KEITH JAMES REINSCH v. MICA REINSCH (2025)

Mica K. Reinsch (Mica) appeals the trial court's judgment partitioning the community property existing between her and her former spouse, Keith James Reinsch (Keith). For the following reasons, we affirm in part, affirm in part as amended, reverse in part and render, and reverse in part and remand with instructions for the trial court to correctly define and partition the community interest in Mica's retirement plan and annuity account.

I.

ISSUES

Mica asserts the following six assignments of error:

1) The trial court committed legal error in the valuation of the community-owned LLC by:

a) Relying upon Appellee's expert's amended valuation report[,] which significantly lowered the LLC's valuation by significantly increasing [A]ppellee's “reasonable salary” as an adjustment without accounting for or eliminating the discretionary expenses for non-business purpose items [A]ppellee's significant distributions to himself for various “expenses[,]” which improperly reduced the LLC's income. If a salary modification was proper, the trial court erred by not requiring the distributions to be returned to the LLC as income for evaluation purposes;

b) Including movables with significant values within the valuation of the LLC, without accounting for their value in calculating the fair market value of the LLC; and

c) Failing to make any adjustment to the value of the LLC for unreported cash, despite evidence that significant cash receipts were received during the period of time considered in Mr. [Chad M.] Garland's evaluation.

2) The trial court awarded [A]ppellant a one-half interest in distributions taken by Keith from the LLC[ ] but committed error in failing to include them in calculating the equalization payment owed by Keith to Mica.

3) The trial court committed legal error by awarding [A]ppellee a 50% reimbursement claim for boat notes and repairs after termination of the community without considering [A]ppellee's exclusive use of the boat and his obligation to maintain the boat in his possession.

4) The trial court committed legal error in awarding [A]ppellee one-half (50%) of [A]ppellant's Teacher's Retirement System of Louisiana [TRSL] pension (a defined benefit pension) and 403(b) account (a defined contribution retirement plan) instead of a 50% interest in the marital portion of the pension and annuity; this division is contrary to law and jurisprudence.

5) The trial court committed legal error in failing to award [A]ppellant legal interest on the equalization payment owed by [A]ppellee from date of judicial demand or date of judgment until paid[.]

6) The trial court erred in taxing all costs of court of the partition proceedings to [A]ppellant when it made no such ruling on the record or in its written reasons.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations made in the course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities in the partition of community property may not be set aside absent manifest error.” Arceneaux v. Arceneaux, 24-883, p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/14/25), 417 So.3d 579, 586. “[T]he appellate court does not set aside the trial court's factual findings unless (1) a reasonable factual basis for the finding does not exist in the record[ ] and (2) the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong.” Moody v. Moody, 23-157, pp. 6–7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/15/23) (unpublished opinion).

III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Keith and Mica were married on June 12, 1999, and physically separated on July 29, 2021. Three children were born of the marriage, but two had reached the age of majority by the time the parties separated. The parties entered into a joint stipulation and consent judgment with respect to custody and visitation regarding the minor child.¹ Keith and Mica were divorced by judgment signed on November 22, 2022.

During the marriage, Mica was employed as a teacher by the Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, and Keith was employed as a licensed electrician. In June of 2016, Keith and Mica established K&M Electrical Services, LLC (K&M). Mica's ownership interest was listed as fifty-one percent (51%), and Keith's ownership interest was listed as forty-nine percent (49%). Keith was named as manager, and Mica was named as manager and agent. Keith is the only licensed electrician employed by K&M.² Mica was the bookkeeper for the business prior to the parties’ separation. There is no dispute that the entire ownership interest in K&M is community property.

The community property regime was terminated retroactive to August 11, 2021, the date Keith filed his petition for divorce. The parties each filed a detailed descriptive list and traversals of the other's list. The trial on the partition took place on October 31, 2024. Keith and Mica were able to stipulate to certain valuations and issues, as well as the allocation of certain debts and property. The trial court issued written reasons for ruling on December 19, 2024, and signed a final judgment on February 4, 2025. The relevant portions of the judgment are:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that KEITH JAMES REINSCH be and is hereby awarded full ownership of the business known as K&M Electrical as his separate property, with the business valued at $73,500 pursuant to the valuation of Chad M. Garland, CPA, which includes, but not limited to, the following movable property:

․

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that KEITH JAMES REINSCH be and is hereby awarded full ownership of the following items as his separate property:

․

3. One-half of the 403(b) Plan with the Jefferson Davis Parish School Board in the name of Mica K. Reinsch to be divided by [qualified domestic relations order] QDRO.

