WILLIAMS BATISTE v. GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

This matter arises from an automobile accident that allegedly occurred on May 10, 2017. The trial court maintained exceptions of prescription filed on behalf of the alleged tortfeasor, Jamie Taylor, and her liability insurer, GEICO Choice Insurance Company. Plaintiff/Appellant, Myavas Williams-Batiste, appeals the judgment.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On May 10, 2018, Appellant filed a petition for damages in proper person and in forma pauperis. The caption of the petition listed Jamie Taylor and GEICO Insurance Company. In the first paragraph, Appellant asserted that GEICO Insurance Company was made defendant in the action; Taylor was not so named. Allegations of Taylor's negligence were asserted. The prayer sought judgment for damages against GEICO Insurance Company. Again, Taylor was not mentioned. Instructions directed that GEICO Insurance Company be served through the Secretary of State. A notation in the record, but no actual service return, asserts that service on the Secretary of State was made on June 4, 2018.

In the meantime, Appellant hired an attorney, and the same record notation indicates that Jamie Taylor was personally served on August 15, 2018. Preliminary defaults were entered on November 2, 2018. A hearing to confirm a default judgment was scheduled for November 2, 2021, but was continued to December 15, 2021.

At the December 15 hearing, plaintiff's counsel appeared to confirm the default. The investigating officer testified that Taylor ran a stop sign and hit Appellant. Taylor also testified to the same effect. When asked by the trial court whether she was served with the petition for damages, Taylor replied, “Yeah, I was served with that paper, saying that she was suing the insurance.”

A discussion ensued off the record. When the record resumed, the trial court continued the matter to January 24, 2022, for counsel to allow Appellant “to contact GEICO and tell them to do their due diligence.”

The January 24 hearing was refixed to August 2, 2022 by the trial court due to family emergencies of Appellant's attorney.

On August 1, 2022, GEICO Choice Insurance Company filed an exception of prescription in which it asserted that GEICO Insurance Company does not exist. Service on a non-entity does not interrupt prescription, according to GEICO Choice's exception. Because the correct entity was not named, nor was its insured, Appellant's claim against GEICO Choice is prescribed. Taylor filed an exception of prescription on August 2, 2022, in which she asserted that she was not named a defendant in the case and that service on GEICO Insurance Company, which does not exist, did not interrupt prescription against her.

The trial court found that GEICO Choice Insurance Company was not a party and that Taylor was not properly named as a defendant because the body of the suit did not name her as a defendant, the prayer did not contain a demand for judgment against her, and the service instructions did not request that she be served:

So if [Taylor] never told GEICO, it's probably because of the way she read the petition. This is—and it's the way I read the petition, that Ms. Taylor found out that her insurance company was being sued for an accident that she was involved in, and the petitioners were seeking damage against her insurance company. I mean, that's how she could have viewed it. And I guess a thought could have come to her mind and says: Oh, well, I guess my insurance company's going to have to deal with that. Because she's not named as a defendant in the pleadings and nor—in the body of the pleadings, nor in the prayer. And the prayer says the plaintiffs are seeking relief against the defendant, GEICO Insurance Company.

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And [the petition] doesn't say plaintiffs are seeking relief against Ms. Taylor. So I can see why she didn't contact anyone, because she wasn't put on notice that she had a duty to do anything to protect her interest.

Later on, [Taylor] was served with it, okay, after prescription had prescribed. But she was, I guess—and I don't know if “served” is a good word. I know she was noticed with it by way of a subpoena duces tecum to come to court and testify.

Nonetheless, I don't see how she is the true defendant in this case. And she's still not the true defendant in this case. And the mover in this case is certainly not a defendant in it either, because they haven't been brought into this case.

So the claim is prescribed, and it is hereby dismissed at plaintiff's cost.

Therefore, both exceptions were maintained.

