CECILE GUILLOT v. JULES GUILLOT (2025)

Plaintiff/appellant Cecile Guillot appeals two judgments rendered by the trial court on January 30, 2025. The first judgment granted her husband, defendant/appellee Jules Guillot, a divorce pursuant to La. C.C. art. 102. The second judgment granted Mr. Guillot's motion for a new trial relative to the trial court's judgment of November 7, 2024, and reinstated the hearing officer's interim judgment of January 11, 2024 which awarded specific amounts of child support and interim spousal support payable by Mr. Guillot to Mrs. Guillot. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments. We further deny Mr. Guillot's answer to the appeal of the divorce judgment, finding that the appeal of the divorce judgment is not frivolous.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Cecile Guillot and appellee Jules Guillot were married in Jefferson Parish in 2006 and are the parents of three minor daughters. On November 10, 2023, Mrs. Guillot filed a petition for divorce based on La. C.C. art. 103(2), alleging that Mr. Guillot had committed adultery, or in the alternative, seeking a divorce pursuant to La. C.C. art. 102 based on the parties’ prospective living separate and apart for the requisite time period.¹ Mr. Guillot filed an answer and a reconventional demand, also seeking a divorce pursuant to La. C.C. art. 102.

The parties litigated the issues of custody, child support, and spousal support before the hearing officer in 2024. Following a hearing on January 10, 2024, the hearing officer recommended that interim spousal support be set at $900 per month and child support be set at $45.35 per month, both payable by Mr. Guillot to Mrs. Guillot. The hearing officer's recommendations, which also addressed other ancillary issues, were made the judgment of the court on January 31, 2024. Both parties timely filed objections. The objections were ultimately heard by the district court judge on November 7, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, which included testimony from the parties and submission of evidence, the judge amended the January 31, 2024 judgment in only two ways: in favor of Mrs. Guillot, increasing interim spousal support to $955 per month and increasing child support to $345 per month. Mr. Guillot timely filed a motion for a new trial, which was set for hearing on January 30, 2025.

In the meantime, on November 26, 2024, Mr. Guillot filed a rule to show cause why a divorce should not be granted under La. C.C. art. 102, which was set for hearing before the domestic commissioner on January 15, 2025. The next day, on November 27, 2024, Mrs. Guillot filed a rule to set her Article 103(2) (adultery) divorce for trial in front of the district court judge, which was set for hearing on January 30, 2025. When the parties appeared before the domestic commissioner on January 15, 2025 for Mr. Guillot's rule, the commissioner declined to hear it, deeming the divorce “contested” because of Mrs. Guillot's later-filed rule seeking the Article 103(2) (adultery) divorce.² Mr. Guillot's rule was then set before the district court judge on January 30, 2025, the same day as Mrs. Guillot's rule to show cause for the Article “103(2)” divorce before the district court judge. Mr. Guillot's motion for a new trial had also previously been set for that same day, as noted above.

At the January 30, 2025 hearing, counsel for Mrs. Guillot objected to the trial court's hearing Mr. Guillot's rule for an Article 102 divorce without also hearing her rule for an Article 103(2) divorce. The trial court, noting that Mr. Guillot's rule to show cause for the Article 102 divorce was filed before Mrs. Guillot's rule to show cause for the Article 103(2) divorce, took up Mr. Guillot's rule to show cause, and ultimately granted the parties a divorce pursuant to La. C.C. art. 102, living separate and apart for the requisite time period, thus rendering Mrs. Guillot's rule for the Article 103(2) (adultery) divorce moot. The trial court also took up Mr. Guillot's motion for a new trial, which it granted, reinstating the hearing officer's recommendations for child support and spousal support.³

Mrs. Guillot filed a motion for a devolutive appeal of both judgments. Mr. Guillot filed an answer to the appeal, seeking attorney's fees and costs for an allegedly frivolous appeal of the divorce judgment by Mrs. Guillot.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Priority between Article 102 divorce and Article 103 divorce

Mrs. Guillot first argues that the trial court committed legal error in refusing to hear her Article “103(2)” (adultery) divorce first, and hearing only Mr. Guillot's rule for his Article “102” (no fault) divorce and granting the same, when both rules were set before the court on the same day. She argues that she had just as much right to her fault-based divorce (as Mr. Guillot allegedly already admitted to adultery) as Mr. Guillot had to his “102” divorce. She argues that the judge should have heard both rules and only then decide which one to grant. And, she argues, both parties could have left court that day with a divorce regardless of which divorce was granted, because the requisites for each were established. She does not dispute that the factual grounds for an Article 102 divorce were established at the January 30, 2025 rule hearing. At the hearing, Mr. Guillot testified to the facts entitling him to an Article 102 divorce. Mrs. Guillot waived her right to cross-examination and did not contest his evidence.