․

5. One-half of the TRSL Retirement Plan in the name of Mica K. Reinsch, to be divided by QDRO.

․

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that KEITH JAMES REINSCH shall pay unto MICA K. REINSCH an equalizing payment of $113,188.46.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all court costs are assessed against MICA K. REISCH.

Mica filed a motion for new trial or, alternatively, a rule to modify the judgment based on her assertion that she objected to the judgment proposed by Keith's attorney, which the trial court signed without a status conference to resolve the issues raised by Mica. The trial court denied the motion for new trial but set the rule to modify the judgment for hearing. On May 26, 2025, Mica dismissed the rule to modify the judgment and filed a supplemental motion and order of appeal. Her appeal is now properly before this court.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

A. Valuation of K&M

K&M is an electrical services company. It provides installation, maintenance, and repair services for residential and commercial locations. At the time of trial, Keith was the only electrician employed by K&M. Accordingly, this court finds that K&M has one product: the labor and purely personal services of its member-manager, Keith.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801(A)(1)(a) provides that the fair market value of community property is to be used in its partition. “Fair market value is defined generally as the price that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller for a certain piece of property in an arm's length transaction, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.” Shopf v. Marina Del Ray Partnership, 549 So.2d 833, 839 (La.1989). The determination of fair market value is a factual determination that will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Moody v. Moody, 622 So.2d 1381 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993).

The trial court relied on the report of Mr. Garland, the CPA retained as an expert by Keith, and found that the fair market value of the community interest in K&M was $73,500.00. Mica argues that the trial court erred in relying on Mr. Garland's valuation because: (1) it significantly lowered the company's value based on the increase in Keith's salary in the second report; (2) it did not account for the significant values of certain movables; and (3) there was no adjustment made for unreported cash despite evidence that significant cash receipts were received.

Mr. Garland prepared two reports and explained the reason for this at trial as follows:

The most recent report, obviously, takes into account the more current information. The first report, obviously, was older. The ․ one of the main key differences between the two reports is that I was under the understanding that the owner, Mr. Reinsch, was taking more salary than he was out of the company, and I later found out that this was not true, and so one of the key differences besides using more current up-to-date information, I did what's called a normalizing adjustment to adjust his salary to what would be what's called reasonable compensation for someone in his position running a company.

Mr. Garland explained that Keith “was only drawing out 50, $70,000 a year in actual salary whereas a reasonable compensation for someone managing and running a company at the CEO level ․ is about twice that.” He used a database, RC Reports, to determine the reasonable compensation rate for an electrical company and determined that reasonable compensation was $97,472.00 for 2021; $117,668.00 for 2022; $121,515.00 for 2023; and $122,840.00 for 2024. This is the information used in his second report.

To reach the conclusion that K&M had a fair market value of $73,500.00, Mr. Garland used an income approach and capitalization of cash flow method. Mr. Garland explained as follows:

I used the two main methods. There's one that's called the market method. The market method essentially means that there are databases ․ out there where I can go and look up for almost any type of company, electrical company, ․ I can go out there and look and find companies that are very similar and what they actually sold for. These were actually comps of other companies that sold for, and you can even delineate it down by size.

So I used the market method [ ] and [came] up with a value. The second method I used was the income method, which is the method that the other expert used when he did his report. The income method basically is a multiple of cash flow. The value of any business is only worth the present value of future cash flows. That's essentially what we do as business valuation. We are trying to figure out how much cash an owner can bring out of this company over a period of time, and you got to discount it back to today's terms, and so when you value a business, that's what you're doing. You're looking at how much money will it bring in over the course of the next few years.

And so ․ when I did my two methodologies, they [came] to be very close to each other.

Mr. Garland further considered that the company had about $300,000.00 in assets, which were fully depreciated used equipment, and a loan for about $100,000.00. On cross examination, Mr. Garland explained that the difference in his first valuation, which was $368,000.00, and the second valuation of $73,500.00, resulted from the correction in his understanding of the salary drawn by Keith and the fact the company lost money in 2024.

