STATE v. WOODS (2026)

Defendant, Troinathan Troyal Woods, appeals his conviction for manslaughter, asserting that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict. For the reasons herein, we affirm the conviction and sentence imposed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was indicted for the July 23, 2021 second degree murder of the victim, Kennedy James Mouton, Sr. At the conclusion of his jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of manslaughter.

The basic facts established at trial show that on July 23, 2021, the victim, a Lafayette resident, suffered multiple knife wounds, including a fatal stab to the heart, outside of his home. A neighbor saw a man with a knife, who was wearing a multicolored jacket, flee the scene. She testified that the man she saw was the same person who lived with the victim and his girlfriend. The subsequent police investigation, which included contact with the victim's girlfriend, Helen Woods, who was also Defendant's aunt, identified Defendant as the couple's housemate. He turned himself in to authorities a few days after the stabbing.¹

Following the guilty verdict, the trial court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years at hard labor. Defendant now appeals, arguing that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support the verdict of manslaughter.

OPINION

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues that the evidence adduced at trial did not support his conviction for manslaughter.

The analysis for a claim of insufficiency of evidence is well-settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Second degree murder, the charged offense, is defined, in part, as “the killing of a human being” with the “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La.R.S. 14.30.1(A)(1). Manslaughter, the verdict rendered by the jury, is defined, in part, as “[a] homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection.” La.R.S. 14:31(A)(1). “The elements of ‘sudden passion’ and ‘heat of blood’ are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense, and when such factors are established by a preponderance of the evidence, a verdict for murder is inappropriate.” State v. Deal, 00-434, p. 5 (La. 11/28/01), 802 So.2d 1254, 1260, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 828, 123 S.Ct. 124, 154 L.Ed.2d 42 (2002).

Although the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter rather than second degree murder, a “compromise verdict” for the lesser included offense of manslaughter, albeit not supported by the evidence, is a legitimate verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict for the greater charged offense, which here is second degree murder. State v. Schrader, 518 So.2d 1024 (La.1988); State v. Charles, 00-1611 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/9/01), 787 So.2d 516, writ denied, 01-1554 (La. 4/19/02), 813 So.2d 420.

In the present case, there was little to no evidence that this homicide was committed in heat of passion or by provocation sufficient to establish manslaughter.² Thus, in applying the Jackson standard, we look to whether the elements of second degree murder have been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.³ Defendant focuses solely on the issue of identification as he alleges that the State failed to prove he was the person who killed the victim.

[W]hen the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Weary, 03-3067 (La. 4/24/06), 931 So.2d 297; State v. Neal, 00-0674 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Weary, 03-3067 at p. 18, 931 So.2d at 311; Neal, 00-0674 at p. 11, 796 So.2d at 658; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988). It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Bright, 98-0398, p. 22 (La. 4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1147.

State v. Hughes, 05-992, pp. 5-6 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051.

In performing our sufficiency evaluation, we find the evidence presented at trial to be relatively straightforward.

At the time of the crime on July 23, 2021, Corey Christian lived next door to the victim on Weston Street in Lafayette, Louisiana. She testified that she did not know the three people who lived next door personally, she only knew them as her neighbors. On the night of the murder, she stated that she heard two yells, or “hollers.” The first yell was faint but the second one made her think that “something's wrong.” She went outside at that point to look, and in the following exchange with the prosecutor, she described what she saw:

A. I went outside and I looked and I went to the fence. And when I got to the fence there was a dude running from the fence with a knife in his hand.

