HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO OF THE PARISH OF ST JAMES ET AL v. HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO OF THE PARISH OF LAFOURCHE ET AL (2025)

REVERSED AND REMANDED

SMC

MEJ

SJW

Plaintiff-appellant, Hospital Service District No. 1 of the Parish of St. James, seeks review of the district court's rulings granting exceptions filed by defendantsappellees, Hospital Service District No. 3 of the Parish of Lafourche, State of Louisiana, and Thibodaux Regional Health System, Inc. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's judgment; overrule defendants’ exceptions of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, no right of action, and no cause of action; and remand for further proceedings.

Background

This case arises from a conflict between two Hospital Service Districts located in adjoining parishes—St. James Parish and Lafourche Parish. The State of Louisiana created Hospital Service Districts (HSDs) in 1950 to ensure citizens have access to health care throughout the state. La. R.S. 46:1051 et seq. Section 46:1051 authorizes the governing body of each parish to establish boundaries for individual hospital districts, and even to combine two or more parishes into one hospital district, if the parishes agree.¹ Some parishes, like St. James Parish, contain one hospital district, while others, such as Lafourche Parish, have three. In 1984, the Legislature amended the Hospital Service District Act to add provisions in an effort to address the increasingly competitive nature of the business of medical care.²

In 1998, the First Circuit Court of Appeal decided Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Par. of Lafourche v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Par. of Terrebonne, 97-1792 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 716 So.2d 168, 169, writ denied sub nom. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Par. of Lafourche v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Par. of Jefferson, 98-2039 (La. 11/13/98), 730 So. 2d 450 (“Lafourche v. Terrebonne (1998)”). There, Lafourche HSD No. 2 filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief asking the trial court to find that Terrebonne HSD's operation of a medical facility in Raceland, which is located in Lafourche HSD No. 2's territory, violated state law. The Court determined that Terrebonne HSD could not own and operate a facility outside of its boundaries without the consent of the police jury of the district in which the facility was being operated.

In the present case, the Hospital Service District No. 1 of the Parish of St. James, d/b/a St. James Parish Hospital (“St. James”), is a public, non-profit entity and the only hospital in St. James Parish. St. James's petition alleges that Lafourche Parish HSD No. 3 (“Lafourche”) created a new entity in 2018, the Thibodaux Regional Health System (“TRHS”), and that in October of 2019, Lafourche transferred all of its asset to TRHS to circumvent the Lafourche v. Terrebonne (1998) decision and HSD laws to open a health care facility within St. James's district. According to St. James, Lafourche “transferred the entirety of its assets and operating funds to TRHS, leased the entirety of its medical facilities and equipment to TRHS and transferred all its employees to TRHS.” St. James argues that by financing, sponsoring, and directing TRHS, Lafourche is attempting to do indirectly what it cannot do directly under Lafourche v. Terrebonne (1998).

St. James initially filed a petition for declaratory judgment, to which Lafourche and TRHS each responded with exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no cause of action, and no right of action. The district court denied all of defendants’ exceptions. St. James then amended its petition, incorporating its request for declaratory relief therein and adding a request for a preliminary and permanent injunction, as well as a claim for damages under Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices Act, La. R.S. 51:1401 et seq. (“LUTPA”). In response to the amended petition, TRHS filed the same exceptions that it and Lafourche previously had filed.³

At the November 18, 2024 hearing on TRHS's second round of exceptions, the parties addressed the additional allegations found in St. James's amended petition, and St. James reminded the district court that it previously denied the same exceptions. However, at the November 2024 hearing, the district court also permitted Louisiana's Attorney General, Elizabeth Murrill, to argue, though neither the State nor the Attorney General is a party in this matter.

On January 16, 2025, the district court issued its judgment and reasons for judgment, granting the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no right of action, and no cause of action as to both TRHS and Lafourche, and dismissing St. James's amended petition after finding that no justiciable controversy exists. The district court's Judgment states, in pertinent part:

Under Louisiana law, TRHS, as an independent non-profit corporation whose hospital acquisition was approved by the Louisiana Attorney General on April 12, 2019, is entitled to the same lack of geographic constraints as other large hospital systems. TRHS is not subject to the hospital service district laws and is not restricted from operating outside the territorial boundaries of Lafourche HSD 3. As such, St. James HSD has not suffered any harm or redressable injury as a result of the Defendants’ alleged actions; nor is any such harm or injury imminently threatened. Accordingly, this case does not present a justiciable controversy, and St. James HSD lacks standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief.

