STATE v. PINZINO (2025)

On July 18, 2024, Defendant, McKenzie H. Pinzino, was charged by bill of indictment with one count of manslaughter, in violation of La.R.S. 14:31(A)(2), and one count of aggravated flight from an officer that resulted in serious bodily injury, in violation of La.R.S. 14:108.1(C) & (E)(2)(a).¹

On January 7, 2025, Defendant entered a guilty plea to manslaughter.² The remaining charge was dismissed. Following a lengthy recitation of facts, the trial court accepted Defendant's plea, ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI), set a hearing date, and ordered sentencing.

A sentencing hearing, at which numerous letters were presented and several witnesses were called, was held on March 19, 2025. On April 9, 2025, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor for manslaughter.³ Defense counsel put forth a general objection. No motion to reconsider sentence was ever filed.

Defendant filed a motion for appeal on April 23, 2025. Defendant now appeals her sentence for manslaughter, contending “[t]he trial court erred and abused its discretion when it imposed a twenty-five-year sentence upon McKenzie Pinzino, a first offender whose conviction was based on a traffic accident.” For the reasons that follow, we find Defendant's argument lacks merit, and her sentence is affirmed.

FACTS

The following factual basis was set forth at Defendant's guilty plea:

All right, Judge, State believes that it could show that on or about February the 23rd, 2024, this defendant did commit manslaughter by killing Mr. Vernon Jackson while engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated flight from an officer.

Back on that date, Judge, while in the area of Highway 171 North and Beltz Road, Officer Burnett was -- of the New Llano PD, was advised by dispatch of a hit and run that occurred up at Highway 171 South and Highway 1211. Dispatch reported that the vehicle that was struck was currently following the suspected vehicle that was headed southbound on Highway 171. The suspect vehicle was a black Impala. Officer Burnett initiated his overhead emergency lights and siren in his marked unit and turned on south --going southbound on Highway 171. He began trying to locate the -- the defendant's vehicle and the complainant's vehicle and traveled southbound. The complainant, Alvin Horn, who was on the phone with dispatch advised that they were on 171 and they were out around the Hixson Ford area headed south. He then attempted to intercept the vehicles and, in fact, did intercept the vehicles just south of Highway 10 on 171. He was able to conduct a traffic stop with the suspects and the complainant. As he attempted to stop the vehicle, because the complainant's vehicle was closely following the defendant's vehicle, he merged to the front of the suspect's vehicle when he stopped them. He exited his vehicle and approached the driver side window of the vehicle driven by defendant. He made contact with the driver who was this defendant, Miss Pinzino, and inside of the vehicle was a black male that was later identified as Clifton Sorrells, who was a passenger in the front seat. Officer Burnett identified himself and asked the driver for license and registration and proof of insurance. While speaking with the defendant he observed that there were multiple puncture marks extending from the door area of the vehicle which he believed to be bullet holes in the vehicle. As a result of that he asked this defendant did she know that there were bullet holes on her vehicle, at which time she advised that she lived in St. Joseph, Missouri and that while traveling in town her vehicle was shot up. At that time he advised and questioned the defendant whether or not there were any weapons in the car, which she advised that there were not. He then advised her for the reason for the stop which was whether or not she knew that she had hit another vehicle. She stated that she did not know that she had hit another vehicle and she further stated that the driver of the vehicle did not make any type of attempt to stop her. Officer Burnett then stepped to the rear of the vehicle to relay the vehicle license plate information to the New Llano Dispatch at which time he was unable to determine the state of origin for the license. As he preceded back to the front of the driver's window of the vehicle, the defendant looked at him in the driver's side mirror and proceeded to flee traveling southbound entering Highway 171 South.

At the time that she exited back into traffic, Officer Burnett observed that there were no signal indicators that were used. Officer Burnett then notified New Llano Dispatch that he would be in pursuit of the suspect's vehicle. He initiated his emergency lights, his siren and engaged in the pursuit. He was also in a marked unit. He observed the speed of the defendant's vehicle to be greater than 108 miles per hour out near Sowela Technical College. This speed exceeded the posted speed limit at that location by 25 miles per hour, which would have placed human life in danger.

While in pursuit, he observed the suspect's vehicle to be moving from inside lanes to outside lanes without using direction indicators, also weaving between vehicles that were extremely close in proximity. As the pursuit continued south on 171, he further observed that he had reached a maximum speed of 118 miles per hour and was unable to intercept the vehicle. He estimated that the suspect's vehicle speed to be greater than what he believed to be 130 miles per hour as they were pulling away. Again, the posted speed limit in that area was being exceeded by about 25 miles per hour. As he approached the intersection of Pinewood Road and Highway 171 South, he observed the suspect's vehicle to be approximately one and a half miles in front of him. He observed, while the suspect's vehicle was maintaining speed, to suddenly leave the roadway and veer to the right-hand shoulder of the roadway and overtake vehicles on the right-hand shoulder of the road that were both in the inside and outside lane. Again, placing human life in danger during the course of this while maintaining their speed.

