BOUDREAUX v. BOUDREAUX (2025)

Mother appeals the trial court's judgment holding her in contempt for violating two provisions of the Joint Custody Plan (the Plan) governing father's contact with and custody of their son, denying her rule for contempt, removing the Plan's “right of first refusal” provision, ordering “co-parent counseling,” denying her rule for contempt filed against father, and denying her motion to disqualify father's attorney. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's removal of the right of first refusal provision from the Plan and its order for the parties to attend counseling and affirm the remainder of the judgment.

FACTS

Neil Boudreaux and Amy Carpenter are the parents of one child. At issue herein are competing rules for contempt. In Boudreaux v. Boudreaux, 22-804, pp. 1–2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/5/23), 368 So.3d 754, 757, another panel of this court reviewed the history of the parties during this litigation, stating:

The parties herein were married in March 2013, and they have one child, who was born in August 2013. They were divorced by judgment dated May 9, 2016, and since then they have been involved in continuous litigation with each other, with the trial court describing their inability to communicate for purposes of raising their child as “caustic.” While the record in this case is voluminous, only the pleadings relevant to this appeal are discussed.

Following a custody trial in January 2018, the parties stipulated to a judgment and joint custody plan that awarded them with joint custody of the child, established Ms. Carpenter as the domiciliary parent, and gave Mr. Boudreaux access to the child pursuant to a phased-in schedule that contemplated fifty-fifty shared physical custody beginning the summer of 2020. The stipulated judgment also ordered the parties to utilize a parent facilitator to assist in the implementation of the custody plan, ordered Mr. Boudreaux to meet with the child's counselor, Ray Melerine, and ordered Mr. Boudreaux to pay monthly child support.

The panel reversed a contempt judgment against Ms. Carpenter finding the record did not substantiate Mr. Boudreaux's claims for reimbursement of school tuition, sanctions including the imposition of a forty-five-day jail sentence, the payment of attorney fees for Mr. Boudreaux's attorney, and all court costs. The panel further ordered the parties to bear their own expenses.

Two judgments are at issue in this appeal.¹ One dated September 12, 2024, that denies Ms. Carpenter's motion to disqualify Mr. Boudreaux's counsel, and one dated October 22, 2024, that addresses the parties’ motions for contempt. The trial court conducted a trial over the course of three days. The trial court first tried Ms. Carpenter's motion to disqualify counsel on August 14, 2024, after which it denied the motion as set forth in its Written Reasons for Ruling and Judgment dated September 12, 2024. Thereafter, on September 18 and 20, 2024, the trial court heard the parties’ remaining claims. It issued a judgment on October 24, 2025, that holds Ms. Carpenter in contempt for violating two provisions of the Plan, removes the right of first refusal provision from the Plan, and awards sanctions against Ms. Carpenter. The parties’ remaining claims for contempt were dismissed.

Ms. Carpenter appealed the trial court's judgment and assigns six errors with the trial court's judgment.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1) The [trial] court erred when it found me in Contempt for being untimely to exchanges of the minor child despite lack of evidence, and the absence of clear, unambiguous language[,] and specificity of the Custody Order.

2) The [trial] court erred when it found me in Contempt for refusing to bring [the] minor child to extra[-]curricular activities by lack of consideration of domiciliary parent status and Appellee's unilateral enrollment of [the minor child in the] activity in question.

3) The [trial] court erred when it denied my Motion [for] Disqualification of Counsel by disregarding significant conflicts of interest and against [the Louisiana Professional] Rules of Conduct.

4) The [trial] court erred when it denied my Rule for Contempt despite testimony of the Appellee himself that he consistently failed to grant [me the] Right of First Refusal[;] admittedly failed to comply with our order regarding specific medical care for our child and instead brought him on three different occasions to an urgent care clinic without my knowledge thereby preventing me from being present; for intentionally exposing our minor child to legal matters in person during a custody exchange; and dismissing clear evidence of Appellee and his family members interfering with communication between our child and myself.

5) The [trial] court erred when it ordered “co-parenting counseling” in this matter by failing to abide by the Louisiana laws governing parent facilitation/counseling.

6) The [trial] court erred when it removed in total the Right of First Refusal in this matter by failing to consider the best interest and safety of our minor child, and despite [the fact that] Appellee admittedly failed to comply with this order, regularly[,] and repeatedly, for several years.

