RENTON PROPERTIES LLC v. 213 UPLAND LLC (2025)

In this protracted litigation, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, a cross-claim defendant, seeks review of the trial court's granting of JodyCorp, LLC's partial motion for summary judgment, declaring the title policy it issued to JodyCorp provides coverage for costs, expenses, and damages incurred by JodyCorp resulting from allegations of defective title. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court's judgment denying Commonwealth's motion for partial summary judgment and reverse the judgment to the extent it grants JodyCorp's partial motion for summary judgment.

In this appeal, Charles Cannon, III, third-party plaintiff, also seeks review of the trial court's granting of Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment, the denial of Mr. Cannon's motion for summary judgment, and the dismissal of Mr. Cannon's claim against Commonwealth. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the trial court's judgment granting Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment, denying Mr. Cannon's motion for summary judgment, and dismissing Mr. Cannon's claim against Commonwealth.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal involves an insurance coverage dispute relative to complex multiparty litigation, which was filed because 213 Upland, LLC, (“Upland”) sold property located at 213 Upland Avenue in River Ridge, Louisiana, to JodyCorp that Upland had allegedly previously agreed to sell to Renton Properties, LLC (“Renton”).

On August 10, 2017, Renton tendered an offer to purchase the Upland property for the sum of $365,000.00. Renton's offer stated:

Upon acceptance of this offer, SELLER and PURCHASER shall be bound by all of its terms and conditions and PURCHASER becomes obligated to deposit immediately with Seller's agent $10,000.00 and failure to do so shall be considered a breach of this agreement.” 1

On August 14, 2017, Upland responded to Renton's offer with a counteroffer of $425,000.00 and a deposit of $20,000.00. Renton accepted the counteroffer on Thursday, August 17, 2017. Mr. Renton printed and signed the check on Sunday, August 20, 2017, and left it taped to the front window in the reception area of his business located in Kenner, Louisiana.

Meanwhile, on August 15, 2017, another party, Charles R. Cannon, III, submitted a backup offer to purchase the Upland property for $500,000.00. 2 On August 17, 2017, Upland responded with a counteroffer, adding to Cannon's offer that the purchase agreement is “subject to termination of the Purchase Agreement with Counter signature of today's date and presently in effect between Seller and third party purchaser [Renton].” Mr. Cannon returned the executed counteroffer on Friday, August 18, 2017.

Approximately 8:00 A.M. on Monday, August 21, 2017, Emily Kramer, the agent for Upland, was at her office at Corporate Realty when she discovered that Renton had not yet furnished the $20,000.00 deposit. She immediately contacted Robert Tonti, a principle of Upland, and they in turn contacted their attorney R. Lewis McHenry (McHenry) to seek legal advice. At 9:09 A.M., Upland's attorney, Mr. McHenry emailed Mr. Mullin the following:

Our Firm represents Mrs. Margaret W. Tonti and 213 Upland, LLC, the owner of 213 Upland Avenue, River Ridge, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. This will advise you that the Owner did not receive the Deposit when the signed counteroffer was delivered to Owner's Broker, in contravention of the Purchase Agreement. The Purchase Agreement requires the Deposit to be delivered “immediately” and “failure to do so shall be considered a breach of this agreement.” Accordingly, the Purchase Agreement is null and void and without any force or effect.

After receiving the letter, Mr. Mullin attempted to hand deliver the $20,000.00 deposit check to Ms. Kramer at Corporate Realty. Ms. Kramer refused to accept the check on the advice of her client, Mr. Tonti, and Mr. McHenry, their attorney.

Meanwhile, on Monday, August 21, 2017, Upland sent Ms. Kramer and Ms. Carrone a “signed Cannon purchase agreement.” Mr. Cannon subsequently dropped off the deposit check at Corporate Realty. On Friday, August 25, 2017, JodyCorp, an entity owned by Cannon that was the actual purchaser, completed the act of sale on the Upland property via cash sale for $500,000.00. The sale was recorded the same day.

On August 25, 2017, Renton filed a petition naming Upland as a defendant and seeking specific performance, or alternatively, damages and injunctive relief. Renton claimed that Upland breached its obligation by refusing to accept its deposit and by attempting to declare the contract null and void. Renton asserted it is entitled to liquidated damages in the sum of $20,000.00, plus attorney's fees and all costs. On February 6, 2018, Renton filed its First Amended and Supplemental Verified Petition naming ten additional defendants, including Mr. Cannon and JodyCorp. In its amended petition, Renton alleged, in addition to seeking specific performance, that defendants breached the Renton Agreement, were negligent, committed fraud, and participated in unfair trade practices.