Louisiana Civil Code article 102 provides:

Except in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted upon motion of a spouse when either spouse has filed a petition for divorce and upon proof that the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, has elapsed from the service of the petition, or from the execution of written waiver of the service, and that the spouses have lived separate and apart continuously for at least the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, prior to the filing of the rule to show cause.

The motion shall be a rule to show cause filed after all such delays have elapsed.4

Louisiana Civil Code article 103 provides:

Except in the case of a covenant marriage, a divorce shall be granted on the petition of a spouse upon proof that:

(1) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously for the requisite period of time, in accordance with Article 103.1, or more on the date the petition is filed.

(2) The other spouse has committed adultery.

(3) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor.

(4) During the marriage, the other spouse physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking divorce or a child of one of the spouses, regardless of whether the other spouse was prosecuted for the act of abuse.

(5) After a contradictory hearing or consent decree, a protective order or an injunction was issued during the marriage against the other spouse to protect the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses from abuse.

Pursuant to Article 102, “a divorce shall be granted upon a motion of a spouse when either spouse has filed a petition for divorce” (emphasis added) and upon proof that the requisite period of time has elapsed from the service of the petition and the spouses have lived separate and apart continuously for at least the requisite period of time prior to the filing of the rule to show cause. Simmons v. Simmons, 34,942 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/01), 795 So.2d 448, 450, writ not considered, 01-2646 (La. 12/14/01), 803 So.2d 982. “The word ‘shall’ as used in article 102 is mandatory and requires the trial court to grant a divorce upon proof that [the requisite period of time has] elapsed since the date of original separation. ․ The article does not require the filing of an answer to the petition or prior resolution of all the ancillary or reconventional claims raised by the other spouse. Its effects take place, automatically, by operation of law (absent reconciliation) on proof by the moving spouse that the delay period expired.” Id., quoting Borel v. Borel, 624 So.2d 1279 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, the article's reference to “the motion of a spouse” makes clear that the defendant in a divorce petition may fix the rule and obtain the divorce, if he presents the requisite evidence. Id., citing Bishop v. Bishop, 98-59 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/27/98), 712 So.2d 697.

Under Article 103, however, a spouse files a petition requesting an immediate divorce because the requisite event has already occurred, i.e., either living separate and apart for the full requisite time period (Article 103(1)), or the commission by the other spouse of adultery (Article 103(2)), or a felony with imprisonment (Article 103(3)), or abuse of the petitioning spouse or child (Article 103(4)), or after a contradictory hearing or consent decree, a protective order or an injunction was issued during the marriage against the other spouse to protect the spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses from abuse (Article 103(5)). Article 103 also requires that the petitioner file a rule to show cause.

Contrary to Mrs. Guillot's arguments, there is no statutory or jurisprudential requirement that a trial judge must hear competing divorce rules when filed pursuant to different codal articles and decide which one to grant, nor does she cite any authority for her position.⁵ In this case, the trial judge took up Mr. Guillot's rule first because it was filed before Mrs. Guillot's, which is an objectively reasonable way to proceed, and which was within the trial court's great discretion in managing its docket.⁶

On appeal, Mrs. Guillot argues that she “had just as much right” to her fault-based divorce as Mr. Guillot had to his no-fault Article 102 divorce. Mrs. Guillot does not explain, however, nor does the record show, why she waited over a year after filing her petition for divorce to file her Article 103(2) divorce rule, when she had every right to do so at any time during the year between the filing of her petition for divorce and when she ultimately filed her rule. It appears that her timing for filing her Article 103(2) divorce rule was motivated or triggered by Mr. Guillot's action, one day before, in filing his Article 102 divorce rule. Any prejudice Mrs. Guillot may have suffered as a result of the trial court's action was apparently at least partly caused by her own inaction in not filing her Article 102(2) divorce rule sooner.

