JOHNSON v. EAST BATON ROUGE SCHOOL BOARD (2026)

Plaintiff appeals the amended judgment of the district court that granted the motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1672(C) filed by Defendants, The East Baton Rouge Parish School System (“the School Board”) and Verdie Batiste (“Batiste”), and dismissed Plaintiff's suit against the School Board and Batiste without prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 6, 2024, Takeysha Johnson filed a petition for damages in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court in her individual capacity and in her capacity as curator of her interdicted son, Kemonte Johnson.¹ In the petition, Ms. Johnson named Willie Scott, Batiste, and the School Board as defendants and alleged that she and Kemonte sustained injuries as a result of a March 7, 2023 incident involving Kemonte at Belaire High School. Ms. Johnson's petition did not include a request for service. However, on April 4, 2024, counsel for Ms. Johnson sent a letter to the Clerk of Court of East Baton Rouge Parish in which he requested service of the petition on the School Board through its interim superintendent, Adam Smith.

On October 30, 2024, the School Board filed a declinatory exception raising the objection of insufficient service of process (“the exception”), and on the same day, the School Board and Batiste (“Defendants”) filed a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1672(C) (“the motion”). In the exception, the School Board argued that pursuant to La. R.S. 17:51, Mr. Smith was not a proper party through whom service on the School Board may be effected. The motion was also based on the School Board's contention that Mr. Smith was not a proper agent for service. According to Defendants, service upon Mr. Smith was not “proper service” on the School Board. Therefore, Defendants argued the petition should be dismissed without prejudice because Ms. Johnson failed to request “proper service” within 90 days as required under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) and cannot show good cause for that failure. Defendants attached the following evidence to its motion: (1) Ms. Johnson's petition for damages; (2) the April 4, 2024 letter by which Ms. Johnson requested service on the School Board through Mr. Smith; and (3) the April 30, 2024 service return for the School Board, through Mr. Smith, showing personal service on “Toni Head” at the School Board's address.

Ms. Johnson filed an opposition to the School Board's exception and Defendants’ motion on November 15, 2024. Ms. Johnson argued that La.R.S. 17:51 is inapplicable as it is specific to contract law. Ms. Johnson instead argued that the applicable statute is La. R.S. 13:5107, which provides for service of process and citation for suits against the State or a State agency.

The district court held a hearing on the exception and the motion on January 13, 2025. At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for the School Board informed the court that the exception was moot, explaining that the president of the School Board was served after the School Board and Batiste filed the exception and the motion. Thereafter, the parties orally argued the remaining matters, and the exhibits attached to the motion were introduced into evidence without objection. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court declared the exception moot and granted the motion. In so ruling, the district court, relying on La. R.S. 17:51, reasoned that Ms. Johnson failed to timely and properly request service on the School Board within 90 days of filing suit. The district court signed a judgment granting the motion on February 13, 2025, which Ms. Johnson now appeals.²

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Bias v. Haley, 2023-0281 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 383 So.3d 175, 181. This court's appellate jurisdiction extends only to final judgments, which determine the merits in whole or in part, and to interlocutory judgments made expressly appealable by law. Bias, 383 So.3d at 181 (citing La. C.C.P. arts. 1841 & 2083).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1918 mandates that a final judgment be identified as such by appropriate language naming the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied, which should be determinable from the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Bias, 383 So.3d at 181. In the absence of such decretal language, the ruling is not a valid final judgment, and in the absence of a valid final judgment, this court lacks jurisdiction. Bias, 383 So.3d at 181.

The February 13, 2025 judgment (“the original judgment”) on appeal states, in pertinent part, “[T]he Motion for Involuntary Dismissal by the defendant, the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board[,] is hereby GRANTED.” On July 23, 2025, this court issued an ex proprio motu Rule to Show Cause Order noting the original judgment appears to lack decretal language as it fails to name specific parties who the ruling is against and identify the relief awarded. The parties were ordered to show cause by briefs whether the appeal should be remanded for the correction of the original judgment. This matter was ultimately remanded for the limited purpose of inviting the district court to correct the defects in the original judgment.