DISCUSSION

Disqualification of Counsel

We first consider Ms. Carpenter's complaint that the trial court erred in denying her motion to disqualify Mr. Boudreaux's attorney, as reversal of the trial court's denial of the motion would require Mr. Boudreaux to hire new counsel and the parties to retry the matter. Ms. Carpenter asserted in her answer and reconventional demand and a motion for continuance that Mr. Boudreaux's attorney must be disqualified because his attorney and an attorney who she previously consulted about representing her in this matter and whose name appears on signed a pleading herein are now employed by the same firm.

The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct govern this issue. Rule 1.9(a) of those rules states:

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Rule 1.18 of the Rules of Professional Conduct sets forth duties owed to a prospective client and provides:

(a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.

(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.

(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d).

(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if:

(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or:

(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and

(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(ii)written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.

The trial court thoroughly outlined the facts at issue in Ms. Carpenter's motion to disqualify and determined her motion lacks merit. Finding the record and the law support the trial court's written reasons, we adopt them as our own:

Amy contends The Johnson Firm should be disqualified because Amy consulted with Rebecca Hunter on December 4, 2019, while Ms. Hunter was with The Sanchez Law Firm. Ms. Hunter is now an attorney with The Johnson Firm and began her time there on or about March 2023. The latest Rule for Contempt was filed on May 17, 2024 by Neil and does not contain any allegations of violation of the Judgment of January 31, 2018 prior to the December 4, 2019 consultation between Amy and Ms. Hunter.

During the hearing on August 14, 2024, Amy and her counsel waived their opportunity for an evidentiary hearing and the parties were to submit the issue of disqualification on memorandum to the Court.

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Ms. Hunter was never retained nor represented Amy in this matter. As such, as stated previously, Rule 1.18 applies to this situation. On the face of her pleadings and in her memorandum to the Court, Amy has failed to provide any information she gave to Ms. Hunter in her consultation on December 4, 2019 that could be significantly harmful to her in this current contempt matter that was filed on May 17, 2024. There are no allegations in the Rule for Contempt that pre-date the December 4, 2019[ ] consultation. Additionally, at the hearing on August 14, 2024, counsel for Neil assured the Court that there are no contempt allegations prior to December 4, 2019. Therefore, Amy could not have provided information to Ms. Hunter that could be significantly harmful to her in this current matter.

Amy has filed [sic] to establish an actual attorney-client relationship between her and Ms. Hunter and/or Erin Abrams. Amy has also failed to establish a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the former and present representation. There were no pending Rules for Contempt at the time of the consultation on December 4, 2019. Neil filed a Rule for Contempt on September 25, 2020, and June 21, 2021, which do not allege any violations that are contained in the May 17, 2024 Rule for Contempt. All the exhibits attached to the May 17, 2024 Rule for Contempt, particularly exhibits G, H, I, J and K pertain to actions or communications occurring in 2024. None of this conduct could have been discussed with Ms. Hunter in 2019. Therefore, the Court finds that Amy has failed to establish a substantial relationship between the subject matter that Amy might have consulted with Ms. Hunter on December 4, 2019 and the allegations contained in the present Rule for Contempt filed on May 17, 2024.

The Court also balanced Neil's right to retain counsel of his choice and the substantial hardship which might result from the disqualification as against the public perception of and the public trust in the judicial system. Amy has had numerous attorneys represent her throughout these proceedings which began in 2016, and she has consulted with even more without retaining them. The Court is aware of some of the attorneys consulted because of the difficulty in appointing a mediator in this case. At least two (2) of the mediators could not accept the appointment because of prior consultations with Amy. The Court recognizes if disqualification is granted it would be extremely difficult for Neil to obtain new counsel, especially local counsel, due to Amy having hired and/or consulted with numerous attorneys and law firms in the area. The Court also believes there would be no negative public perceptions of and no lack of public trust in the judicial system by denying the request for disqualification.

The record does not include any facts regarding Ms. Carpenter's meeting with Ms. Hunter or any confidential information that Ms. Carpenter disclosed to Ms. Hunter during that meeting. Additionally, as the trial court noted, Ms. Carpenter waived presenting evidence at the hearing on her motion to disqualify Mr. Boudreaux's attorney from representing him herein, and the record does not contain the memoranda that the trial court instructed the parties to submit before it ruled on the motion. For these reasons, we find this assigned error lacks merit.

Contempt

Ms. Carpenter next assigns error with the trial court's finding her in contempt for failing to be punctual when meeting Mr. Boudreaux to exchange the child for custody and for failing to transport the child to his jiu-jitsu classes during the weeks that he is in her custody.

