STATE v. BARKER (2025)

Defendant, Gerald Barker, appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts of second degree murder, violations of La. R.S. 14:30.1. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of second degree murder. He also argues that his life sentences on the two counts of second degree murder, which the judge ordered to be served consecutively to one another, are excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 20, 2023, a Jefferson Parish grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant, Gerald Barker a/k/a “Bird,” with two counts of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (counts one and two); obstruction of justice in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (count three); possession of cocaine weighing less than two grams in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C) (count four); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count five). Defendant pled not guilty to all charges.

The case proceeded to trial on December 2, 2024, and on December 4, 2024, the jury found defendant guilty as charged on all counts. On December 18, 2024, the court heard victim impact statements. Thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on each of counts one and two. He ordered both life sentences to run consecutively to one another. On count three, defendant was sentenced to forty years imprisonment at hard labor, and the court imposed a one hundred thousand dollar fine. On count four, defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment at hard labor. On count five, defendant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and the court imposed a five thousand dollar fine. The trial judge stated that counts three, four, and five were to run concurrently with counts one and two. Defense counsel objected to the sentences, orally noted his intent to file an appeal.

On January 5, 2025, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence and a motion for an appeal. A hearing on the motion to reconsider was held on February 5, 2025. The trial court denied the motion on that date. Defense counsel noted his objection to the denial. The court granted defendant's motion for an appeal on February 6, 2025.

FACTS

On January 17, 2023, a double homicide occurred at 645 Emile Street in Westwego, Louisiana, resulting in the deaths of Linda Turner, the homeowner, and Curtis Thomas. Defendant, Gerald “Bird” Barker, was identified as a suspect and later confessed to the murders. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (“JPSO”) received a 9-1-1 call at 9:04 p.m. reporting that two people were shot at the location. Patrol deputies arrived shortly thereafter, finding Mr. Thomas deceased in the doorway and Ms. Turner on the sofa with gunshot wounds. She was transported to the hospital and later died.

Dr. Dana Troxclair, accepted as an expert in forensic pathology, conducted the autopsies and determined both deaths were homicides by multiple gunshot wounds. Toxicology revealed fentanyl and cocaine metabolites in Mr. Thomas and cocaine and marijuana in Ms. Turner.

Linda Tran, accepted as an expert in firearm and tool mark examination, determined that multiple 9 mm casings found at the scene came from at least two firearms, with two casings sharing characteristics of being fired from one firearm and another casing consistent with a second firearm. A bullet found under the television was consistent with a .38 caliber class and could have been fired from a 9 mm, with the casings and bullet most consistent with a Glock pistol.

At the scene, detectives spoke with Kyle “Biggy” Delahoussaye and Kierra Pastrana. Ms. Pastrana identified “Bird” as a person of interest, and detectives later learned “Bird” was Gerald Barker. Two exhibits established that cocaine was recovered from the residence on January 17, 2023. Mr. Delahoussaye described Ms. Turner's house as a “drug house” that many people would frequent. He stated that he knew both victims, and recounted arriving at the residence to find Mr. Thomas in the doorway and being told Ms. Turner had been shot. Ms. Pastrana, who was using drugs at the time and lived with Mr. Thomas as a roommate, confirmed the house functioned as a “trap” house where Mr. Thomas, Donald “Goggy/Cutter” Green, and defendant sold drugs. She described tension among them and reported hearing that Ms. Turner wanted defendant to leave the house.

On January 18, 2023, at approximately 2:50 p.m., JPSO Deputy Chase Bagley responded to a trespassing call on Old Compton Road in Harvey, Louisiana, with the subject reportedly jumping over fences of backyards in the area. Later that evening, another deputy located and detained defendant around 6:42 p.m. Deputy Bagley advised him of his Miranda ¹ rights, and issued a misdemeanor summons to him for trespassing. Items found at the scene of the trespassing earlier in the day, including a phone, sweatshirt, and hat, were identified by defendant as being his and were returned to him. Deputy Bagley did not know at that time that defendant was involved in a homicide investigation.

