STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RODERICK HORNE (2025)

FACTS

On January 18, 2022, the defendant, Roderick Horne, was charged with one count of distribution of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance (CDS), in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1). On February 6, 2024, the defendant was found guilty of distribution of a schedule II CDS after a trial by a six-person jury. On April 2, 2024, the defendant was sentenced to eight years imprisonment with the Department of Corrections, with credit for time served.

The defendant filed an application for post-conviction relief on January 9, 2025, and a supplement thereto on January 17, 2025. As a result thereof, the trial court granted him an out-of-time appeal on May 13, 2025.

Now before this court is the defendant's appeal asserting two assignments of error, which are set forth below. The defendant also filed a pro se brief in this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The state failed to sufficiently prove that Roderick Horne was guilty of distribution of Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, methamphetamine.

2. The eight-year sentence in this case is constitutionally excessive for distribution of Schedule II controlled dangerous substance.

Pro se assignment of error

1. The state failed to meet its burden of proof.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE AND PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his first counseled assignment of error and in his pro se assignment of error, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was guilty of distribution of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance.

Law

The analysis for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess [sic] the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:967(A)(1) makes it unlawful for any person to distribute or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. Methamphetamine is classified as a schedule II CDS pursuant to La.R.S. 40:964.

Facts

Detective Patrick Deshautelle, an investigator with the Louisiana State Police, testified as the case agent. Police received a tip that the defendant was selling drugs, so police arranged for a confidential informant to buy drugs from the defendant in Evergreen, a very rural area in Avoyelles Parish, on September 30, 2020. Trooper Aaron Lemoine, who drove Detective Deshauntelle, testified that the operation occurred late in the afternoon. The confidential informant was considered reliable as he had participated in several prior drug operations and was paid between $150 and $200 for his participation. The informant was given $350 and planned to purchase half an ounce, or approximately fourteen grams, of methamphetamine. Trooper Owens noted that it was Detective Deshautelle's general practice to supply informants with slightly more cash than needed and with instructions to either ask for more drugs or for change back. The informant was thoroughly searched for drugs before Trooper Christopher Owens drove him to meet with the defendant while undercover. Although the informant was given a wire, technical difficulties limited its effectiveness.

The informant ultimately purchased approximately twelve grams of a substance suspected to be methamphetamine and had seven dollars leftover. Detective Deshautelle searched the informant after Trooper Owens drove him to a prearranged debriefing location and took the suspected drugs from him. Sergeant Lawrence Zeller, who was supposed to supervise the entire operation but was held up due to being ticketed by another officer while en route to the operation, placed these drugs in a secure safe, and later sent them off for testing. Field testing and subsequent lab testing confirmed that the substance was methamphetamine.

Trooper Owens, who drove the confidential informant to and from the meeting with the defendant, testified regarding the transaction. After the informant was searched by Detective Deshautelle the first time, Trooper Owens drove the informant to a green house in Evergreen. The informant got out of the vehicle to talk to an unidentified black male in front of the property for a short amount of time before returning to Trooper Ownes and informing him that the defendant was at a house down the street. Trooper Owens testified he maintained visual contact with the informant during this entire encounter and testified that the informant did not shake this man's hands or otherwise make physical contact. The defendant called the informant while they were en route to the next location a few hundred yards away, at which point the informant told Trooper Owens that the defendant was driving a truck and that they were going to be passing him shortly. Trooper Owens parked his car on the other side of the road from this truck when he encountered it.

At this point, the informant got out of Trooper Owens’ vehicle and went towards the rear of the truck to discuss something briefly with the driver of said truck, and the two shortly thereafter walked back to Trooper Owens’ vehicle. Trooper Owens said he had a good look at the driver at this point and identified him as the defendant. The defendant and the informant talked for a while since they were very familiar with each other. Trooper Owens attempted to drive away after a few minutes of this back and forth due to feeling uncomfortable, but while he was doing so, the defendant flagged him down and yelled out, “Hey, you know you don't have your stuff[.]” After stopping the vehicle, the informant got out and moved to the front of the defendant's “truck-well” to have a brief exchange with the defendant before the two parted ways for the final time. Trooper Owens kept visual contact on the informant during this entire encounter but did not see the defendant hand over the bags to the informant since they were behind the defendant's truck, and Trooper Owens could only view them through his rear-view mirror. Trooper Owens noted that the informant's wire failed to capture much useful information since it depended on cellphone coverage. The video that was captured was nonetheless played to the jury as exhibit S-6, over the defendant's objection on authentication grounds.¹

Trooper Aaron Lemoine testified regarding certain operational details. This particular drug buy was part of a broader eighteen-month operation that started in 2020. Police did not immediately arrest the defendant after this transaction so as to protect the identity of the confidential informant. Police instead sought to arrest him as part of a broader roundup in December of 2021, although he was ultimately arrested after he voluntarily presented himself at a sheriff's office.

Photographs of the buy money were taken so that the serial numbers could be matched up if the funds were recovered, but this was not done since the defendant's arrest was well after the transaction. Police eventually lost contact with the confidential informant, which Trooper Lemoine testified was not unusual.

Analysis

There is sufficient evidence to uphold the defendant's conviction for distribution of a scheduled II CDS. As previously noted, La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) prohibits the distribution or dispensation of Schedule II controlled dangerous substances such as methamphetamine. The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did so when it provided evidence that: (1) a confidential informant came into possession of twelve grams of methamphetamine immediately after meeting with the defendant in a secluded, rural area; (2) the confidential informant did not have drugs on him before the transaction with the defendant; (3) a police officer positively identified the defendant as taking part in the transaction; and (4) a police officer maintained visual contact of the informant for the duration of the operation such that the informant could not have reasonably procured the drugs from someone or somewhere else. The jury was entitled to infer from this evidence that the informant obtained the methamphetamine from the defendant and could rely on supporting evidence such as Trooper Owens’ testimony about the defendant calling out to him about how the transaction for the drugs was not complete when he attempted to drive away.