Appellant filed a motion for new trial in which she maintained that her suit had properly named Taylor as a defendant and that she had sought service on Taylor within ninety days. Alternatively, she requested leave of court to amend her petition. Her motion for new trial and for leave of court to amend were denied.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

Ordinarily, the exceptor bears the burden of establishing that a matter is barred by liberative prescription; however, when the matter is prescribed on its face, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove suspension or interruption. Pence v. Austin, 15-1371 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/26/16), 191 So.3d 608. When prescription is raised by peremptory exception, with evidence being introduced at the hearing on the exception, the trial court's findings of fact on the issue of prescription are subject to the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. Carter v. Haygood, 04-646 (La. 1/19/05), 892 So.2d 1261.

A trial court's denial of a motion for new trial will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that the denial was an abuse of discretion. Hargrave v. Delaughter, 08-1168 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/4/09), 10 So.3d 245.

Exception of Prescription

The key issue in this matter–indeed, the only issue–is whether the petition filed on the eve of prescription named Taylor as a defendant. If Taylor was named as a defendant in the timely-filed case, prescription was, obviously, interrupted, at least as to her. As La.Civ.Code art. 3462 provides:

Unless otherwise expressly provided by legislation, prescription is interrupted when the owner commences action against the possessor, or when the obligee commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. If action is commenced in an incompetent court, or in an improper venue, prescription is interrupted only as to a defendant served by process within the prescriptive period. If an action is commenced in a competent court of improper venue, prescription is suspended for a period of seven days as to a defendant not served by process within the prescriptive period.

Service of process would only become relevant had the suit been filed in an improper venue, and venue is not contested in this matter. However, as the trial court pointed out, the service instructions do provide an indicator of whether Taylor was named as a party to the case.

In Louisiana, pleadings in civil matters consist of petitions, exceptions, written motions, and answers. La.Code Civ.P. art. 852. “Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title and number of the action, and a designation of the pleading. The title of the action shall state the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 853. In terms of formality of pleadings, La.Code Civ.P. art. 854 provides, “No technical forms of pleading are required. All allegations of fact of the petition, exceptions, or answer shall be simple, concise, and direct, and shall be set forth in numbered paragraphs. As far as practicable, the contents of each paragraph shall be limited to a single set of circumstances.” Even the prayer of a pleading is of limited import: “Except as provided in Article 1703 [default judgments], a final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 862. A petition is required to

set forth the name, surname, and domicile of the parties; shall contain a short, clear, and concise statement of all causes of action arising out of, and of the material facts of, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation; shall designate a physical address, not a post office box, and an email address for receipt of service of all items involving the litigation; and shall conclude with a prayer for judgment for the relief sought. Relief may be prayed for in the alternative.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 891.

In the title of her petition, Appellant named Taylor. Taylor's domiciliary information was not included. In paragraph 1, Appellant alleged that she was making a demand on GEICO Insurance Company, not Taylor. Other paragraphs allege acts of negligence Taylor committed. The petition concludes with a prayer for damages against GEICO Insurance Company, not Taylor. Plaintiff only requested service on GEICO Insurance Company when her petition was filed.

Appellant maintains that all she was required to do to properly name Taylor as a defendant was comply with La.Code Civ.P. art. 853 and place Taylor's name in the title. Taylor and GEICO Choice maintain that more is required; the failure to name Taylor along with GEICO Insurance Company and the failure to pray for judgment against Taylor did not sufficiently assert a demand against Taylor.

In Lee v. Clinical Research. Ctr. of Fla., L.C., 04-428 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/17/04), 889 So.2d 317, n. 2, writ denied, 04-3002 (La. 2/18/05), 896 So.2d 33, a breach-of-contract matter, the plaintiff listed “Stephen I. Klein” as a defendant in the suit caption, but the court noted that “he is not made a defendant in the petition.” The court assumed this resulted from a typographical error. While inconsequential to the outcome of the case, this indicates that more is required to make a person a defendant than placing that person's name in the title. Indeed, Mr. Klein's name appears twice in the fourth circuit's opinion: in the title and in footnote 2.

