STATE v. ELZY (2025)

In this criminal appeal, defendant/appellant, Alvin Elzy, seeks review of his conviction and sentence for his second offense of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of La. R.S. 15:542. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 15, 2023, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office filed a bill of information charging defendant, Alvin Elzy, with one count of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of La. R.S. 15:542. On September 30, 2024, the State filed a superseding bill of information, charging defendant with failure to register as a sex offender, second offense, in violation of La. R.S. 15:542. On October 2, 2024, defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

On October 15, 2024, before trial, the trial court granted defendant's request to represent himself. But, defense counsel remained appointed as standby counsel. That same day, trial commenced, and the jury found defendant guilty as charged.

On October 21, 2024, the trial court heard several pro se post-trial motions filed by defendant, including a motion for new trial and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied both motions. On October 23, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Following a habitual offender hearing on November 14, 2024, the trial court adjudicated defendant, who represented himself, as a second-felony offender. The trial court vacated defendant's original sentence and resentenced him as a habitual offender to 25 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

EVIDENCE

At trial, the State presented testimony from employees of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (JPSO) Crime Laboratory to prove defendant had failed to register as a sex offender, as required by La. R.S. 15:542. Donna Quintanilla, accepted as an expert in latent print processing and comparison, testified that she took defendant's fingerprints the morning of trial and compared those fingerprints to fingerprints from a certified Orleans Parish conviction packet for defendant's 1982 attempted aggravated rape conviction.¹ Ms. Quintanilla confirmed that the conviction packet indicated defendant had been convicted of attempted aggravated rape on November 24, 1982. After comparing the two sets of fingerprints, she testified defendant's prints matched the fingerprints from the certified conviction packet.

Ms. Quintanilla testified that she also compared defendant's fingerprints taken the morning of trial to a certified conviction packet for defendant's 2011 conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. After comparing the fingerprints, she confirmed that defendant's prints matched the fingerprints from the 2011 certified conviction packet.

Ms. Quintanilla explained that when a defendant's prints are taken, they are placed on a “ten-print card” and stored in an automated fingerprint identification system. Upon comparing two of defendant's ten-print cards with arrest dates of December 13, 2022 and December 19, 2022, she stated that they matched.

Kelly Phelan, also an employee in JPSO's fingerprint identification division, testified she reviews and processes sex offender registrations. Ms. Phelan testified that when an offender is released from the Department of Corrections (DOC), he has three days to register as a sex offender with the sheriff's office where he will reside. She explained that her office notes on its calendar the dates sex offenders are released and the three-day registration deadline. She stated that if no registration is received by the deadline, her office initiates an investigation as to whether the offender is registered in any other parish and/or state.

Ms. Phelan explained that OffenderWatch system is a state-wide program used to register and track sex offenders. In January 2022, she received information on OffenderWatch that defendant had not registered as a sex offender with JPSO or in any other Louisiana parish despite his January 7, 2022 DOC release. In addition, according to the National Sex Offender Registry, defendant had not registered in any other state.

Ms. Phelan explained that upon defendant's release, he received release documentation explaining the Louisiana Sex Offender Notification Requirements, requiring him to register with the sheriff where he resides upon release. She explained that defendant initialed the notice confirming he had been read and explained all of the requirements.

Jennifer Smith, a JPSO crime lab employee, testified that her duties included registering sex offenders for the sex offender registry. She explained that the offender would present her with his identification or proof of address, and she would enter the information on OffenderWatch, such as date of birth, vehicles, and employment. Ms. Smith would review the information and confirm the veracity of the information.

Ms. Smith testified that on October 22, 2010, she completed the initial sex offender registration information with defendant. She informed him that he had a lifelong registration requirement and that he must notify JPSO of any address change within three days of the change. Defendant certified that his registration information was true and complete and he was aware of and understood the registration and notification requirements. Ms. Smith testified that defendant failed to keep up with his sex offender registration, and as a result, he was charged and convicted in 2011 for failure to register.

Sergeant Smith, JPSO custodian of records for the sex offender registry, explained he had access to digitized DOC records via a program called “Cajun.” He confirmed that defendant had a lifelong registration obligation due to his 1982 attempted aggravated rape conviction. He also confirmed that even if the conviction for the sex offense occurred before the registration statutes were enacted, a sex offender was obligated to register if he served time after the June 18, 1992 enactment of the registration laws.

