STATE v. LOZADA (2026)

The defendant, Oscar A. Lozada, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder (count one), in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, and obstruction of justice (count two), in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1).¹ He pled not guilty, and following a jury trial, was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count one and thirty years at hard labor on count two, to be served consecutively. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and the denial of his challenges for cause of three prospective jurors. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTS

The victim, Sylviane Finck, was married to the defendant, and the couple lived in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with their young daughter. Finck, a native of Belgium, was a French teacher at Brusly High School. In late June 2011, Finck returned to their Baton Rouge home after visiting her family in Belgium, and by July 18, 2011, her family and friends reported her missing when they were unable to reach her. Officers with the Baton Rouge Police Department (“BRPD”) responded to the family's home to conduct a wellness check and found the home had been deserted and cleaned out.

The BRPD initiated a missing person investigation but, after finding signs of foul play, classified it as a homicide investigation. Detectives learned Finck had last been seen on July 4, 2011, by a neighbor who described her as distraught and confused. Between July 6 and July 9, 2011, the defendant went to various places in Baton Rouge with his daughter as evidenced by surveillance footage, but Finck was never seen again. Detectives learned the defendant had made two trips to Lowe's to purchase nine five-gallon buckets, cement, and luggage locks. The defendant's vehicle was recovered from an acquaintance of his who explained the defendant had given her the vehicle in exchange for her cleaning and packing up his house. A search of the vehicle revealed numerous circular indentations in the carpet in the trunk, and blood discovered in the garage of their house was determined to be Finck's.

On July 9, 2011, the defendant and his daughter used their passports to fly from Baton Rouge to Venezuela, and the defendant did not return to the United States until he was apprehended by border patrol at the Mexican border on September 13, 2018. Finck's passport had last been used on June 30, 2011, when she flew back to the United States from Belgium, and her passport was never used again. The defendant was arrested for second degree murder, and he provided a statement to law enforcement in which he admitted to strangling Finck, using power tools to dismember her body, and placing her body parts in the five-gallon buckets before dumping the buckets in waterways along Interstate 10.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE AND PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his first counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, he alleges Detective Todd Morris, with the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office, should have immediately stopped questioning him after he requested an attorney. Similarly, in his sole pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues Detective Morris’ interrogation tactics were coercive and induced him to confess.

When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Richard, 2024-0030 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/21/25), 408 So.3d 529, 544. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the Supreme Court promulgated a set of safeguards to protect the therein delineated constitutional rights of persons subject to custodial police interrogation. The warnings must inform the person in custody that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. For a confession to be admissible, the state must show that it was freely and voluntarily given without influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menace, threats, inducements, or promises. La. R.S. 15:451; State v. Anderson, 2006-2987 (La. 9/9/08), 996 So.2d 973, 994, cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1165, 129 S.Ct. 1906, 173 L.Ed.2d 1057 (2009). The “voluntariness” determination is based on the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was given, and if the accused gave the statement while in custody, he must have first been advised of his constitutional rights and executed a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. State v. Brown, 2016-0998 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 745, 789, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 143 S.Ct. 886, 215 L.Ed.2d 404 (2023).

In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, the Supreme Court held if a suspect indicates “in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.” The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883-1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), confirmed these views and, to lend them substance, held that when an accused either before or during interrogation asks for counsel, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated, custodial interrogation, even if he has been advised of his rights. The accused is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel is present, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-485, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-1885.

When an accused invokes his Miranda right to counsel, the admissibility of a subsequent confession or incriminating statement is determined by a two-step inquiry: did the accused initiate further conversation or communication; and was the purported waiver of counsel knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Jefferson, 2018-0083 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/18), 261 So.3d 793, 799, writ denied, 2018-1671 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So.3d 294; see also La. R.S. 15:452 (no arrestee “shall be subjected to any treatment designed by effect on body or mind to compel a confession of crime.”). It is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their insistence, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (emphasis added). Inquiries or statements, by either an accused or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship will not generally initiate a conversation in the sense in which the word was used in Edwards. However, questions by the defendant about what is going to happen to him evince a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation, rather than merely being necessary inquiries arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship. State v. Smith, 2008-0576 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/12/08), 2008 WL 4191504, *7 (unpublished), writ denied, 2008-2640 (La. 9/4/09), 17 So.3d 956.