JPSO Sergeant Steven Keller spoke to Mr. Delahoussaye and corroborated a call at approximately 8:46 p.m. between Mr. Thomas and Mr. Delahoussaye on the night of the murders. He reviewed the audio of Ms. Pastrana's interview identifying “Bird” as responsible with a clothing description, and confirmed that the clothing description matched what defendant was wearing during the January 18 encounter with Deputy Bagley.

Sergeant Keller obtained and analyzed cell phone and GPS records. Ms. Pastrana provided a number linked to “Gerald Barker,” but records showed defendant's phone had been turned off. Mr. Thomas's phone records reflected a last outgoing call at 8:46 p.m. and a last incoming call at 8:51 p.m. that went to voicemail, leading Sergeant Keller to believe that the murders occurred before 8:51 p.m. Surveillance video from a residence at 7801 Dolly Street showed at 8:47 p.m. a truck stopping in front of 645 Emile and a person walking from the residence to the passenger door before returning inside. At 8:49 p.m., a silhouette crossed from 645 Emile and ran down Heather Street, the intersecting street. Using ALPR ² data, Sergeant Keller identified the truck as a light-colored Ford with a dent on the left side of the tailgate registered to Roosevelt Cockheran, whose phone sent a text to defendant at 8:46 p.m. stating “outside,” followed by a 21-second outgoing call at 8:47 p.m. to defendant's phone, corresponding with the surveillance footage.

Additional surveillance review showed a Chevy Impala arriving at 8:26 p.m., registered to Donna Boudreaux, who corroborated that defendant was at Ms. Turner's house during that time. Her passenger, Bonnie Sampey, also confirmed defendant's presence. Surveillance video showed that they left Ms. Turner's house at 8:29 p.m. Another vehicle registered to Bobbie Lynne Hingle arrived at 8:38 p.m. to drop off Mr. Thomas.

Cell site data placed defendant's phone at 645 Emile at 8:46 p.m., then in the vicinity of Lee Wings’ residence at the intersection of Renee and Gwen by 8:51 p.m. Records showed defendant's phone called Mr. Wings at 8:49 p.m., and both phones were in the same vicinity at 9:12–9:13 p.m. They later traveled together from the Westbank to the Eastbank around 10:05 p.m. Text messages extracted from Mr. Wings’ phone reflected that at 12:34 a.m. on January 18 defendant, saved as “Bee Bird,” texted “Call me Lee,” and at 12:40 a.m., he texted “Lee don't do me like that you all I got I'm innocent a lie on me I didn't do nothing I was by you come on and take a shower at your house, so I can't be two places at one time.”

JPSO Sergeant Anthony Buttone, an expert in call detail records and geo-location analysis, corroborated the cell site movement of defendant's and Mr. Wings’ phones throughout the relevant time frame. Sergeant Keller testified it appeared defendant was attempting to establish an alibi and noted prior texts in which defendant asked Mr. Wings for his gun on January 2, 2023.

A phone extraction from Mr. Cockheran's device showed defendant sent multiple texts to Mr. Cockheran between 10:35 p.m. and 11:53 p.m. on January 17, expressing concern about being blamed and requesting assistance. Sergeant Keller testified these messages reflected defendant believed he was being implicated within hours of the murders. JPSO Detective Dustin Ducote, accepted as an expert in the field of mobile device forensics, performed the extraction on Mr. Cockheran's phone. He corroborated the information about the phone calls and text messages between defendant and Mr. Cockheran on the evening of the murders.

Based on the investigation, an arrest warrant was issued for defendant, who was arrested on March 28, 2023, in Orleans Parish. After being given Miranda warnings, defendant waived his rights and gave a recorded statement, initially claiming that he left Ms. Turner's house around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., which was inconsistent with witness accounts and cell site data.

In his statement, defendant admitted selling drugs from Ms. Turner's house with Mr. Green. He said he went to Mr. Wings’ house and then to a motel after leaving, and acknowledged being blamed as the last person at the scene. He denied contacting Mr. Cockheran to meet him at Emile, disclaimed ownership of an iPhone recovered during the January 18 encounter with Deputy Bagley, denied post-homicide communications and travel with Mr. Wings, and denied the killings before later confessing.