On December 4, 2025, the appellate record was supplemented with an amended judgment dated December 2, 2025 (“the amended judgment”). The amended judgment corrected all deficiencies noted in the Rule to Show Cause Order and most significantly, dismissed Ms. Johnson's lawsuit without prejudice. In light of the amended judgment, which we determine to be a valid, final judgment, we maintain the appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, the district court's dismissal of a suit for failure of the plaintiff to timely request service is subject to the manifest error standard of review. Jones v. Iberville Parish Council, 2012-0391 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/2/12), 111 So.3d 83, 85. This case, however, involves no factual disputes and instead turns solely on the resolution of legal questions. When the facts are not disputed and the issue before this court is whether the district court properly interpreted and applied the law, the standard of review is simply a review of whether the district court was legally correct or incorrect. Rodney v. Dukes, 2023-0859 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/22/24), 388 So.3d 393, 396, writ denied, 2024-00523 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So.3d 633.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Citation and service thereof are essential in all civil actions; without them, all proceedings are absolutely null. See La. C.C.P. art. 1201(A). Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1201(C) provides, in pertinent part, that service of the citation shall be requested on all named defendants within 90 days of commencement of the action. Further, La. C.C.P. art. 1672(C) states that “[a] judgment dismissing an action without prejudice shall be rendered as to a person named as a defendant for whom service has not been requested within [90 days as] prescribed by Article 1201(C) ․ unless good cause is shown why service could not be requested[.]”

Louisiana courts strictly construe the good cause requirement of Article 1672(C). Barnett v. Louisiana State University Medical Center – Shreveport, 2002-2576 (La. 2/7/03), 841 So.2d 725, 726. Consequently, plaintiffs are strictly held to the obligation of serving the correct agent for service of process. Barnett, 841 So.2d at 726. The Louisiana Supreme Court has declared the requirement that service upon the defendant(s) be requested within 90 days should be reasonably read to require accurate request of service upon the proper agent for the defendant. See Barnett, 841 So.2d at 726.

The issue before us rests solely on who is the proper person or agent of service of process for the School Board. Defendants argue the proper agent for service of process on the School Board is supplied by La. R.S. 17:51, which states:

There shall be a parish school board for each of the parishes, and these several parish school boards are constituted bodies corporate with power to sue. The legislature hereby authorizes suits against any parish school board for the enforcement of contracts entered into by the school board or for recovery of damages for the breach thereof, without necessity of any further authorization by the legislature. No other suits may be instituted or prosecuted against any parish school board unless in each individual case the legislature first has granted to the party or parties plaintiff the right to sue the particular school board, as provided in Section 26 of Article XIX and Section 35 of Article III of the Louisiana Constitution. In suits against school boards citation shall be served on the president of the board and in his absence on the vice-president.

(Emphasis added). Defendants argue that Ms. Johnson did not request service on the president (or vice-president) of the School Board within 90 days of filing suit, and as a result, her lawsuit should be dismissed. In contrast, Ms. Johnson asserts the proper agent for service of process is governed by La. R.S. 13:5107(B), Which states, in pertinent part:

In all suits filed against a political subdivision of the state, or any of its departments, offices, boards, commissions, agencies[,] or instrumentalities, citation and service may be obtained on any proper agent or agents designated by the local governing authority and in accordance with the laws of the state provided that the authority has filed notice of the designation of agent for service of process with ․ the secretary of state[.] ․ If no agent or agents are designated for service of process, ․ citation and service may be obtained on the district attorney, parish attorney, city attorney, or any other proper officer or person, depending upon the identity of the named defendant and in accordance with the laws of the state, and on the department, board, commission, or agency head or person, depending upon the identity of the named defendant and the identity of the named board, commission, department, agency, or officer through which or through whom suit is to be filed against.

(Emphasis added). Ms. Johnson requested service of process on Mr. Smith, interim superintendent, within 90 days of filing suit; therefore, she maintains that service was proper under La. R.S. 13:5107(B) and her suit against the School Board should be maintained.³

We first note that neither party claims that there was a designated agent for service of process for the School Board or that Mr. Smith was such an agent designated under La. R.S. 13:5107 such that Ms. Johnson could have accomplished service on the School Board through service on Mr. Smith. Secondly, rules of statutory construction provide that where two statutes deal with the same subject matter, they should be harmonized if possible; however, if there is a conflict, the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the more general provision. Davis v. State through Louisiana Racing Commission, 2020-01020 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 1028, 1032. Both La. R.S. 17:51 and La. R.S. 13:5107 arguably apply to service of process on school boards. As La. R.S. 17:51 applies specifically to school boards, we find that La. R.S. 17:51, requiring service on the president or vice-president of the school board, exclusively controls. See Jackson v. St. John the Baptist Parish School Board, 2013-103 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/13), 121 So.3d 164, 168. Therefore, the president or vice-president of the School Board is the proper person upon whom service should be requested to constitute proper service on the School Board.