Sergeant Smith testified that defendant was convicted and sentenced for failure to register in 2011, and was released for this offense in January 2022. Sergeant Smith testified that his office received notice of defendant's release and expected defendant to register there because his last known residence was in Jefferson Parish. Because defendant did not register in Jefferson Parish within three days of being released, JPSO investigated his failure to report and ultimately obtained a warrant for his arrest and arrested him on December 13, 2022.

LAW and ANALYSIS

On appeal, in a counseled brief, defendant claims the trial court (1) failed to conduct an adequate Faretta ² hearing before allowing him to waive his right to counsel; (2) imposed an excessive sentence; and (3) failed to comply with the sentencing mandates of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. In four supplemental pro se briefs, defendant claims his conviction is invalid because, at the time of defendant's 1982 conviction, the registration law was not in effect and he was not returned to the criminal district court in which he was convicted and sentenced to be informed of his registration obligation.

 Self-Representation Issues

Defendant asserts the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself because it did not inform him of the dangers of self-representation or inquire into his age, his level of education, his ability to read or write, his understanding of the charges, or his understanding of trial procedures. Defendant also argues the trial court did not inquire whether he fully understood the nature of his request, or whether he had discussed self-representation with his court-appointed counsel.

Defendant further asserts that the trial court's previous discussion of these issues with him at his prior trial does not negate the trial court's duty to properly advise him regarding the current waiver. Finally, defendant references his mental health inconsistencies and claims this proceeding was more complex than the original failure to register charge because the State had to prove defendant's status as a habitual offender.

In response, the State references the dialogue between the trial court and defendant before trial on October 15, 2024. The State also points to the trial court's extensive knowledge about defendant during pre-trial proceedings in the instant case and the previous trial where defendant represented himself. State v. Elzy, 12-112 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/16/13), 109 So.3d 57, 62-64. As to counsel's reference to defendant's mental health, the State asserts that defendant was found competent to proceed after his competency was restored. The State also argues that defendant affirmed his desire to waive his right to choose counsel and invoke his right of self-representation after being arraigned on the amended bill of information. The State avers that the instant trial was not “infinitely more complex” than the charge in his prior case. The State further responds that the trial judge had ample opportunity to evaluate defendant's ability to understand and waive his right to counsel based on first-hand interactions and observations of defendant and its consideration of his multiple pro se filings.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution give a defendant the right to counsel as well as the right to defend himself. A defendant may represent himself only if he makes an unequivocal request to represent himself and knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 894, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003). A defendant must voluntarily and intelligently reject representation by an attorney and elect to conduct his own defense in a timely manner. State v. Bell, 21-599 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/22/22), 343 So.3d 914, 924, writ denied, 22-1179 (La. 9/27/22), 347 So.3d 155. Whether an accused has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel is a question which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540, 542 (La. 1991).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that in accepting a waiver of counsel at trial, the trial court judge should “advise the accused of the nature of the charges and the penalty range, should inquire into the accused's age, education and mental condition, and should determine according to the totality of the circumstances whether the accused understands the significance of the waiver.” Id. at 542. While the judge does not need to inquire into each and every factor stated to show a valid waiver of counsel, there must be sufficient inquiry on the record to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver under the overall circumstances. Id. There is no rigid set of criteria by which to determine whether a waiver of a defendant's right to counsel was knowing and intelligent. State v. Simmons, 05-1462 (La. 3/17/06), 924 So.2d 137, 138.

In accepting a waiver of counsel, the trial court should advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, such as the lack of knowledge regarding the inadmissibility of certain evidence, objections relative thereto, and the inability to adhere to technical rules governing trials. State v. Patton, 22-112 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/21/22), 355 So.3d 156, 166, writ denied, 23-151 (La. 11/8/23), 373 So.3d 60, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 145 S.Ct. 301, 220 L.Ed.2d 99 (2024); State v. Bruce, 03-918 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/03), 864 So.2d 854, 857.

Once the defendant has made an unequivocal request to represent himself, the trial court must determine whether the defendant is competent to waive counsel and is “voluntarily exercising informed free will.” State v. Santos, 99-1897 (La. 9/15/00), 770 So.2d 319, 321. The focus is on the defendant's competence to waive his right to counsel and not his competence to represent himself. Id.; State v. Victor, 13-888 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/14), 167 So.3d 118, 126.