The Miranda right to counsel is a prophylactic rule that does not operate independent from the danger it seeks to protect against, i.e., the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation and the effect that danger can have on a suspect's privilege to avoid compelled self-incrimination. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. The applicability of the “ ‘rigid’ prophylactic rule” of Edwards requires courts to “determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355 (citation omitted). If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable police officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, the cessation of questioning is not required. Id. The suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Id.

When the officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not know whether the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation of questioning would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460, 114 S.Ct. at 2355-2356 (citation omitted). In Davis, the Supreme Court indicated it would often be good police practice for interviewing officers to clarify whether a suspect actually wants an attorney present in those situations where the suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-461, 114 S.Ct. at 2355-2356.

In his motion to suppress, the defendant argued his constitutional rights were violated when the interrogation continued after he requested an attorney. The defendant filed a pro se motion to suppress on the same ground, alleging Detective Morris “cut [his] replies and statements short” as he “kept trying to invoke his right to have a lawyer present.”² Additionally, the defendant argued he was under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, inducements, and promises during questioning.

At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Morris testified he interviewed the defendant on October 5, 2018, for about five to six hours. Detective Morris reviewed the recording of the interview and testified he advised the defendant of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview. Detective Morris stated the defendant signed the waiver of rights form after the rights discussion and further testified the defendant never indicated he wished to stop talking and did not indicate that he wanted a lawyer present with him after their initial discussion of the Miranda rights.³

In the interview, Detective Morris introduced himself and asked the defendant if he understood and was able to read English. Then, the following exchange ensued:

A: Sir, how is Angelina?

Q: Okay. Let me go over this and you and I will talk about that, okay?

A: Okay.

Q. Alright. I'm gone-- let's just do this first and then I'll- then I'll talk to you about it, okay? This is just a- a standard rights form. I want to talk to you about Sylviane Finck, who was your wife.

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. But before I ask you any questions, I want you to understand your rights. Okay? The first one says, “You have the right to remain silent or answer questions.” Do you understand that? Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. The second one says, “We inform you that anything you say can be used against you in court.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: This one says, “You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before you answer any questions if you so desire, and you may have the lawyer with you during questioning.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: “If you want a lawyer, but cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for you.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: It says, “If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering questions at any time in order to get the advice of a lawyer or for any other reason you might have.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: And this bottom portion is just a consent to questioning. It says, “I have read the statements of my rights shown above. I understand what my rights are. I am willing to answer questions and make a statement. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no pressure of any kind has been used against me.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: So you and I can talk, okay? If you would- if you would, um, sign your name right there and then print it right here for me, please.

A: But, I do want a lawyer.

Q: Okay. Well, if you want a lawyer, um, then- then you and I can't talk then.

A: No?

Q: Okay? No, no, we can't talk, no. If you want a lawyer, um, we'll have -- you'll have to have one here. Um, but if you want a lawyer here for you and I to talk, then you and I can't talk.

A: Well, it's-- it's my right, right?

Q: It is your right. Yeah, you have the right to have one, yes. You have right to- to have a lawyer present during questioning or--

A: Because--

Q: --if you want to talk, and then you want to stop and then get the advice of a lawyer or -- but that's your choice -- whatever you'd like to do. And you have the right to stop answering. If you want to talk, you have the right to start talking, then you have the right to say, “Nope, I don't want to talk anymore,” or you can say, “I don't want to talk at all.” You can -- you have a choice.

A: Well, I want to cooperate in anything that can help you, you know.

Q: Well, that's- that's up to you.

A: But, of course, I do want a lawyer, because--.

Q: Okay, well, do- do you want a lawyer while you and I are talking now. That- that's what--. If you want a lawyer now, um, obviously there's not going to be a lawyer now, because I don't have one here, okay? And the courts will have to appoint you a lawyer when you go before, um, on callout from parish prison or when you appear in court, okay? So, um, I don't have a lawyer here now, but if you want a lawyer then you- then you and I can't talk right now.

A: I don't know. I nev- I never have been in--

Q: I un--

A: --this position.

․

Q: --what this form does -- it says you understand what your rights are. Uh, in order for me to talk to you -- I have to go through this form with everybody that- that we talk to no matter what.

