STATE v. BROWN (2025)

This matter is before us on an application for a supervisory writ from the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. For the following reasons, we grant the writ but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case has a rather long and somewhat convoluted history that brings the issue at hand before the court at present. Defendant, Cassetti Dewayne Brown, Jr.,¹ was found guilty by a jury on November 16, 2018, on Count 1, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967; Count 2, possession of methamphetamines, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967; Count 3, illegal carrying of weapons, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95(E); and Count 4, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. He was also found guilty on Count 6, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, and Count 7, possession of synthetic cannabinoids, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966. He was found not guilty of two other felony narcotics charges.

On January 10, 2019, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information charging Defendant as a third felony offender for Count 4, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and as a fourth and subsequent felony offender for the remaining charges. Following a February 27, 2019 hearing, the trial court issued a ruling on March 26, 2019, adjudicating Defendant a third felony offender as to Count 4 and a fourth or subsequent felony offender as to the remaining convictions. On May 8, 2019, the trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on Count 1; twenty-five years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on Count 2; thirty-five years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on Count 3; thirty-five years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on Count 4; thirty-five years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on Count 6; and six months in the parish jail on Count 7. The trial court then directed that all of the sentences would run consecutively to each other, with the exception of Counts 6 and 7, which would run concurrently.

On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions on Counts 1 through 4; vacated Defendant's convictions and sentences for Counts 6 and 7 based upon the non-unanimity of the jury verdicts and remanded those counts for a new trial; vacated the sentences for Counts 1 through 4 based upon a finding that their consecutiveness rendered them unconstitutionally excessive, and remanded the case for resentencing on those counts. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs. State v. Brown, 19-682 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/17/20), 299 So.3d 661, writs denied, 20-927, 20-925 (La. 11/24/20), 305 So.3d 100, 105.

On remand, the trial court resentenced Defendant on May 25, 2021. On Counts 1 through 3, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve eighty years at hard labor on each count, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On Count 4, the trial court imposed forty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court ruled that Defendant would serve all sentences concurrently.

Defendant again appealed his sentences. This court amended the sentence on Count 1, to require only the first two years to be served without benefit of parole, struck the denial of parole eligibility from the sentence on Count 4, but otherwise affirmed Defendant's habitual offender sentences. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs. State v. Brown, 22-483 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/16/22), 353 So.3d 919, writ denied, 22-1791 (La. 5/2/23), 359 So.3d 1279.

In 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, which was denied by the trial court on May 2, 2022. We initially denied Defendant's application for supervisory review based on the showing made. State v. Brown, 23-152 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/27/23) (unpublished writ decision). However, on September 6, 2023, the supreme court remanded the case to this court with instructions “to allow [Defendant] a reasonable amount of time to supplement his application with the appropriate supporting documentation and to consider his pro se filing on the merits.” State v. Brown, 23-609, p. 1 (La. 9/6/23), 369 So.3d 796, 796 (per curiam).

Pursuant to the supreme court's opinion, this court issued an order on September 8, 2023, allowing Defendant to supplement his writ application by providing this court with a copy of the Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, the ruling thereon, and any written reasons for ruling. Following supplementation by Defendant, this court ultimately ruled on May 20, 2024:

WRIT GRANTED. RELIEF GRANTED. Relator seeks review of the trial court's May 2, 2022 denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence. The trial court erred in denying the motion to correct illegal sentence. See State v. Reed, 11-1026 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/11), 79 So.3d 492, and State v. Moore, 14-1282 (La. 3/27/15), 164 So.3d 186. The matter is remanded to the trial court for consideration of the additional documentation Relator presented with his motion to correct illegal sentence.

State v. Brown, 23-152 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/20/24) (unpublished writ decision).

The trial court was ordered to consider paperwork from Federal Court Docket Number 2:03-CR-20050-001, the conviction which served as the most recent predicate offense for his habitual offender status. Defendant asserted that the paperwork showed that he was released from federal custody on May 7, 2012 on that conviction, which would have resulted in the federal conviction being “cleansed” and not eligible for consideration as a prior conviction at the habitual offender hearing.

On June 18, 2024, on remand, the trial court again denied Relator's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, stating:

Now upon granted writ, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered this Court to consider documentation that contains information that was available in the record at the time of Mr. Brown's sentencing. Upon reviewing all documents submitted including exhibit A (Public Information Inmate Data), the Court concludes that Mr. Brown's arguments are without merit. This Court has found no information contained therewithin that would change this Court's previous conclusions as they relate to sentencing.

