CEDRANEKA ALEXANDER v. CROSSINGS LLC 1ST LAKE PROPERTIES INC AND ABC INSURANCE COMPANY (2025)

WRIT GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART

Defendants-relators, Crossings I, LLC and 1st Lake Properties, Inc., seek supervisory review of the trial court's judgment overruling their dilatory exception of vagueness and their peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action. For the reasons that follow, we grant relators’ writ application in part. The district court's ruling on the exception of no right of action is reversed, and plaintiff's claims against “ABC Insurance Company” are dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, we reverse the district court's ruling on the exception of no cause of action regarding plaintiff's LUTPA claims, and, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 934, remand to allow plaintiff 30 days to amend her petition to state a valid cause of action against defendants under LUTPA. In other respects, the writ application is denied.

Plaintiff-respondent, Cedraneka Alexander, filed suit against relators alleging that she was exposed to water intrusion, excess moisture, and widespread mold, including black mold, which caused her to suffer from acute sinusitis, asthma, shortness of breath, headaches, fatigue, congestion, nausea, and flu-like symptoms while leasing an apartment located on relators’ property. Crossings I, LLC is alleged to be the owner of the property, and 1st Lake Properties, LLC is alleged to manage the property. Ms. Alexander's petition includes claims for general negligence, breach of contract, and unfair trade practices under Louisiana's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“LUTPA”), La. R.S. 51:1401, et seq., asserting that defendants intentionally concealed the hazardous conditions that caused her injuries and failed to make the necessary repairs. Ms. Alexander also alleges relators are liable for actual or constructive notice of vices or defects in the apartment building.

Relators filed exceptions of vagueness, no cause of action, and no right of action, which the trial court overruled.¹ We review the denial of an exception of no right of action and an exception of no cause of action under a de novo standard of review. O'Dwyer v. Metairie Towers Condo. Assoc. Bd. President, 24-277 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/29/25), 404 So.3d 1059, 1065, writ denied, 25-282 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 216. We review an exception of vagueness for manifest error. Register v. Osman Constr., LLC, 24-253 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/20/24), 410 So.3d 821, 827.

Exception of Vagueness

A petition is required to contain a short, clear, and concise statement of all causes of action arising out of, and the material facts of, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation. La. C.C.P. art. 891. The purpose of an exception of vagueness is to place the defendants on notice of the nature of the facts sought to be proved so as to enable him generally to prepare his defense and to identify the cause of action so as to bar its future litigation after a judgment is obtained in the present suit. Spellman v. Discount Zone Gas Station, 07-496 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/07), 975 So.2d 44, 46, writ denied, 08-337 (La. 4/4/08), 978 So.2d 328. However, a defendant may not demand exactitude and detail beyond what is necessary to fulfill that purpose. Wood v. Wood, 14-405 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/25/14), 165 So.3d 181, 187.

Here, relators contend the trial court manifestly erred in overruling their exception of vagueness for two reasons. First, relators argue the plaintiff did not plead with specificity the dates on which the complained of incidents or maladies occurred. Relators argue they are “hamstrung in investigating and defending the case” without more specific dates. The trial court overruled the exception of vagueness. We cannot say the trial court's decision to overrule the exception of vagueness is manifestly erroneous. The petition, which states that plaintiff entered into her lease agreement “on or about February 2023,” is sufficiently specific to put relators on notice of the subject matter of the litigation and the claims that plaintiff asserts. Moreover, relators are entitled to conduct discovery, including interrogatories and requests for admissions, to obtain additional information.

Second, relators argue the trial court should have granted the exception of vagueness because, they contend, plaintiff's LUTPA (and fraud) allegations have not been pled with particularity. We address this issue in our consideration of relators’ exception of no cause of action as to plaintiff's LUTPA claims, below.

Exception of No Cause of Action

Relators argue the trial court erred in refusing to sustain their exception of no cause of action and dismiss plaintiff's claims under LUTPA. The purpose of the exception of no cause of action is to question whether the law extends a remedy to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition. NOLA 180 v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 11-853 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/27/12), 91 So.3d 446, 449. An exception of no cause of action is tried solely on the face of the petition. Id. All well pleaded facts are accepted as true. Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118.

Plaintiff's petition alleges, in relevant part:

5.