Mica hired Bradley J. Casiday (Mr. Casiday) as her expert. He prepared one report using the market approach and placed the fair market value of K&M between $610,000.00 and $660,000.00. According to Mr. Casiday's report, Mica asserted that cash was collected and not run through the accounting system, and if her assertions were true, K&M would be valued between $680,000.00 and $730,000.00. Mr. Casiday explained his calculation as follows:

So as I stated before, I started with the seller's discretionary earning method, which just simply takes whatever the net income is of the business, adds back the owner's salary, adds back any depreciation and interest taken to come up to a net cash flow to equity.

․

And then I applied a capitalization rate to those numbers of three which was developed, again, from the BIZCOMPS that we talked about from actual sells [sic] of businesses. I also did ․ what I've got down here is the rule-of-thumb method which simply takes ․ average revenue times a multiple again developed from ․ the BIZCOMPS software.

Mr. Garland was critical of Mr. Casiday's calculation and noted the following flaws therein:

And so once I get a value for the company, whatever it is, I will look at the balance sheet at the date of valuation. You got [sic] to add whatever cash is in the bank. You got [sic] to add whatever accounts receivable it is he's going to collect, and then you got [sic] to subtract his debt.

The other expert did not do that. When ․ he did his report, I don't see where he added back cash or receivables or subtract out debt.

․

Mr. Casiday in doing his valuation and why there's ․ a difference between my value ․ and his value, he added back Mr. Reinsch's salary to his cash flow number, and by doing that, there's nobody to run the company. Instead of subtracting -- he should have left the salary in there, and he should have added some more to it which would have brought his cash flow ․ number down, and that's the main difference between my report and his report is he added back salaries and he shouldn't have added back salaries, and ․ I made an additional adjustment to make his salary more in line with what ․ if I bought his company, I would have to go pay somebody similar to him to run the company for me ․ he wouldn't come to work I don't think and run that company for 50 or $60,000 a year. He would want reasonable compensation to do that just like any other type of business, and so I made that adjustment. Mr. Casiday didn't. So that's that main difference between our two reports.

Mr. Garland further testified that he felt that Mr. Casiday's report did not meet the valuation standards set forth by the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts because there were “some shortcuts taken that [were] not supported by any kind of data.”

Mica takes issue with Mr. Garland not giving any value to equipment and vehicles by considering them to be fully depreciated. However, since Mr. Garland used an income approach, the focus is on cash flow, which is derived from K&M's business operations, including the use of its tangible assets. Mr. Garland explained:

Got a bunch of used equipment.

․

[H]e can't run the company without those assets, and so the assets are part of the value of the company. If the company was going into liquidation, there's a third methodology in our valuation world called an asset method, and usually it's only used if you're valuing a company that's going out of business[.]

․

[I]f it's what I call a nonoperating asset that has nothing to do with the functioning of the business[,] now you would add that back into the value of the business, but to my knowledge, that's not the case in this situation.

Neither Mica nor her expert provided any testimony or evidence about how the equipment should be valued.

While Mica testified at trial and was the bookkeeper for K&M during the marriage, she offered no testimony or other evidence regarding the alleged cash receipts. Keith testified that all cash receipts were accounted for and that after Mica left the business, he did not accept cash. This testimony was not contradicted.

“[T]he rule that questions of credibility are for the trier of fact applies to the evaluation of expert testimony, unless the stated reasons of the expert are patently unsound.” Hanks v. Entergy Corp., 06-477, pp. 23–24 (La. 12/18/06), 944 So.2d 564, 580–81 (citations omitted). “Credibility determinations, including the evaluation of and resolution of conflicts in expert testimony, are factual issues to be resolved by the trier of fact, which should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of manifest error.” Statham v. Statham, 43,324, p. 7 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/11/08), 986 So.2d 894, 899, writ denied, 08-1578 (La. 10/10/08), 993 So.2d 1288.

Here, the trial court accepted Mr. Garland's valuation approach and methodology. The trial court accepted the specific calculations and normalizing adjustments used by Mr. Garland in calculating the fair market value of K&M. The record does not suggest that Mr. Garland's reasoning was patently unsound. Hence, the trial court did not manifestly err in finding that the fair market value of the community interest in K&M is $73,500.00.