In Robertson v. Ieyoub, 34,775, p. 1 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/16/01), 799 So.2d 863, 864, plaintiffs filed suit against “ ‘the State of Louisiana through the Attorney General Richard P. Ieyoub’ and Caddo Parish.” This suit sought a declaration that La.Code Crim.P. art. 413(B) was unconstitutional, as were jury foreperson selection practices in Caddo Parish. The Attorney General filed an exception of no cause of action that was maintained by the trial court. The plaintiffs were given fifteen days to amend. Two amendments were filed, both of which kept the State as a defendant. The Attorney General subsequently filed a motion to have the plaintiffs’ demands against him dismissed and another to amend the caption of the suit. The plaintiffs filed a brief supporting the Attorney General's motions.

The trial court entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ demands against the Attorney General and changing the caption to “Wilbert Robertson, et al versus Caddo Parish, Louisiana.” Id. at 865. Plaintiffs then appealed, asserting, among other assignments of error, that the trial court erred in dismissing the State as a defendant. The second circuit held that amending the caption did not result in dismissing the State.

In Hemps Creek Users v. Pollutors [sic] of Hemps Creek, 330 So.2d 361 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1976), the trial court dismissed a putative class action for, among other reasons, that the citation was defective because the citation must contain the title of the action, and the title of the matter was improper. This court held that the defect in the matter's title did not render the service and citation insufficient.

In federal courts, the title of the complaint must name all parties. Fed.Rules Civ.P., Rule 10(a). Even so, “A person or entity can be named in the caption of a complaint without necessarily becoming a party to the action.” U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, New York, 556 U.S. 928, 935, 129 S.Ct. 2230, 2235, 173 L.Ed.2d 1255 (2009).

Courts are required to look beyond the caption to determine the nature of the action. Primvest, Inc. v. Dugas, 460 So.2d 718 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1984). When a petition does not name someone as a defendant, though she be included in the caption; does not include required domiciliary information for her; alleges fault against her but asserts that another is liable for her actions; and does not pray for judgment against her, we conclude that person has not been named as a defendant in the action. The Louisiana Civil Code provides that prescription is interrupted when the action commences. Because Taylor was not named as a defendant, no action commenced against her to interrupt prescription The trial court correctly sustained the exception as to her.

The Amended Petition

The fact that Taylor was not made a defendant does not end our analysis. “GEICO Insurance Company” was named a defendant. After the trial court maintained the exception, Appellant sought to amend her petition to name both Taylor and GEICO Choice. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 934 provides:

When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.

A trial court is afforded discretion to allow an amendment, and amendment is not required when “amendment would be a vain and useless act.” Broussard v. F.A. Richard & Assoc., Inc., 99-10, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/99), 740 So.2d 156, 160. Fortunately, the Louisiana Supreme Court has provided a four-part test for determining whether an amendment would constitute a vain and useless act.

In Ray v. Alexandria Mall, through St. Paul Prop. & Liab. Ins., 434 So.2d 1083 (La.1983), the court was faced with the issue of whether an amended petition related back, pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1153.¹ The plaintiff had allegedly been injured at the Alexandria mall on February 18, 1981, when she slipped and fell. She filed suit on February 4, 1982, and named “Alexandria Mall,” which she alleged to be a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Louisiana. The mall's manager was served with the petition. Plaintiff also named St. Paul Property and Liability Insurance, the mall's alleged liability insurer. The “Alexandria Mall” was, in fact, not a legal entity at all; rather, the mall was owned by a partnership, the Alexandria Mall Company.

The defendants filed an exception of insufficiency of service. Before the hearing on that exception was held, plaintiff amended the petition to name the Alexandria Mall Company and requested service on the partnership's agent for service. In April 1982, the trial court maintained the exception.

Thereafter, in May 1982, plaintiff filed a second amended petition in which she named the partnership as a defendant. The defendants then filed an exception of prescription. The trial court maintained the exception of prescription. This court affirmed. Ray v. Alexandria Mall, through St. Paul Prop. & Liab. Ins., 424 So.2d 1245 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1983), writ granted, 429 So.2d 140 (La.1983), rev'd, 434 So.2d 1083 (La.1983).

The supreme court granted writs and established a four-part test to determine whether an amended pleading relates back to the filing of the original petition when the identity of parties is changed:

(1) The amended claim must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading;

(2) The purported substitute defendant must have received notice of the institution of the action such that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits;

(3) The purported substitute defendant must know or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party defendant, the action would have been brought against him;

(4) The purported substitute defendant must not be a wholly new or unrelated defendant, since this would be tantamount to assertion of a new cause of action which would have otherwise prescribed.

Ray, 434 So.2d at 1087.

The supreme court found that no defendant would be prejudiced by maintaining the suit. St. Paul had been paying the plaintiff's medical expenses for more than a year. The mall manager had been sued “well before prescription on the action had run.” Id. Therefore, “the purported substitute defendant named in the amended petitions clearly knew or should have known that but for the plaintiff's mistake ․ the action would have been brought against it in proper style.” Id. (emphasis in original) There is only one Alexandria Mall in Alexandria, so no wholly new or unrelated defendant was added. The court was also swayed by the mall's admission that its attorney delayed filing the declinatory exception until after prescription had tolled so as to not tip the plaintiff off to the fact that she had named a defendant that did not exist.

Applying the Ray test to the present matter, we note that there is but one transaction or occurrence from which this action arises, a motor vehicle accident that allegedly occurred on May 10, 2017. However, we find that the record does not support positive findings regarding the remaining three legs of the Ray test. No party or non-party was served within the prescriptive period. Appellant correctly points out that Taylor testified that she notified GEICO Choice of the suit, but that was only after she had been served. There has been no showing that GEICO Choice knew or should have known that, but for the mistake, it would have been properly named a defendant. Similarly, there is no showing in the record that GEICO Choice received notice of the institution of the action such that it would not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits. While the mall in Ray had “extensive knowledge” of the claim, Appellant has not demonstrated that GEICO Choice had any knowledge at all of her claim. Id.

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant leave of court to amend her petition.

Acknowledgement or Renunciation

Plaintiff also argues that Taylor acknowledged her fault at the December 2021 hearing on confirmation of default; therefore, prescription has not tolled against her. Louisiana Civil Code Article 3464 provides, “Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he has commenced to prescribe.” “[A]cknowledgment acts to interrupt the prescriptive period before it has expired, with the prescriptive period beginning to run anew from the time of the acknowledgment.” Bank of New York Mellon v. Oldemeyer, 19-348, p. 17 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/19), 282 So.3d 1098, 1110, writ denied, 20-34 (La. 2/26/20), 347 So.3d 869 (emphasis in original).

Because Taylor was not named in the original petition, the prescriptive period had expired when she testified. We then need not determine whether her testimony constituted an acknowledgement.

Prescription can be renounced. La.Civ.Code art. 3449. Renunciation can either be express or tacit, which “results from circumstances that give rise to a presumption that the advantages of prescription have been abandoned.” La.Civ.Code art. 3450. Our jurisprudence has solidly established that to find renunciation “a mere acknowledgment is not sufficient for the purpose, even if accompanied by payment on account of the debt. There must be a new promise made to pay the debt in order to nullify an accrued prescription.” Burdin v. Burdin, 171 La. 7, 20, 129 So. 651, 655 (1930). Renunciation must be “clear, direct, and absolute[.]” Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624, 631 (La.1992). “[T]he debtor may even acknowledge the debt and pay part of it without renouncing such acquired prescription.” Bordelon's Inc. v. Littell, 490 So.2d 779, 781 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1986). We find no such circumstances in the present matter.

New Trial

Appellant assigns as error the trial court's denial of her motion for new trial. The grounds for granting a motion for new trial are set forth in La.Code Civ.P. arts. 1971–1978. The peremptory grounds for a new trial are “[w]hen the verdict or judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and the evidence,” when new, important evidence has been discovered since the trial, and when the jury has been bribed or “behaved improperly so that impartial justice has not been done.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1972. None of these factors are present in this matter. Therefore, only discretionary grounds are available to Appellant. The only ground Appellant asserts for entitlement to a new trial is that she should have been granted an opportunity to amend her petition. Because we have already determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant leave of court to amend, we reject Appellant's assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for new trial.

SUMMARY

Appellant did not name Jamie Taylor as a defendant because she only named her in the title of the petition without including her as a named defendant or alleging required domiciliary information or praying for judgment against Taylor. Therefore, Appellant actually sued no party, because GEICO Insurance Company does not exist. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Appellant to amend her petition or in denying her motion for new trial because the grounds for the exception of prescription could not be cured by amendment.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of these proceedings are taxed to Appellant, Myavas Williams-Batiste.

AFFIRMED.

I respectfully dissent.

Batiste filed her petition pro se. “In the interest of justice this court will read pro se filings indulgently and attempt to discern the thrust of the appellant's position on appeal and the relief she seeks.” Magee v. Williams, 50,726, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So.3d 265, 268. And, “[t]his court is further influenced by its ability to afford some level of leeway to pro se litigants ․ [D]oubt should be resolved in favor of maintaining this appeal.” Modicue v. Prince of Peace Auto Sale, LLC, 54,095, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21), 328 So.3d 1239, 1246, writ denied, 21-1864 (La. 2/15/22), 332 So.3d 1188. Adding to this thought, Budget Plan of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Talbert, 276 So.2d 297, 302 (La.1973) says:

Every pleading shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. (Ibid. art. 865).

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The articles of this Code are to be construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in themselves. (Ibid. art. 5051).

Technical objections and harsh rules of pleading are not favored in our courts. Pleadings should be liberally construed, relaxing the technical rules in order to arrive at the truth, afford a litigant his day in court, and avoid a miscarriage of justice. Succession of Smith, 247 La. 921, 175 So.2d 269 (1965); Breaux v. Laird, 230 La. 221, 88 So.2d 33 (1956); West v. Ray, 210 La. 25, 26, 26 So.2d 221 (1946).

Only the caption specified Taylor as a defendant, but the petition detailed Taylor's negligence that bound Geico. Taylor was timely served with the petition (although there was some issue with this, in the end the trial court's ruling relied on Taylor not being properly named as a defendant).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 865 allows us to keep this action alive. The obvious intent was to bind Geico for the negligence of Taylor. The courts routinely ignore a wrongly-worded caption to seek justice with what has been alleged. Here, we have a twist. We have a caption that identifies Taylor as a defendant, and we have the customary fault allegations against her. But we lack the sentence saying she is a defendant. Yet, she was served.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 865 has saved inartful pleadings in other cases. It this case it allows us to fulfill our obligation to “arrive at the truth, afford a litigant his day in court, and avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Budget Plan, 276 So.2d at 302.

It is also noteworthy that Geico was a misnamed, not fictitious, defendant insurance company. A fictious company would have been named “XYZ Inc.” or something similar to indicate that the identity was not then known. Here, the correct Geico entity was not named.

Instead of dismissing the suit, I believe the trial court should have allowed Batiste to conduct discovery on the issue of notice of the original complaint to Geico Choice. If Geico Choice knew of the original suit against Geico Insurance Co., the amended complaint would relate back to the original filing under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1153. It would satisfy the factors of Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So.2d 1083 (La.1983), cited by the majority. Arguably, the amended complaint would relate back because service on “Geico Insurance Co.” was through the Louisiana Secretary of State, the same agent who accepted service of the amended complaint against Geico Choice. Undoubtedly, since the same agent received the original and amended complaints, we may reasonably conclude that Geico Choice received notice of the original filing, thus allowing us to maintain Batiste's claim.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1153 provides, “When the action or defense asserted in the amended petition or answer arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of filing the original pleading.”

GREMILLION, Judge.

Davis, J., dissents and assigns reasons.