STATE v. THOMPSON (2026)

The State of Louisiana charged the defendant, Devontia Kendall Thompson, by amended bill of information with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (count three), in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1; illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities (count four), in violation of La. R.S. 14:94(E); and attempted first degree murder (count five), in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.¹ The defendant pled not guilty. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied.

The State subsequently filed a habitual offender bill of information, and the trial court adjudicated the defendant a third-felony habitual offender on count three and a fourth-felony habitual offender on counts four and five. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve ten years at hard labor on count three,² twenty years at hard labor on count four, and fifty years at hard labor on count five with all sentences to be served concurrently and without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence on each count.³ The defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the attempted first degree murder conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On August 12, 2022, Rebecca Curtis called 911 and reported that a SUV, which was later identified as a tan GMC Yukon, was following her and the driver of the SUV was attempting to run her off the road. While Ms. Curtis was on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, the driver of the SUV shot at her vehicle multiple times. Ms. Curtis indicated to the dispatcher that the SUV belonged to her neighbor. Sergeant Brock Carpenter with the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office (“APSO”) later spotted the SUV near Ms. Curtis's house and conducted a traffic stop. The defendant, the sole occupant of the SUV, was arrested, searched for weapons, and questioned by the police.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove he had the specific intent to kill Curtis to sustain his conviction for attempted first degree murder. He does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his remaining convictions.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Jacquot, 2023-1254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/24), 392 So.3d 663, 667, writ denied, 2024-00979 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 69. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. Jacquot, 392 So.3d at 667.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Id.

First degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of assault by drive-by shooting. La. R.S. 14:30(A)(1). An assault by drive-by shooting is defined as “an assault committed with a firearm when an offender uses a motor vehicle to facilitate the assault.” La. R.S. 14:37.1(A). An attempt to commit an offense is accomplished when “[a]ny person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object․; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.” La. R.S. 14:27(A).

An attempted first degree murder requires that the offender do or omit to do an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object and have the specific intent to kill. While the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm may support a conviction for murder, in order to support a conviction for attempted murder, only specific intent to kill is sufficient. State v. Brown, 2021-0625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/16/22), 2022 WL 472966, *6 (unpublished).

Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the actions of defendant. The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact. Brown, 2022 WL 472966 at *6. Deliberately pointing and firing a deadly weapon at close range indicates specific intent to kill. State v. Griffin, 2014-0730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/22/15), 2015 WL 303519, *10 (unpublished).

At trial, Ms. Curtis, a teacher, testified that on August 12, 2022, around 6:00 a.m., she left her house for work. As she drove down the street, she noticed her neighbor's SUV parked on the corner, but she did not see anyone inside of the SUV.⁴ Ms. Curtis indicated that when she turned onto Brittany Street, the SUV started and the driver of the SUV immediately began following her, at which point she dialed 911. Ms. Curtis testified the driver of the SUV attempted to pull the SUV alongside her car and “run [her] off the road.” Ms. Curtis further testified that after she turned onto another street, the driver of the SUV again attempted to pull alongside her car, so she slammed on her brakes, reversed into a driveway, and drove in the opposite direction. According to Ms. Curtis, the SUV appeared behind her car again, and when she drove on the shoulder of the road, the driver of the SUV started shooting at her.

When the State asked Ms. Curtis what she thought was happening during the shooting, she responded that it looked like the driver was trying to shoot her back tire. Ms. Curtis confirmed that one bullet struck her vehicle on the rear bumper of the driver's side. Ms. Curtis further confirmed she thought that the driver of the SUV was trying to kill her.

On cross-examination, Ms. Curtis stated she was not able to identify the driver of the SUV, but she indicated the SUV belonged to her neighbor. Ms. Curtis testified she thought the driver was trying to shoot her driver's side rear tire, and the following colloquy ensued:

Q. All right. But, then, you also said that it looked like -- you felt that he was [in]tending to kill you?

A. So I was under the impression that if he would have been successful to blow out my back tire, I would not have survived.

Q. Meaning what?

A. Meaning that the moment that my car was no longer able to get away from him, I would not have survived.

Q. You mean that the car would have crashed?

A. So the moment that my back tire would have been blown out, I would not be able to drive away.

Q. Okay. But because of that, you believe that [the defendant], or whoever was the shooter that day, had the intent to kill you, correct?

A. That is correct.

The State introduced Ms. Curtis's 911 call during her testimony. In the call, Ms. Curtis calmly reported that a man was following her and trying to run her off the street. She indicated her location and stated that she was trying to get away from him. A loud bang can be heard in the background, and Ms. Curtis stated, “He is shooting at me.” She began crying as she explained to the dispatcher that she recognized the SUV as the vehicle that was usually parked across the street from her house and indicated that the driver shot two or three shots. Ms. Curtis could not identify the driver.

Sergeant Carpenter testified at trial that Ms. Curtis met him at the Sorrento Fire Department immediately after the shooting. Sergeant Carpenter checked Ms. Curtis's car and noticed a bullet hole in the back bumper of the car. According to Sergeant Carpenter, five shell casings were located at the scene of the shooting.

Sergeant Carpenter further testified that Ms. Curtis indicated the SUV belonged to her neighbor, and while he was canvassing the area near Ms. Curtis's house, he saw a SUV matching the description of the shooter's SUV. Sergeant Carpenter attempted to initiate a traffic stop of the SUV, but the driver continued driving until he reached his house. There, Sergeant Carpenter ordered the driver out of the SUV, placed him in handcuffs, searched the driver for weapons, and located a pistol in the driver's waistband. Sergeant Carpenter noted the sole occupant of the SUV was the defendant, who was then arrested, advised of his Miranda ⁵ rights, and placed in a police vehicle.