Contempt of court is defined as “any act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or respect for its authority.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 221. Constructive contempt is any contempt other than a direct contempt and includes “[w]ilful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art. 224(2). A direct contempt is “one committed in the immediate view and presence of the court and of which it has personal knowledge, or a contumacious failure to comply with a subpoena or summons, proof of service of which appears of record.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 222.

A party seeking to hold another in civil contempt must prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Paradise Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. Inc., 14-1184 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/15), 160 So.3d 626. To hold a party in constructive contempt, the trial court must find that the party committed the violation “intentionally, knowingly, purposely, and without justifiable excuse.” Lang v. Asten, Inc., 05-1119, p. 1 (La. 1/13/06), 918 So.2d 453, 454 (quoting Brunet v. Magnolia Quarterboats, Inc., 97–187 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/98), 711 So.2d 308, writ denied 98–0990, 720 So.2d 343 (La.5/29/98); cert. denied sub nom Polaris Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Brunet, 525 U.S. 1104, 119 S.Ct. 869 (1999)). We review a trial court's factual findings of contempt under a manifest error standard of review, but we will not reverse a trial court's judgment on the issue of contempt unless there is an abuse of discretion. Blackwood v. Reeves, 23-504 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/29/24), 387 So.3d 620.

Custody Exchanges

Ms. Carpenter asserts that Mr. Boudreaux's evidence is insufficient to sustain his first contempt claim because the court's order on custody exchanges lacks “clear, unambiguous language and specificity” to warrant her being held in contempt. The trial court's judgment dated August 17, 2022, addresses the parties’ custody of the child and provides:

[A]s it relates to the shared custody of the minor child, the parties shall maintain their equal access on a weekly basis; however, custodial periods are herein modified to reflect a rotation of Thursday at 6:00 p.m. until the following Thursday at 6:00 p.m. with exchanges to take place at [the] same place that the parties had been exchanging the minor child.

Prior to the August 2022 judgment, the exchange time was also 6:00 p.m., as provided in a judgment signed March 30, 2021.

The Plan's provision governing custody exchanges directs “All parties are to arrive at said exchange location early enough to ensure timely exchanges of custody.” The Plan and the August 2022 judgment in conjunction with each other clearly set forth that custody is to commence every Thursday at 6:00 p.m. The August 2022 judgment specifically states in “clear, unambiguous language” when and where the parties are to exchange the child for their shared custody. Ms. Carpenter admitted she was late for thirty to forty percent of all their custody exchanges. She defended her tardiness, testifying she was “five to ten minutes at the most late[ ]” for custody exchanges “accumulative over all years.”

We have considered Ms. Carpenter's admissions in light of the Plan's requirement that the parties arrive “early enough to ensure timely exchanges” and the testimony of Amy Ledoux, a character witness called by Ms. Carpenter. Ms. Ledoux is a sales manager for a senior living home who “works closely” with Ms. Carpenter in her role as a patient advocate for a home health provider that recruits families needing medical services ordered by their healthcare providers. Ms. Ledoux testified that Ms. Carpenter is excellent in her job, always on time, and never tardy. According to Ms. Ledoux, Ms. Carpenter's timeliness is “one of the main reasons” her employer chooses to work with Ms. Carpenter.

Considering the Plan's requirement that Ms. Carpenter arrive at the stated exchange location “early enough to ensure timely exchanges of custody[ ]” in light of Ms. Carpenter's admission that she was late thirty to forty percent of the time for the exchanges and Ms. Ledoux's testimony as to Ms. Carpenter's punctuality in her business dealings, we cannot say the trial court committed manifest error in finding Ms. Carpenter breached the exchange provision of the Plan or abused its discretion in holding Ms. Carpenter in contempt for that breach. Ms. Carpenter argues her tardiness of only five to ten minutes on occasion does not warrant her being held in contempt. She additionally argues the traffic at that time affects the time it takes for her to reach the exchange location. Considering exchanges occur weekly, Ms. Carpenter should have been well aware that the traffic affected her travel time, how the traffic flow would affect her travel time, and adjusted her schedule to insure she arrived on time for the exchanges. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court's conclusion warrants reversal in light of her admitted tardiness and its frequency.

 Transportation to Extracurricular Activities

Ms. Carpenter next assigns error with the trial court's finding her in contempt for refusing to bring the child to jiu-jitsu, an extracurricular activity in which Mr. Boudreaux enrolled him. The Plan states, in pertinent part: “Each parent is responsible for transporting the child to school and extra-curricular [sic] functions when the child is/are in his or her care.”