[ ]As there is no justiciable controversy, St. James HSD has no right of action, nor a cause of action, against Lafourche HSD 3 and TRHS. The hospital service district statutes provide no private right of action for a hospital service district to sue to exclude competitors and defend a perceived monopoly on its territory.

St. James now appeals and asserts several assignments of error, including that the district court's rulings on the exceptions are erroneous; that the district court erred in allowing the Attorney General to participate in the hearing; and that the district court erred in dismissing St. James’ amended petition. In addition to the parties’ briefing, this Court received three amicus curiae briefs—from the Attorney General, the Counsel for Rural Health Coalition, Inc., and Hospital Service District No. 1 for the Parish of Terrebonne.

Standards of Review

An exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law subject to de novo review, but to the extent the district court's factual findings are challenged, this Court reviews those findings for manifest error. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2, Parish of Jefferson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Parish of St. Charles, 16-702 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 696, 702, writ denied, 17-960 (La. 11/9/17), 227 So.3d 832 (“Jefferson v. St. Charles”). “An appellate court reviews a trial court's rulings on exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action de novo because the exceptions raise questions of law.” Succession of Griffin, 17-637 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/18), 249 So.3d 1048, 1053. “On the trial of a peremptory exception of no right of action, evidence is admissible to support or controvert the objection pleaded when the grounds do not appear from the petition.” Id. at 1054. “[A]n exception of no cause of action is triable solely on the face of the petition and all well-pleaded allegations of fact are accepted as true.” Id. at 1055. “The issue at the trial of the exception of no cause of action is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought.” Id.

Appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment, and a trial court's oral or written reasons for judgment form no part of the judgment. Double NRJ Trucking, Inc. v. Johnson, 17-667 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/18), 247 So.3d 1125, 1131. “While reasons for judgment may be informative, they are not determinative of the legal issues to be resolved on appeal.” Allday v. Newpark Square I Office Condo. Assn., Inc., 20-358 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/18/21), 327 So.3d 566, 573. An appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. La. C.C.P. art. 2164.

Discussion

Echoing the First Circuit's Lafourche v. Terrebonne (1998) decision, St. James argues the Hospital Service District laws are meant to prevent larger and wealthier districts from “cannibalizing” parish hospitals in smaller, poorer parishes. Although patients are certainly permitted to cross parish lines to seek the health care they choose, St. James contends that HSDs cannot leave their own districts to set up shop in a competing district without the latter district's consent. St. James argues that this rule protects each community's public hospital, as well as the economic stability of the community, given that the HSD hospital is often one of the largest employers in rural parishes.

Moreover, St. James contends that Lafourche HSD No. 3's transfer of all of its property, assets, employees, facilities, equipment, and operating funds to TRHS renders TRHS a “creature” of the Lafourche HSD No. 3 and that TRHS operates as the alter-ego of, and/or single business enterprise with, Lafourche HSD 3. To support this contention, St. James alleges that Lafourche used two members of its Board of Commissioners to finance, direct, and sponsor the creation of TRHS, and then transferred its operating funds and leased its medical facilities and equipment to TRHS. TRHS then “installed its employed physicians at a clinic owned by a member of the TRHS Board of Commissioners.” According to St. James's allegations, TRHS “has yet to pay a single dollar in rent to Lafourche HSD 3. Furthermore, TRHS has made no payments on the promissory note provided to Lafourche HSD 3 by TRHS in exchange for more than $130 million in capital.”

St. James further alleges that several members of the board of the Lafourche HSD 3 serve as members of the board of TRHS. St. James contends that Dr. Tulluri, one member of the TRHS board, acting as an agent for TRHS, purchased property and sought to have the property rezoned commercial with the alleged intent of opening and operating a new clinic within St. James HSD's territory that would directly compete with St. James Parish Hospital.