During Plaintiff's residency, Plaintiff experienced various hazardous conditions including but not limited to water intrusion, excess moisture, and widespread mold. Consequently, Ms. Alexander notified all Defendants on multiple occasions about the hazardous conditions at Property. Notably, Further, an inspection of Property confirmed the presence of mold via several fungal organisms. ․

***

7.

Despite receiving several notices, Defendants never rectified any of the hazardous conditions within the Property.

8.

Due to Crossings's and 1st Lake's wrongful conduct and/or omissions – including but not limited to said Defendants’ failure to remedy the uninhabitable conditions within Property and said Defendants intentionally concealing the hazardous conditions of Property, Plaintiff has suffered various damages․.

***

12.

Crossings's and 1st Lake's conduct and/or omissions constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices under the meaning of the Louisiana Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“LUTPA”). La. R.S. § 51:1401 et seq. ․

13.

Crossings's and 1st Lake's unfair trade practices occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce, because Defendants’ unfair trade practices occurred during “the distribution of ․ services and ․ property” pursuant to the lease agreement between Defendants and Plaintiff.

14.

Plaintiff is a consumer under the meaning of LUTPA because she is a person who “leases goods or services.” La. R.S. § 51:1402 (1). Plaintiff experienced a “loss of money or ․ property․” as a result of the use of employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act, or practices because said Defendants’ wrongful conduct caused Plaintiff property damage, moving expenses, personal injury, and mental anguish.

15.

A trade practice is “deceptive” for purposes of LUTPA when it amounts to fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Accordingly, Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations regarding fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 14 above ․.

16.

Crossings's and 1st Lake's acts of intentionally concealing the hazardous conditions at Property and failing to make necessary repairs after Ms. Alexander notified said Defendants of the hazardous conditions were unfair and deceptive and caused Plaintiff substantial damages ․.

17.

All Defendants’ aforementioned practices were not only deceptive but were immoral, unethical, and offends public policy.

Louisiana's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, La. R.S. 51:1405, et seq., makes unlawful any unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. A practice is “unfair” when it offends established public policy and when the practice is unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious. NOLA 180, 91 So.3d at 450. To sustain a cause of action under LUTPA, the petition must allege that the plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss, and that the loss resulted from another's use of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. Cheramie Serv., Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Prod., Inc., 09-1633 (La. 4/23/10), 35 So.3d 1053, 1057. Allegations of mere negligence are insufficient to state a claim under LUTPA. 625 LaBarre Rd., LLC v. Parish of Jefferson, 21-133 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/3/21), 330 So.3d 1201, 1208.

We read plaintiff's claims, as stated in her petition, to be insufficient to state a cause of action under LUTPA.² Although portions of plaintiff's petition closely track the language of the Act, her allegations that defendants “intentionally concealed” the allegedly hazardous conditions are merely conclusory. Mere conclusions, unsupported by the facts, do not set forth a cause of action. Kitziger v. Mire, 19-87 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/24/19), 280 So.3d 302, 306, writ denied, 19-1858 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So.3d 1055. Further, her allegations that defendants failed to make the necessary repairs, and that “[d]espite receiving several notices, Defendants never rectified any of the hazardous conditions,” would appear to state a claim in negligence but fail to satisfy the conditions necessary to assert a LUTPA claim. Accordingly, we sustain defendants’ exception of no cause of action. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 934, plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this ruling to amend her petition to state a valid claim under LUTPA.³

Exception of No Right of Action

Relators contend that the 2024 legislative changes to the Direct Action Statute preclude plaintiff from naming their insurer as a direct defendant in this case. We agree. Plaintiff filed her petition on April 2, 2025, after the August 1, 2024 effective date of the amendments to the Direct Action Statute, La. R.S. 22:1269. Under the amended provisions, a litigant may not directly sue a tortfeasor-defendant's liability insurer unless certain specific conditions apply. Id. A defendant challenging a plaintiff's right to proceed under the direct-action statute may do so by means of an exception of no right of action. Riley v. Acadian Companies, 25-308 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/3/25), 2025 WL 2530733, at *4; George v. Terry, 23-582 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 111, 115.

Because plaintiff's petition was filed on April 2, 2025, several months after the effective date of the amendment, the newly enacted statute governs, even where plaintiff's cause of action may have arisen before the amended statute's effective date. See generally Rogers v. Griffin, 24-537 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/24), 410 So.3d 890, 893-95. Plaintiff's petition also does not appear to fall within any of the delineated exemptions to the general rule that precludes a plaintiff from filing claims directly against the defendant's insurer. See La. R.S. 22:1269 B(1)(a)-(g).