Ms. Carpenter admitted she attended “almost all” of the child's jiu-jitsu classes during the weeks she did not have custody of the child but did not attend those classes during the weeks he was in her custody. She testified the child told her he did not like the classes and cried not to go. Mr. Boudreaux testified he enrolled the child in the classes to boost his confidence and the child enjoyed the classes. He explained, however, the child got discouraged because he lagged behind students who started the program at the same time he did because he missed classes when in Ms. Carpenter's custody. According to Mr. Boudreaux's testimony, the child had been attending jiu-jitsu for one and one-half years at the time of the trial.

Nancy Boudreaux, Mr. Boudreaux's mother, attended some of the jiu-jitsu classes and testified the child enjoyed the classes but told her that he got frustrated because he was falling behind and not keeping up with students who started the classes when he did. Professor Jamie Gomez owns and operates the Gracie Barras Brazilian Studio of jiu-jitsu. He instructs the child during the classes he attends. He testified he believed the child enjoyed the classes and described the child as being engaged, having fun, laughing, and smiling in class. He also testified the child never cried when he arrived at the classes. He described the child as an exemplary student who enjoys the technical aspects of the sport more than the physical aspects.

Ms. Carpenter asserts she is the domiciliary parent and only she has authority to enroll the child in extracurricular activities. Domiciliary status is addressed in La.R.S. 9:335(B)(3) which states, in part: “The domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise.” Ms. Carpenter concludes that jiu-jitsu is an activity imposed on the child when in Mr. Boudreaux's custody and that she is not legally obligated to take the child to jiu-jitsu. Ms. Carpenter also argues that no court order directs her to bring the child to jiu-jitsu; therefore, she cannot be held in contempt.

Ms. Carpenter did not assert this defense in her answer and reconventional demand or argue to the trial court that she told Mr. Boudreaux she did not agree with his decision to enroll the child in jiu-jitsu or that her status as domiciliary parent prevented Mr. Boudreaux from enrolling the child in jiu-jitsu. Rather, she asserted that Mr. Boudreaux unilaterally enrolled the child without her agreement, she did not agree to allow the child to participate in the sport, and did not sign any enrollment forms. When asked by counsel for Mr. Boudreaux, why she did not bring the child to jiu-jitsu when he was in her custody, Ms. Carpenter testified the child did not want to go. Mr. Boudreaux explained to the trial court that he did not realize Ms. Carpenter's status as domiciliary parent meant he could not enroll the child in activities without her approval.

Ms. Carpenter introduced pictures of the child at jiu-jitsu. She described the look on the child's face on some of the pictures as showing his dislike of the class. We have reviewed the copies of the pictures in evidence which are predominantly black and not clear. We acknowledge that some of the pictures of the child's face could be interpreted as evidencing his dislike for the class; however, they could also be interpreted as a look of concentration or concern that he did not perform a move properly.

Ms. Carpenter did not inform Mr. Boudreaux or the trial court in her pleadings, testimony, or argument at trial that she opposed the child attending jiu-jitsu due to her status as domiciliary parent.

As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider issues that were not raised in the pleadings, were not addressed by the trial court, or are raised for the first time on appeal. Burniac v. Costner, 2018-1709 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/31/19), 277 So.3d 1204, 1210. Under Article V, § 10 of the Louisiana Constitution, courts of appeal have broad supervisory jurisdiction; however, even with such broad power, this court will not act on the merits of a claim not yet acted upon by the lower tribunal. Id.; see also Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3.

Jablonski v. Capital Pools, L.L.C., 23-924, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/8/24), 390 So.3d 924, 931–32, writ denied, 24-946 (La. 11/6/24), 395 So.3d 1173.

It is evident the trial court determined that based on the totality of the evidence, Ms. Carpenter did not voice her objections to Mr. Boudreaux about the child attending jiu jitsu classes when he first enrolled him for the classes. This determination is supported by Ms. Carpenter's attendance at the majority of the classes. Based on the totality of the evidence, we cannot say the trial court's conclusion is wrong. Furthermore, the evidence also established that Ms. Carpenter failed to preserve her status as domiciliary parent as a defense to Mr. Boudreaux's contempt claims. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's contempt ruling for her failure to bring the child to jiu-jitsu.