After further questioning, defendant admitted he shot both Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner, asserting self-defense based on purported threats. He described obtaining a gun from the kitchen and “went to shooting.” He acknowledged attempting to leave while Mr. Thomas was in the doorway, and became emotional when asked if Ms. Turner's murder was an accident. When the detectives left the room, they observed defendant snort a substance that later tested positive for cocaine. Defendant stated Mr. Green jumped out a window during the shooting. He did not know how many shots he fired, did not see Mr. Thomas with a gun, and claimed he threw the gun into the Mississippi River while in a car with Mr. Wings.

Witnesses described prior tensions and armed confrontations among the individuals selling drugs at the residence. Mr. Williams testified the group disputed sales and proceeds, that defendant resisted sharing, and recounted defendant's statement, “I don't hustle with nobody,” and a warning from Mr. Green that “somebody going to lose their life,” to which defendant responded he would not lose his. Mr. Williams further described defendant pointing a gun in the direction Mr. Thomas's head the night before the murders, being told by Ms. Turner to have defendant leave, and defendant telling Mr. Williams on the morning of the murders, “Your man's going to get you killed.” Jimmy “Jimbo” Lenox, a neighbor who was standing in his driveway next to 645 Emile,” testified defendant told him to “go take a walk” while armed shortly before gunshots, after which he saw Mr. Thomas in the doorway and Mr. Green exiting through a back window. Mr. Green confirmed living at 645 Emile with Ms. Turner and defendant. He described defendant as being armed near a curtain while Ms. Turner sat on the sofa and Mr. Thomas stood near the kitchen. He heard sequential gunshots with Ms. Turner screaming, and saw defendant in the living room before defendant ran out the front door. Mr. Green later escaped through a back window and avoided talking to police until his arrest.

Crime scene reconstruction by Dr. Tim Scanlan concluded that two weapons were discharged, possibly by one person with two guns or two people, and that Mr. Thomas was shot first in the back of the head with his head angled downward, then again while face up. Ms. Turner's injuries and bloodstain evidence were consistent with her witnessing the shooting of Mr. Thomas and turning her head defensively as the shooter approached, with the gunfire characterized as focused at both victims.

A stipulation was entered that if called to testify, Dona Quintanilla, who would be qualified as an expert in the field of latent print processing, comparison, and identification, would testify that she examined a fingerprint card from defendant's arrest from March 23, 2017, for possession of cocaine in violation of La. R.S. 40:967 (State's Exhibit 127) and compared it to a certified conviction in Case Number 17-4513, Division N of the 24th Judicial District Court when he pled guilty to possession of cocaine on January 11, 2018, and received a three-year sentence at hard labor (State's Exhibit 128). It was stipulated that Ms. Quintanilla would further testify that defendant, who was convicted of possession of cocaine on January 11, 2018, is the same person on trial in the instant matter.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO 3

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient proof that he was the individual who committed the murders, that he possessed a firearm, or that he tampered with the crime scene or removed the murder weapon. He argues that there was no eyewitness to the shooting and no witness who testified that he committed the offense. He avers that the State's cell phone data evidence only showed that he was present at the scene and showed no proof as to his identity as the murderer. He contends his statement was the only evidence of his identity as the perpetrator. Defendant argues that during his statement, he was questioned for four hours, was “coming down” from cocaine, and ingested cocaine. He argues his statement was not reliable enough to “support the entire conviction.” Defendant argues that the convictions for second degree murder must be reversed, and because the obstruction of justice charge is wholly dependent upon the second degree murder convictions, this conviction must also be reversed.