In State v. Gauthier, 05-1365 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/27/06), 941 So.2d 642, 652, the fourth circuit found that the defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel, despite the fact that none of the colloquies with the trial judge covered matters such as the defendant's education, age, the nature of the charges against him, or the range of penalties for the charges. Id. at 651. The trial judge clearly warned the defendant of the dangers and pitfalls of representing himself at trial, saw defendant question members of the sanity commission in a pretrial hearing prior to trial, and heard witnesses at the competency and sanity hearings testify that the defendant was intelligent and “fairly articulate.” Id. The judge explained that from her observations, she found the defendant articulate, generally asked relevant questions, and was respectful and intelligent. Defendant also told the court that he used the prison law library, indicating he was aware of the criminal procedure and was not a stranger to the system. Id. In addition, there were copies in the record of letters defendant wrote showing he was quite literate, and handwritten notes of relevant questions that he wanted to ask the witnesses at his trial. Id. at 652.

In State v. Marts, 98-99 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/31/00), 765 So.2d 438, 442, the fourth circuit found that the defendant made a knowing and valid waiver of right to counsel, although the trial court failed to engage in a detailed colloquy regarding self-representation. Id. at 442-43. At his arraignment, the defendant informed the trial court he wanted to represent himself. The trial court cautioned defendant about representing himself and informed him of the potential sentencing range. The trial court appointed an attorney to assist him in the proceedings. Id. at 441.

In finding the defendant validly waived his right to counsel, the Marts court recognized that the defendant declared from the outset he wanted to represent himself, and although the judge warned him of the lengthy jail time he could face if found guilty, the defendant expressed confidence “that his previous history and experience in the criminal courts adequately prepared him for self-representation.” Id. at 442. The defendant was repeatedly cautioned about proceeding pro se, but he rejected legal advice and attempts to assist him from the indigent defender, the court, his co-defendant's attorney, and the prosecutor. Id.

In this case, at a motion hearing on September 16, 2024, defendant's court-appointed attorney told the trial court that defendant wished to represent himself relative to his pro se motion to quash. Defendant confirmed that counsel was still representing him, but indicated he wanted to argue the motion to quash on his own. Defendant also informed the court he wanted to file a motion to represent himself.

The record indicates the trial court evaluated defendant's competence to waive his right to counsel and found him competent to waive that right. Defendant had previously represented himself in a trial for the same offense before the same trial judge. Thus, the court was familiar with defendant's age, education, knowledge of the criminal justice system, and the ability to represent himself. After defendant told the trial court he wanted to represent himself, the trial court, on the record, reminded him of his claim on appeal of his previous conviction that the trial court had erred by allowing him to represent himself, and the appellate court's finding that the argument had no merit. State v. Elzy, 12-112 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/16/13), 109 So.3d 57. Due to defendant's declaration that he wanted to represent himself, the trial court read into the record excerpts from defendant's prior appeal. In that opinion, this court found the following: (1) the trial court had repeatedly warned defendant about self-representation; (2) defendant had testified that he was 52 years old, knew how to read and write, had a fifth grade education, had been in and out of prison for 34 years, and had been employed in various jobs; and (3) the trial court had lengthy interactions with defendant during the pre-trial hearings. Elzy, 109 So.3d at 62-64. As a result, this court found the record showed the trial court had inquired into the defendant's age, education and mental condition, and the totality of circumstances showed the accused had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

Considering the same trial judge presided over defendant's previous trial and observed defendant during his handling of pro se pre-trial motions in the current case, the trial court was clearly very familiar with defendant's background, including defendant's age, education, and mental condition, although the trial court did not specifically discuss these factors before the current trial.

In addition, the current record shows that the trial court warned defendant against representing himself in this case on multiple occasions:

(1) At the September 16, 2024 hearing on defendant's motion to quash, the trial court warned defendant and reminded him that the last time he had represented himself, the trial had resulted in a conviction.

(2) On October 15, 2024 before trial, the court informed defendant of the superseding bill, charging him as a second felony offender for failing to register as a sex offender and the sentencing range for the charge. The trial judge discussed defendant's wish to represent himself, referring to “multiple conversations” with defendant on the issue. The judge informed defendant that defense counsel would serve as standby counsel, and responded to defendant's questions as to the type of legal assistance she would provide. Defendant confirmed that he understood. Despite the judge's comments discouraging him from representing himself, defendant confirmed his intent to self-represent.

(3) On October 23, 2024, after the judge imposed defendant's sentence, the State stated it was filing the habitual offender bill, to which defendant pled “not guilty.” The judge again asked defendant if he wished to represent himself and advised him that listening to the advice of an attorney may benefit him. Defendant affirmed that he wanted to represent himself.

