COOK v. BUISSON (2025)

Defendant/lessor, Young Buisson, in proper person, appeals a judgment of the trial court which found in favor of plaintiffs/lessees, Theresa Cook and Zachary Cook, and awarded plaintiffs a return of a portion of their security deposit on a residential lease between the parties, as well as damages and attorney's fees. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Theresa Cook and Zachary Cook leased a house located at 300 Labarre Drive in Metairie, Louisiana from Young Buisson. The parties entered into a one-year lease, commencing on June 1, 2020. Under the terms of the lease, plaintiffs paid a $1,600.00 security deposit and a $250.00 refundable pet deposit.

Plaintiffs vacated the house on May 31, 2021. On June 29, 2021, defendant sent a letter to plaintiffs, informing them that they had forfeited their security deposit because of damage to the property. Defendant itemized the damages and expenses, totaling $3,505.00. On August 18, 2021, plaintiffs responded, challenging the alleged damages and expenses and demanding a return of their security deposit.

Thereafter, on May 31, 2022, plaintiffs filed a petition for the return of their deposit plus damages, attorney's fees, and court costs pursuant to La. R.S. 9:3251, et seq. Defendant filed an answer and reconventional demand, requesting reimbursement for incurred property damages, which went beyond the amount of the security deposit, as well as damages for breach of the lease by “impeding and entering the premises when it was on the market,” causing a loss of business rental income. On February 23, 2024, plaintiffs filed an amended petition for return of the deposit, adding a claim for violations of La. C.C. arts. 2682 and 2700 and damages based on a breach of warranty of peaceful possession.

A bench trial on the matter took place on September 24, 2024. Following testimony by plaintiffs, defendant, and defendant's husband, Greg Buisson, the trial court found that: 1) plaintiffs established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant wrongfully retained the deposit; and 2) sufficient evidence was submitted to prove defendant could be reimbursed for costs related to the leased property in the amount of $448.84, itemized as follows: $50.00 for TV cables; $100.00 for sheetrock damage; $29.96 for screen door repair; $105.88 for front porch materials; and $163.00 for sod replacement.¹

On October 8, 2024, the trial court signed a written judgment finding for plaintiffs in the amount of $2,802.32, plus attorney's fees in the amount of 25% (totaling $700.58), plus court costs (totaling $888.57 as of September 25, 2024), plus any additional court costs associated with the proceedings incurred by plaintiffs, plus deposition costs (totaling $1,262.70), and judicial interest from May 31, 2022 (totaling $423.05 as of September 25, 2024, with $0.67 daily at 8.750% a year continuing to accrue each day until the judgment is paid).

Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the judgment was contrary to the law and the evidence and newly discovered evidence required a new trial. Following a hearing on the motion for a new trial, the trial court signed a written judgment on February 20, 2025 denying the motion.

This appeal followed. Defendant assigns the following errors:

1. The trial court erred in excluding MP3 recordings offered for impeachment, which directly contradicted plaintiffs’ testimony on material issues.

2. The trial court failed to enforce the lease provisions and to recognize plaintiffs’ fourteen material breaches, each of which independently justified forfeiture of the security deposit.

3. The trial court erred in awarding most of the security deposit back to plaintiffs, contrary to La. R.S. 9:3251 and governing jurisprudence.

4. The trial court erred in refusing to credit defendant's labor for necessary repairs, despite Louisiana law recognizing recovery for the reasonable value of such labor.

5. The trial court committed manifest error in finding that the premises were returned in “good condition” contrary to extensive photographic, testimonial, and documentary evidence.

6. The trial court erred in dismissing defendant's microwave claim, despite the move-in checklist and lease provisions confirming it was part of the leased premises.

7. The trial court erred in relying on a forged lease form, disregarding false affidavits submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel's employees, and permitting counsel to act as both advocate and necessary witness.

8. The trial court erred in crediting defamatory testimony characterizing defendant as “harassing” despite text records, phone statements, and MP3 recordings disproving that characterization.

9. The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial despite newly available evidence and the court's own instruction that such evidence should be attached on appeal.