The State responds that defendant does not assign the admissibility of his statement as error. It argues that the jury was made aware of the circumstances of defendant's statement because it viewed the video. The State also argues that Sergeant Keller testified that defendant was coherent. The State avers that defendant confessed to the shootings before snorting cocaine and that the jury's function was to determine credibility of the witnesses. The State acknowledges that an accused may not be convicted of a crime based solely on his own uncorroborated statement; however, here the State corroborated defendant's confession with extensive evidence placing him at the location of the murders and with testimony of witnesses. The State contends that the testimony and evidence were sufficient to establish that defendant was the person who committed the murders by shooting them, obstructed justice by removing the firearm, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine if the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact can be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. Gatson, 21-156 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/21), 334 So.3d 1021, 1034. When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of an offense, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” State v. Woods, 23-41 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/23), 376 So.3d 1144, 1155, writ denied, 23-1615 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 700. This is not a separate test from the Jackson standard but rather provides a helpful basis for determining the existence of reasonable doubt. All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

The directive that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution requires the reviewing court to defer to the actual trier of fact's rational credibility calls, evidence weighing, and inference drawing. State v. Aguilar, 23-34 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/23), 376 So.3d 1105, 1108. This deference to the factfinder does not permit a reviewing court to decide whether it believes a witness or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence. State v. McKinney, 20-19 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/4/20), 304 So.3d 1097, 1102. When addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, consideration must be given to the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Tate, 22-570 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 236, 245.

In making this determination, a reviewing court will not reevaluate the credibility of witnesses or re-weigh the evidence. Woods, 376 So.3d at 1157. Indeed, the resolution of conflicting testimony rests solely with the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Lavigne, 22-282 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/23), 365 So.3d 919, 940. Thus, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Sly, 23-60 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/2/23), 376 So.3d 1047, 1072, writ denied, 23-1588 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 608.

Encompassed within proving the elements of an offense is the necessity of proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. Where the key issue is the identification, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification to carry its burden of proof. State v. Key, 23-167 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 96, 113.

Defendant does not contest on appeal that the State failed to prove any specified essential statutory element of second degree murder, obstruction of justice, or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Rather, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he committed the second degree murders because it failed to prove his identity as the shooter.

In the instant matter, the record reflects a 9-1-1 call reporting two deaths at 645 Emile Street at 9:04 p.m. on January 17, 2023. Multiple witnesses placed defendant at the scene that day and immediately before the murders, corroborated by surveillance and cell phone records. Witnesses described defendant's presence, a dispute over drug sales, defendant's possession of a firearm, defendant directing a neighbor to leave immediately before gunshots, contemporaneous gunfire, and observations consistent with defendant fleeing, all corroborated by surveillance timing and phone communications. Cell phone records linked defendant's movements and communications with the arrival of a Ford truck registered to Mr. Cockheran, calls and texts between defendant and associates, and travel from the Westbank to the Eastbank shortly after the shootings. Defendant subsequently texted denials of responsibility and asserted an alibi at Mr. Wings’ house.

Defendant ultimately confessed to shooting and killing both victims, admitted he was the only person with a firearm in the house, confirmed no one else fired shots, stated that Mr. Green jumped out of the window, and admitted throwing the gun into the Mississippi River while traveling to the Eastbank with Mr. Wings. The confession, corroborated by cell site and call/text records, surveillance, and witness testimony, establishes defendant's identity as the shooter.

Defendant's challenge to the reliability of his statement due to cocaine use is unavailing on this record. The State notes defendant did not assign the admissibility of the statement as error. The jury viewed the interview video and heard Sergeant Keller's testimony that defendant was coherent. The confession preceded any observed ingestion of cocaine. The record reflects that although defendant said he was coming down from cocaine, he had been in custody since 9:45 a.m. without signs of distress. His ingestion occurred toward the end of the statement, after his confession. The jury evaluated his coherence and credibility firsthand.

As such, we find that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence was sufficient to find that defendant committed the second degree murders of Ms. Turner and Mr. Thomas under the standard set forth in Jackson.⁴

This assignment of error is without merit.⁵

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Excessiveness of the Sentences

Defendant argues that the trial court's imposition of two consecutive life sentences imposes needless and purposeless pain and suffering. He avers that while the trial court stated it considered La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, it did not provide sufficient justification for imposing the life sentences consecutively. He argues that consequently, the consecutive life sentences are excessive and must be vacated.