Because Renton's lawsuit challenged JodyCorp's ownership of the Upland property, JodyCorp and Mr. Cannon tendered the defense of the case to Commonwealth under the title insurance policy JodyCorp purchased when it bought the Upland property. Commonwealth agreed to defend JodyCorp, but refused to defend Mr. Cannon because he was not an insured under the policy. Commonwealth retained counsel for JodyCorp in March 2018.

The litigation of this case continued for more than four years after the appointment of defense counsel and involved delays due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the plethora of motions and writ applications filed by the parties, the recusal of one judge, and an attempt to recuse a second judge. The complete appellate record, split over two different appeals, consists of nearly 20,000 pages.

On August 3, 2022, five days before trial, JodyCorp's counsel negotiated a settlement on behalf of JodyCorp with Renton under which Renton agreed to take a cash payment from Commonwealth in return for the dismissal of Renton's claims against JodyCorp and Cannon, and the withdrawal of Renton's prayer for specific performance as to all defendants. Renton insisted that as part of the settlement, JodyCorp dismiss the incidental demands it had filed against the other parties, and JodyCorp agreed to do so.

On September 23, 2022, following its settlement with Renton, JodyCorp filed a cross-claim against Commonwealth. JodyCorp alleged that it had purchased the property for a townhouse development; that it could not develop the property while Renton's suit was pending; that it suffered substantial losses due to the delay; and that under the policy, Commonwealth owed those delay damages to JodyCorp. JodyCorp further alleged that Commonwealth's refusal to pay delay damages was in bad faith, entitling it to recovery of statutory penalties and attorney's fees. Commonwealth answered JodyCorp's cross-claim by denying all liability and raising a number of affirmative defenses under the policy.

Following the conclusion of discovery, both JodyCorp and Commonwealth moved for summary judgment on the issue of coverage, specifically whether the policy provides coverage for consequential delay damages allegedly incurred by JodyCorp during the pendency of Renton's litigation against it. Commonwealth's motion sought dismissal of JodyCorp's cross-claim in its entirety, while JodyCorp's motion was partial because it left the issues of bad faith and damages for later resolution. After a hearing on October 9, 2024, the trial court took both motions under advisement. By judgment dated October 10, 2024, the trial court granted JodyCorp's motion and denied Commonwealth's motion, finding the policy “provides for coverage of costs, expenses, and damages incurred by JodyCorp, LLC resulting from allegations of defective title.” In separate written reasons for judgment, the trial court stated in relevant part,

This Court finds that the Owner's Policy provides coverage based on unmarketable title. Specifically, this Court agrees with JodyCorp that Condition 7(b)(i) of the Owner's Policy clearly provides for payment of additional costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses incurred by the Insured․. This Court further declares that the Owner's Policy provides for coverage of costs, expenses, and damages incurred by JodyCorp resulting from allegations of defective title.

Because Commonwealth refused to defend Mr. Cannon, he filed a third-party demand against Commonwealth to enforce his right to a defense and indemnity under the policy. Mr. Cannon incurred substantial attorney's fees and costs defending the lawsuit for which he sought recovery from Commonwealth.

Commonwealth filed a motion for summary judgment against Mr. Cannon, arguing that Mr. Cannon was not an “Insured” under the policy because he was not expressly listed as an Insured and was not an owner of the subject property. Mr. Cannon claims that Commonwealth's duty to defend him is triggered by Renton's alter ego allegations against him that, as the principal member of JodyCorp, the corporate entity should be disregarded and Mr. Cannon should be held liable for JodyCorp's debts, as well as the demands for specific performance. Mr. Cannon filed a motion for summary judgment against Commonwealth, asserting it had a duty to defend him against the Renton claim and its denial was in bad faith.

After a hearing, the trial court granted Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment and denied Mr. Cannon's motion, finding Mr. Cannon was not an Insured under the policy. As a result, the court dismissed Mr. Cannon's third-party demand against Commonwealth.

LAW and ANALYSIS

Commonwealth appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment regarding JodyCorp's claim for coverage of consequential damages. Mr. Cannon appeals the trial court's granting of Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment and the dismissal his third-party demand against Commonwealth.

Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966 A(3); Burton v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co., 23-380 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/27/24), 384 So.3d 1130, 1135; Bryde v. Lakeview Reg'l Med. Ctr., LLC, 19-166 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/19), 284 So.3d 686, 691. The mover has the burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 966 D(1). The opposing party's burden is to “produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

A material fact is one that potentially insures or prevents recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of a lawsuit. Populis v. State Dep't of Transportation & Dev., 16-655 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/17), 222 So.3d 975, 980, writ denied, 17-1106 (La. 10/16/17), 228 So.3d 753. An issue is genuine if it is such that reasonable persons could disagree. If only one conclusion could be reached by reasonable persons, summary judgment is appropriate, as there is no need for a trial on that issue. Id.

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Rhodes v. AMKO Fence & Steel Co., LLC, 21-19 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/21), 329 So.3d 1112, 1117. The interpretation of an insurance policy is usually a legal question that can be properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Allday v. Newpark Square I Off. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 20-358 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/18/21), 327 So.3d 566, 573. Whether an insurance policy provides or precludes coverage is a dispute that can be properly resolved within the framework of a motion for summary judgment. Brewster v. Hunter, 09-932 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/9/10), 38 So.3d 912, 915, writ denied, 10-773 (La. 6/4/10), 38 So.3d 305. Summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance policy may not be rendered unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion, under which coverage could be afforded. Mangerchine v. Reaves, 10-1052 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/25/11), 63 So.3d 1049, 1053.

Insurance Policy Interpretation

An insurance policy is a conventional obligation that constitutes the law between the insured and insurer, and the agreement governs the nature of their relationship. La. C.C. art.1983. Courts interpret insurance policies the same way they do other contracts by using the general rules of contract interpretation as set forth in our Civil Code. Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 95-809 (La. 1/6/96); 665 So.2d 1166, 1169; Crabtree v. State Farm Ins. Co., 93-0509 (La. 2/28/94), 632 So.2d 736. The extent of coverage is determined from the intent of the parties as reflected by the words of the insurance policy. Ledbetter, 665 So.2d at 1169. The role of the judiciary in interpreting insurance contracts is to ascertain the common intent of the insured and insurer based on the policy language. La. C.C. art. 2045; Ledbetter, 665 So.2d at 1169. When the words of an insurance contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, courts must enforce the contract as written and may make no further interpretation in search of the parties’ intent. La. C.C. art. 2046; Central La. Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 579 So.2d 981, 985 (La. 1991); Peterson v. Schimek, 98-1712 (La. 3/2/99), 729 So.2d 1024, 1028.

An insurance contract must be construed as a whole and each provision in the contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions. Pecoraro v. Louisiana Citizens Ins. Corp., 18-161 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 258 So.3d 212, 215. One provision of the contract should not be construed separately at the expense of disregarding other provisions. Id.

Commonwealth's Appeal

Commonwealth claims the trial court erred in finding the policy provides indemnity coverage to JodyCorp for consequential or delay damages “resulting from allegations of defective title,” based on the following policy terms:

(1) Condition 9(a) provides that if Commonwealth establishes JodyCorp's ownership in a reasonably diligent manner, it “shall have fully performed its obligations with respect to that matter and shall not be liable for any loss or damage caused the Insured.”

(2) Condition Section 7(b)(1) only provides for reimbursement of certain authorized litigation expenses – specifically “any costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses incurred by the Insured Claimant that were authorized by the Company up to the time of payment․and that the Company is obligated to pay.”

(3) Condition Section 8 of the Conditions expressly limits the extent of the insurer's liability, even in the event of a title defect that cannot be cured, to the loss in property value caused by the defect.

Initially, it is important to recognize Commonwealth issued a title policy to JodyCorp, which insures “against loss or damage, not exceeding the Amount of Insurance, sustained or incurred by the Insured by reason of” any of ten specified title defects. For the Renton claim, the relevant defect is the provision referring to “Title being vested other than as stated in Schedule A,” which means title allegedly being vested in an entity other than JodyCorp. Title insurance is for property owners “or others having an interest therein against loss by encumbrance, or defective title, or adverse claim to title, and services connected therewith.” La. R.S. 22:47(9).

Property insurance is considered “first-party” insurance, in the sense that it covers a loss sustained by the insured, the first party to the insurance contract. Conversely, liability or “third-party” insurance covers the insured's liability to a third party (a non-party to the insurance contract) for that party's loss. Mangerchine, 63 So.3d at 1055 n.4, citing Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).

In its October 10, 2024 judgment, the trial court, interpreting Condition 7, stated that the Commonwealth policy issued to JodyCorp provides for “coverage of costs, expenses, and damages incurred by JodyCorp, LLC resulting from allegations of defective title.” Commonwealth argues the trial court legally erred by altering the terms of this condition and adding damages to the list of items covered.

Because Commonwealth eventually settled the claim against the title with Renton, condition 7 of the policy, Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims; Termination of Liability, was at issue between Commonwealth and JodyCorp. Pursuant to this condition, Commonwealth has three options to resolve a claim in addition to defending the Insured's title: (a) It can pay policy limits to the Insured; (b) It can “pay or otherwise settle” with the adverse title litigant in the name of the insured; or (c) it can pay or otherwise settle with the insured for “the loss or damage provided for under this policy.”  3 Should the insurer exercise any of these three options, it is also obligated to pay “any costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses incurred by the Insured Claimant that were authorized by the Company up to the time of payment and that the Company is obligated to pay.”

As argued by Commonwealth, the policy limits its obligation to “any costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses, incurred by the Insured Claimant that were authorized by the Company up to the time of payment and that the Company is obligated to pay.” (Emphasis added.) Commonwealth asserts that this language pertains to its defense obligation and not its indemnity obligation to the Insured.

Courts lack the authority to alter the terms of insurance contracts under the guise of contractual interpretation when the policy's provisions are couched in unambiguous terms. Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 07-54 (La. 5/22/07), 956 So.2d 583, 589; Cadwallader v. Allstate Insurance Co., 02-1637 (La. 6/27/03), 848 So.2d 577, 580. The rules of contractual interpretation do not authorize the exercise of inventive powers to create an ambiguity where none exists or the making of a new contract when the terms express with sufficient clarity the parties’ intent. Sims, 956 So.2d 583, 589; Edwards v. Daugherty, 03-2103 (La. 10/1/04), 883 So.2d 932, 941; Peterson, 729 So.2d at 1029.

Because the policy only used the terms costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses, the court cannot incorporate another item into the policy language and make the insurer liable for sums related to something not included within the parties’ intent under the policy. “Costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses” are not synonymous with “damages,” which is the term the trial court incorporated into this language to find coverage for damages caused the alleged defective title. Upon review of this condition and the entire policy, we find the terms costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses as written in this condition pertain more to defending JodyCorp against the title claim and not damages such as lost profits. This is further supported by the phrase written after these terms, specifically “that were authorized by the Company up to the time of payment.” It is illogical and unlikely the insurer would authorize “damages” caused by the defective title.

We therefore vacate the trial court's ruling to the extent it states the policy provides coverage for damages resulting from allegations of defective title under condition 7. In this regard, we also reverse the granting of JodyCorp's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of coverage for damages caused by allegations of defective title.

Commonwealth further asserts that this court should grant its motion for summary judgment in which it seeks dismissal of JodyCorp's cross-claim against it. Commonwealth argues that JodyCorp's claims are precluded by Condition 9(a) of the policy, which provides in relevant part that if Commonwealth “establishes the Title ․ as insured, in a reasonably diligent manner by any method, ․ it shall have fully performed its obligations with respect to that matter and shall not be liable for any loss or damage caused to the Insured.” Commonwealth claims it established JodyCorp's title as insured by defending it against Renton's claims and ultimately settling those claims on terms that preserved JodyCorp's ownership of the property. Commonwealth further claims it established title in a reasonably diligent manner by promptly appointing counsel after being notified of Renton's suit, and that counsel pursued JodyCorp's defense diligently from the very beginning of their engagement through the date of settlement. In its brief, Commonwealth provides an extensive timeline regarding its undertaking of JodyCorp's defense against the Renton claim, and defense counsel's strategies, discovery, defenses, and settlement negotiations in defending the claim. Based on this, Commonwealth asserts Condition 9(a) defeats JodyCorp's delay damage claim.

In other contexts, the determination of whether an insurer acted reasonably has been held to be a question of fact that must be evaluated based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Whether the insurer denied plaintiff's claim on just and reasonable grounds is a question of fact and must be considered on its own facts and circumstances. Benintende v. First Prot. Life Ins. Co., 452 So.2d 258, 260 (La. Ct. App. 1984). The issue of whether just and reasonable grounds exist is a question of fact, with each case being decided on its own facts and circumstances. Poche v. Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co., 391 So.2d 17 (La .App. 3d Cir.1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 885 (La. 1981); Perkins v. United American Ins. Co., 505 So.2d 206, 211 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Lucito v. Louisiana Hospital Service, Inc., 392 So.2d 700 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).

The appropriate standard for appellate review of factual determinations is the manifest error / clearly wrong standard which precludes the setting aside of a trial court's finding of fact unless the finding is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989); Smith v. Murret, 21-662 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/3/22), 347 So.3d 1126, 1129; Morgan v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Development, 06-615 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/16/07), 951 So.2d 408, 411. When the trial court's findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error standard demands great deference to the fact finder's conclusions, because “only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said.” Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844; Smith v. Murret, 347 So.3d at 1129.