Finally, while defendant claims the trial court should not have allowed him to represent himself because of his “mental health inconsistencies,” the trial court found defendant competent to proceed on August 29, 2024. Defendant fails to cite to any specific details or instances involving mental health issues to support this claim.

Based on the overall circumstances, including the trial court's familiarity with defendant's background (including his age, education, and competency), his pro se motions, the trial court's warnings against self-representation, defendant's self-representation at his previous trial, and this court's analysis of this same issue in defendant's previous appeal, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant to represent himself. This assignment of error lacks merit.

 Sentencing Issues

Defendant claims his 25-year sentence is excessive, and that the trial court erred in failing to adequately consider the La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 sentencing factors. Consistent with the State's assertion, the record does not contain either a written or oral motion to reconsider the enhanced sentence. The failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence or to state the specific grounds upon which the motion is based limits a defendant to a review of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness only. State v. Harmon, 19-570 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/20), 301 So.3d 1278, 1288, writ denied, 20-1160 (La. 10/14/20), 303 So.3d 306. When the defendant does not raise the issue of failure to comply with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 in the trial court, that issue is not included within the appellate court's bare review for constitutional excessiveness, and the defendant is precluded from raising that issue on appeal. State v. Clark, 19-518 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/24/20), 296 So.3d 1281, 1291, writ denied, 21-62 (La. 3/9/21), 312 So.3d 585. Because the record does not contain a motion to reconsider sentence, we limit our review to whether defendant's sentence is constitutionally excessive.

Defendant alleges that his sentence is excessive because at his age of 65, the trial judge effectively imposed a life sentence. The State responds that defendant's 25-year enhanced sentence was well below his maximum sentencing exposure, that defendant has multiple convictions, and that defendant's instant conviction was not an isolated criminal act.

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. A sentence is excessive, even if it is within the statutory limits, if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense or imposes needless and purposeless pain and suffering. State v. Le, 22-468 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So. 3d 162, 172-73, writ denied, 23-1230 (La. 2/6/24), 378 So.3d 752. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. Id.

Appellate courts consider three primary factors in evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, including: (1) the nature of the crime; (2) the nature and background of the offender; and (3) the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts. State v. Bell, 21-599 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/22/22), 343 So.3d 914, 923, writ denied, 22-1179 (La. 9/27/22), 347 So.3d 155. Courts typically impose maximum sentences in cases involving the most serious violations of the offense charged and the worst type of offender. State v. Wilmot, 13-994 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/14/14), 142 So.3d 141, 149.

A trial judge has broad discretion when imposing a sentence and a reviewing court may not set aside a sentence absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Bell, 343 So.3d at 923. The appellate court considers whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been proper. State v. Soraparu, 97-1027 (La. 10/13/97), 703 So.2d 608. According to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D), the appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. A trial court should consider the defendant's personal history such as age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record, as well as his prior criminal record, seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation in determining an appropriate sentence. State v. Adams, 23-427 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/24/24), 386 So.3d 676, 686. A trial judge has broad discretion when imposing a sentence because it is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case. State v. Barnes, 23-208 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 196, 204, writ denied, 24-136 (La. 9/24/24), 392 So.3d 1141.

For a second violation of failure to register as a sex offender, defendant faced a sentencing ranging from 5 to 20 years imprisonment at hard labor. Thus, as an adjudicated second-felony offender, defendant faced a minimum sentence of 6.6 years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of 40 years imprisonment. Defendant received an enhanced sentence of 25 years imprisonment at hard labor.

In considering the nature of the crime, as well as the nature and background of defendant, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to 25 years imprisonment. Defendant's criminal history spans decades, including a 1982 attempted aggravated rape conviction, a 2011 failure to register as a sex offender conviction, and a 2012 obscenity conviction. In addition, defendant insists he had no obligation to register, despite his previous registration and acknowledgment of a lifelong obligation to maintain his registration.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that the sex offender registration laws were enacted to protect communities, assist the police in the investigation of sex offenders, and enable quick apprehension of sex offenders. State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 00-172 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, 747 cert. denied, 533 U.S. 936, 121 S.Ct. 2566, 150 L.Ed.2d 730 (2001). The Legislature found this legislation was of paramount governmental interest because sex offenders: (1) pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses, (2) have a high incidence of recidivism, and (3) could remain hidden and increase the risk to public safety without registration and community notification. Id.