The State replies that the facts and evidence in the current matter support the imposition of the consecutive life sentences. It avers that the trial court gave its reasons, considered defendant's criminal history, and considered La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. The State contends that the consecutive life sentences are also supported by jurisprudence. The State argues that considering the gravity of the offenses and the reasons given by the trial court and the supporting jurisprudence, the consecutive life sentences are not excessive, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing them.

At the sentencing hearing held on December 18, 2024, two victim impact statements were heard. Justine Thomas, Mr. Thomas’ mother, testified that her nine-year-old granddaughter (Mr. Thomas’ niece) was seeing a psychiatrist because she was suicidal due to her uncle's murder. She stated Mr. Thomas was a “good child” who never bothered anyone. She explained that she did not know what he did “out there in the street,” but he came from good parents. Ms. Lewis (Mr. Thomas’ ex-wife) stated she knew defendant's sister and mother, and what he did was not worth it. She stated that he destroyed a lot of lives, and she prayed he never saw the streets again. She said that defendant's family could still see him, but “we” can never see Mr. Thomas again.

The court then articulated its reasons, noting the swift jury verdict, the senselessness of the crimes, the execution-style killings of two victims at point-blank range, defendant's reluctance to accept responsibility despite confessing, and defendant's extensive criminal record, concluding he was “incorrigible” and “beyond human redemption,” and expressly stating it had considered Article 894.1. The court then sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentences on each of counts one and two and ordered both sentences to run consecutively with one another. On count three, defendant was sentenced to forty years imprisonment at hard labor and a one hundred thousand dollar fine. On count four, defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment at hard labor. On count five, defendant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence and a five thousand dollar fine. Counts three, four, and five were ordered to run concurrently with counts one and two.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(B) states that a motion for reconsideration of sentence “shall be oral at the time of sentence or shall be in writing thereafter and shall set forth the specific grounds on which the motion is based.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E) provides that “failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.”

Defense counsel objected to the sentences, noted his intent to file an appeal, and stated he would supplement with a written motion. On January 5, 2025, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. The motion argued that pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1, the sentences imposed were excessive, requested reconsideration, and argued that a “lower sentence more in keeping with fairness and state and federal constitutional standards be imposed.” At the hearing on the motion to reconsider on February 5, 2025, defense counsel submitted on the written motion, which the trial court denied. Defense counsel noted his objection to the denial.

This Court has held that the failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence, or to state the specific grounds upon which the motion is based, limits a defendant to a bare review of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Manuel, 20-172 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/2/21), 325 So.3d 513, 568, writ denied, 21-926 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So.3d 1071. When the consecutive nature of sentences is not specifically raised in the trial court, the defendant is precluded from raising the issue on appeal and the issue is not included in the review for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Durant, 24-243 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 406 So.3d 736, 743.

In State v. Adams, 23-508 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/14/24), 398 So.3d 143, 146, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it imposed excessive consecutive sentences even though all three of the counts arose from the same facts and circumstances. This Court stated that the record reflected that the defendant orally objected to his sentences, but he did not specifically raise the issue of their consecutive nature or file a written motion to reconsider his sentences following his resentencing (although he filed a motion to reconsider his sentences following his original sentencing). This Court explained that on appeal, the defendant did not contend that any sentence on its own was excessive; rather, he argued that the consecutive nature of his sentences made them excessive. This Court found that the defendant was precluded from challenging the consecutive nature of his sentences as excessive. The panel did not address the individual excessiveness of each sentence.

