AGUILUZ v. AGUILUZ (2026)

In this community property dispute, Robert Neill Aguiluz appeals the family court judgment partitioning the community of acquets and gains previously existing between him and Susan Kelly Crumholt.¹ For the following reasons, we amend the judgment and, as amended, affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Aguiluz and Ms. Crumholt were married on February 28, 2015. On June 18, 2020, Mr. Aguiluz filed a petition for 102 divorce and a motion to terminate the community. On July 8, 2020, the family court signed a judgment ordering that the community property regime between Mr. Aguiluz and Ms. Crumholt be terminated retroactive to June 18, 2020, the day the petition for divorce was filed. The parties were divorced by a judgment signed by the family court on February 11, 2021.

On April 13, 2021, Ms. Crumholt filed a petition for partition of community property, and thereafter, both parties filed their detailed descriptive list. On February 10, 2022, a trial to partition the community property was held. On June 21, 2024, a “Final Judgment” was signed, which resulted in Mr. Aguiluz owing Ms. Crumholt an equalizing payment of $42,112.42 in settlement of the reimbursement claims arising out of the community property partition.² It is from this judgment that Mr. Aguiluz appeals, raising five assignments of error related to the family court's rulings on reimbursement claims asserted by him and by Ms. Crumholt.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court's allocation or assigning of assets and liabilities in the partition of community property is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Abreo v. Abreo, 2021-0528 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 2021 WL 6069448, *3. In community property partitions, the trial court is granted much discretion in valuing and allocating assets and liabilities and is required to consider the source and nature of each asset or liability, the financial situation of each spouse, and any other relevant circumstances. See La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(c), et seq.; Berthelot v. Berthelot, 2017-1055 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/18/18), 254 So. 3d 800, 808. Given this great discretion, the trial court is not required to accept, at face value, a spouse's valuation of assets. Berthelot, 254 So.3d at 816.

A trial court's findings as to whether reimbursement claims have been sufficiently established are generally reviewable under the manifest error standard of review. Kline v. Kline, 98-1206 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2/10/99), 741 So.2d 670, 672. However, where one or more legal errors by the trial court interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable. The standard of review for mistakes of law by the trial court requires the appellate court to engage in a de novo review of the entire record and render a judgment on the merits. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 n.2 (La. 1989).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Mr. Aguiluz's assignments of error pertain to reimbursements that were awarded to Ms. Crumholt as well as reimbursements that he requested that were denied. The law is well settled that the party seeking reimbursement has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the nature of the indebtedness, and whether the community obligation(s) were incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage. Krielow v. Krielow, 93-2539 (La. 4/11/94), 635 So.2d 180, 187. A party seeking reimbursement of the payment of a community obligation with separate funds must prove that separate funds existed and that those funds were used to satisfy the community obligation. Fulco v. Fulco, 50,256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 11/18/15), 183 So.3d 573, 578.

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Aguiluz contends that the family court erred when it denied him reimbursement for his separate funds used for community purposes on the basis that he did not admit into evidence the documents he used to refresh his memory on the amount of the separate funds. Mr. Aguiluz testified during the hearing that, at the time the parties got married, he had a savings account in the amount of $23,074.50 and a checking account in the amount of $2,529.81, and during the marriage, he used that money “for community purposes.” Mr. Aguiluz used bank statements during his testimony to give the balance on both accounts as of the date of marriage, but he did not introduce those documents into evidence.

During oral reasons for judgment, the family court stated that Mr. Aguiluz failed to introduce any proof that he paid community debts with his separate funds. The court stated that Mr. Aguiluz did not introduce any documents “for the court to even look at to see how those funds were used.” Mr. Aguiluz argues that under Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 612(A),³ the onus was on Ms. Crumholt to introduce the documents he used to refresh his memory if she thought the documents were inconsistent with his testimony, and alternatively, that his testimony was sufficient evidence.

We disagree; the burden to prove entitlement to a reimbursement was on Mr. Aguiluz to show his separate funds existed and that those funds were used to satisfy the community obligation. The record contains no documentary evidence establishing that those funds existed prior to the parties’ marriage and no evidence to establish that those funds were used to satisfy a community obligation. Accordingly, we find no error in the family court's conclusion that Mr. Aguiluz's testimony standing alone was insufficient to satisfy his burden of proof.

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Aguiluz contends that the family court erred in denying his reimbursement claim for non-principal mortgage payments made to Wells Fargo on his separate property home. He contends that the mortgage payments accrued during the community property regime but were deferred until after the termination of the community and paid with separate property funds after the termination of the community.

During the marriage, the parties lived in Mr. Aguiluz's separate property home. In July 2019, Mr. Aguiluz entered into a forbearance agreement with Wells Fargo on his mortgage to pause his mortgage payments through July 2020 because he lost his job with the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). At the end of the forbearance period, in August 2020, after termination of the community, Mr. Aguiluz paid the principal and interest that accrued during the forbearance period in the amount of $19,078.00 with separate funds. Mr. Aguiluz argues that he is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the non-principal payments that accrued during the marriage that he paid with separate funds after termination of the community.

We find no error in the family court's conclusion that Mr. Aguiluz is not entitled to reimbursement from Ms. Crumholt for interest payments that accrued on Mr. Aguiluz's separate property home during the forbearance agreement. Louisiana Civil Code art. 2363 provides that a separate obligation of a spouse is one incurred by that spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime, or one incurred during the existence of a community property regime though not for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse. In this matter, the mortgage debt was incurred prior to the establishment of the community on a separate obligation and payment was not due or paid until after the termination of the community and was paid with his separate property.

In his third assignment of error, Mr. Aguiluz contends that the family court erred when it ruled that the compromise with his former employer, DOTD, in the form of a Receipt, Release, and Indemnity Agreement was a settlement of his Civil Service Appeal, and included community earnings in the form of back pay. On July 15, 2019, DOTD notified Mr. Aguiluz that he was being separated from his position at DOTD effective at the close of business that day. Mr. Aguiluz appealed that decision, requesting reinstatement, back wages, expungement of his personnel record, and attorney fees. On April 23, 2020, the Civil Service Commission Referee granted his appeal, reversed the separation, and ordered DOTD to reinstate Mr. Aguiluz to his position with back pay. The Referee based its decision on its determination that DOTD did not prove that the proper appointing authority effected the separation.

On July 7, 2020, Mr. Aguiluz entered into a Receipt, Release, and Indemnity Agreement with DOTD whereby DOTD agreed to pay him $275,000.00 to release DOTD from any and all past, present, and/or future claims demands, causes of action and rights of action he may have under “the laws of the State of Louisiana, any and all federal and state laws” or “any other laws whatsoever” for pecuniary losses, lost wages, loss of future earnings, other expenses, loss of consortium, penalties, attorney fees, and any and all other damages and other items of recovery which Mr. Aguiluz may be entitled (the settlement agreement).

Mr. Aguiluz contends that before the settlement agreement was signed, he informed DOTD that he intended to pursue state tort law claims available to him and that he and DOTD began negotiating a possible compromise with the goal of making it unnecessary for Mr. Aguiluz to file a lawsuit in state or federal court. Mr. Aguiluz argued that the settlement agreement was a settlement of his state law claims and not a settlement of his civil service appeal and therefore, did not include back pay since the Civil Service Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction to award back pay. In support of his position he cites this court's opinion in Kling v. Louisiana Department of Revenue, which held that the Civil Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to award back pay and reinstatement to a civil service employee. Kling v. Louisiana Department of Revenue, 2018-1480 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/18/19), 281 So.3d 696, 708, writs denied, 2019-01434, 01441 (La. 11/5/19), 281 So.3d 671. He contends that under Kling, his settlement agreement was for state law claims that cannot include back pay, and therefore, none of the settlement agreement payout should constitute community property.

In its reasons for judgment, the family court thoroughly considered Mr. Aguiluz's argument and discussed its conclusion that a portion of the settlement agreement included back pay. The family court pointed to La. Civ. Code art. 2338,⁴ which defines community property; La. Civ. Code art. 2340, which provides that things in the possession of a spouse during the existence of a regime of community are presumed to be community, but either spouse may prove that they are separate property; and La. Civ. Code art. 2344, which provides that damages due to personal injuries sustained during the existence of the community by a spouse are separate property, but the portion of the damages in compensation of the loss of community earnings is community property.

The family court noted that under Kling, the Civil Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over employment issues regarding a classified civil service employee such as reinstatement and back pay, and that the district courts do not have jurisdiction to award back pay. However, the family court pointed out that Mr. Aguiluz never filed suit in district court. Rather, Mr. Aguiluz filed a claim with the Civil Service Commission, resulting in his reinstatement with back pay. Thereafter a settlement was entered. Thus, the family court concluded that a portion of that settlement agreement included back pay attributable to loss of community earnings, and therefore is community property. We find no error in the family court's conclusion.

In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Aguiluz contends that if the family court correctly determined that part of the settlement payment between him and his employer was “back pay” attributed to the community, the family court erred in not reducing Ms. Crumholt's lump sum by half of the deductions from those wages.

In determining the amount of the settlement agreement that included community property, the family court used Mr. Aguiluz's yearly salary and reduced it by one month's salary as the community existed eleven months after he was separated from his job. In so doing the family court concluded that $96,239.00 of the $275,000.00 settlement consisted of community property, and Ms. Crumholt was entitled to reimbursement for one-half of that amount totaling $48,119.50. Without additional evidence, this solution by the family court is appropriate to determine what portion of the settlement included backpay. However, we agree with Mr. Aguiluz that Ms. Crumholt's portion should be reduced by the deductions shown in the evidence introduced.

The check stubs introduced into evidence by Mr. Aguiluz show payment to Mr. Aguiluz from the State Department of the Treasury in the amount of $58,417.00 on July 17, 2020, and $163,925.69 on July 21, 2020. The document also shows deductions in the amount of $52,657.31 for federal and state withholdings, as well as Medicare, Lasers, and Health and Life Insurance. The amount of the two payments to Mr. Aguiluz as well as the amount in reductions total the $275,000.00 of his settlement agreement with DOTD. The amount Mr. Aguiluz received from DOTD was reduced by approximately 19.15% based on the deductions that were shown on the check stubs. ($52,657.31 is approximately 19.15% of $275,000.00). Since the evidence does not clearly delineate the amount of the settlement agreement that was for back pay, and we agree with the family court's use of Mr. Aguiluz's yearly salary to determine back pay, we find that the most equitable solution is to reduce the total amount Ms. Crumholt was entitled to by the same 19.15% that Mr. Aguiluz's settlement was reduced by to account for the deductions. Therefore, we reduce the family court's reimbursement to Ms. Crumholt of $48,119.50 for back pay by 19.15% for the deductions that were taken from Mr. Aguiluz's settlement. This results in the reimbursement being owed to Ms. Crumholt from the settlement agreement being reduced to $38,904.62.

In his final assignment of error, Mr. Aguiluz contends that the family court erred in reimbursing Ms. Crumholt for one-half of the interest payments on his student loan, where the benefits of his professional degree and license benefited the community. We find no merit to this assignment of error. A similar argument was rejected by the Fourth Circuit wherein the husband argued that although his medical school student loan debt was incurred prior to the marriage, his medical education allowed his family a higher standard of living. Gisleson v. Deputy, 2013-0150 (La. App. 4th Cir. 8/7/13), 122 So.3d 1089, 1093-1094. Louisiana Civil Code art. 2363 provides that a separate obligation of a spouse is one incurred by that spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime. Mr. Aguiluz incurred his student loan debt prior to the marriage, and the separate debt was paid during the community.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we amend the family court judgment to reduce Ms. Crumholt's reimbursement from Mr. Aguiluz's Receipt, Release and Indemnity Agreement with DOTD to $38,904.62, which results in the equalizing payment owed to Ms. Crumholt from Mr. Aguiluz to be reduced to $32,897.54. In all other respects, the judgment of the family court is affirmed. All costs of the appeal are assessed to Mr. Robert Neill Aguiluz.

AMENDED, AND AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the judgment of divorce signed on February 11, 2021, Ms. Crumholt resumed use of her maiden name “Susan Kelly Crumholt.”

2.   The original judgment of partition was signed on March 30, 2022. There were issues raised regarding the finality and appealability of that judgment that are not relevant to the assignments of error raised by Mr. Aguiluz on appeal.

3.   Louisiana Code of Evidence article 612 provides that if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying in court, “the adverse party is entitled to” have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. (Emphasis added.) Article 612 allows the adverse party to introduce the evidence, but does not shift the burden of proof to the adverse party.

4.   La. Civ. Code art. 2338 provides,The community property comprises: property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property acquired with community things or with community and separate things, unless classified as separate property under Article 2341; property donated to the spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits of community property; damages awarded for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the community; and all other property not classified by law as separate property.

HESTER, J.