STATE v. MCCARTY II (2025)

The State of Louisiana, through a grand jury indictment, charged defendant, Patrick Earl McCarty, II, with second degree murder (count one), in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1; obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence (count two), in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1) and (B)(1); and possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (counts three and four), in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1.¹ Defendant pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, the jury found him guilty as charged. The trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count one; twenty years imprisonment at hard labor on count two; and ten years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on counts three and four. Defendant now appeals, designating two assignments of error related to the sufficiency of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On June 14, 2022, a fisherman discovered a body floating in a bayou in Santa Rosa County, Florida. The body was wrapped in a white faux fur rug and had obvious signs of trauma. Officers from the Santa Rosa County Sheriff's Office identified the victim as Joshua James,² a St. Tammany Parish resident, through fingerprint identification. The officers contacted detectives from the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office (“STPSO”) to help them investigate. The STPSO detectives learned Joshua's brother, Jason James, lived in St. Tammany Parish with his boyfriend, the defendant.³ When detectives discovered that officers had been dispatched to Jason's house a few months before the homicide, they watched the bodycam footage officers obtained from the earlier visit, which showed there was a white faux fur rug in the living room. The rug appeared to be the same faux fur rug that was found wrapped around Joshua's body. Detectives then searched the house and discovered the white faux fur rug and living room couch were missing. The remnants of the couch were discovered in a burn pile outside the house. Jason and the defendant were brought in for questioning and thereafter arrested.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, defendant raises two assignments of error: (1) the evidence presented at trial showed the homicide was committed in the heat of passion caused by sufficient provocation such that the responsive verdict of manslaughter should be entered; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal as the evidence only supported a verdict of manslaughter.⁴ He does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his remaining convictions nor does he deny that he was the perpetrator of the homicide.⁵

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. C.Cr.P. art. 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Jacquot, 2023-1254 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/27/24), 392 So.3d 663, 667, writ denied, 2024-00979 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 69.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Jacquot, 392 So.3d 667.

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as a killing committed “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent can be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. Jacquot, 392 So.3d at 667.

The responsive verdict of manslaughter is defined, in pertinent part, as:

A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]

La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1).

The existence of “sudden passion” and “heat of blood” are not elements of the offense but, rather, are mitigating factors that the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence. Jacquot, 392 So.3d at 668. See also State v. Mellion, 2021-1116 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 41, 45, writ denied, 2022-00732 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 1186, cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 319, 214 L.Ed.2d 141 (2022). If a man unreasonably permits his impulse and passion to obscure his judgment, he will be fully responsible for the consequences of his act. Provocation and time for cooling off are determinations made by the trier of fact under the standard of the ordinary person with ordinary self-control. Thus, an appellate court must determine whether a rational trier of fact, upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find the mitigating factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. See Jacquet, 392 So.3d at 668.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. Mellion, 342 So.3d at 48. Provocation testimony is an issue of credibility. Id. at 47. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not re-assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a determination of guilt. Jacquot, 392 So.3d at 668.

At trial, Dr. Lorraine Lopez-Morell, accepted as an expert in forensic pathology, testified she was an associate medical examiner in Pensacola, Florida, and performed the autopsy of the victim on June 15, 2022. Dr. Lopez-Morell determined the manner of death was homicide and the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries. Additionally, Dr. Lopez-Morell found that Joshua suffered from ligature strangulation, a thermal burn, and acute ethanol and phenobarbital intoxication. Dr. Lopez-Morell testified there were significant blunt force injuries to Joshua's head, upper and lower extremities, and torso, and she noted his hyoid bone had been broken as a result of the ligature strangulation.⁶ With the exception of the thermal burn, Dr. Lopez-Morell determined that most of the injuries were inflicted perimortem, or before death. The toxicology report revealed Joshua's blood alcohol concentration was .358, which Dr. Lopez-Morell characterized as significant.