In State v. Greene, 06-667 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/30/07), 951 So.2d 1226, 1238, writ denied, 07-546 (La. 10/26/07), 966 So.2d 571, the defendant argued that the consecutive nature of his sentences, which exceeded life, were excessive. He contended that particular justification for the consecutive sentences was required and that the trial court failed to give reasons for imposing his sentences consecutively. This Court found that the defendant was precluded from challenging the excessiveness of his consecutive sentences, pointing out that although he filed a motion to reconsider sentence, he failed to state a basis for the motion as required by Article 881.1. This Court asserted that the failure to state the specific grounds upon which the motion was based limited the defendant to a bare review of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness. This Court recognized that the excessiveness of a consecutive sentence was not included in a bare constitutional review. Further, this Court did not address whether each sentence on its own was excessive since defendant did not raise that issue.⁶

In the instant matter, defendant does not argue that his individual sentences are excessive, but only that the consecutive nature of the life sentences were excessive. While defense counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, he did not specifically object to the consecutive nature of his sentences in his written motion or at the motion hearing. Additionally, while defense counsel orally objected to his sentences, he did not specifically raise the issue of the consecutive nature of his sentences. Because it was not raised in the trial court, the issue is not preserved for review on appeal. As defendant does not challenge the excessiveness of the individual sentences, we decline to conduct a limited review for constitutional excessiveness as to the individual counts. See Adams, 398 So.3d 143; Greene, 951 So.2d 1226; Jones, 119 So.3d 250.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

The record was reviewed for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). The following matters are noted.

Lack of Financial Hardship Hearing

Defendant was ordered to pay a one hundred thousand dollar fine for his sentence on count three (La. R.S. 14:130.1) and a five thousand dollar fine for his sentence on count five (La. R.S. 14:95.1). La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1 requires the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether payment of any fine, fee, cost, restitution, or monetary obligation would cause substantial financial hardship to defendant or his dependents.⁷ In the instant matter, there is no evidence in the record that the court held a hearing or that defendant waived the judicial determination of financial hardship. See State v. Bello-Urbina, 24-8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/30/24), 398 So.3d 782, 795-96 (where this Court vacated the defendant's financial obligations and remanded the matter for compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1).

This Court's prior decision in State v. Lopez, 23-335 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/21/24), 398 So.3d 167, 185, writ denied, 24-1187 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 650 is instructive. Therein, the defendant was sentenced to fines and fees without a hearing or a waiver of the hearing. Due to the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1, this Court vacated the portion of the defendant's sentence that imposed the court costs, fines, and fees. However, in light of the defendant's life sentence for second degree murder, this Court stated, “[W]e decline to remand this matter for a financial feasibility hearing, which would appear to constitute an exercise in futility.” Id. In the instant matter, we take into consideration defendant's two life sentences and vacate his financial obligations without remanding the matter for a financial hardship hearing.

Consecutive and Concurrent Nature of Sentences

There is a discrepancy between the sentencing transcript, the sentencing minute entry, and the uniform commitment order (UCO). At sentencing, the trial judge ordered counts one and two to run consecutively to one another. He ordered counts three, four, and five to run concurrently with counts one and two. The sentencing minute entry provides the following in pertinent part: “The court ordered sentence on count 1 & 2 are to run consecutive to one another and count 3, 4, & 5.” The UCO provides that the sentences are Consecutive to: “Count 1 & 2, and consecutive with count 3, 4, & 5.” The transcript does not reflect that the trial judge ordered counts one and two to run consecutively to counts three, four, and five; he only ordered counts one and two to run consecutively to each other. Where there is a discrepancy between the transcript and the sentencing minute entry, the transcript must prevail. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

As such, we remand the matter to the trial court for correction of the minute entry and UCO and order the Clerk of Court for the 24th Judicial District Court to transmit the original of the corrected UCO to the officer in charge of the institution to which defendant has been sentenced as well as the Department of Corrections’ legal department. See State v. Tate, 22-570 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 236, 249-50.