Further, the insurer is not the only defendant who has standing to file an exception of no right of action in conjunction with the amended direct-action statute; a defendant who has an interest at stake in the litigation also may seek to remove the insurer through an exception of no right of action. See Hurel v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 25-49 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/11/25), 414 So.3d 778, 788. Thus, Crossings I, LLC and 1st Lake Properties, Inc., are appropriate parties to pursue the exception of no right of action in these circumstances.

Accordingly, upon our de novo review, we find as a matter of law that the trial court erred in overruling defendants’ exception of no right of action. Relators’ exception of no right of action is sustained, and plaintiff's claims against the insurer are dismissed without prejudice.

Conclusion

We grant relators’ writ application in part. Relators’ exception of no cause of action is sustained as to plaintiff's LUTPA claims, but plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this disposition to amend her petition to state a claim under LUTPA. Furthermore, relators’ exception of no right of action is sustained, and plaintiff's claims against relators’ insurer are dismissed without prejudice. In all other respects, relators’ writ application is denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 2nd day of December, 2025.

SMC

FHW

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal

State of Louisiana

NO. 25-C-446

CEDRANEKA ALEXANDER

versus

CROSSINGS I, LLC, 1ST LAKE PROPERTIES, INC. AND ABC INSURANCE COMPANY

JOHNSON, J., DISSENTS IN PART WITH REASONS

I, respectfully, dissent in part from the majority disposition on the issue of whether the trial court properly overruled the dilatory exception of vagueness filed by Defendants/Relators, Crossings I, LLC and 1st Lake Properties, Inc. In their exception, Relators specifically argued, “[Cedraneka Alexander] fails to allege when the water intrusion, excess moisture and widespread mold either occurred or became known. She fails to allege when she sustained injuries [and]/or when she became aware of her alleged injuries.” I agree with Relators’ argument.

A review of Ms. Alexander's petition reveals only one date: February 2023, the day she entered into a lease agreement to reside at the apartment complex. She then alleges that she experienced various hazardous conditions—including but not limited to water intrusion, excess moisture, and widespread mold—and suffered adverse health effects resulting from those conditions. She further alleges that Relators are liable “at all relevant times” without providing any dates for the alleged negligent acts. Consequently, I find that Ms. Alexander's petition is vague because it lacks the temporal specificity necessary to inform Relators when the alleged negligent acts and damages occurred. See, Roache v. Alpha Technical Services, Inc., 10-1086 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/29/11), 71 So.3d 520, 523-24, writ denied, 11-1622 (La. 9/30/11), 71 So.3d 294, where this Court affirmed a judgment that sustained an exception of vagueness, finding the petition did not provide the temporal element of the alleged negligence and failed to meet the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 891.

Accordingly, I would find that the trial court manifestly erred by overruling Relators’ exception of vagueness, sustain the exception, and allow Ms. Alexander an opportunity to amend her petition to cure the defect. In all other respects, I agree with the majority disposition.

MEJ

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

(504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX

NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6 THIS DAY 12/02/2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

25-C-446

E-NOTIFIED

24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)

Hon. Lee V. Faulkner, Jr. (DISTRICT JUDGE)

James C. Rather, Jr. (Relator)

MAILED

Lamont M. Hills (Respondent)

David D. Daniels, II (Respondent)

Attorney at Law

2439 Manhattan Boulevard

Suite 403

Harvey, LA 70058

Michael B. Alker (Relator)

Attorney at Law

4030 Lonesome Road

Suite B

Mandeville, LA 70448

DeVonn Jarrett (Respondent)

Attorney at Law

643 Magazine Street

Suite 301A

New Orleans, LA 70130

FOOTNOTES

1.   Relators also filed a motion in limine, which the trial court granted and is not at issue here.

2.   Furthermore, we do not read plaintiff's petition as asserting any fraud claims that are separate from her LUTPA claims. Indeed, in plaintiff's opposition to defendants’ exception filed in the trial court, plaintiff denied that she has asserted a cause of action in fraud.

3.   La. C.C.P. art. 934 provides: “When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand issue, or theory shall be dismissed.”