Ms. Johnson filed her petition on March 6, 2024. The only service information in the record is a service return dated April 30, 2024, showing completion of service of the petition on Mr. Smith, who is not the president or vice-president of the School Board but the interim superintendent. The record does not contain any service information for Batiste. Defendants filed the motion on October 30, 2024, well after the expiration of the 90-day deadline for Ms. Johnson to request service. As previously noted, the requirement that service be requested within 90 days should be reasonably read to require an accurate request of service upon the proper agent for the defendant. See Barnett, 841 So.2d at 726. Therefore, based on our review of the record, it does not appear Ms. Johnson made an accurate request of service upon the proper party for service of process within 90 days of commencement of suit.

Nevertheless, if the plaintiff successfully demonstrates good cause for failure to timely request service, the court may order that service be effected within a specified time. Barnett, 841 So.2d at 726. Good cause is not defined in La. C.C.P. art. 1672; however, appellate courts have concluded that the mere confusion regarding a party's correct name or inadvertence on the part of plaintiff's counsel to request service is not a sufficient basis for good cause. Norbert v. Loucks, 2001-1229 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1283, 1285 (per curiam). Likewise, confusion as to the proper agent for service of process does not constitute good cause for failing to request proper service. See Thomas v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 2002-0897 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/03), 848 So.2d 635, 639-40 (citing Norbert, 791 So.2d at 1285), writ denied, 2003-2397 (La. 11/21/03), 860 So.2d 552. Moreover, even though a service return for Mr. Smith appears in the record, this notice that the sheriff made the requested service upon the wrong agent does not relieve Ms. Johnson of her duty to request service upon the proper party. See Thomas, 848 So.2d at 640. Therefore, under the facts of this case, we are unable to say the district court erred in its conclusion that Ms. Johnson's claims against Defendants should be dismissed for her failure to timely request proper service within 90 days of commencement of suit.⁴

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, the district court's December 2, 2025 amended judgment dismissing Ms. Johnson's claims against the East Baton Rouge Parish School System and Verdie Batiste without prejudice is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiff, Takeysha Johnson, individually and as curator of her indicted son, Kemonte Johnson.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Kemonte is a 22-year-oId, autistic, non-verbal male who attends Belaire High School.

2.   We note that Ms. Johnson raises the constitutionality of La. R.S. 17:51 on appeal. However, this matter was not raised at the district court. Appellate courts will not consider issues that were not raised in the pleadings, were not addressed by the district court, or are raised for the first time on appeal. Succession of Brown, 2023-1137 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/4/24), 391 So.3d 703, 706 (citing Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3), writ denied, 2024-00876 (La. 10/23/24), 395 So.3d 253. More specifically, litigants generally must raise constitutional attacks in the district court, not the appellate courts, and the constitutional challenge must be specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim particularized. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 2003-0732 (La. 1/19/05), 903 So.2d 392, 399. Although several exceptions to this general rule have been recognized, none of those exceptions apply here. See Unwired Telecom Corp., 903 So.2d at 399 & 399 n.5. Accordingly, we do not consider Ms. Johnson's constitutionality arguments.

3.   Ms. Johnson also asserts that La. R.S. 17:51 applies only to suits in contract and not delictual actions. Based on a reading of the statute as a whole, it is clear the statute applies to all suits against school boards. As such, we find this argument meritless.

4.   Counsel for the School Board informed the district court at the hearing on the exception and the motion that the president of the School Board was served after the School Board filed its exception and motion. However, no evidence of this was presented at the hearing, and there is no service return for the president of the School Board in the record. See Zillow, Inc. v. Blanchard, 2021-1167 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/17/22), 342 So.3d 892, 896 (“Argument of counsel and briefs, no matter how artful, are not evidence.”). Therefore, we need not determine whether this case is distinguishable from Barnett, 841 So.2d 725.

EDWARDS, J.