Detective Bryant Blank with the APSO testified he was dispatched to assist in a shooting investigation and instructed to respond to Mary Lane where patrol had detained the defendant as a person of interest in the shooting. Patrol advised Detective Blank that three shell casings and a projectile were recovered from the scene of the shooting. Detective Blank confirmed that he applied for a search warrant of the SUV after learning that a firearm was collected from the defendant. During a search of the SUV, officers located several magazines for a firearm matching the caliber of shell casings from the scene of the shooting.

Detective Blank further testified that the defendant requested to speak with him while still on the scene, and the defendant claimed the shooting was a misunderstanding.⁶ According to Detective Blank, the defendant indicated that after consuming Ecstasy a few hours before the shooting, he was feeling paranoid. Thus, when the defendant saw a Nissan Altima, which was the make and model of the vehicle involved in the recent drive-by shooting of his brother and cousin, he reacted by following the Altima. Detective Blank testified that the defendant indicated he wanted to determine who was driving the Altima. According to Detective Blank, the defendant explained that when he saw one of the windows roll down, he believed the driver of the Altima was going to shoot him, so he shot first.

After again being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, the defendant provided an audio-recorded statement to the police at the APSO, which was played at trial. In his interview, the defendant stated he was parked at the end of the road in his uncle's vehicle when he saw a black Altima drive by and stop down the road. The defendant claimed the Altima appeared to be the same Altima that was involved in the drive-by shooting of his family members, so he followed the Altima to identify the driver. At one point, the defendant alleged the driver rolled down the window, so he shot seven to eight times because he was scared. He claimed the shooting was a mistake, and he did not intend to hurt anyone. Detective Blank testified the defendant was emotional during the interview, but he did not think the defendant showed remorse for Ms. Curtis.

On cross-examination, Detective Blank stated he was aware of the drive-by shooting involving the defendant's family members, but he did not know the status of the investigation. Detective Blank indicated a black Altima was the vehicle involved in the shooting of the defendant's family members. Defense counsel asked Detective Blank if he believed the defendant had the specific intent to kill Ms. Curtis, to which he answered in the negative. Detective Blank testified he believed the defendant was “targeting” whoever was driving the vehicle.

On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence showed he shot at Ms. Curtis's rear tire to disable her vehicle, which proved he did not have the specific intent to kill her. He notes that Ms. Curtis testified the shooter seemed to be aiming at her tire and that Detective Blank testified he did not believe the defendant had the intent to kill Ms. Curtis. The defendant also argues his Ecstasy-induced paranoia influenced him to follow Ms. Curtis's vehicle (an Altima) to determine the identity of the driver, and he only shot when he thought the driver was going to shoot him.⁷

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the record supports the jury's attempted first degree murder verdict. The verdict rendered in this case indicates that the jury rejected the defendant's theory that he lacked specific intent to kill because he shot at Ms. Curtis's vehicle. The evidence presented at trial reflects the defendant followed Ms. Curtis down several streets, pulled his vehicle alongside hers, and attempted to run her off the road. When Ms. Curtis attempted to evade him, he continued to actively pursue her. At some point, he fired multiple shots directed at Ms. Curtis's vehicle. Though only one bullet struck the back of her vehicle, there were multiple shell casings at the scene, and the shooting occurred while Ms. Curtis was trying to drive away.

While there was no direct evidence presented to suggest that the defendant had the specific intent to kill Ms. Curtis, there was evidence presented to suggest that the defendant had the specific intent to kill the driver of the vehicle, who he thought was involved in the drive-by shooting of his family members. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer from the circumstances that the defendant intended to kill Ms. Curtis while involved in the perpetration of assault by drive-by shooting. See State v. Hollins, 2023-0785 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/19/24), 387 So.3d 641, 646, writ denied, 2024-00487 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So.3d 865.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the trier of fact and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find a rational trier of fact could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence the defendant was guilty of attempted first degree murder. Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State entered a nolle prosequi on the charges of illegal possession of stolen firearms (count one), in violation of La. R.S. 14:69.1; and aggravated criminal damage to property (count two), in violation of La. R.S. 14:55.

2.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:95.1(B) mandates the imposition of a fine. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1, however, does not authorize the imposition of the fine mandated in La. R.S. 14:95.1(B) when imposing a habitual offender sentence. See State v. Thomas, 2012-0177 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/12), 112 So.3d 875, 880; State v. Kimble, 2023-0176 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/23), 376 So.3d 869, 876 n.10.

3.   On counts three and five, the trial court did not specify the sentences were to be served without the benefit of parole. See State v. Chatman, 2021-1356 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/29/22), 344 So.3d 131, 133 n.4 (citing State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685, 687 (La. 1981) (“[T]he conditions imposed on the [habitual offender] sentence are those called for in the reference statute.”)). Both possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (count three) and attempted first degree murder (count five) require the sentence be served without the benefit of parole. See La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1); La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a); and La. R.S. 14:30(C)(2). However, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:301.1(A), the defendant's habitual offender sentences are deemed to contain the benefits restriction by operation of law. See State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799. Thus, we find no corrective action is warranted.

4.   Ms. Curtis stated it was unusual for the SUV to be parked on the corner; it was usually parked across the street.

5.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

6.   The defendant's initial statement was not recorded.

7.   Implicit in the defendant's arguments on appeal is that his voluntary intoxication precluded the formation of specific intent to kill and/or that his actions were committed in self-defense. We note the defendant did not allege self-defense or voluntary intoxication at trial and the jury was not instructed as such, nor did the defendant request such instruction or object to the lack of instruction. Accordingly, the defendant is barred from raising these defenses for the first time on appeal. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841(A); see also State v. London, 2023-1229 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/3/24), 391 So.3d 1076, 1080 n.1.

FIELDS, J.