10. The trial court erred in sustaining objections and excluding documents already produced in discovery, thereby preventing defendant from rebutting plaintiffs’ testimony with properly disclosed evidence.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Procedural Note

We initially note that the appeal in this case was taken from the February 20, 2025 denial of the motion for a new trial. The denial of a motion for a new trial is an interlocutory judgment, which is not appealable. Truitt v. Graco, Inc., 19-121(La. App. 5 Cir. 11/20/19), 284 So.3d 674, 677; 9029 Jefferson Highway, L.L.C. v. S & D Roofing, LLC, 15-686 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/24/16), 187 So.3d 522, 524. The denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewable only under the appellate court's supervisory jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, an appeal from the order denying a new trial, rather than from the judgment from which the new trial is sought, is improper. Id.

However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has directed us to consider an appeal of the denial of a motion for a new trial as an appeal of the judgment on the merits as well, when it is clear from the appellant's brief that he intended to appeal the merits of the case. Roubion Shoring Company, LLC v. Crescent Shoring, L.L.C., 16-540 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So.3d 921, 924, citing Smith v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 254 La. 341, 223 So.2d 826, 828-29 (1969). It is clear from defendant's brief that she intended to appeal the October 8, 2024 judgment; therefore, we will address the merits of that judgment on appeal.

Lessee's Deposit Act

Louisiana Revised Statute 9:3251, et seq. (the “Lessee's Deposit Act”) is a set of laws meant to protect lessees from the arbitrary retention of their security deposits by the lessors. Webapps, L.L.C. v. Murdock, 16-0092 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/29/16), 196 So.3d 765, 768. It provides the lessee a legal process to recover the security deposit, as well as attorney's fees. Id.

Louisiana Revised Statute 9:3251(A) provides:

Any advance or deposit of money furnished by a tenant or lessee to a landlord or lessor to secure the performance of any part of a written or oral lease or rental agreement shall be returned to the tenant or lessee of residential or dwelling premises within one month after the lease shall terminate, except that the landlord or lessor may retain all or any portion of the advance or deposit which is reasonably necessary to remedy a default of the tenant or to remedy unreasonable wear to the premises. If any portion of an advance or deposit is retained by a landlord or lessor, he shall forward to the tenant or lessee, within one month after the date the tenancy terminates, an itemized statement accounting for the proceeds which are retained and giving the reasons therefor. The tenant shall furnish the lessor a forwarding address at the termination of the lease, to which such statements may be sent. (Emphasis added.)

Louisiana Revised Statute 9:3252(A) provides:

The willful failure to comply with R.S. 9:3251 shall give the tenant or lessee the right to recover any portion of the security deposit wrongfully retained and three hundred dollars or twice the amount of the portion of the security deposit wrongfully retained, whichever is greater, from the landlord or lessor, or from the lessor's successor in interest. Failure to remit within thirty days after written demand for a refund shall constitute willful failure.

In an action brought under La. R.S. 9:3252, the court may in its discretion award costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing party. La. R.S. 9:3253.

A trial court's reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review unless they are manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Jackson v. Sumlin, 23-329 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/10/24), 386 So.3d 318, 327-28 (citing Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507 and Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989)). When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error standard demands great deference to the trial court's findings, for only the fact finder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Jackson, 386 So.3d at 328.

The trial court's factual findings under the manifest error standard can only be reversed if the appellate court finds, based on the entire record, no reasonable factual basis for the factual finding and the fact finder is clearly wrong. Cousin v. Cousin, 21-151(La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/21), 365 So.3d 793, 797. Where the factfinder's determination is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one or two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous. Jurado v. Phillips, 23-373 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/28/24), 384 So.3d 1155, 1158.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TEN

Improperly excluded evidence

In her first assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court erred by improperly excluding MP3 recordings that she offered for impeachment purposes. Defendant claims that the MP3 recordings were referenced in her October 21, 2022 discovery responses and were not “surprise evidence.”

During defendant's case-in-chief, Greg Buisson testified on direct examination that he and defendant made MP3 recordings of conversations they had with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs objected to the admission of the MP3 recordings as evidence, claiming the recordings were never produced during discovery. Defense counsel argued the recordings did not have to be produced prior to trial since he planned to use the recordings for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. He explained he planned to use the recordings against plaintiffs. The trial court did not allow the taped conversations to be included as evidence.