A: Yes.

Q: And so I'm going through this form with you explaining what each of your rights are. Um, and if you can sign the form it doesn't mean you want to talk, you don't want to talk, the- the point is though if you want a lawyer with you now when you and I talk, then you and I cannot talk, because there is not a lawyer here with you. The courts will have to appoint you one. Um, that's your choice. Or if you decide to talk, you said you wanted to talk, but you wanted a lawyer, you can stop talking at any time, and say, “Nah, I don't want to answer any more questions.” You have the right to do whatever you want to do. I can't force you to talk. Um, I'm not going to force you to talk. Um, you have that right to wait and not talk to me at all, but you have to make that decision.

A: So, if we go to court, the court will appoint me a lawyer, and then what happens?

Q: Well, then the lawyer would just have to contact me if he wants you to- to speak with me. That'll be up- between you and your lawyer at the time. Yes, sir. This is strictly your decision.

A: Okay. Full name?

Q: Yeah, yeah, just print your name, just Oscar -- however you sign your name. Right there.

A: That's it?

Q: Let me just- let me just sign it. Um, so would you like to talk to me or not like to talk to me? That's your choice.

A: Well, yes. I mean--.

Q: Okay. Are you-are you -- you want to talk to me now without a lawyer with us?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. I'm just- I just have to ask you that.

A: Yes, I--.

Q: Okay . Okay. So, you -- okay.

Detective Morris then explained that Angelina was “doing good” and was with members of Finck's family in Baton Rouge. Hours later in the interview, the defendant confessed to killing Finck and described details of the murder.

In response to the defendant's motion to suppress, the State argued he never unambiguously stated he did not want to speak to Detective Morris without the presence of an attorney and initially seemed confused about his rights. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, reasoning:

THE COURT: Thank you all very much. All right. It's clear to me that the defendant wanted to cooperate, and wanted to make a statement. He knew he had a right to an attorney. He wanted an attorney there at the interview, but he wanted to do the interview contemporaneously more than he wanted an attorney there. Under those circumstances there's a․ knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel, so the motion is denied for that reason.

The defendant filed a writ application seeking review of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, and in a plurality decision, this court denied his writ:

WRIT DENIED.

Holdridge, J., I concur in the writ denial. While I may have arrived at a different result, the trial court's conclusions as to the credibility and weight of the testimony relating to voluntariness of a confession “are entitled to great weight.” See State v. Watson, 423 So.2d 1130, 1133 (La. 1982). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 658 [655] So.2d 272, 280–81.

Theriot, J., dissents and would grant the writ application. When an acused [sic] has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). I find that relator clearly and unambiguously invoked his right to counsel at which point the detective should have ceased further inquiry. See State v. Lagos, 2018-1724 (La. 1/28/19), 262 So.3d 277, 278 (per curiam).

State v. Lozado,⁴ 2019-0655 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/21/19), 2019 WL 3948820, *1 (unpublished), writ denied, 2019-01492 (La. 11/12/19), 282 So.3d 227.

On appeal, the defendant adopts the dissent's reasoning to argue the motion to suppress should have been granted. Additionally, he argues Detective Morris’ testimony at trial indicating the interview was long “because [the defendant] wanted to tell his story” suggested the defendant needed to testify in his defense to challenge the recorded statement. In his pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues Detective Morris’ “gentle, sweetheart approach, by design, did exactly what the law is trying to prevent: soothing [the defendant] into a situation to hurt himself without the advice of a[n] unbiased lawyer.” He contends this approach, along with his need for information as to his daughter's safety and wellbeing, induced him to confess.

The State, on the other hand, argues the law of the case doctrine bars reconsideration of the issue, because the defendant already fully litigated the admissibility of his post-arrest statement. The State contends he has failed to prove this court's writ denial was clearly, palpably, or manifestly erroneous and has failed to prove manifest injustice would occur if the law of the case doctrine was applied. Alternatively, the State alleges the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress, because the defendant did not clearly and unequivocally indicate he wished to consult with an attorney prior to any questioning.