B. Equalizing Payment and Interest (Assignments of Error 2 and 5)

The trial court ordered Keith to pay Mica an equalizing payment in the amount of $113,188.46. Mica asserts that the equalizing payment should have included a one-half interest in distributions taken by Keith from K&M since the trial court awarded a one-half interest in said distributions to her. However, that is not what the trial court did.

Mica and Keith stipulated to various amounts, and their combined detailed descriptive list was introduced into evidence. This combined list reflects business distributions from K&M to Keith in the amount of $50,255.00 after the termination of the community. That amount is classified as community property, and the trial court increased Mica's equalizing payment by $25,112.50 accordingly.

Mica argues that there were other post-termination distributions to Keith totaling $210,579.00, not counting whatever amounts were taken by Keith in 2024 (because these amounts were not available at the time of trial), and that the trial court “appears to have simply overlooked” that she is entitled to one half of these distributions. In effect, Mica is seeking to have all K&M distributions taken by Keith after the termination of the community property regime classified as “civil fruits” flowing from the ownership of community property rather than as “earnings” resulting from Keith's post-termination labor, which would be his separate property. See La.Civ.Code art. 2338.

In Statham, 986 So.2d 894, Ms. Statham objected to the valuation of a community business as well as the trial court's determination that Mr. Statham's post-termination distributions were not community property. Mr. Statham argued that the distributions were his separate property based on Boone v. Boone, 39,544 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/6/05), 899 So.2d 823.³ His expert CPA testified that the post-termination distributions “were only salary resulting from his effort, skill and industry each year.” Statham, 986 So.2d at 900. The second circuit stated: “Since the distributions at issue came into [Mr. Statham's] possession after the termination of the community, they do not carry the presumption of community․ The burden thus fell to [Ms. Statham] to prove the distributions were community assets.” Id. The business at issue was an insurance agency in which only about twenty percent of the policies renewed automatically. Mr. Statham testified that he had to regularly contact his customers to “shop” policies every year and that he took his customers to lunch or hunting on a regular basis. Id. at 901. The second circuit found that Ms. Statham failed to carry her burden of proof because she did not specifically show how much income was a result of the automatic renewals. Therefore, there was no manifest error in the trial court's finding that the post-termination distributions were Mr. Statham's separate property “because this income resulted from his effort, skill and industry exercised after the termination of the community.” Id.

As in Boone and Statham, the distributions at issue herein were made to Keith after the termination of the community and are not presumed to be community. The burden is on Mica to prove that they were community assets. As stated in Boone, 899 So.2d at 827: “the issue was whether the distributions received by [the former spouse] after the termination of the community were more in the nature of ‘revenues derived by operation of law’ or the product of [the former spouse's] ‘effort, skill, or industry.’ ” Here, for much of the relevant time period, Keith was the only electrician employed by K&M. Keith is K&M. Mica failed to prove that the post-termination distributions were community property rather than income derived from Keith's effort, skill, and industry. For that reason, we find no manifest error in the trial court's refusal to include one half of the other post-termination distributions to Keith totaling $210,579.00 in the equalizing payment to Mica.

Mica also asserts that the trial court erred in not ordering that legal interest on the equalizing payment was due from the date of judicial demand until paid. Even though we find that there is no merit to Mica's assertion that trial court erred in failing to include a one-half interest in the other post-termination distributions taken by Keith in calculating the equalizing payment, her claim for interest on the equalizing payment is well grounded. Interest on an equalizing payment runs from the date of the judgment of partition. Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 99-723 (La. 10/19/99), 748 So.2d 423. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment awarding Mica an equalizing payment in the amount of $113,188.46 but amend the award to provide for legal interest on that sum from February 4, 2025, until paid.

C. Boat Maintenance & Repair

The parties owned a 2021 Yamaha Express Bay Boat, which was purchased during the marriage. It was sold prior to trial for $35,000.00, which was used to pay off the balance of the loan, $33,812.60. The remainder of the proceeds of the sale, $1,187.40, was listed as an asset to Keith, but he also claimed reimbursement for paying the note, a community obligation, after termination, with his separate funds. The amount claimed by Keith was $8,401.77, half of the payments totaling $16,803.55. “A trial court's findings as to whether reimbursement claims have been sufficiently established are reviewable under the manifest error standard of review.” Arterburn v. Arterburn, 15-22, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/15), 176 So.3d 1163, 1171.