Because the purpose of the registration laws is to protect the public, particularly children, from heinous crimes, defendant's failure to register is not to be taken lightly. Defendant was aware of his registration obligations as a sex offender based on his 2010 registration, in which he signed and acknowledged he was subject to lifetime registration. There is nothing to suggest defendant attempted to comply with the registration obligation relative to the current conviction. Defendant's continued failure to register and insistence he should not be obligated to register reflects a disregard for public safety, a lack of remorse, and an attempt to avoid supervision.

In reviewing defendant's sentence, the third factor involves the consideration of sentences imposed for similar crimes. Louisiana jurisprudence reveals cases involving defendants whose maximum 20-year sentences for failure to register, second offense, were upheld. This court upheld the imposition of a 20-year sentence where defendant's underlying criminal offenses involved felony convictions for aggravated oral sexual battery, indecent behavior with a juvenile, and sexual battery of a child younger than eighteen. State v. Mouton, 16-673 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/26/17), 219 So.3d 1244, 1258, writ denied, 17-1149 (La. 5/18/18), 242 So.3d 572. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal found the imposition of the 20-year maximum sentence was not constitutionally excessive in State v. Aulph, 47,966 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/13), 114 So.3d 610, 616, and State v. Young, 46,575 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/11), 73 So.3d 473, 478-79, writ denied, 11-2304 (La. 3/9/12), 84 So.3d 550. In these cases, the Second Circuit considered each defendant's continuous criminal history, lack of improvement, and continued pattern of escaping supervision. Id.

It is well-settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed. State v. Mejia, 23-161 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/23), 377 So.3d 860, 889, writ denied, 23-1722 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 705. The focus of a sentence review remains on the character and propensities of the offender and the circumstances of the offense. Id.

Upon review, we do not find defendant's 25-year sentence as a second-felony offender involving the failure to register as a sex offender constitutionally excessive. Defendant was exposed to a maximum sentence of 40 years as a second-felony offender. Thus, defendant's sentence is well within the statutory range. In addition, defendant has been convicted of this same crime twice, indicating that he has continued to disregard the law and his community's right to be aware of sex offenders in the area. Further, the record indicates defendant was clearly aware of his responsibilities as a sex offender in that he had previously registered in 2010, and signed and acknowledged he was subject to lifetime registration.

Considering the above, we find that the enhanced sentence is neither grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, nor is it shocking to this court's sense of justice. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant.

 Application of Registration Laws

In a handwritten, barely legible, pro se brief, defendant asserts the registration law is not applicable to his case in that it was never made a part of his sentence and that his conviction and sentence should be reversed. Defendant claims the law requires that the defendant be brought back to the same criminal district court where he was convicted to be informed in open court of his responsibility to register. Because he was not returned to Orleans Parish criminal district court, where he was convicted of attempted aggravated rape in 1982, to be informed that he had to register as a sex offender, he argues the registration law does not apply to him.

The law does not provide, as defendant contends, that a defendant must be brought back before the original trial court of conviction in order to be informed about the sex offender registration requirement. In addition, defendant fails to cite any authority for this contention. Defendant was informed of his registration obligation upon release from DOC, and he initially registered in October 2010. Further, the State produced evidence of defendant's January 6, 2022 signed acknowledgement of his sex offender registration requirements upon his release from the DOC.

The sex offender registration statute, effective June 18, 1992, clearly applied to defendants who were incarcerated for a sex offense at the time the law was passed. Moore v. Louisiana Attorney's General's Office, 24-588 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/21/25), 408 So.3d 549. The 1992 version of the statute provided in pertinent part, “Any adult residing in this state who has plead [sic] guilty or has been convicted of any sex offense shall register with the sheriff of the person's residence.” La. R.S. 15:542(A) (1992). In addition, the sex offender registration law has been found to be remedial and can be applied retroactively without violating the prohibition of the ex post facto clause. State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 779 So.2d at 749-50. The registration law does not present an ex post facto problem because any conviction based upon the statute is dependent upon the State proving that other relevant conduct took place after the statute's passage, i.e., a defendant's failure to register as a sex offender. State v. Mitchell, 10-193 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/29/10), 49 So.3d 958, 959.

Because defendant was incarcerated for attempted aggravated rape in 1992 when the law was passed and released thereafter, the sex offender registration law applies to him.

Accordingly, we find this assignment of error has no merit.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ms. Quintanilla testified that she worked for the JPSO Crime Lab as a latent print section supervisor. Latent prints are prints that are easily hidden or not easily seen without help from chemical, physical, photographic, or electronic means.

2.   A defendant may represent himself only if he makes an unequivocal request to represent himself and knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

WINDHORST, J.