With regard to St. James's LUTPA claim, St. James contends that (1) creating TRHS in order to avoid the HSD laws, (2) using a third party (Dr. Talluri) to lease space to insert its physicians in St. James's district, and (3) intending to further operate medical facilities in St. James's district through another third party affiliated with Dr. Talluri (Priya Properties), amounts to deceit and misrepresentation, and that these actions violate Louisiana's public policy as expressed in the HSD laws, La. R.S. 46:1051 et seq. Thus, St. James argues it is entitled to “recover damages in the form of lost profits and revenue that it would have otherwise realized absent Defendants’ deceitful, misrepresentative and injurious conduct.”

On the other hand, TRHS argues that it is separate and independent of Lafourche HSD No. 3, and that Lafourche has never “owned or controlled” it. TRHS contends St. James has no standing or legal authority to pursue claims against it. TRHS also argues that the Louisiana Legislature's enactment of La. R.S. 12:1705 abolished the “single business enterprise” doctrine upon which St. James relies to support its allegations. TRHS argues that the district court correctly determined that TRHS is an independent entity and is not bound by the HSD laws or any geographical constraints.

Exception asserting the lack of subject matter jurisdiction

Defendants contend the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because St. James “has not suffered any harm or redressable injury as a result of the Defendants’ alleged actions; nor is any such harm or injury imminently threatened.” According to defendants, because St. James has suffered no injury, there is no justiciable controversy, and St. James lacks standing to seek declaratory relief. Further, TRHS argues that the HSD laws do not provide a private right of action to enforce any purported territorial restrictions. We disagree.

Under La. C.C.P. art. 1872, a person whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute may ask the district court to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute, and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to “settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations,” and the declaratory judgment statutes “are to be liberally construed and administered.” La. C.C.P. art. 1881. See also Jefferson v. St. Charles, 218 So.3d at 703.

In Jefferson v. St. Charles, East Jefferson General Hospital (“EJGH”) sought a declaratory judgment that the Hospital Service District statutes did not prohibit it from operating a clinic in Boutte, within St. Charles Parish's HSD. The trial court granted an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the petition indicated that St. Charles had withdrawn its objections to EJGH's operation of the Boutte clinic in St. Charles HSD's territory. But because EJGH allegedly had additional plans to open a second clinic in Destrehan (also in St. Charles Parish), EJGH filed a second petition, seeking a declaratory judgment that EJGH was “authorized and permitted by law to open, own, and operate healthcare facilities in St. Charles Parish in order to provide healthcare services under the Enhanced Ability to Compete Act (La. R.S. 46:1071 et seq.) and that it need not solicit the consent of the SCPH District in order to do so[.]” 218 So.3d at 701. On review, this Court noted that St. Charles again had withdrawn its objection to EJGH opening and operating a clinic in Destrehan. This Court found that where testimony at the hearing established that EJGH had no other operations planned, and no other evidence in the record indicated that EJGH planned further expansion into St. Charles Parish, there was no longer an existing actual controversy:

With the opening of these two centrally located clinics, EJGH appears to have met its stated goals. Any future potential skirmishes between EJGH and the SCPH District about further EJGH expansion into St. Charles Parish are entirely theoretical at this point. Where we can discern no evidence in the record that further litigation may ensue between the parties on this issue, we find no justiciable controversy to which our jurisdiction can attach.

218 So.3d at 706. The basis of this Court's ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction was the admitted lack of justiciable controversy, not that the HSD laws provided no vehicle by which an aggrieved party could seek relief.

On the other hand, in Lafourche v. Terrebonne, 716 So.2d at 169, Lafourche HSD filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief asking the trial court to find that Terrebonne HSD's operation of a medical facility in Raceland, Lafourche Parish, violated state law. In that case, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment—Lafourche had not given its consent to Terrebonne (as in Jefferson v. St. Charles), and there was no question that a justiciable controversy existed.

