SINEGAL v. FRANCIS USAA (2025)

In this appeal, Defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion in rendering excessively high general damage and loss of consortium awards to Plaintiffs. After examining the particular facts and circumstances of the case, along with consideration of prior awards in similar cases, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court and affirm the awards.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The matter arises from a two-vehicle accident that occurred on May 19, 2022. Plaintiff, Stanley Sinegal, who was a relatively healthy and active 68-year-old man, was driving his vehicle when it was struck from the rear by a vehicle driven by Defendant, Aaron Francis. GoAuto Insurance Company was Francis’ insurer. It was stipulated by both parties that Francis was solely at fault in causing the accident.

Suit was filed by Plaintiffs against Francis, GoAuto, and USAA Casualty Insurance Company (their underinsured motorist carrier). Plaintiffs settled their claims against USAA prior to trial. No punitive or exemplary damages were alleged by Plaintiffs. They simply sought general and special damages for the injuries Stanley incurred in the accident. Stanley's wife, Coralee, alleged she was entitled to damages for loss of consortium. Following a bench trial on July 29, 2024, the matter was taken under advisement. In a judgment signed on October 3, 2024, the trial judge awarded $1,600,000.00 to Stanley for his “pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of his life.” The trial court further found Coralee was entitled to loss of consortium damages in the amount of $500,000.00.

Finding the judgment did not delineate what was awarded against GoAuto only (it had bodily injury policy limits of $15,000), as opposed to what was awarded against Francis personally, GoAuto filed a Motion for New Trial on those limited grounds. Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion and on December 2, 2024, an amended judgment was signed. That judgment reflected that GoAuto “shall pay its bodily injury policy limit of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($15,000.00) DOLLARS as the liability insurer of Aaron Francis, which amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($15,000.00) DOLLARS is to be credited against any amount owed by Aaron Francis to Plaintiffs, Stanley Senegal [sic] and Coralee Senegal [sic].” Pertinent to this appeal, the damage amounts awarded were unchanged.

Defendants, GoAuto and Francis, have filed this appeal asserting only that awards for general damages to Stanley and loss of consortium to Coralee are an abuse of the trial court's discretion and should be reduced.

ANALYSIS

Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC v. Capitol City Produce Company, LLC, 23-788 (La. 06/28/24), 388 So. 3d 331, on rehearing, 23-788, pp. 4-6 (La. 12/19/24), 397 So.3d 404, 408-09, set out the appellate standard of review for determining whether an award is excessive or inadequate:

It is well-settled that appellate courts “have a constitutional duty to review the law and facts and thereafter render a judgment on quantum based on the merits,” including “determining whether the jury has abused its ‘much discretion’․ in awarding general damages.” Carollo v. Wilson, 353 So.2d 249, 252 (La. 1977) (citing La. Const. art. V, § 10 (B), which provides, in pertinent part, that “appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts.”).

This court has long recognized that “[r]easonable persons frequently disagree about the measure of general damages in a particular case.” Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1993). “The standard for appellate review of general damage awards is difficult to express and is necessarily non-specific, and the requirement of an articulated basis for disturbing such awards gives little guidance as to what articulation suffices to justify modification of a generous or stingy award.” Id., 623 So.2d at 1261. “It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances that the appellate court should increase or decrease the award.” Id.

General damage awards must not be “obviously the result of passion or prejudice, and they [should] bear a reasonable relationship to the elements of the proved damages.” Youn, 623 So.2d at 1261. “To reduce the trier of fact's award, [a reviewing court] must conclude from the entirety of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that a rational trier of fact could not have fixed the awards of general damages at the level set by the trial judge or that this is one of those ‘exceptional cases where such awards are so gross as to be contrary to right reason.’ ” Davis v. Hoffman, 00-2326, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/24/01), 800 So.2d 1028, 1030 (quoting Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 832 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Youn, 623 So.2d at 1261. In summary, to find abuse of discretion warranting the disturbance of a factfinder's award of general damages, a reviewing court must find that the award is “so high or so low in proportion to the injury ․ that it shocks the conscience.” Baack v. McIntosh, 2020-1054 (La. 6/30/21), 333 So.3d 1206, 1215 (quoting Riley v. Maison Orleans II, Inc., 01-0498, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/25/02), 829 So.2d 479, 487).