Defendant now seeks review of the trial court's denial of his motion. On application for supervisory review, Defendant raises a single assignment of error, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his “motion to correct illegal sentence.”

OPINION

While the procedural journey of this case has been arduous, it is before us on an application for supervisory review of the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence resulting from a determination of guilt in the underlying case and an adjudication as a habitual offender for sentencing purposes. Although styled as a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, Defendant's motion is, in no uncertain terms, an attack via supervisory writ on his adjudication as a third and fourth felony offender and not on the legality of the sentences imposed therefore, which were indeed within the statutory ranges for such crimes.²

A claim that a sentence is illegal is primarily restricted to those instances in which the term of the prisoner's sentence is not authorized by the statute or statutes which govern the penalty authorized for the crime for which the prisoner has been convicted. See State v. Alexander, 14-0401, p. 1 (La.11/7/14), 152 So.3d 137, 137 (per curiam) (citing State v. Parker, 98-0256, p. 1 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694, 695 (per curiam)) (“[U]nless a pleading captioned as a motion to correct illegal sentence ‘points to a claimed illegal term in the petitioner's sentence,’ it is not cognizable under [Article] 882.”) (punctuation omitted). See also State v. Perkins, 08-0078, p. 14 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/25/08), 988 So.2d 793, 802. Thus, a sentence is illegal when its duration falls outside of the statutorily-provided sentencing limits for the offense of which the prisoner has been convicted. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 881.2 A(1). See, e.g., State v. Williams, 12-1092, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/24/13), 115 So.3d 702, 704; State v. Hunter, 02-2742, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/19/03), 841 So.2d 42, 43; State v. LeBlanc, 14-0163 (La.1/9/15), 156 So.3d 1168, 1170 (per curiam).

In contrast, an excessive sentence, that is a sentence which falls within the sentencing limits but nonetheless violates the Louisiana Constitution, see La. Const. art. I, § 20; State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993), is not an illegal sentence for the purposes of obtaining relief under Article 882. See Perkins, 08-0078, p. 12, 988 So.2d at 800–01.

Determining whether the sentence that a prisoner is serving is an illegal sentence is a straightforward exercise. The statutorily-provided limits on the sentence are determined by examining the law in effect on the date the commission of the offense of which the prisoner was convicted. See State v. Sugasti, 01-3407, p. 4 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, 520; State v. Parker, 03-0924, pp. 9–10 (La.4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 322 (defendant's status as a habitual offender is determined as of the date that he commits the charged crime). Thus the version of the penalty in the violated statute as well as the versions of any statutes that enhance that penalty in effect on the date of the commission of the prisoner's offense control the determination of the limits on the penalty.

State v. Mead, 14-1051, pp. 3–5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/22/15), 165 So.3d 1044, 1047–48 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).

In State v. Alexander, 14-401, pp. 1–2 (La. 11/7/14), 152 So.3d 137, 137–38 (per curiam) (last alteration ours), the supreme court was faced with a similarly postured case and ruled as follows:

Writ granted; relief denied. The lower courts erred to the extent that they construed relator's pleading as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which can be filed any time under La.C.Cr.P. art. 882, rather than an (untimely) application for post-conviction relief. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State v. Parker, 98-0256, p. 1 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694, 695 (unless a pleading captioned as a motion to correct illegal sentence “point[s] to a claimed illegal term in [the petitioner's] sentence,” it is not cognizable under La.C.Cr.P. art. 882); State ex rel. Stepter v. Whitley, 93-2346 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 480 (“As to all of relator's other claims, which do not relate to the legality of the sentence itself under the applicable statutes, relator's application is denied because the court correctly treated these issues as forming the proper basis for an application for post-conviction relief ․”); cf. Smith v. Cajun Insulation, 392 So.2d 398, 402 n. 2 (La.1980). Relator's application, filed some 18 years after his conviction became final, is time-barred. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Furthermore, this Court has construed the provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3 and determined that they “provide[ ] no basis for review of claims of excessiveness or other sentencing error post-conviction.” State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. “An habitual offender adjudication ․ constitutes sentencing for purposes of Melinie and La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3[,] which provides no vehicle for post-conviction consideration of claims arising out of habitual offender proceedings, as opposed to direct appeal of the conviction and sentence.” State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

Relator's application is untimely and the claims raised therein are not cognizable on collateral review.