Officer Burnett used his radio to advise Rosepine PD that he would be within their jurisdiction within seconds. While entering Rosepine and as he neared the -- as he neared Rosepine he was advised that there was a signal 20, which in police lingo, there was an accident that had occurred at Highway 171 at Highway 171 and Main Street in Rosepine. Upon arrival at the crash he observed that the suspect's vehicle had collided with a small white Hyundai vehicle driven by Mr. Vernon Jackson Senior and that the vehicle driven by defendant had crashed and careened into the pole of the signal light.

During the course of that stop, Mr. Vernon Jackson was checked upon, who was in a vehicle, the white Hyundai, and it was determined at that time that Mr. Jackson was pronounced dead by Sharon Green. The autopsy report showed that Mr. Jackson died from the impact, blunt force trauma, as a result of the impact of the vehicle colliding with him.

If the State were to take this matter to trial, Judge, the State believes that it would show that this defendant did kill Mr. Vernon Jackson, with or without intent. That at the time that occurred, she was fleeing from an officer of the law. She had intention to refuse. That human life was in danger. That she knowingly knew that she had been given visual and audible signals to stop by a police officer. And that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that this driver had committed an offense in that she did leave the roadway, she did collide with Mr. Vernon Jackson's vehicle, and in fact, killed him. And that she did exceed the posted speed limit by some 25 miles per hour.

And so, Judge, State believes that if it were to go to trial, it could prove Mr. Jackson's death and it could prove that this defendant did engage in an aggravated flight from an officer which would support the charge of manslaughter as found in that particular statute.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors patent present.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In her sole assignment of error, Defendant contends her twenty-five-year sentence for manslaughter is excessive.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 provides the mechanism for preserving the review of a sentence on appeal:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to reconsider sentence.

․

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

Although Defendant argues the trial court failed to consider her extensive injuries as a mitigating factor in crafting her sentence, Defendant failed to raise an actual ground for her objection at sentencing and further failed to file a motion to reconsider sentence. As such, Defendant is restricted to a bare excessiveness review, which she acknowledges in brief prior to raising arguments about the trial court's reasoning. Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines with regard to an excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005–06 (alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a), which by definition is:

A homicide committed, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm.

When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in Article 30 or 30.1, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person[.]

Under La.R.S. 14:31(B), the penalty for manslaughter is imprisonment “at hard labor for not more than forty years.” In the instant case, the allegation was that Defendant killed Mr. Jackson during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated flight from an officer, which is not a felony enumerated in La.R.S. 14:30 or La.R.S. 14:30.1.

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant took the stand and read letters that she had written to the victim's wife, children, and nephew. Defendant also gave a short autobiography. The hearing featured testimony from Officer Joseph Burnett, of the New Llano Police Department, who noted the only gun recovered from the car wreck was inside a black zippered bag. Officer Burnett's body-camera video was played for the court as was video from Officer Burnett's dashboard camera. There was also testimony from Mr. Andre Westlake, previously of the Rosepine Police Department, as well as Ms. Ashley Jackson, the victim's wife.

The trial court stated the following when imposing Defendant's sentence:

Was there economic harm caused to the victims? Yes, there was economic harm to the victim. Mr. Jackson was killed in the accident. His vehicle was destroyed. His family has suffered immeasurable losses. Mr. Shae Smalling, driver of vehicle #3, suffered damages to his vehicle. The DOTD traffic signal was damaged at the intersection of Highway 171 and Main Street in Rosepine. And two vehicles on the lot of Johnson's Auto Sales were also damaged as a result of the collision.

There do not appear to be any substantial grounds that exist that tend to justify or excuse this defendant's conduct. The court also finds that the defendant did not act under strong provocation by the victim or others, although there was some testimony that the passenger of the vehicle held a gun to Miss Pinzino and told her to drive off from the scene. But the court does not find that the facts and circumstances of this case indicate that that happened because that was all provided by the self-serving testimony of the defendant. The evidence was that the pistol was in a case contained under the seat of the passenger side of the vehicle.

The defendant is 25 years of age, she is single and has one child. She's in good health. She claims to have had several medical procedures and is currently in need of a right hip replacement and left foot reconstruction. She further claims to have been treated for depression, anxiety, PTSD, but did not indicate where she did receive the treatment.

The employment record is such that she claims she worked in the cosmetology industry and a funeral home prior to the instant offense.

Her education is that she graduated from Benton High School in St. Joseph, Missouri in 2018, and earned a cosmetology certificate from St. Joseph Beauty School in 2023.

She does have a history of some drug abuse. Her toxicology report on February 23, [20]24 reflects that her urine tested positive for cannabinoids and Benzodiazepine. In addition, upon arrival to Rapides following the accident, the medical staff located a small bag containing some blue pills concealed in her rectum. However, she denied any current use of illegal narcotics or alcohol, but did admit to using Percocet for approximately seven months in the past.

She denies receiving any treatment for illegal narcotics or alcohol problems, and there does not appear to be substantial income or resources from any kind of a drug addiction.

She has no prior criminal record other than the instant offense.