Prior to this Court's decision in Pete [v. Boland Marine and Manufacturing Company, LLC, 23-170 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So. 3d 636], attempts to offer guidance in determination of what “shocks the conscience” provided little objective criteria beyond the codal “much discretion” being left to the judge or jury. See La. C.C. art. 2324.1. In Pete, this Court appropriately recognized that the consideration of “past awards in evaluating whether an award is an abuse of discretion” “provides a reasonable criterion by which courts can evaluate awards for general damages, whether for excessiveness or insufficiency.” Id., 2023-0170, p. 8, 379 So.3d at 643. As observed in Barber I, realizing that “[n]o two cases will be identical,” the Pete court cautioned that “a review of prior awards is not the only factor to be considered in evaluating whether a general damage award is an abuse of discretion” and explained that “[t]he review of prior awards will simply serve to illustrate and supply guidance in the determination of damages.” Barber I, 2023-0788, p. 25, 388 So.3d at 352 (quoting Pete, 2023-0170, p. 9, 379 So.3d at 643). The Pete court emphasized that other factors such as “the facts or circumstances particular to the case under consideration,” that is, “the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances” must always be considered as well. Clearly, prior awards in truly similar cases are a touchstone in the review performed by the appellate courts. Thus, under Pete, “to determine whether a trier of fact abused its discretion in its award for general damages, an appellate court is to consider the particular facts and circumstances of a case, in conjunction with a review of prior awards. This applies to claims of excessiveness as well as insufficiency in an award.” Id., 2023-00170, p.10, 379 So.3d at 644.

Accordingly, in Pete, this court incorporated “a reasonable criterion” into a reviewing court's determination of whether an award is abusively high or low based on what has been done through the decades in practice by attorneys in estimating the value of a case and by courts in assisting in the determination of whether an award shocks the conscience so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Id., 2023-0170, p. 8, 379 So.3d at 643.

Taking these principles into account, Pete concisely summarized the required two-step analysis for appellate review of a damage award: (i) determining whether abuse of discretion occurred by examining the particular facts and circumstances of the case under review while including a “consideration of prior awards in similar cases,” and (ii) if abuse of discretion is found, “the court is to then also consider those prior awards to determine ‘the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.’ ” Id., 2023-0170, p. 10, 379 So.3d at 644 (quoting Jones v. Mkt. Basket Stores, Inc., 2022-0841, p. 16 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 452, 464).

With the above framework in mind, we begin by thoroughly examining the record as to both awards made in this case.

General Damage Award to Stanley Sinegal.

GoAuto acknowledged Stanley suffered serious injuries from the accident in question and does not dispute he was entitled to an award for general damages. GoAuto argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Stanley $1,600,000.00 in general damages. General damages are inherently speculative, cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty, and include pain and suffering (both physical and mental), physical impairment and disability, and loss of enjoyment of life. McGee v. A C & S, Inc., 05-1036 (La. 7/10/06), 933 So.2d 770.

While Stanley was driving his vehicle, it was struck from behind by the vehicle driven by Defendant Francis. The collision was undoubtedly severe, as the vehicle driven by Francis struck Stanley's vehicle at a high rate of speed. Stanley testified at impact there was an “implosion” in his vehicle. He had his seat belt on, which prevented him from going through the windshield. He further stated when his seat belt restrained him, he felt his back “snap.” Stanley was unable to move out of the vehicle. He testified the interior of the vehicle filled with smoke and he had extreme difficulty breathing. Stanley required assistance from emergency personnel to be removed from the vehicle and stated during this process he suffered excruciating pain in his back.

Stanley was transported from the scene by ambulance to the emergency room of Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital in Lafayette. He was diagnosed with a thoracic fracture and was fitted for a back brace. He then was discharged and allowed to return home wearing the back brace. Stanley testified after returning home, he experienced continuing difficulty breathing, along with excruciating pain and returned to the hospital.

While at the hospital he underwent several breathing treatments. Stanley also underwent physical therapy at Lourdes. He continued physical therapy until Dr. Jason Cormier stopped that therapy and recommended Stanley undergo back fusion surgery. Dr. Cormier informed Stanley it was his opinion that paralysis was a distinct possibility if he did not undergo a four-level thoracic fusion. Because Stanley was on an aspirin regimen, he had to have blood platelet treatment done to fortify his blood prior to surgery, which delayed the impending surgery by several days, thus prolonging his hospital stay.

Subsequent to the surgery, Stanley suffered a wound complication, which required wound debridement to be performed by Dr. Perez. Thereafter, home health personnel continued to treat Stanley for his wound complications.

Stanley testified he needed to wear his back brace for several months following the surgery. He was unable to walk to the bathroom without his brace, which required him to wake up his wife to help him put it on at night when he needed to use the bathroom.

Stanley testified he continues to suffer from continual back pain and always feels the rods and screws throbbing in his back. He has been unable to exercise and has gained approximately 40 to 50 pounds since the surgery. He stated that fitness had always played a large part in his life, and he feels unfit and unhealthy since the surgery.