We initially note the law of the case doctrine does not bar reconsideration of the arguments raised by the defendant on appeal. The law of the case doctrine embodies the rule that an appellate court ordinarily will not reconsider its own rulings on a subsequent appeal in the same case. The reasons for the law of the case doctrine are to avoid relitigation of the same issue; to promote consistency of result in the same litigation; and, to promote efficiency and fairness to both parties by affording a single opportunity for the argument and decision of the matter at issue. State v. Chandler, 2017-0962 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/17), 240 So.3d 950, 952. However, a denial of supervisory review is merely a decision not to exercise the extraordinary powers of supervisory jurisdiction, and it does not bar consideration on the merits of the issue denied on supervisory review, when an appeal is taken from final judgment. See State v. Fontenot, 550 So.2d 179 (La. 1989) (per curiam); State v. Edwards, 2024-0664 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/11/25), 2025 WL 1147550, *2 n.4 (unpublished). Thus, we will address the merits of the defendant's arguments.

In analyzing whether there has been a direct, clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous request for counsel, courts must give a broad, rather than narrow, interpretation to the suspect's request. See State v. Payne, 2001-3196 (La. 12/4/02), 833 So.2d 927, 936. In State v. Chesson, 2003-606 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/1/03), 856 So.2d 166, 175, writ denied, 2003-2913 (La. 2/13/04), 867 So.2d 686, the third circuit found the defendant's “statement regarding his ‘thinking’ that he possibly ‘should’ speak with an attorney is not the type of unequivocal and unambiguous statement described above. See Davis, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (wherein the United States Supreme Court found the statement ‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer’ not to be an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel).”

In Leger, 936 So.2d at 135, the supreme court did not find the statement, “I know I need to see one [a lawyer]” amounted “to an unambiguous request for counsel that would indicate to a reasonable police officer that the defendant was asking for counsel at that time.”

In State v. Montejo, 2006-1807 (La. 5/11/10), 40 So.3d 952, 973, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1082, 131 S.Ct. 656, 178 L.Ed.2d 513 (2010), the supreme court disagreed that the statement, “Well, and I don't, I don't, I don't really want to go with you ․ I got a lawyer appointed to me. ․ Yeah, I think I got a lawyer appointed to me” constituted an “unambiguous request for counsel.” Rather, the supreme court characterized the statement as an indication the defendant might want counsel, or an “ambiguous or equivocal” request for counsel, or an indecisive request for counsel, each of which the Davis Court stated would be insufficient to trigger Edwards’ protections against further questioning. Id.

We agree with the State that the defendant indicated he wanted an attorney at some point but not necessarily at the time of questioning. Immediately after his statement about wanting a lawyer, Detective Morris informed him that if he wanted a lawyer present, the conversation would not be continued, and the defendant responded, “No?” The recorded interview establishes the manner of the exchange between Detective Morris and the defendant was meant to explain his constitutional rights and to alleviate the defendant's confusion. Detective Morris was aware the defendant was not a United States citizen who was familiar with the legal system and was aware the defendant's native language was not English. In fact, the defendant told Detective Morris he had never been “in this situation before” and had never been in jail. These circumstances support Detective Morris’ follow-up explanation of the Miranda rights. After Detective Morris explained the defendant had a choice to talk to him—with or without the presence of an attorney—or not to talk to him, the defendant said, “Well, I want to cooperate in anything that can help you, you know.”

The defendant subsequently unequivocally waived his right to having an attorney present at that time, agreeing to continue the interview in the absence of counsel. As this court stated in Smith, 2008 WL 4191504 at *7, “[t]here are undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to initiate any conversation or dialogue.” We find Detective Morris’ statements prior to the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel were made only to assure he understood the questioning would cease if he wanted an attorney at that time. We, therefore, conclude the trial court was correct in determining the defendant wanted to participate in the interview and to obtain a lawyer at a later stage.

We further conclude the trial court, whose conclusions are entitled to great weight, did not err in ruling that the confession was voluntary. The defendant has failed to establish he was induced to confess by Detective Morris’ alleged coercive tactics of “using his daughter as bait.” Immediately after the defendant agreed to speak with Detective Morris without an attorney, Detective Morris assured him as to Angelina's safety and wellbeing. It certainly cannot be concluded there was any coercive conduct leading to the confession at that point in time. Accordingly, the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, and this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of prospective jurors Lena McGee, Lance Doss, and Clarice Gordon.