This approach is consistently upheld by other courts in this state. In State v. Muse, 53,345 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 373 So.3d 88, officers testified that they searched the confidential informant and his mother-in-law, as well as the vehicle they were driving, before the transaction and determined neither had contraband. Unlike the matter before us, officers relied on surveillance footage and did not maintain direct visual contact of the confidential informant or the mother-in-law through the entire transaction. The defendant raised at trial the fact that the confidential informant was seen briefly speaking to another woman, and the mother-in-law was not always visible in the vehicle on the footage. Nonetheless, the court in Muse reasoned that the possibility that the informant got the drugs from a source other than the defendant was merely a theory the jury could consider and choose to disregard in light of other available evidence, such as the fact that the confidential informant was seen getting into the defendant's vehicle where containers with cocaine and marijuana were clearly visible. The fact that the confidential informant failed to testify was irrelevant since the jury was entitled to believe the officers’ testimony.

The defendant, both through his counsel and through his pro se brief, complains about the reliability of and lack of testimony by the confidential informant, citing case law supporting the disclosure of the identity of confidential informants who participate in the charged crime. This case law is only relevant when a defendant actually files a motion to disclose the identity of said informant. The defendant in this case failed to file such a motion, so his assertions lack merit. State v. Scott, 09-202 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/12/09) (unpublished opinion)(2009 WL 1655705), writ denied, 09-1502 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1247; State v. Griffin, 07-974 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/8/08), 984 So.2d 97. Further, the jury was not required to trust the confidential informant to justify a conviction. The jury was only required to trust that the police: (1) properly searched the informant for drugs before and after the suspected transaction; and (2) maintained visual contact with the informant between the time police searched him for drugs at the start of the operation and when police searched him for drugs at the end of the operation. See Muse, 373 So.3d at 95.

Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2

In his second assignment of error, the defendant asserts that his eight-year sentence is constitutionally excessive since he has no criminal history. The defendant did not object to the sentence and there was no motion to reconsider sentence. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1(E) provides that:

Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

In State v. Bamburg, 00-675 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/00), 772 So.2d 356, the defendant failed to object to the sentence at the sentencing hearing and did not timely file a motion to reconsider sentence. This court found his claim of excessiveness of sentence was barred. See also State v. Williams, 01-998 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/02), 815 So.2d 908, writ denied, 02-578 (La. 1/31/03), 836 So.2d 59. However, this court has reviewed sentences for excessiveness despite the lack of an objection and motion to reconsider sentence. State v. Jackson, 14-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/18/14), 146 So.3d 631, writ denied, 14-1544 (La. 2/27/15), 159 So.3d 1066; State v. Soriano, 15-1006 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 192 So.3d 899, writ denied, 16-1523 (La. 6/5/17), 219 So.3d 1111; State v. Price, 16-899 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/17), 216 So.3d 304; State v. Debarge, 17-670 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/18), 238 So.3d 491.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines with regard to constitutionally excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005–06 (alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

First, this court must look to the nature of the offense. The trial court described the offense as follows:

The crime before the Court is for distribution of illegal drugs classified under Scheduled [sic] II, methamphetamines. Drug dealing is not a crime of violence ․. This Court recognizes that drug dealing undermines all things that nurture and support the development of a stable community environment necessary to educate and raise our children. The use of illegal drugs is rampant in our world today and same challenges all social and economic levels in our society. The use of illegal drugs is a contributing factor [to] the commission of other crimes all of which has [sic] diminished the quality of life in the world in which we live.

Second, this court must look to the nature and background of the defendant. The trial court described the defendant as having no prior criminal history. However, the record reflects a 2006 misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana.

Third, this court must compare sentences imposed for similar offenses. At the time of his offense, La.R.S. 40:967(B) provided a sentencing range of between one- and ten-years imprisonment, with or without hard labor, and a fine of not more than $50,000 for distributing less than twenty-eight grams of a schedule II substance. The defendant was convicted of selling twelve grams of methamphetamine. The defendant's eight-year sentence is in the upper half of this sentencing range, which the trial court itself described as a “near maximum sentence[.]” Typical sentences for distribution of less than twenty-eight grams of a schedule II CDS (other than cocaine/fentanyl) by someone with no prior criminal history appear to hew to the middle of the sentencing range. This court has, however, upheld sentences in the upper half of the sentencing range. See State v. Patterson, 11-892 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/12), 83 So.3d 1209, writ denied, 12-526 (La. 6/1/12), 90 So.3d 435 (upheld consecutive five-year sentences for distribution of an unspecified amount of methamphetamine by a first-time felony offender under prior sentencing regime with a higher maximum of thirty years); State v. Upchurch, 510 So.2d 112 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987) (upheld concurrent eight-year sentences at hard labor for distribution of an unspecified amount of methamphetamine by a defendant with no prior convictions under prior sentencing regime with higher maximums); State v. Brewer, 436 So.2d 631 (La.App. 3. Cir. 1983), writ denied, 440 So.2d 148 (La.1983) (upheld sentence of six years at hard labor for a first offender for distribution of a “small amount” of marijuana, which at the time was a schedule II substance punishable by a maximum ten-year sentence).

We do not find the defendant's sentence to be out of line with other sentences upheld by this court for similar offenses. We find the sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive. This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

The defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant asserts in his pro-se brief that neither the transaction itself nor any of the money or drugs in said transaction are seen in the “audio video.”

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT CHIEF JUDGE