Stanley, who was a pastor, was unable to sit in church for several months, let alone deliver a sermon to his congregation. Stanley testified this inability was a major cause of distress to him. His wife corroborated that his duties as a pastor were his passion and his inability to perform those duties depressed him severely.

Stanley was unable to drive for a lengthy time after the surgery and had to rely on his wife to take him everywhere. Stanley testified, as of the date of trial, it was very difficult for them to travel long distances due to the constant pain in his back. Stanley further stated he cannot stay seated for more than a couple of hours at most. This was extremely distressing to Stanley as many of his children and grandchildren live out of state, thus limiting how often he is able to visit with them. Lastly, Stanley testified he was no longer capable of helping his wife around the house. He testified his injuries and constant pain have made him feel like he is less of a man.

Dr. Cormier testified by way of trial deposition. Dr. Cormier testified that Stanley had a fracture of his anterior longitudinal ligament, which is an unstable fracture. He noted that with an unstable fracture, the procedure is performed two levels above the fracture and two levels below, thus the necessity for a four-level fusion. Although there was testimony from Dr. Cormier that Stanley may have suffered from diffuse idiopathic skeletal hyperostosis, there was no doubt that the accident caused the fracture and necessitated the surgery. He testified the surgery required inserting rods and screws into Stanley's body and was a complicated and highly invasive procedure. He did believe the surgery was a relative success and noted Stanley had, in general, recovered as well as could be expected from the procedure.

We now examine the general damage award as instructed in Pete and Barber, by looking at general damage awards in cases involving similar injuries, with the understanding that no two cases are identical. Noting the particular facts and circumstances of Stanley's injuries and recovery in mind, we will look at similar cases as one factor in determining whether the award is so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Pete, 379 So.3d 636.

In Franks v. State National Ins. Co, 22-169 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/25/23), 355 So.3d 1174, writ denied, 23-259 (La. 4/18/23), 359 So.3d 512, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was in a wheelchair, and he was being transported in a medical van from a hospital to a rehab hospital after suffering a stroke. The plaintiff alleged he suffered serious injuries requiring two separate neck operations that resulted in a seven-level fusion of his cervical spine. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding Plaintiff with $2,750,000.00 in general damages. The jury also awarded plaintiff's wife with $500,000.00 for loss of consortium. This court on appeal found no abuse of discretion in the jury's award of general damages, noting the plaintiff ultimately underwent two separate cervical surgeries, which resulted in the complete fusion of seven levels of his cervical spine. These surgeries limited flexion, extension, and rotation of the plaintiff's neck, caused headaches, pain, and balance issues that would affect him for the rest of his life. This court also noted the testimony of the plaintiff and his wife as to the significant effects of the plaintiff's injuries and surgeries on his daily life. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff led an active lifestyle that included running, hunting, camping, and playing with his grandchildren, which changed significantly following the accident, when he essentially could only watch television. This court concluded after “reviewing the record and the severity of the injuries [the plaintiff] sustained in the accident, and the significant and permanent affects they had on his life, we cannot say that the jury's award of general damages was excessive or otherwise an abuse of its discretion.” Id. at 1193.

In Cooper v. Lacorte, 99-1726 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/31/01), 775 So.2d 4, on rehearing, 99-1726 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/31/01), 775 So.2d 704, the plaintiff in question, Marion Cooper, was injured in an automobile accident. According to the facts as set out in the original opinion, the “collision appears to have been a minor impact; the Yukon sustained no damage while the Barreta suffered only a small dent to the front panel on the driver's side.” Mrs. Cooper asserted that, as a result of the accident, she sustained acute headaches, neck pain, and lower back pain. Mrs. Cooper underwent a conservative course of treatment for approximately two years. At that point, she underwent an MRI of the cervical spine which revealed annular protrusions at the C4/5, C5/6, and C6/7 levels. As a result, she eventually underwent an anterior cervical fusion at the C5/6 and C6/7 level and a two-level caged fusion in the lumbar spine. The testimony established that Mrs. Cooper possessed a long history of pre-existing medical problems, including treatment for debilitating back pain years before the accident. Because of her pre-existing injuries, the appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Mrs. Cooper $1,600,000.00 in general damages. Therefore, it reduced the award to $800,000.00. However, on rehearing, the appellate court stated that it “relied on older cases without taking into account that both general damage awards and the cost of living have increased over the last decade.” The court then amended the opinion to reflect that the general damage award to Marion Cooper should be reduced from $1,600,000.00 to $1,200,000.00. We note Cooper is nearly twenty-five years old and involved similar injuries as to what Stanley endured in the present incident.