Here, St. James’ petition contends that Lafourche, through alleged alter egos and/or intermediaries, has encroached upon St. James's territory without St. James's permission. St. James seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and requests damages under LUTPA. Under Lafourche v. Terrebonne (1998), we cannot say St. James lacks a justiciable controversy or that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case. St. James's petition and amended petition seeking declaratory relief and set forth allegations that TRHS and/or Lafourche, by installing its own physicians or operating a clinic in St. James Parish without St. James's consent, has encroached upon its territory in violation of the Hospital Service District statutory laws. We recognize that St. James's pursuit of declaratory or injunctive relief against one or both defendants is dependent upon St. James's ability to prove its allegations against Lafourche and TRHS. But because at this stage we find St. James's petition and amended petition allege sufficient facts in support of their claims, we find no reason why the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been sustained.

Moreover, persuasive authority from our sister circuit has determined that one HSD may seek declaratory relief against another HSD. See Lafourche v. Terrebonne, 716 So.2d 168 (1998); Terrebonne v. Lafourche, 2025 WL 2206137. Finally, we find Jefferson v. St. Charles, discussed above, is distinguishable from the present case, where, in the present case, there is no indication in the record that St. James consented to Lafourche's actions. As such, we reverse the district court's judgment on defendants’ exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Exceptions of no right of action

The peremptory exception of no right of action is intended to determine whether the plaintiff has a legal interest in judicially enforcing the subject matter of the litigation. La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(6); Grubbs v. Haven Custom Furnishings, LLC, 18-710 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/19), 274 So.3d 844, 849. It questions whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted. Terrebonne v. Lafourche, 2025 WL 2206137, at *5. The burden of proof is on the exceptor. Grubbs, 274 So.3d at 850. The exception should be overruled where the plaintiff demonstrates a real and actual interest in asserting the claim under the law. Jefferson v. St. Charles, 218 So.3d at 703.

Defendants argued in the district court that the Hospital Service District statutes do not provide a right of action to an individual HSD for enforcement. Again, we disagree. For St. James to have no right of action against Lafourche and/or TRHS, where Lafourche allegedly created TRHS and allegedly ceded all of its assets to TRHS to operate in another parish, would negate the very purpose of La. R.S. 46:1051. See Terrebonne v. Lafourche, 2025 WL 2206137, at *5. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's decision and overrule defendants’ exception of no right of action.

Exceptions of no cause of action

An exception of no cause of action questions whether the law extends a remedy to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition. Succession of Vidrine, 23-15 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/6/23), 380 So.3d 590, 593. A cause of action, for purposes of the peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert an action against the defendant. Id. at 592-93. No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception raising the objection of no cause of action. Id. at 593. For the purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception of no cause of action, we are bound to accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the petition, not conclusions of law.” Young v. Knapp, 05-269 (La. 4/29/05), 900 So.2d 839, 839.

In Lafourche v. Terrebonne (1998), Lafourche HSD No. 2 filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, arguing that Terrebonne HSD No. 1 was illegally operating a clinic within Lafourche's district. After considering cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lafourche HSD No. 2 but denied its request for injunctive relief. On appeal, when interpreting La. R.S. 46:1051, Louisiana's First Circuit Court of Appeal held that one hospital service district could establish a health care facility or provide medical services in the geographic territory of another hospital service district only if the second police jury agreed. 716 So.2d at 170. In addressing Terrebonne HSD's argument that the “competition” statutes, La. R.S. 46:1071-1077, which the Legislature added to the Hospital Service District laws in 1984, fully supported Terrebonne's right to provide medical services in Lafourche HSD's territory, the First Circuit stated:

The general language in the enhanced competition articles, “notwithstanding any other law to the contrary,” must also be interpreted and applied within the overall statutory scheme governing the hospital service districts. La. R.S. 46:1077; see also La. R.S. 46:1074. The topic specific competition articles do not and cannot, by inference, re-write or supersede the enabling statute; and, thereby, extend the authority of the hospital service districts beyond that granted by the legislature. Thus, the competition articles provide that the hospital service districts’ ability to compete, with the “market for health care services” within its authorized district boundaries, is enhanced, “notwithstanding any other law to the contrary” that would impede such competition. La. R.S. 46:1077; see also La. R.S. 46:1074.