An accused in a criminal case is constitutionally entitled to a full and complete voir dire examination and to the exercise of peremptory challenges. La. Const. art. I, § 17(A). The purpose of voir dire examination is to determine prospective jurors’ qualifications by testing their competency and impartiality and discovering bases for the intelligent exercise of cause and peremptory challenges. State v. Folse, 2018-0154 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/18), 258 So.3d 53, 62-63. A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. A trial court is accorded great discretion in determining whether to strike a juror for cause, and such rulings will not be disturbed unless a review of the voir dire as a whole indicates an abuse of that discretion. State v. Mills, 2013-0573 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/27/14), 153 So.3d 481, 487, writ denied, 2014-2027 (La. 5/22/15), 170 So.3d 982 and writ denied, 2014-2269 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So.3d 139.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 797 provides, in pertinent part, the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that:

(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence; [or]

․

(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court[.]

The trial court has the benefit of seeing the facial expressions and hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as they respond to questioning, whereas the reviewing court reviews the matter only on a transcript in a record. See State v. Dorsey, 2010-0216 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So.3d 603, 627, cert. denied, 566 U.S. 930, 132 S.Ct. 1859, 182 L.Ed.2d 658 (2012). Moreover, a prospective juror's seemingly prejudicial response is not grounds for an automatic challenge for cause, and a trial court's refusal to excuse him on the grounds of impartiality is not an abuse of discretion, if after further questioning the prospective juror demonstrates a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. State v. Kang, 2002-2812 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So.2d 649, 653. An erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge violates his substantial rights and constitutes reversible error; therefore, prejudice is presumed when a defendant's challenge for cause is erroneously denied and the defendant exhausts all of his peremptory challenges. State v. Taylor, 2003-1834 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 58, 62. In this case, the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. The only question left for our determination on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's challenges for cause.

Prospective Juror Lena McGee

The first prospective juror at issue is Lena McGee. When the State asked if any of the prospective jurors had been a victim of a crime, McGee raised her hand and spoke of an incident over thirty years ago when her child's father pulled a gun on her after she refused to give him their daughter. McGee said she did not report the incident to the police, because she was young, afraid, and did not understand the law. McGee agreed she could set that aside and be an appropriate juror. Defense counsel later questioned McGee about the presumption of innocence, asking the following: “Would you require [the defense] to put on any evidence? Would you have to hear from us?” McGee responded that the evidence would speak for itself and, specifically, that she would require the defense to put on evidence because “there's two sides to every story.” Defense counsel then asked:

[Defense counsel]:

So, we're really not even. We're really not tied. The other side has to put on evidence or prove something. Would that be correct?

Prospective Juror:

Correct.

[Defense counsel]:

So you wouldn't really necessarily -- if they don't prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you wouldn't really have to hear from us would you?

Prospective Juror:

No. But if they have the evidence, the evidence will speak for itself.

Subsequently, defense counsel asked McGee how much being a victim of domestic violence affected her, to which she responded “[a] lot.”⁵ McGee said the subject matter of the case was difficult for her, and she felt extremely strong about domestic abuse. The trial court questioned McGee outside the presence of the other prospective jurors and asked if her experience with domestic abuse would influence her decision in the case. McGee responded in the negative. McGee also stated that her neighbor's daughter had been killed by her neighbor's son-in-law, who then killed himself. Defense counsel challenged McGee for cause, arguing:

Your honor, it goes beyond the news. Also, her whole life has been -- I mean, two traumatic events -- one which she was threatened with death and another [with] murder suicide. ․ She knows this is a homicide involving domestic abuse violence. There's no way. No matter what she said on that witness stand there is no way that she could put that aside and give my client a fair trial.

On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court should have granted the challenge for cause because McGee was a victim of domestic abuse and had knowledge of the case. Contrary to the defense's assertion that she “knew all about the case from television news,” McGee said she knew very little about the case. McGee stated she did not know any of the facts but had seen the defendant handcuffed on the news.