In order to preserve an evidentiary issue for appellate review, it is essential that the complaining party enter a contemporaneous objection to the evidence and state the reasons for the objection. Detillieu v. Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 23-226 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/24), 392 So.3d 918, 942; Matthews v. Breaux, 04-958 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/15/05), 896 So.2d 1146, 1150. The failure to make a contemporaneous objection in the trial court waives the right of a party to complain about the ruling on appeal. Anderson v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. & Agr. & Mech. College, 06-153 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/06), 943 So.2d 1198, 1201. Defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection regarding the excluded MP3 recordings. Additionally, defendant failed to proffer the MP3 recordings for this Court to consider. See La. C.C.P. art. 1636. Accordingly, defendant did not properly preserve this issue for our review. See Koussanta v. Dozier, 16-45 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 196 So.3d 60, 67, writ denied, 16-1214 (La. 9/6/16), 205 So.3d 917. This assignment of error is without merit.

Defendant also argues in assignment of error number ten that she produced “photographs, text messages, and other exhibits” during discovery and they were improperly excluded as exhibits at trial. However, she does not specify what documents this is in reference to, and she only references the part of the trial transcript where the MP3 recordings were excluded. As such, we find no merit to this assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, AND EIGHT

Material breaches of the lease and forfeiture of the security deposit

Defendant argues the trial court improperly awarded most of the security deposit back to plaintiffs and overlooked fourteen material breaches of the lease that required forfeiture of the security deposit. These breaches include: unauthorized satellite dish installation; repeated parking on the lawn; unauthorized appliance tampering; false emergency gas leak report; false pest infestation complaints; microwave theft; “laundry washer” incident; unauthorized utility closet use and mishandling of window screens; refusal of inspections, verbal abuse, and obstruction of entry; harassing letter from tenant's attorney; interrupted and incomplete inspection; financial loss due to denial of entry and interference with showings; and property damage and uncredited owner-performed labor. Defendant argues the trial court only credited some of her receipts regarding the repairs and ignored the cost of her personal labor. She contends the trial court erred in finding plaintiffs returned the premises in good condition.

To begin, several of defendant's alleged breaches/reasons for retaining the security deposit were not raised in either her June 29, 2021 letter itemizing the property damage or in her reconventional demand. These include the claims of “repeated parking on lawn,” “false emergency and gas leak report,” “false pest infestation complaints,” “disassembled the ice maker,” and “harassing letter from tenant's attorney.” Accordingly, we pretermit any discussion of these additional expenses or issues, as “categorical specification” is required concerning expenses to “reasonably apprise” plaintiffs of the “nature of the elements of wear and tear involved” in order to comply with the itemization requirements of La. R.S. 9:3251. See Devall v. Home Finders Int'l, Inc., 22-0774 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/8/23), 368 So.3d 125, 133.

Unauthorized satellite dish installation

Defendant contends plaintiffs installed a satellite dish on the roof without written consent within five days of moving in and such unauthorized alterations to the home justify a $350.00 security deposit deduction.

At trial, defendant testified that plaintiffs installed the satellite dish on the roof without permission, and plaintiffs were informed that it needed to be removed before they moved out. When it was not, defendant received a $350.00 quote for its removal. Before the satellite dish could be removed, Hurricane Ida hit, requiring a full roof replacement. The satellite dish was removed during this process. Defendant testified she paid extra to remove the satellite dish during the roof replacement. When asked for proof to support this allegation, she responded, it's “included in the roof replacement.”

Mr. Buisson testified he did not authorize the installation of the satellite dish on the roof. When he observed it being installed, he “yell[ed] at the Dish guy,” but since the plate was already mounted, he said to just leave it there. He explained that the satellite dish damaged the plywood under the roof. After plaintiffs moved out, he received two quotes for its removal; however, the dish was ultimately removed when the roof was replaced after Hurricane Ida. He testified he paid the deductible and a “partial payment.” When asked if he had proof that defendant incurred any additional expense for removing the satellite dish when the roof was replaced, he testified he did not know if any of the bills specified this. Defendant did not submit any invoice related to the roof replacement.