One of the benefits of obtaining a fault-based divorce pursuant to La. C.C. art. 103(2) is that there is no waiting period: the divorce is immediate. Martin v. Trushyna, 19-79 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/13/19), 283 So.3d 1083, 1089, citing 2015 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 221 § 4. In this particular case, however, this benefit is not exclusive to the Article 103(2) rule, because, as Mrs. Guillot noted in brief, the parties were also entitled to an immediate divorce based upon living separate and apart pursuant to Article 102.⁷

Just as in Martin v. Trushyna, supra, a final judgment of divorce has been issued in this case. Overturning that decision would be contrary to the purposes of La. C.C. art. 102, which the legislature enacted to provide “an expeditious method of granting a divorce,” and litigating fault claims delays what was intended to be a streamlined process. Martin, 283 So.3d at 1089, citing Watters v. Watters, 607 So.2d 948, 949-50 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 610 So.2d 819 (La. 1993). Nor has Mrs. Guillot lost her right to litigate her claims of fault in a future proceeding, if necessary or desired. Watters, 607 So.2d at 950 (“Furthermore, we find that defendant has in no way been prejudiced by the trial court's judgment since she may still litigate her claims of fault.”).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its great discretion in hearing Mr. Guillot's first-filed uncontested divorce rule instead of hearing Mrs. Guillot's later-filed contested divorce rule, especially considering that Mrs. Guillot has not lost her right to litigate her claims of fault in a future proceeding, if necessary or desired. This assignment of error is without merit.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Motion for a New Trial

Mrs. Guillot next argues that the trial court erred in granting Mr. Guillot's motion for a new trial and reinstating the recommendations of the hearing officer's January 11, 2024 interim order (later reduced to a written judgment dated January 31, 2024) regarding child support and spousal support, and making these recommendations the judgment of the court.

Judgments granting or denying a new trial are usually interlocutory and therefore not appealable. Alvarez v. LeBlanc, 08-247 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/30/08), 996 So.2d 517, 519; Succession of Burke, 24-141 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/24), 398 So.3d 1191, 1196-97. However, in this case, the trial court's judgment also granted Mr. Guillot relief on the merits, reinstating the previous amounts of child support and interim spousal support for which he was liable pursuant to the January 31, 2024 written judgment. Also, it is apparent from the arguments made in brief that Mrs. Guillot appeals the substantive relief rendered in Mr. Guillot's favor, the reinstatement of the amounts of child support and interim spousal support in the January 31, 2024 judgment.⁸ Accordingly, the judgment of January 30, 2025, which granted the new trial and determined the merits of the child support and interim spousal support claims, is a final and appealable judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 1841.⁹

The January 31, 2024 judgment contained many detailed stipulations and recommendations regarding the parties’ communications, custody, holidays and visitation, co-parenting, child support, and spousal support. The evidence showed that both parties are employed, but Mr. Guillot carries the health insurance for the children at a cost of over $500 per month. Among other terms, the judgment awarded Mrs. Guillot $45.35 per month for child support effective January 20, 2024, and interim spousal support in the amount of $900 per month effective November 10, 2023. The judgment also memorialized terms for Mr. Guillot's payment of back child support and arrearages in the amount of $2,616.67 to Mrs. Guillot, as well as for the payment of retroactive interim spousal support in the amount of $2,400. The children's medical expenses, school expenses, and child care expenses would be borne 58% by Mr. Guillot and 42% by Mrs. Guillot.

Both parties objected to various terms in the judgment. Mrs. Guillot objected to the amounts awarded to her for child support, spousal support, and the percentages of expenses each party would bear for “various extra expenses.” Mr. Guillot objected to “Custody; Physical Custody; Child Support; Use of Family Home; Use of Community Movables; Interim Spousal Support; Private School; Injunctions.” A hearing was set on the objections for March 14, 2024, but was continued. The objections were ultimately heard by the district court judge on November 7, 2024. Finding that “the preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing indicates that both the child support and spousal support obligations recommended by the Hearing Officer are too low ․,” the trial judge amended the January 31, 2024 judgment only with respect to two specific terms: he increased the amount of child support due to Mrs. Guillot from $45.35 to $345 per month, and increased the interim spousal award from $900 to $950 per month. The trial judge denied both parties’ objections to every other term of the January 31, 2024 judgment.

A new trial may be granted, upon contradictory motion of any party or by the court on its own motion, to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, or for reargument only. La. C.C.P. art. 1971. A new trial shall be granted, upon contradictory motion of any party, when the verdict or judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and the evidence. La. C.C.P. art. 1972. A new trial may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor, except as otherwise provided by law. La. C.C.P. art. 1973. The granting or denying of a motion for a new trial is within the discretion of the trial court. Healthlogic Partners, L.L.C. v. Owen, 22-47 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/2/22), 362 So.3d 824, 841, writ denied, 22-01885 (La. 2/24/23), 356 So.3d 334, citing 131 Beverly Knoll, LLC v. Clipper Constr., LLC, 18-486 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/19), 273 So.3d 1243, 1250. The trial court's determination of a motion for a new trial shall not be disturbed absent an abuse of its discretion. Id., citing Lambert v. State Through Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 96-160 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/96), 683 So.2d 839, 845.