In Cobb v. Delta Exports, Inc., 05-509 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 918 So.2d 1080, writ denied, 06-225 (La. 4/24/06), 926 So.2d 551, the plaintiff was injured as a result of an accident where a front-end loader backed into his vehicle. The plaintiff began treatment with his physician a few days after the accident and began a continuous course of treatment for back and neck complaints. He eventually underwent lumbar fusion and cervical fusion surgeries. He maintained even after the surgery he continued to experience pain and his daily activities were curtailed. The plaintiff testified that, although he had occasional pain prior to the accident, his condition significantly worsened afterward. The plaintiff explained that he could no longer participate in the type of activities he once enjoyed. Although he testified he had traveled on occasion since his accident, he explained that visits to his children were more time-consuming given his inability to travel for long periods. This court found that the jury did not abuse its discretion in awarding $500,000.00 in general damages. It should be noted that Cobb is a twenty-year-old case and the plaintiff's accident and injuries in that case, while significant, are not as severe as what Stanley endured in the present case.

As the Supreme Court stated, “a review of prior awards is not the only factor to be considered in evaluating whether a general damage award is an abuse of discretion; it is a starting point.” Pete, 379 So.3d at 643. Proper weight must be given to the effects of “the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances[.]” Id. at 643 (quoting Youn, 623 So.2d at 1261). The record amply demonstrated the detrimental effect the injuries have had on Stanley's quality of life. The record established that before the accident, Stanley was very active, was devoted to his duties as a pastor, was heavily involved in his children and grandchildren's lives, and regularly helped with household duties. As a result of the injuries he suffered in the accident, he is not able to engage in many of these activities. Additionally, he has gained substantial weight since the accident, which has affected his self-image. His inability to travel has severely impacted the amount of time he can spend with his family. The trial court clearly accorded significant weight to the full record of his injuries, impairments, and ongoing suffering. In conjunction with a review of prior awards in cases involving similar injuries, we cannot conclude that “a rational trier of fact could not have fixed the award[ ] of general damages at the level set by” the trial court. Youn, 623 So.2d at 1261. The general damage award bore a reasonable relationship to the damages, which are supported in the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, we find the trial court's award of general damages to Stanley in this case does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Loss of Consortium Award to Coralee Sinegal.

Coralee testified she was at a school event for a grandchild when she was called on her phone by Stanley soon after the accident occurred. Coralee stated she couldn't really understand what he was saying as he was in a severe panic. All she was able to make out was that Stanley was having extreme difficulty breathing. Coralee immediately left and arrived at the scene just prior to Stanley being pulled out of the vehicle. She recalled that there were police, fire and ambulance personnel all at the scene when she arrived. Shortly after arriving, a police officer came over and communicated to Coralee what had happened. She stated she knew Stanley was seriously injured and heard his complaints that he could not breathe. She was able to be close to Stanley as he was being removed from the vehicle, and he again told her he was “having problems breathing.”

She followed the ambulance to the hospital, where she testified x-rays were taken and a MRI performed, and Stanley was fitted for a brace. Coralee testified it was “very, very rough” when they returned home because he could not move without the brace, which was very heavy. It required her to help him put it on and take it off whenever he needed to move.

Coralee testified Stanley had to return to the hospital because he was having problems breathing and was in severe pain. She remained with Stanley for the entire two weeks he was in the hospital, which included the surgical procedure. She slept at the hospital that entire period which she stated was very difficult for her as she suffered from arthritis.

When Stanley came out of anesthesia, Coralee testified as to the following harrowing sequence:

He was, like - - he was hollering: I need my sons; I need my sons; I need my three sons. And so the - - one of them, he had already left to go back to Houston, and so we had to FaceTime them all so he could see his son and then my daughter. They got hysterical because he started seeing his mother and father, who had passed away. And, you know what they say, whenever you see somebody passed away, you know, you may be dying. And so, like I said, my daughter really, like I said - - and so I'm trying to keep her calm and keep everything going. Like I said, it was a nightmare, you know. It was terrible because, you know, he never acted like that and then crying for his boys. And, you know, having to FaceTime them and stuff. But like I said, it was rough. It was rough.

After returning home following surgery, Coralee testified she had to do everything for Stanley. He had to wear his brace for several months following the surgery and he needed assistance to put it on and to take it off. She had to bathe him, and because of Stanley's difficulty ambulating, had to replace their jacuzzi tub with a handicapped shower. Stanley was unable to drive for some time after the surgery, which required Coralee to take him everywhere.