Zachary Cook testified that while the satellite dish was being “adjusted” for installation on the roof, Mr. Buisson came over and began arguing with the technician about its placement. Eventually, Mr. Buisson allowed it to be installed on the roof. Mr. Cook testified that they only had to use two screws that went in through the roof.

Considering the testimony that the entire roof had to be replaced due to the hurricane and that no evidence was submitted to show there was any additional expense to remove the satellite dish, we find no manifest error in the trial court's refusal to award defendant costs for the removal of the satellite dish.

Unauthorized appliance tampering

Defendant contends plaintiffs tampered with the dishwasher, which risked the warranty and caused additional expenses for repair in the amount of $890.00.

According to defendant, plaintiffs reported an issue with the dishwasher soon after they moved in. A technician repaired the dishwasher; however, a few days later, plaintiffs reported that there was a leak. A technician found a “hole” in the dishwasher. Because the warranty would not cover the repair, Mr. Buisson purchased materials to fix it. Defendant could not say how plaintiffs damaged the dishwasher, and she had no record or technician report that shows plaintiffs tampered with or caused the hole. Defendant never purchased a new dishwasher.

Mr. Buisson testified that as an engineer, he often helped with home repairs, including assisting with the dishwasher. In July 2020, it was determined that a rodent entered through the utility room and chewed on the dishwasher wires. The technician replaced the damaged parts, which were covered under the warranty. Thereafter, a leak developed; the technician returned and determined there was a hole in the stainless-steel drum. Because the warranty did not cover this issue, he patched the hole with epoxy. When plaintiffs moved out, he found wax in the dishwasher. He did not know how the wax got there. He testified that he spent over two months cleaning wax from the appliance.

Theresa Cook testified that she never intentionally caused damage to the dishwasher and only ran the dishwasher every couple of days. Mr. Cook stated a technician determined that the hole in the dishwasher was a “manufacturer's defect,” and Mr. Buisson then used epoxy to fix the problem. Mr. Cook denied causing any intentional damage to the dishwasher.

Both defendant and her husband admitted there was no evidence or report showing the actual cause of the hole or the wax inside the dishwasher. Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court's denial of this claim.

Microwave theft and forged lease

Defendant contends plaintiffs owe her $100.00 for the microwave they removed from the home. She argues the trial court erred when it dismissed her claim about the microwave since the microwave was on the move-in checklist and thus was a part of the lease.

At trial, when the parties began discussing the microwave, the trial court stated the microwave was not listed as an “appliance” in the lease, so it was “not an issue at all.” Defense counsel then stated, “It is not on the lease, your Honor. We'll stipulate to that.” Defense counsel then later stated, “Judge, we're going to skip No. 11 because it's the microwave, which I understand is not part of the case any longer.”

Because defense counsel stipulated that the microwave was not on the lease, and, nonetheless, did not contemporaneously object to the trial court's decision that the microwave claim was not valid, we find this issue is not properly before us for review.

Defendant further contends that the lease entered into evidence at trial was “forged” with an altered date and missing initials, and it excluded the move-in checklist as an addendum.² At trial, plaintiffs offered into evidence a copy of the signed lease. Defense counsel was asked if there was any objection, and he replied “No objection, Your Honor.” With no contemporaneous objection, this argument was not preserved for our appellate review.

Laundry washer incident

Defendant claims that six months after moving in, plaintiffs demanded that the washing machine be repaired, costing her up to $400.00 for parts and labor. She argues that by the terms of the lease, she was not obligated to repair the washing machine. Defendant produced a receipt from Ideal Appliance Parts for $154.00 documenting the fixing of the washing machine's motherboard. When asked what evidence she had that plaintiffs damaged the washing machine, defendant opined that because plaintiffs washed heavy items in the washing machine, the motherboard broke. She admitted she is not an expert. Mr. Buisson testified that when plaintiffs moved out, the dryer door was broken and the washing machine did not work.

Mrs. Cook testified that the washing machine unit in the home was small, so she would do a load of laundry every day. It broke four or five months into the lease. She was unsure why it was not working and only recalled that the lint filter on the dryer was broken when they moved in and glue was holding it together. She cleaned out the lint filter anytime she used the dryer and denied breaking the lint filter. When she reported the problem, defendant would refer to the lease and tell plaintiffs she did not have to fix anything.