Here, Defendant's sentence is not illegal as a third and fourth felony offender as it is within the parameters set forth in the habitual offender law. Rather, it is Defendant's adjudicated status as a third and fourth felony offender that he claims was in error. That adjudication, when addressed on direct appeal, was affirmed. Brown, 299 So.3d 661. The habitual offender sentence was again affirmed in Defendant's subsequent appeal as modified. Brown, 353 So.3d 919. As the attack here is not on the actual length of the sentence, but on the status adjudication as a habitual offender, it is at best a post-conviction claim, but one arguably not cognizable by this court. However, we deny the writ on other grounds.

In Defendant's initial appeal of his conviction, this court specifically addressed his claim that the trial court incorrectly calculated the cleansing period and limited defense counsel's cross examination of a witness pertaining to the federal release date on the conviction used as the predicate for finding him a third felony offender.³ Therein, we specifically listed the assignment of error considered: “2. the trial court erred in applying the incorrect version of La.R.S. 15:529.1 as to the applicable cleansing period, in limiting the defense's cross-examination during the habitual offender hearing, and in its ruling that the State had sufficiently proven that the five-year cleansing period had not been met.” Brown, 299 So.3d at 665. The following excerpt from that opinion highlights, without a doubt, that the issue was considered and found to be without merit, even though the issue as to the release date had not been objected to at trial or on motion to reconsider sentence:

As will be discussed below, Mr. Brown contends the use of the July 25, 2014 date, the date he was released from federal custody, was error. However, the State asserts that Mr. Brown failed to preserve any complaint against the calculation of his cleansing period by failing to object to the calculation, as set out in the trial court's written ruling, at sentencing or in his timely-filed motion to reconsider.

Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E):

Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

Regardless, habitual offender proceedings are generally reviewed as errors patent. Accordingly, we will consider Mr. Brown's claim, despite his failure to previously object to the trial court's determination of his habitual offender status.

As stated above, the trial court erred in finding the applicable cleansing period was ten years when it was actually five years. In its habitual offender memorandum to the trial court, the State correctly asserted there was a five-year cleansing period. Despite this, however, we find the trial court did not err in finding Mr. Brown's cleansing period did not begin until his release from federal custody, as Louisiana courts have unanimously and consistently held that computation of the cleansing period is based upon actual date of release from custody or supervision. See State v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 311 (La.1977); State v. Robinson, 549 So.2d 1282 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989); State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 272 So.3d 999, writ denied, 19-1045 (La. 2/10/20), 292 So.3d 61; and State v. Stock, 16-552 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/22/17), 212 So.3d 1268.

There is no dispute that Mr. Brown was released from federal custody on July 24, 2014. While the State bears the burden of proving the cleansing period had not passed, the evidence produced at the hearing established that Mr. Brown was not released from federal custody until July 24, 2014. Accordingly, we find the trial court's calculation of Mr. Brown's cleansing period was correct and the applicable five-year cleansing period had not run when Mr. Brown was arrested in June of 2017. This assignment of error, therefore, lacks merit.

Id. at 678–79 (footnotes omitted).

In Defendant's second appeal following the remand for resentencing from the first appeal, we again considered Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in adjudicating him a third and fourth felony offender based on the calculation of his federal sentencing and release date. Therein, we noted the assignment of error as follows:

In his first pro se assignment of error, Defendant challenges his adjudication as a third felony habitual offender and a fourth felony habitual offender on the contention that the State failed to prove the five-year cleansing period had not lapsed. Similarly, in his second pro se assignment of error, Defendant argues the “State failed to establish when the defendant was actually discharged from Federal custody[.]” Finally, Defendant alleges the trial court failed to address certain matters in his motion to reconsider sentence, specifically his argument that the cleansing period had lapsed. Because these assignments of error are intertwined, they will be discussed together.

Brown, 353 So.3d at 934 (alteration in original).