 Co-parenting Counseling

Ms. Carpenter next assigns error with the trial court's order that she and Mr. Boudreaux attend co-parenting counseling with a specific counselor and equally pay the costs of the counseling. Citing La.R.S. 9:358.1, she argues this order constitutes reversible error.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:358.1 states, in pertinent part:

A. On motion of a party or on its own motion, the court may appoint a parenting coordinator in a child custody case for good cause shown if the court has previously entered a judgment establishing child custody, other than an ex parte order. The court shall make the appointment on joint motion of the parties.

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C․ No parenting coordinator shall be appointed by the court if a party has been granted pauper status or is unable to pay his apportioned cost of the parenting coordinator.

Mr. Boudreaux argues that the trial court's order is not an order to appoint a co-parent counselor. He points out that La.R.S. 9:358.1 governs custody proceedings following divorce, while La.R.S. 13:4611, entitled “Punishment for contempt of court; defenses,” governs contempt proceedings.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4611(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a trial court can “punish a person adjudged guilty of a contempt of court therein:”

(d)(i) For any other contempt of court, including disobeying an order for the payment of child support or spousal support or an order for the right of custody or visitation, by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than three months, or both.

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(e) In addition to or in lieu of the above penalties, when a parent has violated a visitation order, the court may order any or all of the following:

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(iii) Require one or both parents to attend counseling or mediation.

The trial court's judgment was issued pursuant to Mr. Boudreaux's motion for contempt of court; however, subsection (e)(iii) applies only to violations of a visitation order. Ms. Carpenter violated a custody order, not a visitation order. Therefore, the trial court erred in ordering the parties to attending counseling, and we reverse that provision of the judgment.

 Right of First Refusal

Ms. Carpenter next assigns error with the trial court's removal of the right of first refusal provision from the Plan. The provision states: “If for any reason either parent must be away or work overnight while having custody of the child, the other parent is to be allowed the opportunity to keep the child before any other arrangements for care with a non-parent are made.”

Mr. Boudreaux's work schedule consists of one week working days, one week off, one week working nights, one week off. The weeks he works days, Mr. Boudreaux tries to be asleep by 6:00–6:15 p.m. because he has to wake up by 2:00 a.m. to drive the one-hour commute to work and be on time for his shift. He and his mother testified that on the evenings he has to go to sleep early, she often cooks dinner and Mr. Boudreaux and the child eat with Mr. Boudreaux's parents. After dinner, Mr. Boudreaux and the child stay at the Boudreauxs’ home until Mr. Boudreaux has to return to his home and go to bed.

Prior to the August 17, 2022 judgment, Mr. Boudreaux used vacation days to allow him to stay with the child until he had to go to sleep in order to not violate the right of first refusal. The right of first refusal was removed by that judgment only for nights Mr. Boudreaux had to work. In her reconventional demand, Ms. Carpenter asked that Mr. Boudreaux be held in contempt for not obeying the right of first refusal provision.

At trial, Mr. Boudreaux explained that he did not believe this provision applied to the nights at issue because he stayed with the child until he had to go to bed and after he left, the child was with his grandparents who live a short distance from him, so he could return quickly if needed. At trial, the child was eleven years of age and visited his grandparents often, and when in his father's custody, he occasionally asked to stay the night with them.

Boudreaux, 368 So.3d 754, addressed this issue with regard to Ms. Carpenter's contempt claim for Mr. Boudreaux's violation of the this provision. The panel found no error with the trial court's failure to hold Mr. Boudreaux in contempt because “she did not remember the specific dates she alleged in her motion as dates when Mr. Boudreaux was in violation of the right of first refusal, and that she could not ‘attest’ to any specific dates without a calendar in front of her.” Id. at 763. Here again, Ms. Carpenter did not identify specific dates that Mr. Boudreaux violated this provision. Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court's failure to find Mr. Boudreaux in contempt for violating the right of first refusal provision of the Plan.

Ms. Carpenter further argues the trial court erred in deleting the right of first refusal provision from the Plan. Neither party requested that this provision be removed. “ ‘Modification of custody plans, whether by consent decree or considered decree of the court, may only be obtained where there is shown to be a material change of circumstances since the custody decree was rendered.’ ” Newcomb v. Newcomb, 01-1530, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/02), 810 So.2d 1269, 1271–72 (quoting Chance v. Chance, 00-1658, pp. 6–7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/01), 784 So.2d 817, 822). Thus, the trial court erred in removing the right of first refusal provision from the Plan, and we reverse that ruling.