Here, with only defendant's theory on how plaintiffs could have broken the washing machine, we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision to accept Mrs. Cook's testimony and find the security deposit did not need to be retained for repairs to the washing machine.

Unauthorized utility closet use and mishandling of window screens

Defendant contends plaintiffs used the exterior utility closet as a dog shelter, left it unsecured during their tenancy, and discarded a window screen on the ground for over 15 days, thus warranting the forfeiture of part of the security deposit.

Defendant testified at trial that the utility closet door was regularly left open and plaintiffs used the closet as a doghouse. This caused the door to bang in the wind resulting in the hinges bending and the frame cracking. On multiple occasions, defendant and Mr. Buisson entered the property to close the door. The cost to repair the door, including labor, was $350.00. Mr. Buisson testified he informed plaintiffs the utility closet was off limits. He explained that Mr. Cook left the door open for his dog and used it as a dog house. He fixed the door himself so there was no receipt as to the labor and costs of its repair. Mrs. Cook denied ever using the utility closet as a doghouse, stating the room was too small for her dog.

Concerning the screen, defendant testified that a window screen was torn and left on the ground and will require $65.00 for repairs. She submitted a picture of a screen on the ground as evidence. She testified that the screen is still damaged and has not been replaced.

Mrs. Cook testified that they did occasionally remove a screen from the window so they could temporarily run an extension cord for patio lights. They always replaced it immediately and ensured it was reinstalled before they vacated the property.

Based on the evidence and testimony presented concerning both the utility closet and the screen, we find the trial court's ruling cannot be found to be manifestly erroneous.

Refusal of inspections, verbal abuse, and obstruction of entry; interrupted and incomplete inspection; financial loss due to denial of entry and interference with showings

Defendant contends that plaintiffs refused inspections and showings, at times with hostility and harassment. She asserts that the trial court improperly credited plaintiffs’ testimony that defendant was harassing and intimidating. Defendant further argues plaintiffs repeatedly canceled showings, harassed prospective tenants, and caused defendant to withdraw the rental listing.

Defendant testified at trial that plaintiffs were always postponing inspections of the property. On May 6, 2021, defendant attempted to contact Mrs. Cook regarding inspecting the home. When Mrs. Cook would not respond to her, she went to the property to speak with her. Mr. Buisson testified that on that occasion, Mr. Cook started using the “f-word” and threatened to call the police. According to Mrs. Cook, at the time, she was sick with Covid-19, but did not cancel any requests for inspections. Defendant and Mr. Buisson arrived to the house late, and Mr. Cook told them it was not a good time; Mr. Buisson responded that he was going to call the police if they did not let them in to do the inspection. Mrs. Cook admitted to being “mean” to defendant in response. According to Mrs. Cook, the inspection still occurred, and plaintiffs were not informed of any violations.

Defendant also testified at trial that she gave a few different dates and times to Mrs. Cook to bring over prospective tenants. Of those, Mrs. Cook responded that only one of the days would work for her. Defendant explained Mr. Cook told her she could only bring tenants on one specific day. Mrs. Cook testified that defendant would text her multiple times a day about bringing over prospective tenants at different times. She recalled only ever cancelling one appointment because she either had work or was sick. She testified defendant did show the property.

Considering plaintiffs testified that they did not prohibit the inspection of the property nor showings of the property, we find no manifest error in the trial court's credibility determination regarding these claims.

Property not left in “good condition”

Defendant argues the property was not left in good condition and there was extensive property damage following plaintiffs residing at the home. She argues the evidence presented, including the photographs, invoices, and receipts of repairs, show the damages went well beyond ordinary wear and tear and required that the security deposit be retained. Defendant claims she is owed $300.00 for cleaning expenses.

Both parties presented testimony and evidence regarding the condition of the property. Defendant submitted pictures of the stove, oven, cabinets, bathroom, vents, lights, window sills, and exterior of the home taken after plaintiffs moved out. Plaintiffs submitted videos they took of the home just prior to moving out. When defendant was shown the videos, she testified the refrigerator, blinds, and pantry looked clean. She stated that normally she cleans the home or hires someone to clean the home after a tenant leaves. She testified that photographs of the yard taken the day after plaintiffs vacated the property show weeds that could not have grown like that “overnight.” Mr. Buisson testified that when the Cooks vacated the property, they began cleaning up the house and realized it was “more and more work.”