Q. Okay. What did you notice about the person you saw running with the knife in his hand?

A. He had a red and white jacket on and he was running. He saw me, he looked right at me.

Q. Uh-huh. Did you recognize him at all?

A. I mean it definitely was the dude who stays on the porch.

Q. Okay. But you didn't know his name?

A. No.

Q. You said the dude that stays on the porch, you're talking about the neighbor?

A. The nephew.

Q. Okay. The neighbor's house?

A. Yeah.

Q. You had seen him there prior to this?

A. Yes.

Q. You'd seen him with the other two people that lived there also?

A. Yes.

Ms. Christian testified that when she located the victim on the side of the house, “[h]e was drowning in his own blood.” She stated that the man she saw holding a knife was running from the direction where she found the victim, and as he ran, he looked back at her a second time. She said that he was wearing a red, white, and black jacket, which he took off as he ran. Ms. Christian could not recall whether she called 911 before or after she spoke to Ms. Woods. She explained that while she told the 911 dispatcher that she did not know who the perpetrator was, she meant that she did not know his name. However, she testified that she recognized him as being Defendant, who lived next door with the victim and Ms. Woods.⁴

Ms. Christian was extensively cross-examined about her ability to identity Defendant as the person she saw running from the scene with a knife. Although she denied using drugs on the night in question, she admitted to using drugs, particularly in the three years following the incident as a means of dealing with trauma from the event. She further denied drinking alcohol that night as she does not drink. When questioned as to how she could identify Defendant from approximately fifty feet away at night, she said, “I don't mistake a man with a knife in his hand, sir[,]” and “I noticed that it was the skinny neighbor.” She also told the investigating officers that the man running away had a “small fro” hairstyle. She testified that while she had only interacted with Defendant once in the month or so prior to the murder, she had seen him sitting on the victim's porch on numerous occasions.

Ms. Woods testified that she and the victim, who were a couple, had lived at the residence where the murder occurred for about eight years. Defendant, who was her nephew, had been living with them for about seven months. She stated that on the day of the murder, she had spoken to Defendant about contributing money towards his living expenses while staying with them. She testified that just prior to the murder, she was taking a shower, Defendant was watching television in the house, and the victim was sitting on the front porch. She stated that Defendant was wearing a “white jack [sic] with red and yellow.” She testified as to what occurred next:

About maybe ten [sic] within taking a shower I heard somebody knock but I couldn't tell if it was somebody in trouble or not, so -- because I had the water on. And Troinathan was seated in the back part with the television and it was kind of loud, so whenever the person knocked, which I didn't know who it was, knocked on the bathroom window, I told Troinathan, I said, I call him [Pookie],[5] “[Pookie], lower the blank [sic] TV, somebody's knocking.” And as soon as I said that, I heard -- I heard Kennedy. That's when I knew it was him, when he said “Oh no, not again. Helen, please help me.”

Ms. Woods testified that she got out of the shower and tried to exit the house through two doors before finally exiting out of a side door. There, she saw Ms. Christian standing next to the gate, who asked if she had heard an argument:

A. When I -- when she asked me if I had heard the -- the argument and I told her no, that I didn't, that I just heard someone knock at the door and I asked her who was arguing and she said two guys.

Q. And so you go to the side of the house?

A. First I ran to the front part of the house, because I wanted to know which direction he had went, and then I went to the side of the house.

Q. And then is that where you found Kennedy?

A. Yes. Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am.

Q. And what did you do when you found him?

A. Ma'am?

Q. What did you do when you found him? Did you try to help him?

A. At first I couldn't understand what was going on -- what was -- what was going on because when -- when I -- when I kneeled down by him, we were face to face, and it kind of -- his eyes was open and I tried to talk to him because I didn't see no blood. And I picked up his clothes and I seen he was stabbed.

She testified that although she had not seen Defendant while she was running through the house, she knew “when the lady said the two people were arguing, it was just Kennedy and my nephew, Troinathan.” When the police arrived, she gave them Defendant's name, because he was the only other person at the house beside her and the victim. She later called Defendant's mother to tell her that “Troinathan had did [sic] it.” She said that Defendant never returned to the house after the murder, and his personal belongings and clothes were picked up by someone several days later. When asked if Defendant told her that he was going out prior to the murder, she replied, “No,” and stated that, usually, “[h]e was always home.”