Thus, this court considered this very assignment of error as to the habitual offender status determination:

At his resentencing hearing, Defendant orally moved to quash the habitual offender bill based on his argument that the five-year cleansing period had lapsed by the commission date of the current offenses. The trial court read directly from this court's opinion affirming Defendant's habitual offender adjudication, denied the motion, and proceeded with sentencing. On April 27, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence and attached two-page documentation purporting to show his actual release from federal custody was May 7, 2012. In written reasons, the trial court again denied the motion, finding the claim was not before the court because Defendant's habitual offender adjudication had been affirmed on appeal. Further, the trial court noted that “unless a pleading captioned as a motion to correct illegal sentence points to a claimed illegal term in the petitioner's sentence, it is not cognizable under Article 882. See State v. Mead, [14-1051 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/22/15),] 165 So.3d 1044[.]”

Defendant raises the same claim in his pro se brief to this court. On September 28, 2022, this court received a “Motion for Leave to Amend Exhibits Within Pro Se Supplemental Brief of Appellant Casetti Brown” wherein Defendant attached additional documentation of his release date from federal custody.

However, because this court affirmed Defendant's habitual offender adjudication based on the information in the record at the time of his adjudication hearing and because the trial court did not consider the documentation Defendant attached to his motion to correct illegal sentence, this court will not consider Defendant's argument that the five-year cleansing period lapsed. Defendant may seek review of the trial court's denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence by filing an application for supervisory writs. La.Code Crim.P. art. 912; State v. Decay, 18-626 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So.3d 578.

Accordingly, Defendant's pro se assignments of error are without merit.

Id. at 935–36 (alterations in original).

In response to this court's May 20, 2024 remand for consideration of Defendant's additional documentation, the trial court specifically stated that it had the information concerning the release date when it resentenced Defendant, ruling: “Upon reviewing all documents submitted including exhibit A (Public Information Inmate Data), the Court concludes that Mr. Brown's arguments are without merit.” It further held that it “found no information contained therewithin that would change this Court's previous conclusions as they relate to sentencing.” Simply put, this matter is before us as a result of a ruling on Defendant's motion. Defendant had the burden to establish his claim, whether it was classified as a motion to correct illegal sentence or a motion for post-conviction relief. Based on the limited information presented, without further explanation, the trial court ruled that Defendant did not meet that burden.

The records before the trial court at the habitual offender adjudication hearing and sentencing showed that Defendant was under federal supervision for his conviction in Case 42:03-CR-20050-001, when his status thereunder was revoked on February 24, 2012, and he was sentenced to twenty-four months in the Bureau of Prisons. The same records show that not only was the revocation based on a new federal conviction, later dismissed, but on Defendant's admitted violation of the terms of his federal supervised release. “The standard of review in a sentencing matter is whether the trial court abused its discretion[.]” State v. Hauser, 19-341, p. 43 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/19), 317 So.3d 598, 623, writs denied, 20-429, 20-418 (La. 7/2/20), 297 So.3d 730, 764, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 70 (2021). We thus find no abuse of discretion in this ruling even if Defendant's claim was a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief or on review of a motion to reconsider. State v. Henry, 20-412 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/29/20), 307 So.3d 249. Further, having determined that this court has already considered this very argument in Defendant's prior appeal yet affirmed the decision, we also find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in its ruling.

DECREE

For the reasons set forth herein, we grant Defendant's supervisory writ and deny the relief requested therein.

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant's name is listed as Cassetti Dewayne Brown, Jr. in the federal and trial court documents attached as exhibits to his writ application as well as in this court's previous opinions and writ decisions. However, on his writ application, Defendant signed his name as “Casetti D. Brown Jr.” For consistency, we will continue to use the spelling contained in the court documents.

2.   See State v. Brown, 22-483 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/16/22), 353 So.3d 919, writ denied, 22-1791 (La. 5/2/23), 359 So.3d 1279.

3.   Introduced into evidence at the original habitual offender status hearing were records from Federal Court Case 2:03-CR-20050-001, U.S. District Court Judgment in a Criminal Case, containing fifteen pages detailing that Defendant was sentenced in that case in 2006 to sixty-three months in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. It also contains from Case 42:03-CR-20050-001, U.S. District Court Minutes of Court dated February 24, 2012, showing that Defendant's probation was revoked and that he was sentenced to serve twenty-four months in the Bureau of Prisons. At the habitual offender status hearing, Cristina Cypher, United States Federal Probation Officer, testified. When asked if the date July 25, 2014 “marks the termination date for his federal issues under [Federal Court Case 2:03-CR-20050-001],” she replied, “Yes, sir, it does.”

KYZAR, Judge.