Adam Rudolph, the sergeant of the Major Crimes Unit of the STPSO at the time of the homicide, testified the STPSO was contacted after Joshua's body was found in Santa Rosa County, Florida. After he learned that Joshua's brother, Jason, lived in St. Tammany Parish, Sergeant Rudolph recalled that he had recently been dispatched to Jason's house in response to an unrelated missing person's report. Sergeant Rudolph identified bodycam footage from the night of March 28, 2022, which captured the officers’ interaction with defendant and showed a white faux fur rug in the living room. On June 15, 2022, officers searched the house Jason shared with the defendant to determine if the white faux fur rug was in the house. Sergeant Rudolph testified there was a burn pile outside the house that contained springs and other furniture pieces. Importantly, the carpet, white faux fur rug, and couch that Sergeant Rudolph saw in the March 28, 2022 bodycam footage were missing from the living room on the day of the search. Sergeant Rudolph testified that the defendant and Jason were detained during the search and interviewed.

After being advised of and waiving his Miranda ⁷ rights, defendant provided a statement to police. Throughout his hours-long interview, defendant's version of events changed. After the police informed defendant that Joshua was reported missing, defendant said Joshua was still alive when he last saw him. Defendant explained that Joshua had problems with alcohol and caused drama in his relationship with Jason. After police informed defendant that they had found Joshua's body, defendant admitted that he punched Joshua “a few times” in the neck and nose. Defendant later admitted that he “punched the s*** out of him.” While defendant adamantly maintained that he did not kill Joshua, he did admit that he, Jason, and Navarre drove to Florida after his altercation with Joshua. However, he said he was highly intoxicated and could not recall much of what happened.

Police determined that Lindsey Mautino, the branch manager of the Fidelity Bank in Mandeville in 2022, interacted with defendant and Joshua on the day of the homicide. Mautino described the defendant and Joshua as follows:

Their demeanor was a little off. They were -- one of them did not have shoes on. That same person had clothes that were probably two to three times too big for him and his hair was a disarray. Once I approached him, the smell -- they did not smell nice at all. They․ didn't need to be out in the public, in my opinion. So I asked them how could I help them, at that point.

According to Mautino, defendant told her he “needed help getting on his husband's account” and identified Joshua as his husband. Mautino observed that Joshua was spinning very slowly, his eyes were rolling back in his head, he was unable to speak coherently, and he was mumbling. Mautino pulled the defendant and Joshua into her office and informed the defendant that Joshua “was in no way, shape, or form able to request or conduct any business,” and they could return to the bank when Joshua was sober, able to provide proper identification, and more presentable. Surveillance footage from the bank indicated that the defendant and Joshua were at the bank between 11:30 and 11:45 a.m.

Aarin Navarre, who was seventeen years old at the time of the homicide, testified about his involvement in Joshua's death. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Navarre pled guilty to manslaughter and agreed to testify at the defendant's trial in exchange for a twenty-year sentence. According to Navarre, he met defendant when he was about fifteen years old and sold defendant marijuana. Navarre eventually developed a friendship with him. On June 13, 2022, Navarre asked defendant to pick him up from his house to run errands, and Jason, Joshua, and defendant picked him up around noon. Navarre said Joshua and defendant were in the back seat while he sat in the front with Jason. Navarre, Joshua, and defendant were drinking Jameson liquor, and Navarre was smoking marijuana. Joshua said he didn't think defendant was good for Jason. Angered by the comment, defendant began to hit Joshua on the face with his hand and a pink gun. Defendant also hit Joshua on the back and front of his head and on his body. Navarre said Joshua “tried to throw one punch back” at defendant, but “he was kind of sluggish” and unable to hit back, describing him as very intoxicated. According to Navarre, Joshua was “just taking it.” At one point, the fight stopped, and when Navarre glanced back, he saw the defendant performing oral sex on Joshua. Navarre testified that neither he nor Jason said anything and Jason kept driving.