Moreover, while McGee's statements seemingly raised questions concerning her ability to be impartial, the trial court was ultimately satisfied that she could render an impartial verdict based on the totality of her responses. In denying the challenge for cause, the trial court noted as follows: “We talk about credibility of a witness. I watched [McGee testify] and she was adamant, I mean ․ I almost think she's had so much things happen to her it doesn't affect her. ․ I think she was straight up honest as could be.” The trial court had the benefit of observing McGee's demeanor and hearing her responses firsthand; the trial court was in the best position to determine whether she would be impartial. See Dorsey, 74 So.3d at 627. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause of McGee.

Prospective Juror Lance Doss

The next prospective juror at issue is Lance Doss. When questioned about his knowledge of the case, Doss said he thought it involved a murder wherein the perpetrator fled the country with a child and was captured in 2018. Doss said he followed the story when it first happened but “left it alone” until he heard the case was coming up for trial last week. Doss also mentioned reading a news article the night before when he “was half asleep” but could not recall any specifics. The State asked if he had formed an opinion about the defendant's guilt or innocence, to which Doss responded he had not. Doss agreed he could set aside anything he had heard from the news and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial. Doss testified he heard several prospective jurors speculate which case they were going to hear and theorize on the accused's guilt versus innocence. Defense counsel challenged Doss for cause based on his prior knowledge of the facts of the case and the conversation Doss overhead during which prospective jurors discussed the case. The trial court denied the challenge for cause and the defense objected.

A prospective juror's exposure to a case through the news will not automatically warrant excusal absent a showing of impartiality. Cf. State v. Chapman, 410 So.2d 689, 695 (La. 1981); State v. McIntyre, 381 So.2d 408, 410 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 90 (1980). We must look to the entirety of the voir dire to determine whether a prospective juror's exposure to newspaper publicity resulted in him forming any opinion regarding the facts or the defendant's guilt or innocence. See State v. Young, 569 So.2d 570, 585 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So.2d 386 (La. 1991).

In this case, Doss unequivocally stated he could set aside what he had read and heard from the news and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented. The circumstances do not suggest he could not be fair and impartial. After reviewing Doss’ responses during voir dire, we find no indication that his familiarity with the case would have any influence on his decision. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause of Doss.

Prospective Juror Clarice Gordon

The final prospective juror at issue is Clarice Gordon who also expressed familiarity with the case. Gordon said she was an “avid news reader” and indicated there were two cases she knew of, the “Brusly case” and the “car dealership case.” Gordon described the “Brusly case” as involving a victim who was a teacher at Brusly High. She knew there was a child who was taken out of the country, and she said “there was some discussion about concrete in buckets.” Gordon said she recalled the information from when “it was happening” and had not read anything about the case in the last week. Gordon agreed she could set aside everything she had read about the case and base her verdict only on the evidence presented. Defense counsel challenged her for cause based on her knowledge of the case. The trial court denied the challenge.

We find Gordon's responses, as a whole, fail to reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably inferred. See State v. Brown, 2018-01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 267-270, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d 596 (2022). Like Doss, Gordon stated she could set aside what she knew from the news and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented. The reviewing court should afford great deference to the trial court's determination, as the trial court was in the best position to assess the prospective jurors’ credibility and candor. Additionally, the voir dire as a whole supports the trial court's finding that Gordon could be fair and impartial. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause of Gordon. Assignment of error number two is without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

I disagree with the majority's opinion insofar as it affirms the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.

The majority finds that defendant's statement “But, I do want a lawyer” is ambiguous or equivocal. I disagree. In analyzing whether there has been a direct, clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous request for counsel, courts must give a broad, rather than narrow, interpretation to the suspect's request. See State v. Payne, 2001-3196, p. 11 (La. 12/4/02), 833 So.2d 927, 936. One doesn't need a broad interpretation to find “But, I do want a lawyer” to be clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous. The defendant clearly stated, after being informed of his rights, that he did want a lawyer. The defendant did not say that he was “thinking” that he possibly “should” speak to an attorney, see State v. Chesson, 2003-606, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/03), 856 So.2d 166, 175, writ denied, 2003-2913 (La. 2/13/04), 867 So.2d 686; he did not say “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer,” see Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2357, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); he did not say “I know I need to see one [a lawyer],” see State v. Leger, 2005-0011, pp. 31-32 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 135; he did not say “[y]eah, I think I got a lawyer appointed to me,” see State v. Montejo, 2006-1807, p. 13 (La. 5/11/10), 40 So.3d 952, 961; nor did he say “why don't you just give me a lawyer, dog,” see State v. Demesme, 2017-0954, p. 1 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So.3d 1206. Therefore, I find the Davis ¹ analysis is not appropriate in this matter. It is error to apply the Davis analysis when the defendant's statement is clear and unambiguous.