 Medical Care

Ms. Carpenter asserts the trial court erred in failing to hold Mr. Boudreaux in contempt for not taking the child to his designated pediatrician on three occasions. Section A(1)(b) of the Plan states:

The minor child shall continue seeing his current pediatrician, Dr. Andrew Davies in Sulphur or any other medical professional at said clinic. All information concerning [the child's] treatment and the doctor's recommendations shall be communicated by each parent to the other parent. Each parent will be made aware of, and given the opportunity to be present for, the child's medical exams and any necessary medical treatments.

On three occasions while in Mr. Boudreaux's custody, the child complained of pain, and Mr. Boudreaux brought him to a nearby urgent care rather than the designated primary care physician (PCP). Mr. Boudreaux explained that because the child complained of pain, the uncertainty of how long it might take to get into see the PCP, and the close proximity of urgent care versus the greater distance to the PCP's office, he opted to take the child to urgent care. He also explained that he understood the PCP was designated for ongoing health conditions, not an earache like the child had on one occasion.

Mr. Boudreaux testified that after the visits, he notified Ms. Carpenter of the diagnosis of the urgent care visit and the medication prescribed. He further explained that Ms. Carpenter did not notify him of when she brought the child to the doctor until the next custody exchange when she would send any prescribed medication with the child.

Ms. Carpenter argued the PCP was designated for all medical conditions. She also argued Mr. Boudreaux should have called her before bringing the child to urgent care, so she could be at the appointment with them.

The record shows the trial court considered Ms. Carpenter's claim in light of the fact that Mr. Boudreaux failed to abide by PCP provision on three occasions when the child complained of pain. Under the circumstances described by Mr. Boudreaux, we cannot say the trial court committed manifest error in finding Mr. Boudreaux did not act with willful contempt of the Plan's PCP provision for taking the child to urgent care to treat the child's complaints of pain.

 Remaining Issues

Ms. Carpenter further alleges Mr. Boudreaux should be held in contempt for (1) exposing the child to legal matters in person; (2) failing to inform her that he changed the religious institution the child attends when in his custody; and (3) interfering with and monitoring communication between her and the child while in his care.

In the first instance, the parties described the events of the day Ms. Carpenter was served by a process server before the parties exchanged custody. Ms. Carpenter testified the child could see the process server as he approached her car and served her with the rule at issue herein. Mr. Boudreaux testified that he parked his car such that the child could not see the service occur. Additionally, the process server testified that he followed Mr. Boudreaux's instructions to avoid being where the child could see him. Ms. Carpenter was not in Mr. Boudreaux's car when the exchange occurred and, therefore, could not know what the child saw when the process server approached her car.

Testimony at trial established that Ms. Carpenter believed Mr. Boudreaux made the child become an altar server at his church. Mr. Boudreaux explained, however, that he is Methodist, not Catholic. Therefore, the child could not serve as an altar server.

Finally, Ms. Carpenter testified she believed Mr. Boudreaux and/or his family interfered with and/or monitored the child's telephone conversations with her while he is with Mr. Boudreaux. To support her claim, she produced still shots from recordings she made of the child's telephone conversations with her when he was with Mr. Boudreaux and pointed out that the child was always near Mr. Boudreaux or someone in his family in the shots.

Mr. Boudreaux explained that the child often walked around when he talked with Ms. Carpenter. He also explained that he and the child regularly spend time with his family because they live near each other, and his parents have a swimming pool that they all enjoy using. His testimony shows that the Boudreaux family is close-knit and that the child regularly talks with his mother while amongst the family.

Based on this evidence, we cannot say the trial court erred in finding Ms. Carpenter's evidence did not substantiate her claims for contempt and dismissed them.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons discussed, the trial court's judgment is reversed with respect to removal of the right of first refusal provision from the Plan and the order for the parties to attend counseling and affirmed in all other respects. Costs are assessed seventy-five percent to Ms. Carpenter and twenty-five percent to Mr. Boudreaux.

REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ms. Carpenter's motion for appeal identified both judgments, and the trial court signed an order on December 6, 2024, granting Ms. Carpenter's devolutive appeal of its judgment dated October 22, 2024, but not its October 12, 2024 judgment. An appeal is taken by order, either oral or written, within the time delay allowed from a judgment rendered by the trial court. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2121. Thereafter, Ms. Carpenter assigned errors with both judgments and argued those errors as required by. Rule 1–3, Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal. Accordingly, we address all of her assigned errors. See Broussard v. Martin Operating P'ship, 11-1559 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/21/12), 103 So.3d 713, writs denied, 13-215, 13-249 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 383.

PICKETT, Chief Judge.