716 So.2d at 170 (emphasis in original).

Again, we recognize that the facts in the present case require an additional element of proof – that TRHS and Lafourche are a single business enterprise or alter egos of one another. TRHS denies that it and Lafourche constitute a single business enterprise. The defendants also contend that the recent enactment of La. R.S. 12:1705 prohibits the court from disregarding their separateness and independence. La. R.S. 12:1705(A), effective August 1, 2024, applies prospectively and states: “The separate juridical personality of a business organization shall not be disregarded as between one business organization and another except on grounds that would justify disregarding the separate personality of a business organization as between the business organization and a natural person.” La. R.S. 12:1705(C) defines “business organization” as “a business corporation, nonprofit corporation, limited liability company, partnership, trust, or other form of business organization that is treated as a juridical person or legal entity pursuant to the laws of the state or country under which it is incorporated or organized. We disagree that the newly enacted provisions of La. R.S. 12:1705 categorically resolve the issue of whether Lafourche HSD No. 3, which was created by a governmental entity pursuant to the authority granted in the HSD laws, can then create a separate and entirely independent business organization, as defendants allege.

TRHS and Lafourche further contend that because the Attorney General approved the transaction by which Lafourche transferred its assets and leased its facilities, the matter is settled. While the Attorney General may, and indeed, must, approve special services lease agreements and other transactions between HSDs and private entities,⁴ we find no support for the argument that the AG's approval of the lease and transfer of assets automatically clothes TRHS with private-entity vestments and permits Lafourche to circumvent HSD laws. In our view, St. James's allegations are sufficient to assert a cause of action against defendants.

For these reasons, we overrule defendants’ exceptions of no cause of action with regard to the declaratory judgment action and the request for injunctive relief. District court's previous rulings on the same exceptions, and failure to rule on the LUTPA claims

Procedurally, the district court's January 16, 2025 judgment dismissed “the First Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, and Damages” after finding there was “no justiciable controversy” and that St. James has no right of action and no cause of action against either TRHS or Lafourche.⁵ The district court was acting within its authority to re-visit its prior interlocutory rulings with regard to Lafourche's original exceptions, even though Lafourche did not file a second round of exceptions in response to the Amended Petition.⁶ However, to the extent that St. James's amended petition asserted claims against Lafourche for damages under LUTPA, the district court improperly dismissed those claims, as Lafourche did not re-assert an exception of no cause of action visà-vis the LUTPA claims.

TRHS did, however, argue that no cause of action existed as to St. James's LUTPA claims. But because the district court found no justiciable controversy and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court did not specifically address St. James's claim for damages under LUTPA. As the district court has not ruled on this portion of TRHS's exception of no cause of action, and because the matter is remanded for further proceedings, we pretermit any discussion regarding St. James's claim for damages under LUTPA. Nothing prevents defendants from reasserting an exception of no cause of action seeking dismissal of St. James's LUTPA claims should they choose to do so.

Permitting the Attorney General to argue in support of TRHS's exceptions

St. James has not asserted a claim against the State of Louisiana or the Attorney General, nor does St. James seek to nullify the 2019 transaction, approved by the Attorney General, in which Lafourche's assets were leased or transferred to TRHS. Because the Attorney General is not a party to this action, St. James contends the trial court erred in permitting her to appear at the hearing, essentially arguing in favor of TRHS's exceptions.

We take no position regarding the district court's decision to permit the Attorney General to make an appearance as amicus curiae at the hearing. In our view, the Attorney General's approval of the Lafourche-TRHS transaction has no bearing on defendants’ exceptions. Moreover, we find the First Circuit's statements regarding the Attorney General's approval of the transaction between Lafourche and TRHS applicable here:

Although the defendants argue that the transaction was approved by the Attorney General, the approval of the lease agreement was merely that. The Attorney General did not, and cannot, authorize a hospital service district to circumvent the law and expand into another hospital service district without that district's consent. It is therefore irrelevant that the Lafourche HSD voiced its intentions of expansion into the Terrebonne HSD to the Attorney General in its application and at the public meeting.