Commonwealth recognizes in its brief that the amount of time it takes to clear title depends on a variety of factors, and each situation is different. As a result, Commonwealth indicates a uniform time period cannot be set or established relative to determining whether a claim was resolved in a “reasonably diligent manner.”

We believe the determination of whether Commonwealth handled the Renton claim in a “reasonably diligent manner” is a question of fact. The resolution of this issue depends on various factors, including, but not limited to, the complexity of the case, the number of parties involved, the viability of defense strategies, the amount of discovery necessary, and any COVID impact. Different determinations can easily be reached in the evaluation and resolution of these issues. Thus, we find a genuine issue of material fact exists, about which reasonable persons could disagree.

Because we find a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Commonwealth handled the Renton claim in a reasonably diligent manner, we further find no error in the trial court's denial of Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment against JodyCorp.

Mr. Cannon's Appeal

Mr. Cannon also filed a motion for appeal regarding the trial court's granting of Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment and finding that Mr. Cannon was not an insured under the policy. The policy defines the Insured as “The Insured named in Schedule A”, which is JodyCorp, LLC.

The term “Insured” also includes certain transferees of the property including “successors to the Title of the Insured by operation of law as distinguished from purchase, including heirs, devisees, survivors, personal representatives, or next of kin.” The language extending insured status to successors to the title indicates an individual or entity must acquire an interest in the insured property to have insured status under the policy. Mr. Cannon has never individually had an interest in the property by operation of law or through a purchase because JodyCorp remains the record owner of the property. Thus, Mr. Cannon is not entitled to insured status under this provision of the policy.

This result is consistent with the purpose of the policy, which is a first party coverage of property ownership to provide coverage against adverse title claims. La. R.S. 22:47(9) defines title insurance as follows: “Insurance of owners of property or others having an interest therein against loss by encumbrance, or defective title, or adverse claim to title, and services connected therewith.” The covered risks under the policy also relate to title claims, including but not limited to “title being vested other than as stated in Schedule A [JodyCorp]”, defects in the title, unmarketable title, inability to access property, and governmental actions affecting title and use of the property. As argued by Commonwealth, the policy does not cover third-party claims for damages. A title insurance policy provides indemnity for actual loss caused by a title defect; the insured must show that it suffered actual loss because of a failure of title. In re W. Feliciana Acquisition, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. 2014).

Mr. Cannon asserts that Commonwealth has an obligation to defend him under the policy because Renton made allegations against him that he was the alter ego of JodyCorp and sought specific performance against him. Mr. Cannon claims the policy's definition of insured policy is ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of coverage. Mr. Cannon, relying on the legal principle that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, argues he must only demonstrate a possibility that the claims against him in the petition fall within the policy's coverage to trigger Commonwealth's duty to defend.

With regard to the defense and prosecution of claims, the policy states:

Upon written request by the Insured, and subject to the options contained in Section 7 of these Conditions, the Company, at its own cost and without unreasonable delay, shall provide for the defense of an Insured in litigation in which any third party asserts a claim covered by this policy adverse to the Insured.

Based on this provision, the policy clearly only provides a defense to an Insured. As a result, in order for Mr. Cannon to be entitled to a defense, he must be an Insured under the policy. Mr. Cannon is not an Insured and thus is not entitled to a defense.

Considering the foregoing, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that no genuine issue of material exists relative to the lack of Mr. Cannon's insured status under the policy. Thus, we find the trial court properly granted Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment against Mr. Cannon on this issue.

DECREE

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Commonwealth against Mr. Cannon. We also affirm the trial court's judgment denying Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment against JodyCorp. We reverse the trial court's judgment to the extent it grants JodyCorp's motion for partial summary judgment finding the policy covers “damages incurred by JodyCorp, LLC resulting from allegations of defective title” based on the language in Condition 7(b)(i).

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART

FIFTH CIRCUIT

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SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

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25-CA-36

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24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

HONORABLE JUNE B. DARENSBURG (DISTRICT JUDGE)

CHARLES L. STERN, JR. (APPELLANT)

RENEE S. MELCHIODE (APPELLEE)

MADELEINE FISCHER (APPELLEE)

CAMILLE E. GAUTHIER (APPELLEE)

PATRICK S. MCGOEY (APPELLEE)

RICHARD L. TRAINA (APPELLANT)

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ALIXE L. DUPLECHAIN (APPELLEE)

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FOOTNOTES

1.   The offer provided for a 90-day due diligence period, followed by a closing within 30 days.

2.   This offer provided for a 15-day due diligence period and a closing within 5 days.

3.   This refers to the formula for determining the extent of the insurer's liability for a title defect that cannot be cured under Condition 8 of the policy.

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST JUDGE