Counsel for Defendant cross-examined Ms. Woods and tried to discredit her testimony by alluding to her having memory issues:

Q. So it's possible that you are a little fuzzy about - -

A. No, I'm not fuzzy. I know what I saw and what the lady said two guys were arguing. And I asked who and she said the ones that live here. That's the only two.

Q. That lady was the white lady next door?

A. Yeah.

Q. The one that was on the phone with the police?

A. Right.

Q. Would it surprise you that she didn't mention that in any testimony including testimony today?

A. I don't why she wouldn't.

Q. You called Troinathan's mom without even knowing if he did this, right?

A. I -- yeah, I guess. I mean that's the only two guys that was there. And he's gone.

Q. So there's – you're just kind of guessing, right?

A. No, I'm not guessing.

Ms. Woods testified that she tried to contact Defendant after the murder but was unsuccessful in reaching him.

Michael Milzano, a sergeant with the Lafayette Police Department (LPD), testified that he responded to the murder on July 23, 2021. When he arrived at the scene, he found Ms. Woods leaning over the victim, who appeared to have no signs of life. After retrieving latex gloves, he examined the victim and found that he was suffering from multiple stab wounds. He recounted the information he received from Ms. Woods:

She was in the shower, her old man, as she described him, which was the victim, was outside on the porch, and her nephew I believe was inside the residence. While she was in the shower she heard a commotion or some type of disturbance, and then when she got out nobody was there. So when she started walking around the house is when she observed the victim laying between the houses, and she did not see her nephew anymore.

Sergeant Milzano testified that he found no one else present when he conducted a search of the house.

Thomas Marceaux, a sergeant with the LPD, stated that other officers were already present and the victim was deceased when he arrived at the scene. He testified regarding his conversation with Ms. Christian:

Ms. Christian advised that she saw this male individual walking with a knife in his hand, so of course I'm looking for a knife. And she also described the subject as appearing to be taking his jacket off of him as he was fleeing the scene, so I'm also looking for a jacket at that time.

Sergeant Marceaux confirmed Ms. Christian's report that the man running from the scene had a “ ‘Fro haircut, hairstyle[,]” and Ms. Wood's report that Defendant was the only other person at the house at the time of the murder. He testified that he found no physical evidence at the scene. In response to questions regarding Ms. Christian's condition, Sergeant Marceaux stated that she was “frantic, distraught” but did not appear to be under the influence of any intoxicant. He also said that she “seemed lucid and cognizant.” After being cross-examined as to discrepancies in the information he received at the scene regarding the identification of the perpetrator, Sergeant Marceaux responded during redirect, as follows:

Q. Whenever you were speaking with Ms. Christian, did she indicate that she knew generally who the suspect was? Do you have your report with you?

A. She could not -- she could not name him. However, she indicated that the person that she saw exiting from the side of the house[,] where the victim was seen deceased[,] with a knife in his hand fleeing the scene was the same person that she regularly sees at the front of that home.

James Gayle, a detective with the LPD, also testified relevant to the issue of the perpetrator's identification. He stated that when he interviewed Ms. Christian about four days after the offense, she had learned from Ms. Woods that Defendant's nickname was “Pookie.” Before that, Ms. Christian knew him only as one of the three people who lived next door. Detective Gayle testified that he did not show Ms. Christian a line-up because he was uncertain whether she had previously seen another picture of Defendant. He noted that Defendant, whom he saw after he turned himself in, matched the description of the suspect that he received during the investigation.

Dr. Christopher Tape, the Chief Forensic Pathologist and Coroner for St. Tammany Parish, testified that he performed an autopsy on the victim and determined that the cause of death was “stab wounds to body and extremity[,]” particularly “sharp force injury, stab wound to heart, stab wounds to body and extremity.” He determined the manner of death to be a homicide.