Mrs. Guillot argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the new trial, because three hours of testimony at the trial on November 7, 2024 showed that Mr. Guillot was earning “significantly” more than was represented by the pay stubs he had submitted into evidence to the hearing officer, and thus the hearing officer had used lower figures, which were wrong, to calculate Mr. Guillot's support obligations. She also argues that Mr. Guillot revealed that while he was “responsible” for half of the expenses in his new living situation, he was not actually paying them.

Mr. Guillot argued at the hearing that based upon the evidence presented to the hearing officer, as well as his testimony, both the original award and the increased award of interim spousal support were beyond his ability to pay. Counsel highlighted that Mr. Guillot pays $549 each month for the children's health insurance. He argued that his evidence at the hearing showed that he earned less than when the parties were together, for reasons totally unattributable to him. He testified that he was currently employed full time at an apartment complex in maintenance, which was forty hours per week with additional call time. He previously performed pressure washing services for a relative's business, but that relative's death and the division of the business between the relative's two children caused him to be assigned fewer “side” jobs. He still worked around 60 hours per week between his full-time job and side jobs, and thus argued that he should not be found to be voluntarily underemployed. Counsel for Mr. Guillot asked for child support to be recalculated based on the parties’ actual income applied to the support guidelines found in La. R.S. 9:315, and that interim spousal support be reduced to something that Mr. Guillot could pay. At the hearing, the entire record was entered as an exhibit. The judge recessed court so that he could review the evidence. After court resumed, the judge granted Mr. Guillot's motion for a new trial, reinstating the hearing officer's recommendations of January 11, 2024 (written judgment of January 31, 2024), and further denied both parties’ objections to the hearing officer's recommendations.

On appeal, we review the trial court's findings of fact under the manifest error standard. Martin v. Trushyna, 283 So.3d at 1086, citing Thomas v. Thomas, 17-0760 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/21/18), 238 So.3d 515, 518. The trial judge is vested with great discretion in weighing evidence and credibility. Id. A trial court's findings of fact cannot be reversed unless a reasonable factual basis for the verdict does not exist and the record establishes that the verdict is manifestly erroneous. Id. The manifest error standard also applies to mixed questions of law and fact. Id. When an issue is a strictly legal question, the de novo standard of review is used. Id.

In its written judgment granting the motion for a new trial, the court stated:

After reviewing the law and evidence, this Court finds that its Judgment of November 7, 2024, was contrary to the law and evidence. Therefore, pursuant to Articles 1971, 1972, and 1973 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, this Court must grant the Defendant's Motion for New Trial, and issues the follows Judgment in accordance therewith.

(Underlining in original; italics added.) The court then granted the motion for a new trial, vacated its November 7, 2024 judgment, and adopted the hearing officer's interim order of January 11, 2024 with respect to the amount of child support due to Mrs. Guillot ($45.35 per month), and the amount of interim spousal support awarded to Mrs. Guillot ($900 per month).¹⁰

Having carefully reviewed the entire record, we find no manifest error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in granting the motion for a new trial and reinstating the amounts of child support and interim spousal support contained in the January 31, 2024 judgment memorializing the hearing officer's recommendations. The trial court evidently felt that it originally miscalculated the appropriate amounts of child support and interim spousal support based on the evidence and testimony presented and thus decided to reinstate the hearing officer's recommendations of January 11, 2024 (written judgment of January 31, 2024), which was clearly within the trial court's broad discretion in deciding whether or not to grant the motion for a new trial. All things considered, we find no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling on Mr. Guillot's motion for a new trial. This assignment of error is without merit.

ANSWER TO THE APPEAL

Mr. Guillot has answered the appeal, arguing that Mrs. Guillot's appeal of the divorce judgment was frivolous. Upon review, we deny Mr. Guillot's answer to the appeal of the divorce judgment, finding that the appeal of the divorce judgment is not frivolous.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of divorce rendered on January 30, 2025, which granted Mr. Guillot's rule for an Article 102 divorce, is affirmed, and the judgment of January 30, 2025, which was amended on September 29, 2025, which granted Mr. Guillot's motion for a new trial and which reinstated the previous judgment of January 31, 2024 regarding child support of $45.35 per month to Mrs. Guillot and interim spousal support of $900 per month to Mrs. Guillot, is also affirmed. Mr. Guillot's answer to the appeal of the divorce judgment is denied.

AFFIRMED

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion only insofar as it affirms the trial court's decision granting Mr. Guillot's (hereafter “Jules”) 102 petition for divorce without hearing and to the exclusion of Ms. Guillot's (hereafter “Cecile”) 103(2) petition for divorce based on adultery, which had been set for trial at the same time and date. I believe that in this case, this is an unfair deprivation of her right to present her case amounting to a deprivation of due process and of equal protection of law, and I would therefore vacate the La. C.C. arts.102 / 103.1(2) divorce judgment in order to allow both parties to present their respectively cases. Otherwise, Cecile's case for adultery is deemed moot without a hearing. The 102 divorce should thus be vacated, and both cases should be heard. I conclude that the ground given by the trial court, with which the majority agrees, results in an unfair and moreover, and undesirable precedent.

On the incidental matters on appeal, I agree with the majority.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As the majority states, on November 10, 2023, Cecile filed her petition for divorce based primarily on adultery under La. C.C. art. 103(2) (hereafter “103(2)”). If proven, it would have given her the right to an immediate divorce at the first setting. Shortly after being served with Cecile's petition alleging adultery, on December 15, 2023, Jules filed an answer and reconventional demand for a La. C.C. arts.102 / 103.1(2) (hereafter “102”) divorce also upon proper showing at a rule to show cause hearing thereon. The parties allege and agree that they have lived separately and apart without reconciliation since October 24, 2023.

For the next fourteen or so months, the parties litigated the issues of custody and visitation, child support, and spousal support.

After 13 months living separate and apart, on November 26, 2024, Jules filed a motion to set his 102 divorce for hearing, and it was improperly set for hearing before the domestic commissioner on January 15, 2025. It was improper because the Domestic Commissioner had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a contested divorce under La. R.S. 13:717 F(2) and (3). 11 The following day, on November 27, 2024, Cecile filed a motion to set her petition for 103(2) adultery divorce for hearing, which was properly set before the district court for hearing on January 30, 2025. Both motions to set for hearing were filed electronically.

REASONS

The reason given by the trial court, with which the majority here agrees, to hear Jules’ motion first and grant his divorce, and to immediately deny Cecile the fundamental right to present her case, thereby rendering Cecile's divorce petition forever moot, was that Jules’ motion to set was supposedly filed a day sooner. In this case, I believe that is an insufficient reason, even as a tie-breaker. Moreover, Jules’ motion to set for hearing was actually his second motion setting a hearing date, and was filed after Cecile's.

The law is clear that the Domestic Commissioner cannot hear a contested divorce under La. R.S. 13:717 F and the 24th JDC local rule as well. While the “mistake” of setting the hearing in the Domestic Commissioner's Court, which favored Jules, may have begun unintentionally and without artifice, it eventually proceeded as a strategy. The divorce was not contested only on the merits, but the true divorce contest was as to which ground, adultery or living separate and apart, or both, would be the basis of the eventual judgment of divorce. There was no corrective action by Jules to move it to the district court docket, and the status quo allowed him to jump ahead of Cecile's earlier set January 30, 2025 hearing date by maintaining his 102 hearing in the Domestic Commissioner's Court.

I suggest that this was clearly a contested case from the beginning. The filing of the original petition for divorce alleged adultery, and Jules had answered denying those allegations and filing a reconventional demand based on 102. Thus, it was well known long before the parties arrived in the Domestic Commissioner's Court on January 15, 2025 that this divorce was hotly contested, and that accordingly, the Domestic Commissioner had no subject matter jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:717 F.

The problem could have been corrected by Jules promptly upon first seeing the order set before the Domestic Commissioner back in November 2024. Instead, no corrective action was taken, and the attempt to obtain the 102 divorce by the Domestic Commissioner was made 15 days before the district court hearing. Counsel for Cecile appeared in the commissioner's court to show that this was a contested divorce, and the commissioner, stating that he was unauthorized by law, refused to hear it. Counsel for Jules objected to the commissioner's refusal to grant his 102 divorce, arguing that he was entitled to an immediate divorce under 102, despite La. R.S. 13:717 F and the local rule prohibiting the Domestic Commissioner from hearing contested divorces.

By the time of the January 15, 2025 hearing, it is obvious from the transcript that Jules was attempting to jump ahead of Cecile to preclude Cecile's chance to prove adultery, which demonstrates that the contested nature of the case was more about which ground would be proven than anything else. This is not to imply that such zealous representation by Jules’ counsel was improper; it was not. However, this action certainly did not merit the reward of being the first and only party to get a trial, to the clear disadvantage with prejudice to Cecile who made no such “mistake” when she filed to set hearing in the proper court.

What makes this matter worse is that Jules’ motion to reset was not first; Cecile's was. The hearing date for the divorce from which this appeal is taken was on January 30, 2025. Cecile's motion to correctly set her divorce for trial before the district court on January 30, 2025 was filed on November 27, 2024, which pre-dated the filing of Jules’ motion to reset by seven weeks. Jules did not file his motion to reset his 102 divorce case on January 30, 2025 until January 15, 2025, shortly after the Domestic Commissioner correctly ruled that he could not hear Jules’ case.

Jules did receive the January 15, 2025 hearing date for which he had moved to set. Both parties appeared and argued their positions. Having not obtained the 102 divorce he hoped for in advance of the adultery trial, Jules filed a new motion to reset his case to January 30, 2025. As counsel for Jules stated on the record:

Well, Your Honor, if it's going to be contested we're going to have to just tack it on to the January 30th date we have with the Judge.

[Record p. 425, Tr. p. 9, ll. 9-12; boldface added.]

He later filed his “Motion to Reset Rule to Show Cause Before the District Court Judge” [Boldface added.] to add his 102 motion to the district court January 30, 2025 docket. Thus, the divorce hearing on January 30, 2025 was set by Cecile's motion seven weeks before Jules’ subsequent motion to reset, i.e., “to just tack it on to the January 30th date.”

Regardless of who filed first, I believe that Cecile should have had her day in court to introduce evidence to determine the just ground for the divorce, and that should not be denied on the basis of a misapplied tie-breaker. This couple had been married for about 18 years with three children. This judgment will forever define the legal reason their union was severed. She will live with her divorce judgment, and from time to time, will need to produce and show it. She should have an equal opportunity to present her evidence for that judgment which correctly states the legal reason her marriage ended, whatever the trial court determines that to be. The only way to do that is to vacate the 102 divorce judgment signed January 30, 2025, and allow both parties to present their cases, and to oppose each other's. Otherwise, this denial of due process will be allowed to stand.

To the oft repeated question, “What difference would it make?” I say, plenty. It makes a significant difference. Cecile had a right to have her case heard on the date which she—and only she—first filed a motion to have it set it. Further, a judgment of divorce based on adultery makes a real difference because La. C.C. art. 112 C provides that when a judgement of divorce is awarded to a spouse, not at fault,¹² on the ground of Article 103(2), that spouse is presumed to be entitled to final periodic support. Depriving her of a divorce based on adultery deprived her of the significant La. C.C. art. 112 C presumption without even a hearing. An after-the-fact and pointless declaration of fault will not suffice to satisfy these considerations or recoup her substantial losses of these rights. The notion that a future finding of fault would make up for these deprivations is not serious.

It has also been argued that Jules was entitled to a 102 divorce immediately, upon proof that the spouses lived separately and apart for the requisite period of time. Yet the law is the same for adultery; the spouse alleging adultery is likewise entitled to an immediate divorce upon proof that the other spouse committed adultery. La. C.C. art. 103 (2). The ground of living separate and apart is not treated preferentially to that of adultery.

THE CASE LAW

Several cases have held that in a divorce action, a trial court should consider both the principal and reconventional demands for divorce or competing petitions for divorce prior to granting a divorce decree. In re Gernhauser, 23-573 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/4/24), 410 So.3d 858, 862, reh'g denied (Jan. 14, 2025), writ denied, 25-207 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1176, citing Jennings v. Jennings, 21-386 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/21), 332 So.3d 179, 184 (The trial court did not err in hearing both art. 103 petitions before deciding upon which grounds to grant the divorce.); Yates v. Yates, 355 So.2d 573, 575 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (The trial judge should have tried both the principal and reconventional demands. He would have discretion to grant the divorce to either party, depending upon the evidence adduced.); Ogea v. Ogea, 378 So.2d 984, 991 (La. Ct. App. 1979), writ denied, 379 So.2d 1104 (La. 1980) (The trial court properly considered evidence in support of both the main and the reconventional demand.)

In the present case, both parties’ petitions were set before the trial court, and both parties were prepared to proceed with the trial on the merits. In addition, allowing a party to escape a fault decree divorce based solely on the choice of filing a petition for divorce under Article 102 instead of Article 103 is contrary to the principles of justice inherent in our legal system.

The cases allowing consideration of an Article 102 petition in disregard of an Article 103 petition are easily distinguishable here. None involve a situation where both petitions for divorce were properly set to be heard on the same day and the trial court choose to hear one instead of the other.

In Borel v. Borel, Mrs. Borel filed a supplemental and amending petition alleging Mr. Borel committed adultery one day before the scheduled hearing and had requested a continuance of the scheduled hearing. Borel v. Borel, 624 So.2d 1279, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 1993). In addition, Mrs. Borel did not even obtain leave of court to file her supplemental pleading. Thus, Mrs. Borel's petition was not set for hearing on the same day as Mr. Borel's petition.

In Bishop v. Bishop, there was no competing petition for divorce. Instead, Mrs. Bishop claimed the evidence did not show the parties lived separate and apart continuously and voluntarily for 180 days without reconciliation. Bishop v. Bishop, 98-59 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/27/98), 712 So.2d 697, 700.

In Martin v. Trushyna, only Mr. Martin had filed a rule to show cause on his petition. Both parties, each represented by counsel, attended the ensuing hearing on Mr. Martin's rule to show cause why an Article 102 divorce should not be granted, and Ms. Trushyna's attorney did not object to the proceedings under Article 102. Martin v. Trushyna, 19-79 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/13/19), 283 So.3d 1083, 1088-89.

Simmons v. Simmons, 34,942 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/22/01), 795 So.2d 448, 450, writ not considered, 2001-2646 (La. 12/14/01), 803 So.2d 982, although Ms. Simmons had filed a petition for divorce based on adultery under Article 103, her petition was not set for hearing on the day Mr. Simmons's petition for divorce under Article 102 was set.

In Watters v. Watters, Mrs. Watters reconventional demand based on adultery was not set for hearing. Defendant asked that her right to litigate the claims raised in her reconventional demand be reserved, the court reasoned that pursuant to a recent House Resolution, parties do not have to reserve their rights to litigate claims of fault because the res judicata laws no longer apply. Watters v. Watters, 607 So.2d 948, 949 (La. Ct. App. 1992), writ denied, 610 So.2d 819 (La. 1993).

CONCLUSION

I do not believe that when two matters are set for trial on the merits on the same day, that one of them might be completely disregarded, excluded, and made moot based on who filed to set for hearing first. But if that is the deciding factor, Cecile filed her motion on November 27, 2024 setting her adultery case to be heard on January 30, 2025. Seven weeks later, immediately after his unsuccessful attempt to obtain a 102 judgment from the Domestic Commissioner on January 15, 2025, Jules moved to reset his 102 divorce motion “to just tack it on to the January 30th date” of Cecile's case, for which she had been awaiting her day in court for seven weeks.

It is true that Jules filed on November 26, 2024, but it was set in the wrong court which had no jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:717 F. Although initially this may have been unintentional, he did not seek to correct the error; he aggressively sought to take advantage of it. Having zealously argued for a divorce on a contested ground, and having objected to the commissioner's adverse ruling, this was no longer a mere mistake. If it was not a strategy from the beginning, it obviously became one.

There are now two possibilities. The first is the status quo, in which the judgment stays as is. In this option, the prevailing party made what may have been an initial mistake in setting his motion in a court without authority to hear the case. But that “mistake” eventually became a strategy which was zealously pursued to its limit. The motion for 102 divorce had to be reset on his motion by tacking it on to Cecile's pre-existing motion date, and the strategy was rewarded by the advantages of a hearing and the judgment he preferred. The other party, Cecile, who had made no mistake, had filed her motion in the proper court, and had patiently waited nine weeks for her hearing, was denied a hearing or opportunity to prove her case, although she had filed her motion to set her adultery case for hearing seven weeks prior to Jules’ motion to reset his 102 on Cecile's hearing date.

The second option is to do it over fairly. The only way to achieve that is to vacate the three January 30, 2025 judgments, which grant (or to the extent that they grant) divorce based on living separate and apart, and then allow both parties to appear to put on their cases at a future hearing date. If anyone must go first based on filing dates, it should be Cecile, who was the first to set for hearing on January 30, 2025.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the 102 divorce should be vacated, and the case remanded to hear the 103(2) adultery divorce, or both. If adultery is proven, the divorce should be granted on that ground.

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY DECEMBER 16, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

25-CA-149

E-NOTIFIED

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

HONORABLE DONALD A. ROWAN, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)

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FOOTNOTES

1.   Because the parties have minor children, the requisite time period to live separate and apart is three hundred and sixty-five days. La. C.C. art. 103.1.

2.   At the time Mr. Guillot filed his rule, it was uncontested and therefore was properly set before the domestic commissioner. (It is noted that Mrs. Guillot's original petition also sought a 102 divorce, alternatively to a 103(2) divorce.) Per La. R.S. 13:717(F)(3) and local rule, domestic commissioners do not hear contested divorce rules. They are empowered to grant uncontested divorces under La. C.C. arts. 102 and 103, or pursuant to La. R.S. 9:307. “Pursuant to La. R.S. 13:717(F) the powers of the domestic commissioner are limited to those specifically enumerated herein. Nothing herein shall diminish the powers of the district court.” La. R. Dist. Ct. App. 32.0B.The filing of Mrs. Guillot's rule seeking a 103(2) divorce, one day after Mr. Guillot filed his rule, made the divorce grounds contested, at which point Mr. Guillot's rule was properly transferred without objection to the district court.

3.   Upon lodging of the appeal with this Court, our customary review of the record indicated the judgment signed by the trial court on January 30, 2025 was insufficient to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction because it lacked the appropriate and requisite decretal language. Accordingly, this Court issued an order to the trial court, ordering it to amend the January 30, 2025 judgment to include the appropriate and requisite decretal language and to supplement the appellate record with the amended judgment. The court amended the judgment on September 29, 2025, which amended judgment was lodged with this Court in a supplemental record on October 8, 2025.

4.   La. C.C. art. 103.1 provides, in pertinent part:The requisite periods of time, in accordance with Articles 102 and 103 shall be as follows:* * *(2) Three hundred sixty-five days when there are minor children of the marriage at the time the rule to show cause is filed in accordance with Article 102 or a petition is filed in accordance with Article 103.

5.   In Jennings v. Jennings, 21-386 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/21), 332 So.3d 179, 184, the court found that when both parties are seeking a divorce under Article 103, which allows for the possibility of fault, the trial court should allow both claims to be tried at the same hearing. See also In re Gernhauser, 23-573 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/4/24), 410 So.3d 858, 862, reh'g denied (1/14/25), writ denied, 25-207 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1176 (The trial court did not err in hearing both art. 103 petitions before deciding upon which grounds to grant the divorce.). The Jennings court distinguished other cases where competing divorce petitions or rules fell under two different code articles.The instant case is distinguishable from Jennings in that the competing divorce rules here relied upon different code articles, Article 102 and Article 103(2), respectively.

6.   Trial courts are vested with great discretion in determining the manner in which they handle their dockets. Politz v. Politz, 49,242 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/10/14), 149 So.3d 805, 815.

7.   Even if Mrs. Guillot were to prove Mr. Guillot's adultery, she would still be required to show that she had been free from fault prior to the filing of her petition for divorce in order to be qualified to receive final periodic support. La. C.C. arts. 111 and 112; Bourg v. Bourg, 96-2422 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/97), 701 So.2d 1378, 1380.

8.   The January 30, 2025 judgment granting the new trial refers to the January 11, 2024 recommendations of the hearing officer, which was reduced to a written judgment dated January 31, 2024. The parties do not allege that there are any discrepancies between the January 11, 2024 recommendations and the January 31, 2024 written judgment.

9.   La. C.C.P. art. 1841 provides:A judgment is the determination of the rights of the parties in an action and may award any relief to which the parties are entitled. It may be interlocutory or final.A judgment that does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action is an interlocutory judgment.A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment.

10.   These provisions are confirmed in the amended judgment issued by the trial court on September 29, 2025.

11.   R.S. 13:717 F states that the powers of the commissioners hearing domestic matters shall include but not be limited to the power to * * * (2) Render and sign judgments and orders confirming judgments by default in accordance with the general provisions of law, including the requirement of introducing proof sufficient to establish a prima facie case; (3) Grant uncontested divorces * * *. The Local Rules for the 24th JDC (La. District Court Rules App. 32.0 B) prohibit any authority other than those specifically enumerated in 13:717 F.

12.   There has been no allegation that Cecile was at fault.

JUDE G. GRAVOIS JUDGE

DISSENTS WITH REASONS SJW