Terrebonne v. Lafourche, 2025 WL 2206137, at *12.

The Hospital Service District laws do no grant the Attorney General authority to permit one HSD to invade the territory of another HSD without the latter HSD's permission. Lafourche v. Terrebonne, 716 So.2d 168, 169 (1998). Where St. James's allegations assert that Lafourche specifically created TRHS to, among other things, provide medical services outside of the Lafourche HSD, these facts, if proven, are decidedly different from the scenario in which a pre-existing private entity, unrelated to and having no prior contractual relationship with the HSD, acquires property belonging to an HSD.

The question of whether TRHS is truly an “independent, non-profit corporation” as opposed to a mere invisibility cloak for Lafourche, or whether TRHS and Lafourche constitute a “single business enterprise” under these unique facts, is an issue for the merits. Our statements here, made in conjunction with defendants’ exceptions, in no way circumvent St. James's responsibility to prove its case at trial, nor do we suggest that St. James will ultimately prevail on the merits.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing St. James's claims against defendants. The exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no cause of action, and no right of action filed by defendants Lafourche and TRHS are overruled, and the matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY NOVEMBER 26, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

25-CA-202

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23RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

HONORABLE JASON VERDIGETS (DISTRICT JUDGE)

ALVIN J. HERBERT, III (APPELLANT)

GREGORY E. BODIN (APPELLEE)

MATTHEW J. PAUL (APPELLEE)

JENNIFER W. MOROUX (AMICUS)

JENNIFER R. HERBERT (APPELLANT)

JERALD P. BLOCK (APPELLEE)

RICHARD C. STANLEY (APPELLEE)

ELIZABETH F. PRETUS (AMICUS)

LARRY E. DEMMONS (APPELLANT)

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CAREY T. JONES (AMICUS) ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1885 NORTH THIRD STREET BATON ROUGE, LA 70802

FOOTNOTES

1.   La. R.S. 46:1051(A) states: “The police juries of parishes are authorized and empowered, upon their own initiative, to form and create one or more hospital service districts within the respective parishes, or with agreement among police juries concerned, to combine two or more parishes into a single hospital service district with such names as the police juries may designate, and, in so doing, police juries may create hospital service districts whose boundaries overlap those of other hospital service districts.”

2.   La. R.S. 46:1071 provides, in pertinent part: “The legislature [ ] finds that hospital service districts are presently at a competitive disadvantage. The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of R.S. 46:1071 through 1076 is to enhance the ability of a hospital service district to compete effectively and equally in the market for health care services. Towards this end, the provisions of R.S. 46:1071 through 1076 shall be construed liberally.”

3.   Lafourche did not refile its own exceptions in response to the amended petition.

4.   La. R.S. 40:2115.11 states that “no not-for-profit hospital shall be acquired by any person unless and until the acquisition is reviewed and approved by the attorney general.” La. R.S. 40:2115.17(A) provides that when evaluating such an acquisition, the attorney general considers a number of factors, including “whether [the] acquisition affects the continued existence of accessible, affordable health care facilities that are responsive to the needs of the community.” La. R.S. 40:2115.18.

5.   St. James's first amended petition incorporated by reference all of the allegations in its original petition.

6.   A judgment denying a peremptory exception of no right of action or no cause of action is an interlocutory judgment, not a final judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 1841; LaPlace Sand Co., Inc. v. Troxler, 98-36 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/27/98), 712 So.2d 1077, 1078. The Louisiana Supreme Court states that a district court may, on its own motion, revise an interlocutory judgment any time before a final judgment is rendered. See VaSalle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 01-462 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So.2d 331, 334 (“It is well-settled that prior to final judgment a district court may, at its discretion and on its own motion, change the result of interlocutory rulings it finds to be erroneous.”); Koerner v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 24-134 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 702, 703 (reaffirming VaSalle).Because the previous rulings were interlocutory, the district court was free to reverse its previous decision and sustain the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, no right of action, and no cause of action, and also sustain Lafourche's peremptory exceptions to the extent those exceptions involved the claims in the original petition. St. James's argument that the district court erred in overturning its prior decisions simply because it previously ruled the other way is without merit.

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE