STATE IN INTEREST OF v. << (2026)

The biological parents of P.G., a minor, appeal the trial court judgment terminating their parental rights and certifying their child for adoption.¹

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

P.G. was born on May 23, 2021. P.G.’s mother is R.J.G. P.G.’s father is W.L.P.

In September 2022, P.G. was taken into the custody of the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Several years later, in March 2025, DCFS filed a petition for involuntary termination of the mother and father's parental rights. Here are the relevant allegations of the petition:

6.

[P.G.], pursuant to a Court Order, was removed from the physical and legal custody of the parents and placed in the care, custody and control of [DCFS] on or about 09/16/2022.

7.

[P.G.] was adjudicated as a Child In Need of Care on 01/27/2023 ․ [.]

8.

At least one year has elapsed since the child was removed from the parents’ custody pursuant to a Court Order, there has been no substantial parental compliance with the case plan for services which has been previously filed by [DCFS] and approved by the Court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parents’ condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child's age and the need for a safe, stable, and permanent home as set out in LA Ch.C Art. 1015 and is a basis for termination of the parental rights.

Trial was held on June 10, 2025. At the close of evidence, the trial court ruled from the bench, terminating the mother and father's parental rights and certifying P.G. for adoption. The trial court provided oral reasons for its ruling at that time. Two weeks later, on June 23, 2025, the trial court signed a written final judgment. Both parents have appealed this judgment.

On appeal, the father asserts the following assignment of error: “The court manifestly erred in terminating the parental rights of [the father] because the agency failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that [he] failed to comply with his case plan.”

Similarly, the mother assigns as error that “[t]he court manifestly erred in terminating the parental rights of [the mother] because the agency failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that she failed to comply with her case plan.²

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The involuntary termination of a parent's parental rights was at issue in State in the Interest of C.F., 17-1054 (La. 12/6/17), 235 So.3d 1066. There, the Louisiana Supreme Court provided the following statement of law:

The termination of parental rights is a two-pronged inquiry. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one ground for termination under La. Ch. Code art. 1015. La. Ch. Code art. 1035(A) (“The petitioner bears the burden of establishing each element of a ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Only after a ground for termination is found, the trial court must determine whether the termination is in the best interest of the child. La. Ch. Code art. 1039; State ex rel. L.B. v. G.B.B., 02-1715 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 918, 922.

Id. at 1072.

“Whether termination of parental rights is warranted is a question of fact, and a district court's factual determinations will not be set aside in the absence of manifest error.” State ex rel. H.A.B., 10-1111, p. 31 (La. 10/19/10), 49 So.3d 345, 368 (citation omitted).

Assignments of Error: Was there Substantial Compliance with the Case Plans?

In the matter before us, the trial court's judgment states in relevant part:

The Court finds that more than one year has elapsed since the child was removed from the parents’ custody and there has been no substantial compliance with the case plan for the safe return of the child. Further, there is no reasonable expectation that the parents will substantially complete their case plan in the near future, considering the child's age, condition, and need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

The grounds for termination of parental rights are set forth in La.Ch.Code art. 1015. That article provides in pertinent part:

(5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent's custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child's age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5).

Under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5), DCFS had the burden of proving three essential elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that at least one year had elapsed since P.G. was removed from the parents’ custody, (2) that the parents had failed to substantially comply with their case plan, and (3) that there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parents’ condition or conduct in the near future. Id.; State in the Interest of A.L.D., 18-1271 (La. 1/30/19), 263 So.3d 860. As stated earlier, the dispute here concerns the second element: substantial compliance with the case plan. For this element, La.Ch.Code art. 1036(C) provides an illustrative list of relevant evidence.

Nonetheless, as explained in State in the Interest of B.H., 24-46, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/24), 388 So.3d 471, 479 (first and second alterations in original):

When the record lacks a case plan that has been properly approved by the trial court, “the termination petition must fail[, because] [t]he ‘fundamentally fair procedure’ required by our supreme court and outlined in the Children's Code has clearly not been followed.” State in Interest of P.A.R., [06-423, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/18/06),] 942 So.2d [57,] 61.

In the same way, the record before us on appeal does not include any case plan created or filed by DCFS. Nor does it include the prior instanter order, disposition judgment, adjudication judgment, or any evidence of the child-in-need-of-care proceeding involving P.G. Instead, the record lodged on appeal consists of the trial court minutes, the petition for termination of parental rights, the father's motion for continuance, the trial transcript and exhibits (photographs) introduced into evidence by the father, the judgment on appeal, the notice of judgment, the motions for appeal, and the notices of appeal. And the record evidence—the evidence adduced at trial—is even more limited, consisting only of the trial transcript and the photographs in evidence.

DCFS tries to remedy this on appeal by arguing that the trial court took judicial notice of the entire child-in-need-of-care record at the close of DCFS's case-in-chief. Here is what the trial transcript shows:

BY MS. FOSSETT[3]:

I have no further witnesses, but I would ask that the Court take judicial notice of the entire CINC record under 1036.1.

BY THE COURT:

Okay. Mr. Martin.[4]

BY MR. MARTIN:

I'm going to call my client, [W.L.P.,] to the stand. [W.L.P.,] go up and be sworn in.

DCFS sums things up this way: “Despite the ambiguous response to the request for judicial notice, the CINC record should have been made a part of the appellate record for this review.”

As to judicial notice, we agree that a trial court can take notice of its own proceedings under La.Code Evid. art. 202. Pinegar v. Harris, 06-2489 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 1246. We also agree that the trial court here could have taken judicial notice of P.G.’s entire child-in-need-of-care record under La.Ch.Code art. 1036.1. But in this instance, the trial court did not take judicial notice of anything. In other words, because judicial notice serves as evidence, a trial court must clearly inform the parties that judicial notice is being taken and of the specific matter being noticed. An ambiguous “okay” response does not provide the clarity necessary for the parties to understand what matter is being judicially noticed and, if necessary, to mount an effective challenge. Hence, judicial notice requires more than an informal acknowledgment.

To sum up, like State in the Interest of B.H., 388 So.3d 471, the record before us does not include a case plan created or filed by DCFS. Like State in the Interest of B.H., the record does not show that the trial court considered and approved a case plan as required by La.Ch.Code art. 677. And like State in the Interest of B.H., the petition for termination of parental rights filed by DCFS must fail based on these deficiencies.⁵

DISPOSITION

The trial court's judgment of June 23, 2025, is reversed to the extent that it terminated R.J.G. and W.L.P.’s parental rights to P.G. and certified P.G. as eligible for adoption. This case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Initials are used throughout this opinion to protect and maintain the privacy of the minor child in accordance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5–2.

2.   The mother asserts several other assignments of error. First, that the trial court manifestly erred in finding that DCFS provided reasonable efforts to achieve reunification. Second, that the trial court manifestly erred in finding that she failed to provide a significant contribution toward P.G.’s care. And third, that the trial court manifestly erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in P.G.’s best interest.

3.   Natasha D. Fossett is the attorney of record for DCFS.

4.   Don W. Martin is the attorney of record for the father, W.L.P.

5.   Considering the above, we need not address the mother's remaining assignments of error. Those assignments are now moot.

FITZGERALD, Judge.