According to Mrs. Cook, she constantly cleaned the house. She spent three full days, six to seven hours, making the house “perfect” before they moved out. She cleaned the windows, windowsills, refrigerator, floors, pantry, and fans in all the rooms. When asked if the videos shown at trial reflected the condition of the home at move-out, she replied, yes it was “spic and span.” Mr. Cook testified his wife cleaned the home every day, including the period right before their departure. He also testified they mowed and maintained the lawn frequently.

As noted, under the provisions of La. R.S. 9:3251(A), the landlord “may retain all or any portion of the advance or deposit which is reasonably necessary to remedy a default of the tenant or to remedy unreasonable wear to the premises.” Cleaning expenses have been considered normal wear and tear expenses that are outside of the scope of acceptable reasons to withhold a lessee's security deposit. Devall, 368 So.3d at 134–35. The trial court was presented with testimony, photographs, and video evidence of the condition of the house at the time the lease ended by both parties and accepted plaintiffs’ testimony regarding its condition.

Conclusion

In conclusion as to these assignments of error, upon review, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination that plaintiffs were entitled to a return of the security deposit, minus that which it determined defendant was owed for repairs. These assignments of error are without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER NINE

Denial of motion for a new trial

In her ninth assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial since the judgment was contrary to the law and the evidence and she presented newly discovered evidence in support of her case. She claims that after the trial, additional evidence became available, including affidavits from prior tenants, her own affidavit detailing the MP3 recordings contradicting plaintiffs’ testimony, and photos and repair records.

La. C.C.P. art. 1972 provides, in pertinent part, “A new trial shall be granted, upon contradictory motion of any party, in the following cases: (1) When the verdict or judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and the evidence. (2) When the party has discovered, since the trial, evidence important to the cause, which he could not, with due diligence, have obtained before or during the trial.” A new trial may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor, except as otherwise provided by law. La. C.C.P. art. 1973. The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a new trial is abuse of discretion. LMB Servs., LLC v. Par. of St. Charles, 24-46 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/27/24), 409 So.3d 799, 803, writ denied, 24-01581 (La. 2/28/25), 402 So.3d 492.

The moving party bears the burden of proving that there are adequate grounds for a new trial. Burns v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 14-421 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/14), 165 So.3d 147, 155. When a claim is made that a new trial is warranted due to newly discovered evidence, there must be a clear showing, not only that the evidence was discovered after the conclusion of the proceedings, but that every reasonable and diligent effort was made to procure it before the proceedings. Id.

In her motion for a new trial, defendant argued the trial court failed to consider that plaintiffs’ breaches of the lease should result in a forfeiture of the security deposit and the trial court erred by dismissing her microwave claim. She also argued plaintiffs submitted a forged lease and made numerous false statements during their trial testimony.

Following argument at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the trial court denied the motion, stating that at trial, it weighed the credibility of each witness and the evidence that was submitted according to Louisiana law of evidence and procedure.

Upon review, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. Based on our review of the record and considering our analysis above, we find defendant has not proven that the judgment issued by the trial court was unreasonable or clearly contrary to the law and the evidence.

CONCLUSION

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that there is a reasonable factual basis for all of the trial court's factual findings and the court was not clearly wrong in such factual findings. Nor do we find that there were any legal errors in the trial court's rulings under review. Accordingly, defendant's assignments of error are without merit.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court under review is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court stated that the original deposit owed to plaintiffs totaled $1,850.00 minus what she determined defendant could keep ($448.84) would mean plaintiffs would be entitled to a return of double $1,401.16 plus costs and attorney's fees pursuant to La. R.S. 9:3251, et seq.

2.   Defendant also argues that the trial court considered a “perjured” affidavit that was submitted in support of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. We note that no affidavit was submitted as an exhibit at trial and/or relied upon by plaintiffs. Defendant further argues plaintiffs’ counsel, who is plaintiffs’ daughter, was a necessary witness to this case. Defendant asserts she should not have served as both counsel and witness since this compounded the prejudice created by the forged lease and perjured affidavit. We find no merit to either of these arguments.

GRAVOIS, J.