When they arrived at Jason and the defendant's house, Jason helped a stumbling Joshua out of the car and sat him down on the couch. Navarre said he could tell the defendant was “pretty drunk” from drinking multiple bottles of Jameson liquor in the back seat and because “it don't make no sense on how angry he could be.” Navarre and Jason sat down at the kitchen table, and the defendant began walking around the living room, rambling about how Joshua couldn't get between him and Jason and how Joshua owed Jason money. Navarre said Joshua had no visible response to the defendant's ramblings and sat on the couch “acting like he wasn't hearing [anything].” Defendant then pulled Joshua off the couch by his hair, punched him until he fell on the ground face-first, and began punching and kicking him all over his body. According to Navarre, defendant repeatedly slammed Joshua's head onto the ground and Joshua did not try to fight back. Navarre said the defendant pulled Joshua's pants down and he thought the defendant was going to perform oral sex on him again, so he left the room for about thirty to forty-five minutes. When Navarre walked back into the living room, Joshua was nonresponsive and, after several unsuccessful attempts to awaken Joshua, defendant said they needed to get rid of the body.

After Jason wrapped his brother's body in the white faux fur rug, Jason and Navarre carried the body to the car and placed it in the trunk. Navarre said they drove by Joshua's house, and the defendant threw Joshua's cell phone out the window near the house. Their plan was to drive to Georgia; however, while stopping to rest in Florida, they saw two police cars nearby and got “spooked.” Navarre testified that, instead, they drove down a road and stopped on a bridge. Navarre and Jason threw the body in the river, but the defendant remained in the car because his wrist was injured. Then, they drove back to Louisiana. Navarre said once they got back to the house, they disassembled the couch, wiped blood from the walls, mopped the floor, and pulled up the carpet. The disassembled couch and carpet were set on fire in the fire pit, along with the clothes Jason, Navarre, and the defendant were wearing.

On cross-examination, Navarre acknowledged that he was not initially truthful when questioned by police, as he initially said the defendant forced the others to help him dump the body “and stuff,” when actually, the defendant did not force the others to help. Regarding defendant's mental state, Navarre agreed that, after the fight in the car, defendant was angry and remained in an agitated state for the remainder of the car ride. Once at the house, defendant was “in a rage[,]” which culminated in the physical altercation about five minutes after they arrived at the house. Navarre testified that Jason paid him three thousand dollars the day after the homicide.

On appeal, defendant argues that he was angered and upset by Joshua's attempts to interfere with his relationship with Jason, which resulted in the physical altercation in the vehicle and the ensuing fatal altercation at the house. Defendant contends, “[t]hese circumstances support a finding that this was a manslaughter committed in the heat of passion caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection.” We disagree.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the record supports the jury's second degree murder verdict. A reduction of second degree murder to manslaughter requires that the killing be committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1). While defendant claims he was provoked by Joshua's statements insulting him and attempting to interfere with his relationship with Jason, the evidence showed a substantial amount of time passed between the altercation in the vehicle and the time when Joshua was killed — sufficient time for an ordinary person with ordinary self-control to cool off. Further, the evidence showed that by the end of the car ride, defendant stopped beating Joshua and began performing oral sex on him.

There was no allegation that Joshua threatened physical harm at any point, and nothing in the moments leading up to the homicide established that Joshua provoked the defendant in a manner sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. See State v. Tran, 98-2812 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/5/99), 743 So.2d 1275, 1292, writ denied, 99-3380 (La. 5/26/00), 762 So.2d 1101. To the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly showed Joshua was so intoxicated on the day of the homicide that he was unable to form coherent sentences or walk without assistance. Moreover, it is well-settled that mere words or gestures, however offensive or insulting, will not reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. See Mellion, 342 So.3d at 47.