The court finds that in light of the fact that someone died in this horrible accident, the court finds that this defendant is not likely to respond favorably to probationary treatment. It's also unknown whether or not that during a period of a suspended sentence, if this defendant would commit another crime.

The court finds that this defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by commitment to an institution.

Looking to similar sentences, the cases cited by both parties are distinguishable from the instant case. Defendant cites State v. Delacerda, 14-36 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/11/14), 140 So.3d 1245, writ denied, 14-1456 (La. 3/6/15), 162 So.3d 373, wherein this court upheld a twelve-year sentence for a defendant on probation when his offense occurred; State v. Blackwell, 13-316 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13) (unpublished opinion) (2013 WL 5539242), writ denied, 13-2600 (La. 4/11/14), 137 So.3d 1215, in which the defendant killed someone while intoxicated and speeding over ninety-nine miles per hour and received a ten-year sentence; State v. Gumto, 10-876 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/13/11) (unpublished opinion) (2011 WL 9160380), writ denied, 11-998 (La. 11/18/11), 75 So.3d 449, wherein the fourth circuit affirmed a thirteen-year sentence for a driver whose blood alcohol content (BAC) was more than ten times the legal limit; State v. Baker, 31,162 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/28/98), 720 So.2d 767, writ denied, 99-7 (La. 4/23/99), 742 So.2d 880, wherein the second circuit affirmed a fifteen-year sentence when there were three deaths; State v. Trahan, 93-1116 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 694, in which the first circuit upheld a ten-year sentence for a first offender; and State v. Kotrla, 08-364 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1224, wherein this court affirmed a sixteen-year sentence where the driver was a first offender whose BAC was more than double the legal limit.⁴ While Defendant points to these cases to argue her sentence should be lower than the twenty-five years she received, every case cited by Defendant involved a conviction for vehicular homicide, not manslaughter. Accordingly, the maximum sentence in Delacerda, Blackwell, Gumto, and Kotrla was thirty years at hard labor, not the forty years Defendant faced. Additionally, in Baker and Trahan, the maximum sentence was only fifteen years at hard labor, meaning Baker upheld imposition of a maximum sentence.

On the other hand, the State cites six manslaughter cases wherein this court upheld sentences of twenty-five years or more; however, none of those cases involved a vehicle crash. Instead, those cases involved shooting, stabbing, and beating deaths. The cases cited were State v. Jackson, 24-592 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/9/25), 408 So.3d 619, in which a sentence of twenty-five years for manslaughter by a sixteen-year-old who shot a man was upheld; State v. Chatman, 23-187 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/23), 376 So.3d 301, writ denied, 24-30 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So.3d 631, which affirmed a thirty-two-year sentence for manslaughter involving the beating death of a woman and her unborn child; State v. Banks, 16-34 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 194 So.3d 1224, which upheld a twenty-five-year sentence for manslaughter involving a knife; State v. Soriano, 15-1006 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 192 So.3d 899, writ denied, 16-1523 (La. 6/5/17), 219 So.3d 1111, which affirmed forty years for manslaughter committed with a knife; State v. Goodman, 15-131 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/15), 165 So.3d 1285, which sustained twenty-five years for manslaughter for a shooting death; and State v. Herbert, 12-228 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/13/12), 94 So.3d 916, writ denied, 12-1641 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d 78, which upheld a forty-year sentence for manslaughter for a beating death that was allegedly accidental.

In determining whether Defendant's sentence is excessive, this court relies upon the language of State v. Cook, 95-2784, p. 3 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 959, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996), namely that “[t]he only relevant question on review, however, was ‘whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate.’ ” Simply put, Defendant received a mid-range sentence of twenty-five years when she was facing forty. While Defendant argues she should get leniency due to the seriousness of the injuries she incurred on the night she killed Mr. Jackson, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in handing down her sentence.

CONCLUSION

Defendant's sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant was additionally charged in trial court docket number 99,363 with (1) reckless operation of a vehicle, in violation of La.R.S. 14:99; (2) speeding, in violation of La.R.S. 32:64; (3) driving without insurance, in violation of La.R.S. 32:861; (4) hit and run driving, in violation of La.R.S. 14:100; (5) reckless operation of a vehicle, in violation of La.R.S. 14:99; (6) driving under suspension, in violation of La.R.S. 32:415; (7) turning without signaling, in violation of La.R.S. 32:104; and (8) unattended vehicle on a highway shoulder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:296. Finally, in trial court docket number 99,744, Defendant was charged with aggravated battery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:34.

2.   Defendant also pled guilty to reckless operation of a vehicle and speeding in trial court docket number 99,363. The remaining charges in that docket number and those in trial court docket number 99,744 were dismissed.

3.   Defendant was sentenced to ninety days in parish jail for reckless operation of a vehicle and two days in parish jail for speeding, with all sentences imposed at that time to run concurrently.

4.   Defendant also cites State v. Lanham, 31,791 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/31/99), 731 So.2d 936, writ denied, 99-1320 (La. 1/14/00), 753 So.2d 207. However, the sentence imposed therein was not addressed on appeal.

BRADBERRY, Judge.