Defendant, who testified on his own behalf, claimed that he walked to the Rooftop Bar and Lounge (the Rooftop Bar) on the night of the murder. He stated that he met a female while there, with whom he spent the night. He presented the same general scenario on cross-examination although he did not know the female's name or phone number and could not identify where she lived, other than to say it was “[o]n the northside.” According to Defendant, the female dropped him off at the downtown library, where he was picked up by his cousin.

Defendant stated that he did not want to return to his aunt's home after his cousin informed him that he was accused of killing the victim. Instead, his cousin took him to a hotel in Opelousas, where he stayed for two days. Defendant acknowledged that he was inside the house and the victim was outside when Ms. Woods started her shower. However, he stated that he left the house while she was showering, and he did not see either the victim or Ms. Christian as he was leaving.

On rebuttal, Detective Gayle testified that on the night of the murder, he was working security at a parking garage located across the street from the building that houses the Rooftop Bar. He stated that he was called to the crime scene while working that job. It was his belief that the Rooftop Bar was not open on the night of the murder. He further stated that he saw no people entering or leaving the building that night.

Forrest Chaisson, the fire prevention chief for the Lafayette Fire Department, testified that a certificate of occupancy for the building housing the bar was not issued until October 1, 2021, months after the offense. Thus, the Rooftop Bar was not operating as a business in the building before that day. On cross-examination, Chief Chaisson stated that he could not be certain if a bar was operating in the building in the summer of 2021.

Nidal Balbeisi, the owner of the building that houses the Rooftop Bar, testified that no business was operating in the building on the date of the murder, July 23, 2021.

Applying the Jackson standard, our review leads to the conclusion that the evidence was more than sufficient to establish each element of the offense of second degree murder, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was the perpetrator of the offense.⁶ The jury heard and observed Ms. Christian's testimony describing and identifying Defendant as the person she saw running from the scene with a knife in his hand. Despite extensive cross-examination by defense counsel in an attempt to discredit her identification, Ms. Christian was adamant that the person she saw was the nephew that lived next door, who was ultimately identified as Defendant, or Pookie.

The jury also saw and heard Ms. Woods, who described the events immediately preceding the murder, starting about ten minutes after she entered the shower, until its aftermath, when the victim was found lying next to the house, drowning in his own blood from multiple stab wounds. It heard her testify that Defendant was, in fact, present at the house just before she heard the victim beg for his life at the bathroom window, but almost immediately afterwards, he was gone and never returned.⁷ She knew he was the perpetrator because he was the only other person there, and she was so certain of that fact that she told Defendant's mother and other relatives that he had committed the murder.

Credibility determinations and decisions regarding the acceptance or rejection of a witness's testimony are matters best left to the jury's discretion, as it is in the best position to make those determinations on seeing the witness's demeanor and hearing their testimony. “[T]he question of credibility is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact[,]” and “[t]he jury's factual determinations are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless contrary to the evidence.” State v. Voorhies, 590 So.2d 776, 780 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991).

The jury heard Defendant's convenient alibi but rejected it. It did so reasonably as the alibi was entirely discredited by the State's rebuttal witnesses, who testified that the bar Defendant claimed he was at when the murder took place was not operating, much less open, at the time. Further, even assuming, as Defendant argues, that all of the evidence establishing that he committed the murder is circumstantial, in that there are no eyewitnesses to the killing, the State's evidence was found by this jury to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis of innocence. “When circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence, ‘assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, [the circumstantial evidence] must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” State v. Toby, 23-722, p. 4 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 831, 834 (alteration in original) (quoting La.R.S. 15:438). We find Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be the only rational conclusion based on the evidence presented. Defendant was the only other person at the house immediately prior to the murder, only two people were heard arguing just prior to the murder, Ms. Christian told Ms. Woods it was the victim and Defendant arguing, she saw Defendant running away from the scene with a knife in hand immediately after the murder, and Defendant fled and did not return.

As we have concluded, on reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the charged offense of second degree murder, we affirm Defendant's conviction for the underlying responsive charge of manslaughter, as per the jury's verdict.