Keith's reimbursement claim for these note payments presents a straightforward application of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2365, which provides in pertinent part:

If separate property of a spouse has been used either during the existence of the community property regime or thereafter to satisfy a community obligation, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.

If the community obligation was incurred to acquire ownership or use of a community corporeal movable required by law to be registered, and separate property of a spouse has been used after termination to satisfy that obligation, the reimbursement claim shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the claimant's use after termination of the community property regime. The value of that use and the amount of the claim for reimbursement accrued during the use are presumed to be equal.

Mica does not dispute that Keith used his separate funds to pay $16,803.55 in note payments. Rather, her argument is that she should not be responsible for reimbursement because Keith was in sole possession of the boat and had exclusive use of it. Yet there is no evidence to support Mica's argument. Because there is no evidence that Keith had the exclusive use of the boat, there is no basis to reduce this reimbursement claim.

We now turn to Keith's reimbursement claim for boat repairs. Keith made repairs to the boat in the amount of $1,700.00. With respect to Keith's claim for reimbursement in the amount of $850.00, we first note that “[e]ach spouse acting alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided by law.” La.Civ.Code art. 2346. However, once the community property regime is terminated by divorce, “[a] spouse has a duty to preserve and to manage prudently former community property under his control” and “is answerable for any damage caused by his fault, default, or neglect.” La.Civ.Code art. 2369.3. Comment (f) to Article 2369.3 (footnote added) provides that “[a] spouse who incurs expenses in compliance with the obligation imposed by this Article is entitled to reimbursement for one-half the costs in accordance with general principles of the law of co-ownership. C.C. Art. 806 (rev. 1990).”⁴ Again, Mica presented no evidence or testimony regarding the use of the boat. We agree with the trial court and find no manifest error in its findings that the repair was an ordinary and necessary expense to sell the boat and that Keith is entitled to reimbursement of one half of that expense.

We find no merit to this assignment of error, and we affirm the trial court's ruling that Keith is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $8,401.77 for payment of the boat loan with his separate property and the ruling that Keith is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $850.00 for repairs to the boat prior to its sale.

D. Community Interest in Teacher's Retirement System of Louisiana Benefits

Mica argues that it was legal error for the trial court to award Keith one half of her teacher's retirement benefits to be divided by QDRO.⁵ We recognize that the trial court's determinations as to the proper division of the retirement accounts “were based on the trial court's application of the law, rather than its findings of fact, so we review the trial court's ruling [in this regard] de novo.” Spivey v. Spivey, 51,348, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/5/17), 218 So.3d 251, 254.

The community property regime terminated on August 11, 2021, and since that date, Mica has continued to contribute to TRSL. The record evidence shows that Mica has many more years of work before she becomes eligible to receive any retirement benefits under TRSL. The trial court erroneously awarded Keith an undivided one-half interest in all pension benefits, including benefits earned by Mica after the termination of the community. This is contrary to law, and Keith is not entitled to any portion of the benefits earned by Mica after August 11, 2021.

Mica's teacher's retirement plan is unquestionably a defined benefit plan, which means that when Mica retires, she will be paid a monthly benefit based on a formula rather than on the contributions made by Mica and her employer. The amount of the benefit has no direct relationship to the contributions made by Mica during her employment. Unlike a defined contribution plan, Mica has no individual account. Oversimplifying slightly, TRSL has a pool of funds comprised of all contributions from all employees in the system. Thus, when Mica retires, a formula will determine the amount that she will receive; and Keith, as Mica's former spouse, has an interest in a portion of this benefit. The issue then is how the court determines which portion of the unmatured pension benefits are attributable to Mica's work efforts during the marriage (community property) and which portion of the benefits are due to Mica's work efforts after the termination of the community (separate property). The Louisiana Supreme Court answered this question in Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919, 922-924 (La.1978) (footnotes omitted):

A spouse's right to receive an annuity, lump-sum benefit, or other benefits payable by a retirement plan is, to the extent attributable to his employment during the community, therefore an asset of the community. Further, the community interest is not limited to the refund of community funds paid, usually (as here) greatly less in monetary value than the pension rights acquired as a result of the employment of one spouse of the community.