Here, defendant bore the burden of establishing that the mitigating factors of sudden passion or heat of blood were present at the time of the killing. See Mellion, 342 So.3d at 47-48. Under the facts and circumstances presented in this case, we cannot say the jury was irrational in determining that the defendant failed to prove the mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. Rather, after a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the jury's verdict. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict based on an exculpatory hypothesis of mitigatory circumstances presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Eby, 2017-1456 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/6/16), 248 So.3d 420, 426-27, writ denied, 2018-0762 (La. 2/11/19), 263 So.3d 1153. Accordingly, defendant's assignments of error lack merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this Court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. See Anthony, 378 So.3d at 775. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.⁸ Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:95.1(B) required the trial court to impose a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars as part of defendant's two sentences for possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies. The trial court failed to impose the mandatory fine, rendering the sentences on counts three and four illegally lenient. However, since the sentences are not inherently prejudicial to the defendant, and the State has not raised this sentencing issue on appeal, we decline to correct this error. See State v. Hollins, 2023-0785 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/19/24), 387 So.3d 641, 652, writ denied, 2024-00487 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So.3d 865.

Accordingly, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

I agree with the affirmation of the defendant's convictions and sentences. I concur to note that based on our opinions in State v. Jarrell, 2024-0570 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/17/25), 2025 WL 2942641, *15-16 (unpublished), and State v. Vongchanh, 2024-0369 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 76, 82, I would find that the trial court's language after imposing the sentences is patent error under La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). In the instant case, as in Jarrell, the trial court informed the defendant that “any application for post-conviction relief must be filed within two years after your sentence becomes final.” See Jarrell, 2025 WL 2942641 at *16. Because a defendant generally has two years after the “judgment of conviction and sentence” has become final to seek post-conviction relief under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A), the trial court provided incomplete advice regarding the prescriptive period for seeking post-conviction relief. Jarrell, 2025 WL 2942641 at *16; Vongchanh, 404 So.3d at 82. However, as stated in the opinion, the trial court's failure to properly advise the defendant has no bearing on the sentences and is not grounds to reverse the sentences or remand for resentencing. Jarrell, 2025 WL 2942641 at *16; Vongchanh, 404 So.3d at 82.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Also indicted for second degree murder were co-defendants Jason Robert James and Aarin Navarre, who was seventeen at the time of the offense. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Navarre pled guilty to manslaughter and testified against the defendant at trial. At the time of defendant's trial, Jason had not proceeded to trial or pled guilty.

2.   Given that the victim and co-defendant Jason Robert James are brothers and share the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

3.   Defendant is referred to by his nickname, “Paris,” throughout the record.

4.   We note the question of the legal sufficiency of evidence is properly raised by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, not by a motion for new trial. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821. An appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion for new trial only for errors of law. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 858; State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 790 n.3 (en banc), writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177. Accordingly, the only issue reviewable in this assignment of error is the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence, which defendant raised in his motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Id.

5.   As defendant does not argue the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions for obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence (count two) and possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (counts three and four), we will not discuss the evidence adduced at trial relating to those convictions.

6.   According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the hyoid bone is a U-shaped bone or complex of bones that is situated between the base of the tongue and the larynx and that supports the tongue, the larynx, and their muscles.

7.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

8.   After sentencing, the trial court advised the defendant that under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A), in pertinent part, “any application for post-conviction relief must be filed within two years after your sentence becomes final.” As written, Article 930.8(A) provides that “[n]o application for post conviction relief ․ shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922.” According to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(D), the trial court must “inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for post-conviction relief either verbally or in writing.” Here, the trial court's language did not track the language of Article 930.8(A) verbatim, as the trial court did not inform the defendant that he must file any application for post-conviction relief within two years after “the judgment of conviction and sentence” become final. (Emphasis added). We nevertheless find that the trial court's instruction satisfied the requirements of Article La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(D) as the defendant's sentence could not become final until there was a final judgment of conviction. Thus, we do not find that the trial court's advice constituted patent error. Even if we did, which we do not, the trial court's advice has no bearing on the sentence and would not constitute grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. See State v. Vongchanh, 2024-0369 (La. App 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 76, 82.

GREENE, J.

Stromberg, J., concurs with reasons. McClendon, C.J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Judge Stromberg.