ERROR PATENT REVIEW

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that there is one error patent pertaining to the verdict form.

The verdict form contained in the record is not signed by the jury foreperson. Additionally, the foreperson circled “2),” which was the number indicating the second listed responsive verdict of “Guilty of Manslaughter[.]” However, despite the verdict form's instruction that the verdict be written on the back of the form, the foreperson failed to do so. Thus, although both the trial transcript and the court minutes indicate that the verdict was signed by the foreperson, the back of the verdict form contained in the record is blank.⁸

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 810 provides:

When a verdict has been agreed upon, the foreman shall write the verdict on the back of the list of responsive verdicts given to the jury and shall sign it. There shall be no formal requirement as to the language of the verdict except that it shall clearly convey the intention of the jury.

The foreman of the jury shall deliver the verdict to the judge in open court.

In State v. Mitchell, 258 La. 427, 246 So.2d 814, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1000, 92 S.Ct. 561, 30 L.Ed.2d 553 (1971), our supreme court considered a defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motions concerning the fatally defective verdicts non-compliance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 810. The defendant argued that the verdicts were invalid because they were “improperly dated and not signed before the polling, and further that [they were] improperly dated and not signed after the polling.” Id. at 836. The supreme court found no reversible error in the irregularities in the verdict form:

The non-compliance herein with the provisions of LSA-C.Cr.P., Art. 810, is also of no consequence. The jurors were polled in the presence of defendant and his counsel, who were aware of the verdicts in no uncertain terms. The polling of the jury cured the clerical non-compliance with the provisions of LSA-C.Cr.P., Art. 810, as to the three verdicts (with which we are herein concerned) not signed by the foreman of the jury. It is well to remember that the jurors were laymen; they were not furnished with a copy of the judge's charge to the jury in this case and therefore had to rely upon their memories as to their instructions. The cases having been consolidated and tried together, it was a reasonable oversight by the foreman not to have signed the three verdicts. Under the facts and circumstances surrounding this matter, the failure of the foreman to sign three of the verdicts rendered herein does not constitute reversible error. Prejudice has not been shown.

Id. at 837.

In State v. Green, 10-791, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/28/11), 84 So.3d 573, 578, writ denied, 11-2316 (La. 3/9/12), 84 So.3d 551, two defendants, who were tried together, argued that “the verdicts were defective in that neither was signed by the jury foremen, either on the back or the front.” They further argued “that the verdicts were not in the proper form because both stated only ‘Guilty,’ without reference as to what offense.” Id. at 578–79. Citing La.Code Crim.P. art. 921, the fourth circuit held that these were harmless errors as the verdicts were not ambiguous and did not affect the defendants’ substantial rights.⁹

In State v. Vargas-Alcerreca, 12-1070, pp. 14-16 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/2/13), 126 So.3d 569, 578, writ denied, 13-2588 (La. 4/17/14), 138 So.3d 625, the fourth circuit discussed the lack of a signature on the jury verdict sheet and found that although the form was in error, it was harmless error where “the notations written on the back of each form in this case unquestionably convey the jury's intent.”

In State v. Dotson, 16-89 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/16) (unpublished opinion) (2016 WL 5808737), writ denied, 16-1992 (La. 9/15/17), 225 So.3d 487, this court recognized as an error patent the jury foreman's failure to sign the verdict sheet. As in the present case, although the trial transcript indicated that the verdict sheet was signed, the verdict sheet was not signed. Additionally, it was verified by the clerk's office, via affidavit, that the record did not contain a signed verdict sheet. However, the error was found to be harmless because the verdict of second degree murder was clearly indicated on the verdict sheet, the jury was polled regarding the verdict, and counsel for the parties stipulated that the verdict was valid during a bench conference shortly after the verdict was rendered.