Coralee also testified they could no longer travel to visit their children, many of whom lived out of state. As of the date of trial, she testified it was very difficult for them to travel anywhere, as Stanley's pain doesn't allow him to stay seated for more than a couple hours at most. She testified they lead a much more restrictive and sedate lifestyle due to his problems.

Coralee noted she suffers from back problems herself, as well as arthritis and has had a knee replacement. Prior to his injuries, Stanley helped quite a bit around the house and did all the yardwork. She said she can no longer rely on Stanley to help at all, which has placed a significant physical toll on her. She also testified she and Stanley did not have sex for “a long, long time after the collision.”

In reviewing an award for loss of consortium, it is necessary to evaluate the elements that comprise a loss of consortium claim.

The compensable elements of damage in a loss of consortium claim are loss of society, sex, service, and support. “Society” is broader than loss of sexual relations. It includes general love, companionship, and affection that the spouse loses as a result of the injury. “Support” is the lost family income that would go to support the uninjured spouse. “Service” is the uncompensated work around the house or educational help with the children which will, as a result of the injury, have to be obtained from another source and at some price.

Rowe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 95-669, p. 25 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 718, 732, writ denied, 96-824 (La. 5/17/96), 673 So.2d 611.

We note Defendants do not dispute that Coralee was entitled to an award for loss of consortium, but rather only argue that the amount awarded was excessive and an abuse of the trial court's discretion.

In Franks v. State National Ins. Co, 22-169 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/25/23), 355 So.3d 1174, writ denied, 23-259 (La. 4/18/23), 359 So.3d 512, the jury awarded the plaintiff's wife $500,000.00 for loss of consortium. As discussed earlier, the husband was involved in an auto accident, which necessitated two separate neck surgical procedures that resulted in a seven-level fusion of his cervical spine. On appeal, this court noted the wife's testimony as to her loving relationship with her husband of fifty years. She testified that, prior to the accident, they travelled together, enjoyed outdoor activities, and they enjoyed active involvement with their grandchildren on a regular basis. She also testified that, prior to the accident, her husband assisted with maintaining the house and lawn and handy work round the house. However, after the accident, she and her husband were no longer able to enjoy the active lifestyle they previously had because of his injuries and surgeries. She stated all they could do together was watch television. She noted she could not leave Mr. Franks alone for more than an hour or two and had to continually help her husband with most tasks. She indicated that he could no longer maintain the house or lawn as he did prior to the accident. This court affirmed the award, finding the “injuries sustained in the accident caused a significant and permanent change in he and [his wife's] relationship and lifestyle, and [there was] no abuse of discretion” in the award. Id. at 1192.

In Rentrop v. Arch Insurance Co., 17-635 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/17), 241 So.3d 357, the appellate court affirmed a loss of consortium award in the amount of $250,000 to a wife after her husband's cervical discectomy and fusion. The appellate court found that the wife's life had been “substantially impacted” by her husband's injuries that resulted from the accident. The plaintiffs were married for thirty-nine years and raised two children and have seven grandchildren. Mrs. Rentrop testified that before the accident, the couple were always outdoors, fishing and boating. Mr. Rentrop had always been a very active person. However, following the accident, Mr. Rentrop was confined to his home. The wife stated that since the accident, Mr. Rentrop was unable to help out around their home like before. Mrs. Rentrop explained to the jury that before the accident, Mr. Rentrop would do household chores, such as cleaning and cooking. Since the accident, he was unable to do any of these things because “after a while it just got to be too much.” Additionally, Mrs. Rentrop testified that since the accident, she and her husband's relationship had been strained. This case is factually similar to the present case. The age of the wives and the disruption to their lives is similar. But we do note the case is nearly ten years old and it should be recognized that the trial court affirmed the award rather than amending it in any way, finding it was not an abuse of discretion.

As set forth above, the record establishes Stanley can no longer be the same husband to Coralee, or the same father and grandfather to his children and grandchildren as before the accident. Prior to his injuries, he contributed to the household in a variety of ways. Following the accident, he became someone Coralee had to take care of, becoming more like a child than a husband. Both Stanley and Coralee testified they are substantially less involved in their children and grandchildren's lives due to Stanley's inability to travel. The debilitating effects of the injuries on Stanley's lifestyle and self-image have negatively affected his spousal relationship with Coralee. We find the jury's award in this case, while on the high end of the range of reasonable awards, does not “shock the conscience,” and does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's loss of consortium award to Coralee Sinegal.

DECREE

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendants-Appellants, GoAuto Insurance Company and Aaron Francis.

AFFIRMED.

THIERRY, Judge.