DECREE

For the reasons herein assigned, defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

I agree with both the outcome and analysis in this case and write separately only to emphasize that, as the writer points out at footnote 5, Defendant focused his sufficiency of the evidence argument only upon the evidence produced to support the second-degree murder convictions. Nevertheless, Defendant also asserted that the State “failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in possession of a firearm or that he tampered with the crime scene or removed the murder weapon for the purpose of distorting the results of a criminal prosecution.” To support a conviction for obstruction of justice in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1(a)(1) the State must prove more than the mere removal of a murder weapon from the crime scene; the State must also prove that such removal was done with “the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding.” State v. Lopez, 23-335 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/21/24), 398 So.3d 167, writ denied, 24-1187 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 650. In fact, however, during his confession, Defendant admitted to throwing the gun he used to kill Ms. Turner and Mr. Thomas into the Mississippi River while fleeing to the Eastbank with Mr. Wings. The evidence in this case was clearly sufficient also to support Defendant's conviction of obstruction of justice. In this case the State proved Defendant did more than leave the scene of the crime with the murder weapon. The State also proved Defendant intentionally threw the gun in the Mississippi River in order to deprive the State of incriminating evidence.⁸

FOOTNOTES

1.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2.   ALPR is an acronym for Automated License Plate Reader.

4.   Defendant does not contest on appeal that the State failed to prove any specified essential statutory elements of any of his convictions. As such, it is unnecessary address the evidence as it relates to each essential element. See State v. Nelson, 14-252 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/15), 169 So.3d 493, 500, writ denied, 15-685 (La. 2/26/16), 187 So.3d 468.

5.   While defendant focuses his argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence for the second degree murder convictions (arguing identity), he also asserts that the State “failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in possession of a firearm or that he tampered with the crime scene or removed the murder weapon for the purpose of distorting the results of a criminal prosecution.” Defendant does not present a separate argument for his convictions of obstruction of justice and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. To the extent that defendant also challenges identity as to these convictions, the same evidence shows there is no issue as to identity for these convictions.

6.   See also State v. Jones, 12-750 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/13), 119 So.3d 250.

7.   La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1(C) provides:C.(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, prior to ordering the imposition or enforcement of any financial obligations as defined by this Article, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether payment in full of the aggregate amount of all the financial obligations to be imposed upon the defendant would cause substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents. The court may consider, among other factors, whether any victim of the crime has incurred a substantial financial hardship as a result of the criminal act or acts and whether the defendant is employed. The court may delay the hearing to determine substantial financial hardship for a period not to exceed ninety days, in order to permit either party to submit relevant evidence.(2) The defendant or the court may waive the judicial determination of a substantial financial hardship required by the provisions of this Paragraph. If the court waives the hearing on its own motion, the court shall provide reasons, entered upon the record, for its determination that the defendant is capable of paying the fines, fees, and penalties imposed without causing a substantial financial hardship.

8.   The evidence of specific intent to distort a criminal investigation found in this case is consistent with the relevant evidence discussed in State v. Lee, 24-419 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/25), 415 So.3d 487, 492–94 (affirming obstruction conviction based on circumstantial evidence that defendant removed murder weapon and later attempted to trade it, showing intent to thwart investigation); and State v. Alexander, 23-540 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/23/24), 401 So.3d 105, writ denied, 24-665 (La. 12/11/24), 396 So.3d 968 (affirming obstruction conviction where defendant deleted phone records linking him to cab company used to reach crime scene, distinguishing Scott); see also State v. Bethley, 22-849 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 1148, 1155 (finding sufficient evidence of intent to obstruct where defendant gave evasive testimony about firearm's whereabouts, supporting inference he knew gun's importance to investigation).Distinguishable are State v. Newton, No. 25-KA-9, ––– So.3d. –––– (2025), a case in which this court recently reversed the obstruction of justice conviction where the defendant left the crime scene with the weapon but there no other evidence of his specific intent to obstruct the ensuing investigation; see also State v. Ramirez-Delgado, 409 So.3d 953, 961–63 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2024) (holding evidence insufficient where defendant left scene with murder weapon but did not destroy evidence, harm witnesses, or attempt to hide gun, showing no intent to obstruct justice); Scott v. Louisiana, 372 So.3d 42, 54–55 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2023) (finding evidence insufficient to prove specific intent to distort investigation where defendant fled scene with rifle but left shell casings, surveillance video, and witnesses, indicating no effort to interfere with investigation).

GRAVOIS, J.