Unlike Dotson and Mitchell, the jury in the present case was not individually polled. After the clerk read the verdict of manslaughter and noted that it was signed by the jury foreperson, the trial court asked the jury if that was their verdict. The foreperson responded, “Yes.” As previously stated, the minutes also indicate that the verdict was signed by the foreperson. Considering that Defendant has not alleged prejudice by raising this issue as an error, we find the lack of the foreperson's signature on the jury's verdict form to be harmless error under the circumstances.

We note, additionally, that the verdict form failed to contain the foreperson's written verdict. Rather than handwrite the verdict, the foreperson simply circled the responsive verdict of “Guilty of Manslaughter[.]” The fifth circuit addressed a similar situation in State v. Kelly, 96-903 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/97), 704 So.2d 800, writ denied, 97-3104 (La. 4/9/98), 717 So.2d 1142. As in the present case, the foreperson circled the verdicts from a printed list of responsive verdicts rather than writing the verdicts on the forms. Unlike the present case, the issue was assigned as an error by the defendant. The fifth circuit addressed the issue as follows:

In State v. Gilmore, 522 So.2d 658 (La.App. 5th Cir.1988), this Court held that “[u]nder LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 810, there is no formal requirement as to the language of the verdict except that it clearly convey the jury's intention.” In Gilmore, the jury's verdict form read “12-0 guilty”; it did not specify whether the jury found the defendant guilty as charged, or guilty of a lesser included offense. The record showed that the trial court had polled the jury and that each juror had stated for the record that he or she had found the defendant guilty of armed robbery on both counts. This Court held that the jury's oral verdict was sufficient to overcome the ambiguities in the written verdict.

In the case at bar, the trial judge conducted an in-court polling of the jurors, asking them to show by a raise of hands how they had voted. The vote on each count was ten for guilty as charged, and two for not guilty. Defense counsel stated that she was satisfied with the polling. The court's minute entry also reflects a verdict of guilty as charged on both counts. Hence, we find that the jury reached a legal verdict of guilty as charged on both counts.

Id. at 807 (alteration in original).

Although the members of the jury in the present case were not individually polled, both the minutes and the transcript indicate that the jury's verdict was manslaughter, and the foreperson verbally confirmed the verdict as manslaughter. The actual verdict as derived from the verdict form is not ambiguous in the least. Furthermore, no one has complained of the foreperson's failure to handwrite the verdict. Accordingly, we find that the jury's intention to convict Defendant of manslaughter was clearly conveyed in this case, and the errors in the jury's verdict sheet are harmless errors.

DECREE

For the reasons herein, Defendant's conviction for manslaughter and the sentence imposed therefore are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A detailed review of the facts is undertaken below.

2.   We do note that there was evidence of possible overkill or that the murder was committed in anger, as the victim was stabbed multiple times, including in the heart, and there was no evidence that he was robbed.

3.   Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

4.   Ms. Christian did not make an in-court identification of Defendant as the perpetrator as counsel for Defendant had removed him from the courtroom during her testimony in an apparent attempt to prevent an identification or provoke a misidentification. When asked on direct examination if she recognized the perpetrator in the courtroom, she stated, “No.”

5.   Although the transcript indicates that Ms. Wood's nickname for Defendant is “Poogie,” we note that the transcript also lists the nickname as “Pookie.” Therefore, we will use “Pookie” as Defendant's nickname.

6.   Defendant makes no argument that the victim was not killed with the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, and we find the evidence more than sufficient to prove these elements for second degree murder. His multiple stab wounds were proof of such intent. State v. Martinez, 09-740 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/23/10), 38 So.3d 926.

7.   “Evidence of flight, concealment, and attempt to avoid apprehension is relevant. It indicates consciousness of guilt and, therefore, is one of the circumstances from which the jury may infer guilt.” State v. Davies, 350 So.2d 586, 588 (La.1977).

8.   Pursuant to a request from this court, a Lafayette Parish Deputy Clerk of Court submitted an affidavit stating that she had reviewed the file and could find no signed copy of the verdict sheet.

9.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 921 provides: “A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused.”

KYZAR, Judge.