Accordingly, ․ our courts have uniformly held that, at the dissolution of the community, the non-employed spouse is entitled to judgment recognizing that spouse's interest in proceeds from a retirement annuity, or profit-sharing plan or contract, if and when they become payable, with the spouse's interest to be recognized as one-half of any payments to be made, insofar as they are attributable to the other spouse's contributions or employment during the existence of the community.

․

Due to the nature of the interest acquired by the community, as these decisions likewise recognize, it is not merchantable or susceptible to partition by licitation. The recognition of the respective interests of the spouses in this non-merchantable asset acquired during the community is analogous to a partition or division in kind. Of course, the parties between themselves can agree upon a valuation for purposes of conventional partition. See Due v. Due, 342 So.2d 161, 166 (La.1977).

The wife's proportionate interest in any retirement plan proceeds, if and when payable to or for the husband's account.

At the time of the dissolution of the community, as well as of the present date (at which, we are informed by the briefs, the husband is still employed as an air traffic controller), the community interest in the retirement plan has no immediate redeemable cash value. Until the employee is separated from the service, dies, retires, or becomes disabled, no value can be fixed upon his right to receive an annuity or upon lump-sum payments or other benefits to be paid on his account.

․

The proper ratio can be expressed in this way:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

The second circuit summarized Sims this way:

Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La.1978), is the seminal case in Louisiana establishing the method of valuation and division of the “community” interest in a spouse's pension plan. The court described the nature of the interest acquired by the community in the following terms: “Until the employee is separated from the service, dies, retires, or becomes disabled, no value can be fixed upon his right to receive an annuity or upon lump-sum payments or other benefits to be paid on his account.” Id. at 923. To assign a present valuation to an unmatured pension benefit would be speculative. “Deferring the actual valuation until distribution to the annuitant substantially increases the chance that the numerous variables which affect the ultimate pension will then be taken into account.” Id. at 924 n. 7. The judgment recognizing a non-employee spouse's proportionate interest in a community asset merely fixes for the first time the percentage owned by each spouse in the asset which continues to be co- owned. The former community asset remains under the exclusive control of one of the co-owners by virtue of her relationship with her employer. Obviously, the employee spouse has a duty to exercise her control of the co-owned asset in “good faith.” As stated in Sims, “At present, the community's retirement-plan interest, as yet inchoate, is in annuities or lump-sum payments to become payable in the future, as determined by the husband's good-faith election of options available to him or by his death, separation from service, or involuntary retirement.” Id. at 923 n. 4.

“When acquired during the existence of a marriage, the right-to-share (in a retirement plan) is a community asset which, at the dissolution of the community, must be so classified even though at the time acquired or at the time of dissolution of a community, the right has no marketable or redeemable cash value, and even though the contractual right to receive money or other benefits is due in the future and is contingent upon the happening of an event at an uncertain time.” T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 851 (La.1976).

The purpose of the Sims formula is to calculate a non-employee spouse's interest in the employee spouse's employee benefit plan at the time the community property regime is terminated. This does not mean that the non-employee spouse is limited to the monetary value of the plan at the time of the community's dissolution, but rather the non-employee spouse is entitled to the interest attributable to the community when payments become due. The hearing officer incorrectly found that Mr. Tucker was only entitled to half of the $36,985.68 of employee contributions paid in by Mrs. Edinger during the existence of the community property regime. This recommendation is counter to the ruling in Sims and hinges on the distinction that Mrs. Edinger purchased 2.36 service credits after the community regime ended. Regardless, it is situations like this to which the Sims formula applies. The Sims formula is used to classify the portion of an employee spouse's employment benefit plan that is attributable to the community, and thus community property, and the portion that is considered the separate property of the employee spouse.

The judgment in this case erroneously awards Keith an interest that includes amounts that were contributed by Mica after the termination of the community. The account cannot simply be divided in half by QDRO. The record lacks the necessary information to apply the Sims formula. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the trial court's judgment and remand the matter with instructions to the trial court to determine the amount due to Keith pursuant to Sims.

E. Community Interest in Mica's 403(b) Account

Mica's 403(b) plan is a defined contribution plan, which means that a separate account is maintained for her as an employee and that no amount is guaranteed at retirement. Mica's 403(b) account is in part community property and in part her separate property. We again note that Mica has continued to work for the Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, and the contributions to the 403(b) account made by Mica after the termination of the community property regime are her separate property.