Assuming the Davis analysis is appropriate, the majority notes that Detective Morris was aware the defendant was not a U.S. citizen who was familiar with the legal system and was also aware the defendant's native language was not English. Therefore, the majority concluded Detective Morris had reason to further explain the Miranda rights. Yet, as Detective Morris reviewed the form, line by line, with the defendant, it was not until the defendant clearly stated he wanted a lawyer that Detective Morris felt compelled to further explain the Miranda rights. In other words, Detective Morris felt no need to question the defendant's knowledge of understanding English during the first six questions, to-wit:

Q: Okay. But before I ask you any questions, I want you to understand your rights. Okay? The first one says, “You have the right to remain silent or answer questions.” Do you understand that? Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. The second one says, “We inform you that anything you say can be used against you in court.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: This one says, “You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before you answer any questions if you so desire, and you may have the lawyer with you during questioning.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: “If you want a lawyer, but cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for you.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: It says, “If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering questions at any time in order to get the advice of a lawyer or for any other reason you might have.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: And this bottom portion is just a consent to questioning. It says, “I have read the statements of my rights shown above. I understand what my rights are. I am willing to answer questions and make a statement. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no pressure of any kind has been used against me.” Do you understand that?

A: Yes.

Not until the defendant clearly invoked his right to counsel by saying “[b]ut, I do want a lawyer,” did Detective Morris feel compelled to further explain defendant's Miranda rights. For six questions, Detective Morris believed the defendant understood what was explained to him. Once the defendant clearly invoked his right to counsel and refused to sign the waiver form, Detective Morris questioned the defendant about exercising his right to counsel. If one believes the defendant understood each and every right explained to him, it is unclear why Detective Morris felt the need to further question defendant when he exercised one of the rights just explained to him. The only person who appeared confused at this point was Detective Morris. The defendant clearly affirmed after each of the six questions that he understood. When given a pen to sign the waiver form, the defendant clearly stated that he wanted an attorney and refused to sign the waiver form. Such conduct is unequivocal.

Giving Detective Morris the benefit of the doubt, that he was concerned that the defendant was confused and the circumstances warranted further explanation of the Miranda rights, the majority finds that the defendant “unequivocally” waived his right to counsel by stating “[w]ell, I want to cooperate in anything that can help you, you know.” However, the majority fails to consider, and the opinion does not address, the defendant's next breath when he clearly stated, “But, of course, I do want a lawyer.” For the second time, the defendant clearly asserted his right to counsel. Read in context, the defendant was stating he would cooperate with a lawyer present. After this second unambiguous request for counsel, Detective Morris should have ceased the inquiry. Yet he continued his dialogue about talking now or talking later and having a lawyer appointed and that “[t]his is strictly your decision.” The defendant had already made his decision, TWICE: he wanted a lawyer. I find the defendant clearly and unambiguously invoked his right to counsel – not once, but twice – at which point Detective Morris should have ceased further inquiry. See State v. Lagos, 2018-1724, p. 1 (La. 1/28/19), 262 So.3d 277, 278.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A prior indictment charged the defendant with only second degree murder.

2.   In his pro se motion to suppress, the defendant also argued the waiver of rights form was incomplete and unlawful. (R. 197-99). However, he has not raised this argument on appeal; thus, the argument is considered abandoned. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4; State v. Garnett, 2023-0699 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/21/24), 384 So.3d 384, 389 n.1, writ denied, 2024-00360 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 67.

3.   Detective Morris testified a second waiver of rights form was executed relative to a follow-up interview regarding the whereabouts of Finck's body.

4.   As reflected in the indictment and his pro se pleadings, the defendant's last name is spelled Lozada.

5.   There was evidence of prior domestic violence admitted into evidence at trial, specifically medical records and threatening phone messages.

1.   Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).

LANIER, J.

Theriot, J., dissents with reasons.