial court reset the hearing for injunctive relief to January 24, 2025, and extended the effects of the December 4, 2024 TRO to that date.¹

On December 27, 2024, Mrs. Shenton filed her own Petition for Protection from Abuse on behalf of herself and her two minor children, asserting allegations of stalking and verbal abuse against Ms. Boyd, and asking that Ms. Boyd be forced to vacate the Laplace residence. Mrs. Shenton claimed that Ms. Boyd told people at the children's games that she (Mrs. Shenton) was a bad mother and that Ms. Boyd harassed her by constantly videoing her and measuring the physical distance between them to determine if Mrs. Shenton had violated the December 4, 2024 protective order. On December 27, 2024, the trial court entered a TRO ordering Ms. Boyd to remain at least 50 feet from Mrs. Shenton and to refrain from contacting, stalking, or harassing Mrs. Shenton. The TRO also set a hearing for injunctive relief for January 24, 2025. On December 30, 2024, the trial court reset the hearing date to January 31, 2025.²

On January 30, 2025, the trial court continued the effectiveness of the December 4, 2024 TRO through February 26, 2025. The order also indicated that the parties could attend the same sporting events in support of the minor children, but they were to remain at least 20 feet apart at all times and were to refrain from making derogatory or inflammatory statements about one another in person, through third parties, via electronic communications, on social media, or to the children.

On February 24, 2025, Ms. Boyd filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's January 30, 2025 order, specifically the portion of the order that reduced the distance between the parties to 20 feet (rather than the previously ordered 100 feet), based on allegations that Mrs. Shenton had violated the court's previous TRO by harassing her at four sporting events. Ms. Boyd also complained that the previous hearings were rescheduled without notice to her, and that the February 26, 2025 hearing was scheduled at a time when she was unavailable to attend. Ms. Boyd also filed a motion to continue the February 26, 2025 hearing.

On February 26, 2025, the trial court continued the hearing scheduled for that date to April 10, 2025, with all previously issued injunctions remaining in effect until that date.

On April 10, 2025, Ms. Boyd filed a Motion to Dismiss with prejudice the December 27, 2024 TRO issued against her, as defendant-in-reconvention, and in favor of Mrs. Shenton, the plaintiff-in-reconvention. Ms. Boyd argued that the court did not hold a hearing within 21 days of issuing the TRO, as mandated in La. R.S. 46:2135(7)(B). The trial court did not specifically address Ms. Boyd's Motion to Dismiss Mrs. Shenton's Petition in Reconvention at the hearing on Ms. Boyd's Petition for Protection.

At the conclusion of the April 10, 2025 hearing, the trial court issued a Modified/Amended Order, extending protection of Ms. Boyd through October 10, 2026. The trial court found that “defendant represents a credible threat to the physical safety of a family member, household member, or dating partner. Therefore, pursuant to 46:2136.3, the defendant is prohibited from possession of a firearm for the duration of this Order.” The Order further reiterated the previous prohibitions against harassment, stalking, and contact by any means, “or going within 100 feet of the protected person, Ms. Boyd.”

The April 10, 2025 hearing on Mrs. Shenton's request for injunctive relief against Ms. Boyd was continued to May 27, 2025, after the trial court determined that Ms. Boyd had not been served with notice of the hearing scheduled for consideration of Mrs. Shenton's Petition on that date. Thus, the trial court again continued the effectiveness of the TRO issued on December 27, 2024 against Ms. Boyd, through May 27, 2025.

At the May 27, 2025 hearing on the Protective Order in Reconvention, both parties appeared without counsel. Mrs. Shenton, testifying on her on behalf, stated that Ms. Boyd continued to harass her by constantly videoing her, following her, and making derogatory comments to others about her while at the children's sporting events. Mrs. Shenton stated that she is forced to remain in her car at these events due to Ms. Boyd's conduct. Mrs. Shenton called no other witnesses in support of her Petition for Protection from Abuse. Ms. Boyd then presented her defense by calling Mr. Vicknair as a witness. Mr. Vicknair testified that he was arrested on December 16, 2024, for playing basketball at the neighbors’ house, which was within 100 feet of Ms. Boyd, and a violation of the separate protective order that Ms. Boyd obtained against him in another case. Mr. Vicknair also testified that on December 26, 2024, he was cutting his neighbor's grass on the neighbor's property, when he thought Ms. Boyd and Mr. Shenton were not home.

Ms. Boyd then testified on her own behalf, indicating that she thought Mrs. Shenton and Mr. Vicknair were constantly violating the December 4, 2024 protective orders in place against both of them. Ms. Boyd then asked that Mrs. Shenton's petition in reconvention be dismissed for being “completely retaliatory.” In rebuttal, Mrs. Shenton testified that Ms. Boyd violates the December 27, 2024 protective order every time she videos Mrs. Shenton or measures the distance between them, and in attempting to alienate the children against her.

At the conclusion of the May 27, 2025 hearing, the trial court explained that he could issue a protective order based on the preponderance of evidence, further stating:

I've been sufficiently shown today that certain matters, I'm relatively sure, by preponderance of the evidence, did occur. And they were harassing in nature, so, ergo, I see my way to granting the limited order. And it's going to be very limited when it comes out. It's gonna track some of the language of the Louisiana Protective Order Registry, but not much of it. ․ This order will expire after 18 months. If you think an order is needed after that, you may ask that it be renewed. ․ it's a very little abridgement of your rights, Ms. Boyd.

After the hearing, the trial court entered a final Protective Order in favor of Mrs. Shenton and against Ms. Boyd, effective through November 27, 2026, finding that “defendant represents a credible threat to the physical safety of a family member, household member, or dating partner. Therefore, pursuant to 46:2136.3, the defendant is prohibited from possession of a firearm for the duration of this Order.” Ms. Boyd was similarly ordered to refrain from stalking, harassing, or contacting Mrs. Shenton by any means, and was ordered not to go within 100 feet of Mrs. Shenton. The Order further stated: “At sporting events, the parties must stay apart from each other, a distance of at least 30 feet. No direct contact or interaction. No filming or taping or video capture. No derogatory or inflammatory statements regarded or directed toward the other party.”

On June 10, 2025, Ms. Boyd filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Dismissal of Judgment, raising a number of issues. Among other arguments, Ms. Boyd contended that she was not properly served with notice of the hearing on the final protective order; that proper service is a prerequisite for personal jurisdiction; and that an order issued without the defendant (in reconvention) being properly served renders the judgment absolutely null, citing Sessions v. Runnels, 15-616 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/9/16), 192 So.3d 182.³

In a June 10, 2025 Order, the trial court denied Ms. Boyd's Motion for Reconsideration. The Order further stated:

This matter began as an LPOR Petition for Protection from Abuse, filed on December 4, 2024. Ashley Fallon Shenton was served with the original petition and filed an LPOR Petition in reconvention on December 27, 2024.

Several pleadings were filed during the in[ter]vening time period. At no time did either party contest the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the pleadings prior to April 10th, 2025 Order extending the original relief to May 27, 2025.

A hearing was conducted in this matter on May 27, 2025. The court granted Ashley Fallon Shenton's request for an Order of Protection which was granted in open court May 27, 2025.

Roslyn Boyd filed the instant motions on June 10, 2025. The Court considers the Motion as a Motion for a New Trial. Such matters are governed by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 4907. The delay for filing for a new trial shall be seven days, exclusive of legal holidays.

The instant Motion for a New Trial is untimely. Additionally, the mover has not presented sufficient argument or legal authority to persuade the court to dismiss this matter.

N.B., the court notes that it cannot locate in any legal database the cases provided by mover in support of the motion.

Ms. Boyd timely sought an appeal from the trial court's May 27, 2025 Protective Order.

Discussion

Under the Domestic Abuse Assistance law, based on the preponderance of the evidence, a trial court may grant a protective order prohibiting the defendant from “abusing, harassing, or interfering with” the petitioning party. La. R.S. 46:2135(A)(1) and (B); La. R.S. 46:2136(A)(1). Domestic abuse is not limited to physical or sexual abuse, but includes any offense against the person, physical or non-physical, as defined in the Louisiana Criminal Code, except negligent injury and defamation, committed by one family member, household member, or dating partner, against another. La. R.S. 46:2132(A)(3); Alexander v. Victor, 23-173 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/31/23), 374 So.3d 1016, 1020-21.

We review orders of protection for an abuse of discretion. Riviere v. Bello, 23-372 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/17/24), 389 So.3d 273, 280. Whether to grant a protective order and the extent of protection is within the trial court's discretion. Id. When a conflict in the testimony exists, the trial court's reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact are not to be disturbed on review in the absence of manifest error, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are just as reasonable. Oliva v. Jones, 22-385 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/29/23), 360 So.3d 573, 578. To reverse a fact-finder's determination in an action seeking protection from abuse, the appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the trial court's finding and that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Riviere, 389 So.3d at 280.

Ms. Boyd raises a number of issues in her appeal of the May 27, 2025 protective order, including that Mrs. Shenton did not prove there was “good cause” or “immediate danger” for issuance of the order; that the trial court failed to consider Ms. Boyd's previous motions for reconsideration of the TRO and to dismiss the protective order; that the trial court issued the final protective order without proper service and in violation of her due process rights; that the rule to show cause for the protective order exceeded the 21-day statutory window for holding such a hearing; and certain due process violations. After careful consideration of Ms. Boyd's appellate brief and a thorough review of the record, we find no merit to her assertions.

Regarding her claims of improper service of notice of the May 27, 2025 hearing, the April 10, 2025 hearing transcript shows a colloquy with the trial court regarding a new date to consider a potential motion for contempt and a motion to reconsider. The trial court stated that May 27, 2025 would be the new date for consideration of these issues. In the presence of Ms. Boyd, Mrs. Shenton then questioned the trial court as to the hearing on her petition in reconvention:

COURT: We're going to take a quick break now, so that Ms. Clerk can make a plan of how to serve and use the bailiff, Mr. Quentin, to make official service.

MS. SHENTON: Your Honor, what about my position against – reconvention against Ms. Boyd for the same protection?

COURT: She's gonna about to get served with that.

MS. SHENTON: Okay.

COURT: And that will have the May 27 da[te] in it.

While the appellate record in this case does not include subsequent proof that the Clerk served Ms. Boyd at the April 10, 2025 hearing, Ms. Boyd appeared at and participated in the May 27, 2025 hearing. At no point did she object to improper service or lack of notice. A party who fails to file an exception of insufficient service of process, and who appears at the hearing to argue the merits, waives the right to object to improper service of process. Reed v. Landry, 21-589 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/3/22), 343 So.3d 874, 878.⁴ Furthermore, Ms. Boyd's due process rights were not violated and she was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard, given that she appeared, testified on her own behalf, and cross-examined other witnesses at the May 27, 2025 hearing. See S.M. v. T.M., 19-369 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/26/19), 289 So.3d 141, 144 (finding that where husband was fully aware of the purpose of an evidentiary hearing and that specific relief was sought against him, and husband was given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to testify on his own behalf, his due process rights were not violated). We find Ms. Boyd's failure to object to service of process in a timely manner, combined with her full participation in the May 27, 2025 hearing on the merits, render her due process objections under La. Const. Art. I, § 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution meritless.

As for the assertion that the hearing was not held within the 21-day window for the issuance of a protective order under La. R.S. 46:2135(B), subsection (E) of that statute states that if the hearing is continued, “the court shall make or extend such temporary restraining orders as it deems necessary. Any continuance of a hearing ordered pursuant to Subsection B or D of this Section shall not exceed fifteen days, unless good cause is shown for further continuance.” La. C.C.P. art. 3604(C)(1) further provides that “at any time” before the expiration of a TRO issued in conjunction with the Protection from Family Violence Act, La. R.S. 46:2121 et seq., “it may be extended by the court for a period not exceeding thirty days.”

The record shows the trial court issued the initial order of protection in favor of Mrs. Shenton and against Ms. Boyd on December 27, 2024, with a hearing date set for January 24, 2025, within 30 days. But on December 30, 2024, the trial court ordered the hearing reset for January 31, 2025 and ordered that “all previously issued judgments remain in full force and effect” and “all previously issued injunctions remain in full force and effect.”⁵ The trial court signed a similar order again on February 26, 2025, based on Ms. Boyd's February 24, 2025 motion to continue the February 26, 2025 hearing date due to a work conflict. That hearing was reset for April 10, 2025.

Importantly, even if the TRO issued against Ms. Boyd (and extended several times by order of the trial court) had expired as a matter of law, the issue on appeal is not the viability of the TRO but rather the validity of the May 27, 2025 final protective order. We find the continuances of the hearing dates, even though falling beyond the 30-day mark in some cases, did not nullify the final protective order. In Keneker v. Keneker, 579 So.2d 1083, 1085 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), although the TRO issued in that case had expired, we found that the proceeding for a Domestic Abuse Assistance protective order was still viable and the proceeding did not need to be dismissed. More recently, in Ragland v. Ragland, 22-770 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/22), 2022 WL 17847347 at *10, citing Keneker, the appellate court held that although the trial court extended the TROs numerous times because the show-cause hearings were passed and reassigned, Mr. Ragland's petition for protection from abuse was still viable. The Keneker court determined that under La. R.S. 46:2135(E), the trial court had the authority to extend the TRO and to continue the hearing for good cause.

Ms. Boyd did not object to the timing of the protective order hearing before April 10, 2025. In light of the unique circumstances of this case--Ms. Boyd's request to continue the February 26, 2025 hearing, her failure to object before April 10, 2025, and the mirrored protective orders sought by both parties--the trial court was not without good cause in continuing the hearings and extending the effectiveness of the TRO against the parties.

As for Ms. Boyd's argument that her motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the TRO and her motion to dismiss “were never docketed, heard, or ruled upon,” as a general proposition, when a trial court does not rule in favor of the relief sought by a party, it is presumed that the relief was denied. Barber v. Louisiana Municipal Risk Mgt. Agency Group Self-Insured Fund, 17-1005 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/18/18), 244 So.3d 56, 61 (citing M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 26). See also Succession of Gendron, 21-14 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/23/21), 325 So.3d 584, 592 n.7, writ denied, 21-1075 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So.3d 79 (“[W]hen a trial court's judgment is silent with respect to a party's claim, or an issue placed before the court, it is presumed the relief sought was denied.”). As evidenced by the May 27, 2025 protective order, the trial court effectively denied Ms. Boyd's motions. Ms. Boyd has not explained how the court's consideration of those motions in a contradictory hearing would have brought about a different result.

Ms. Boyd's argument that the protective order was issued without “good cause,” or without a showing of an “immediate and present danger of abuse” under La. R.S. 46:2135 and 2136, questions the trial court's factual findings, but Ms. Boyd does not point to any specific evidence to show how or why the trial court's findings are manifestly erroneous. Moreover, Ms. Boyd's contention ignores La. R.S. 46:2135(A), which states that the court “shall consider any and all past history of abuse, or threats thereof, in determining the existence of an immediate and present danger of abuse” and that “[t]here is no requirement that the abuse itself be recent, immediate, or present.” See Alexander, 374 So.3d at 1021.

The pleadings and testimony in the record establish the incredibly antagonistic relationship between the parties. The trial judge, who in this case is the fact finder and in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, found that Mrs. Shenton proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a protective order should issue against Ms. Boyd. Ms. Boyd's vague denials provide no basis for this Court to disturb the trial court's findings.

Ms. Boyd further contends that the parameters of the protective order are overbroad because the prohibition on video recording infringes her property and evidentiary rights, as well as potential First Amendment rights to document conduct affecting public safety or legal interests. We disagree. The protective order prohibits Ms. Boyd from videoing under certain circumstances. The May 27, 2025 order states:

At sporting events, the parties must stay apart from each other, a distance of at least 30 feet. No direct contact or interaction. No filming or taping or video capture. No derogatory or inflammatory statements regarding or directed toward the other party.

Given Mrs. Shenton's hearing testimony that Ms. Boyd was videoing her whenever she exited her house or attended the children's sporting events, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by including this additional prohibitory language in the protective order.

As for a number of additional allegations within Ms. Boyd's brief, including purported ex parte communications between the trial judge and opposing counsel, the trial court's failure to consider the evidence and to conduct a fair hearing, and her argument that the protective order was merely retaliatory, we find Ms. Boyd has not supported these assertions with any specific facts, detailed arguments, or law. Thus, they are not viable issues for our consideration on appeal. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4).

Lastly, as seen above, Ms. Boyd obtained a virtually identical final protective order against Mrs. Shenton on April 10, 2025, more than a month before the May 27, 2025 hearing, and Mrs. Shenton did not appeal that order. As the trial court observed at the April 10, 2025 hearing, what's good for the goose is good for the gander. Simply stated, Ms. Boyd has not persuaded us that the protective order issued against her constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion or that it was otherwise improvidently granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's May 27, 2025 protective order issued against appellant, Rosalyn Boyd.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Also on December 12, 2024, Ms. Boyd filed a letter outlining a December 6, 2024 incident that allegedly occurred between her and Mrs. Shenton after the TRO became effective.

2.   The hearing transcripts show that the trial judge in this matter also presided over Mr. and Mrs. Shenton's separate divorce proceedings and custody matters, as well as Ms. Boyd's Petition for Protection from Abuse filed against Mr. Vicknair. The transcripts in this case also indicate that the parties and their partners were attempting to resolve some of these issues in the custody proceeding rather than, or in addition to, seeking injunctive relief in the present case. Regardless of those tangential proceedings, we reviewed this matter based only on the present record, in which only Ms. Boyd and Mrs. Shenton are litigants.

3.   This Southern Third citation is to a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal case that is irrelevant to these proceedings. We have found no case entitled “Sessions v. Runnels.” We caution Ms. Boyd, and all litigants, whether lawyers or non-lawyers, against presenting arguments to this Court or any court that are supported by invalid on nonexistent jurisprudence.

4.   Additionally, a question regarding sufficiency of service of process generally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but rather, should be raised in a suit to annul the judgment. Id. (citing La. C.C.P. arts. 925, 928, and 2002).

5.   This order extended the December 4, 2024 TRO against Mrs. Shenton and in favor of Ms. Boyd as well; the December 12, 2024 hearing on Ms. Boyd's petition for a protective order was not completed.

CHEHARDY, C.J.