Mica argues that it was legal error for the trial court to award Keith one half of her 403(b) account to be divided by QDRO. As with the division of the TRSL account, the trial court committed legal error in dividing the 403(b) account in this manner. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the trial court's judgment and remand the matter with instructions to the trial court to partition only the community interest in the 403(b) annuity account registered in Mica's name.

F. Court Costs

Mica argues that it was error for the trial court to assess all court costs to her when it made no such ruling on the record or in its written reasons. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 provides:

Unless the judgment provides otherwise, costs shall be paid by the party cast, and may be taxed by a rule to show cause.

Except as otherwise provided by law, the court may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against any party, as it may consider equitable.

“It is well settled that a trial court has much discretion in the determination of costs.” Gautreau v. Gautreau, 96-1548, p. 22 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/18/97), 697 So.2d 1339, 1354, writ denied, 97-1939 (La. 11/7/97), 703 So.2d 1272. Insofar as the sole issues in this case related to the partition of the community property and since the parties were able to stipulate to several valuations and divisions, we cannot say that this litigation was particularly complex or that Mica was engaging in dilatory tactics such that the allocation of all costs to her was proper or supported by the totality of the record. See McCorvey v. McCorvey, 05-889 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 922 So.2d 694, writ denied, 06-435 (La. 4/28/06), 927 So.2d 295. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's assessment of all costs to Mica and render judgment assessing costs equally between both parties.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part, affirm in part as amended, reverse in part and remand, and reverse in part and render as follows:

The valuation of K&M Electrical Services, LLC, at $73,500.00 is affirmed.

The amount of the equalizing, $113,188.46, is affirmed but the award is amended to reflect that legal interest is due on that amount from the date of the judgment of partition, February 4, 2025, until paid.

The reimbursement claims in the amount of $8,401.77 for boat loan payments and $850.00 for boat repairs are affirmed.

The trial court's award of fifty percent (50%) of the Teacher's Retirement System of Louisiana Plan is reversed, and the issue is remanded to the trial court to determine the amount due to Keith James Reinsch pursuant to Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La.1978). Likewise, the trial court's award of fifty percent (50%) of the 403(b) account registered in the name of Mica K. Reinsch to Keith James Reinsch is reversed, and the issue is remanded to the trial court with instructions to partition only the community interest in the 403(b) annuity account.

That portion of the trial court's judgment that assessed all costs to Mica K. Reinsch is reversed, and we hereby render judgment assessing all costs equally to the parties.

The trial court's judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally to Keith James Reinsch and Mica K. Reinsch.

AFFIRMED IN PART; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND RENDERED; AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Some modifications were made to the custody and visitation agreements, but those are not relevant to this appeal.

2.   Between 2019 and 2021, there were one or two journeymen electricians employed by K&M, but by the time of the trial in this matter, K&M was again a one-man shop. Keith testified that he did not think the other electricians “closed out 2021.”

3.   In Boone, Ms. Boone claimed that the distributions received by Mr. Boone from a community subchapter “S” corporation, an oilfield consulting business, after the termination of the community were civil fruits while Mr. Boone asserted that these distributions were derived from his skill, industry, or labor and were, therefore, his separate property. Both Mr. Boone and his expert CPA testified that the business had no significant assets or capital investments and that Mr. Boone's expertise was the income-generating product. Ms. Boone's expert CPA, who was also her brother, could not dispute this. The second circuit found that “the district court was entitled to find that the ‘corporate distributions’ were income resulting exclusively from [Mr. Boone's] effort, skill or industry, and not civil fruits derived by juridical act.” Id. at 828.

4.   Louisiana Civil Code Article 806 states:A co-owner who on account of the thing held in indivision has incurred necessary expenses, expenses for ordinary maintenance and repairs, or necessary management expenses paid to a third person, is entitled to reimbursement from the other co-owners in proportion to their shares.If the co-owner who incurred the expenses had the enjoyment of the thing held in indivision, his reimbursement shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the enjoyment.

5.   “A QDRO is a limited exception to the pension plan anti-alienation provision and allows courts to recognize a nonparticipant spouse's community property interest in pension plans under specific circumstances.” Gorham v. Gorham, 09-1118, 09-1119, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/09), 31 So.3d 421, 425, writ denied, 10-164 (La. 4/5/10), 31 So.3d 363.

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE