S.L. v. D.S. (2025)

Defendant, D.S.,¹ appeals a judgment granting a protective order under the statutes addressing Domestic Abuse Assistance, La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq., of the Protection from Family Violence Act. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 2, 2023, S.L., the maternal grandmother of the minor children (“the grandmother”), filed a petition for protection from abuse in Tangipahoa Parish pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq., on behalf of the minor children, E.S. (who was born in March 2016) and A.S. (who was born in December 2020), against the children's father, D.S. (hereinafter referred to as either “father” or “dad”). The grandmother alleged that E.S. told her that her father sexually abused her. She further alleged that A.S. resisted having her diaper changed. On the same day, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against the father and granted temporary custody of E.S. and A.S. to the grandmother. The TRO was effective through February 2, 2024.²

On November 6, 2023, the father filed a motion to dissolve the TRO, a motion for damages, and a declinatory exception of lis pendens in Tangipahoa Parish. He requested that the TRO be dissolved or, in the alternative, that the matter be transferred to St. Tammany Parish. He also requested damages, attorney fees, and costs. The father alleged that the grandmother previously filed two emergency custody actions against him in St. Tammany Parish relative to the custody of E.S. and A.S. After a hearing on January 22, 2024, the trial court sustained the exception and ordered all pending matters in this case be transferred to St. Tammany Parish. A written judgment was signed on February 15, 2024.

On January 26, 2024, the grandmother filed a motion to set her petition for protection from abuse for trial and to extend the TRO pending a trial in St. Tammany Parish. The St. Tammany Parish court set the petition for trial on March 1, 2024, but found the motion to extend the TRO was moot due to a new TRO signed by the Tangipahoa Parish court on January 30, 2024.³ This later TRO was effective through April 2, 2024.⁴ The father then filed a motion to dissolve this TRO, and he filed a motion to set a rule to show cause for damages for wrongful issuance of TRO, for attorney fees and costs, and for sanctions.⁵

A Commissioner of the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of St. Tammany ⁶ (“commissioner”) held a hearing on the grandmother's petition for protection from abuse. The commissioner dismissed the matter with prejudice and issued reasons.⁷ Thereafter, the grandmother filed an “Exception to Hearing Officer's Recommendation,” contending the commissioner failed to admit evidence, which allegedly proved E.S. was sexually abused and failed to admit evidence of an alleged ongoing criminal investigation.

A hearing was held on March 18, 2024, on the grandmother's petition for protective order and the father's motion to dissolve the TRO, rule for sanctions, and request for damages. The trial court received evidence, including the testimony of the grandmother; the children's maternal aunt, J.R. (“aunt”); the children's maternal step-grandfather, D.L. (“step-grandfather”); the father; the children's mother, A.S. (“mother”); and E.S.’s counselor, on the issue of whether the petition for protective order filed by the grandmother on behalf of E.S. and A.S. should be granted. At the close of the hearing, counsel for the grandmother made an oral motion requesting that the court appoint a qualified individual to conduct a forensic interview of E.S.⁸ The court took the matter under advisement and later ordered the grandmother's counsel to issue a subpoena duces tecum to the Children's Advocacy Center (“CAC”) to produce any forensic interview of E.S. and any report, recommendation, or other documentation of a forensic interview of E.S. in its possession.

On March 27, 2024, the grandmother filed a motion for in camera inspection, requesting the trial court conduct an inspection and review of any and all records of CAC pertaining to E.S. On March 28, 2024, the trial court ordered CAC to produce any records pertaining to E.S., including a copy of the forensic interview, for an in camera inspection.⁹

On April 1, 2024, the trial court extended the TRO against the father, which became effective through May 1, 2024.¹⁰ The protected persons were E.S. and A.S. The trial court subsequently received the CAC records. Thereafter, the trial court reset the hearing on the protective order to April 25, 2024, for the limited purpose of receiving evidence or testimony related or in response to the CAC records. On April 25, 2024, the trial court signed a protective order against the father pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq., which was effective through April 25, 2025.¹¹ The protected persons were E.S. and A.S. The trial court ordered the defendant not to abuse, harass, assault, stalk, follow, track, monitor, or threaten E.S. and A.S.; not to contact E.S. and A.S.; not to go within 100 yards of E.S. and A.S.; not to go within 100 yards of E.S. and A.S.’s home; and to stay away from E.S. and A.S.’s school and daycare. Further, the trial court granted the grandmother temporary custody of E.S. and A.S., and the father was granted no visitation.

The father appeals, alleging the trial court erred in: (1) finding E.S.’s reports of sexual abuse by the father credible based on the testimony of E.S.’s counselor; (2) finding E.S.’s report of sexual abuse by the father credible based on the CAC forensic interview on November 1, 2023; (3) finding E.S.’s reports of sexual abuse true under a preponderance of the evidence standard; and (4) granting the protective order.

DISCUSSION

An appellate court reviews domestic protective orders for abuse of discretion. Head v. Robichaux, 2018-0366 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/2/18), 265 So. 3d 813, 817. Moreover, we review the trial court's factual findings relating to such protective orders under a manifest error standard of review. Compton v. Chatman, 2021-0706 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/25/22), 341 So. 3d 581, 586, writ denied, 2022-00527 (La. 5/3/22), 337 So. 3d 154. In matters of credibility, we must give great deference to the trial court's findings, as the trial court is in the best position to view the witnesses’ demeanor and mannerisms. Id. When conflicting testimony exists, this court cannot disturb the trial court's reasonable credibility evaluations and reasonable factual inferences. Id.

In his first assignment of error, the father contends the trial court erred in finding E.S.’s reports of sexual abuse by the father credible based on the testimony of E.S.’s counselor. Since the father alleges the trial court erred in its factual finding that the counselor found E.S. to be credible in terms of whether there was a report of child sexual abuse, we will review the first assignment of error under the manifest error standard of review. Head, 265 So. 3d at 817.

E.S.’s counselor is a licensed professional counselor and a national certified counselor, employed by the CAC's Hope House. E.S.’s counselor stated that she has been treating E.S. since December 15, 2023, on a weekly basis. The counselor testified that “[E.S.] stated that her [father] touched her on her vagina.” However, the counselor indicated that she did not have the proper qualifications to render an opinion as to whether the abuse actually occurred. When asked, the counselor agreed that it was a part of her job to help E.S. recover, not to determine the truthfulness one way or another of whether the child was abused. At the conclusion of the trial, during the trial court's ruling in open court, it stated that it considered the testimony of E.S.’s counselor. The trial court specified, “although [the counselor] was not a forensic examiner ․ she indicated that in her training, she found [E.S.] to be credible in terms of whether there was a report of child sexual abuse.” (Emphasis added.)

The father contends there is no factual support in the record that the counselor found E.S.’s allegations credible. While the father is correct in his assertion that the counselor did not make a finding as to the truthfulness of E.S.’s allegations, we believe the father mischaracterizes the finding of the trial court. The trial court did not state that the counselor found E.S.’s allegations of abuse credible. The court was deliberate in noting the counselor was not a forensic examiner. We note the determinative question is generally not whether the child reported abuse, but whether the report is credible. Here, the trial court instead stated that the counselor found E.S. to be credible in terms of whether E.S. made a report of child sexual abuse. After review, we find the trial court did not manifestly err in its determination that the counselor found E.S. to be credible to the extent that the counselor confirmed that E.S. did in fact make a report of abuse.¹² Therefore, insofar as the trial court determined that the child made a report of abuse, this assignment of error is without merit.

In his second assignment of error, the father alleges the trial court erred in finding E.S.’s report of sexual abuse by the father credible based on the CAC forensic interview conducted on November 1, 2023.¹³ We do not assume the court's decision was based entirely on the CAC video, nor do we quantify the weight attached to the video. The trial court conducted an in camera inspection of the CAC video. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court noted that it watched the CAC video twice, and it found E.S. “to be credible in terms of what [E.S.] felt that she was reporting.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court was required to decide based upon all of the evidence presented. After reviewing the evidence, the trial court apparently determined that E.S.’s report of sexual abuse was credible. On appellate review, we cannot disturb the trial court's reasonable credibility evaluations and reasonable factual inferences. Compton, 341 So. 3d at 586. Specifically, if the trial court's findings are reasonable in light of the entirety of the record, an appellate court may not reverse those findings even if convinced it would have weighed the evidence differently had it been the trier of fact. Caronna v. Outdoor Living, LLC, 2023-1048 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/24), 403 So. 3d 1164, 1179.

Admittedly, E.S.’s report of sexual abuse based on the CAC forensic interview has its shortcomings. The interview was conducted after multiple custody filings by the grandmother.¹⁴ During the interview, E.S., who was seven years old at that time, stated that a friend told her the CAC interview was for a “custody thing.” E.S. stated that her dad touched her vagina on top of her underwear with his hand two times while she was lying on the sofa at her dad's house. She indicated that no one else was there at the time and her younger sister was taking a nap. She further stated that her dad made her eat fruits and vegetables, do chores, and exercise. When asked if her dad ever did anything to her younger sister, E.S. stated that he did not because E.S.’s younger sister was the favorite child and that her dad says that “little sisters are more important than big sisters.” E.S. further stated that her grandparents told her that if there was anything her dad did to her they would tell it to the judge to have more evidence and that the step-grandfather asked her if her dad did anything inappropriate to her. When asked if there are any adults that she trusts, E.S. indicated that she trusts her grandparents and does not trust her mother or father.

After thoroughly reviewing the video evidence herein, we find that the trial court's determination that E.S.’s testimony in the CAC interview was credible is reasonable. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court manifestly erred in its determination that E.S.’s report of sexual abuse was credible based on the November 1, 2023 CAC forensic interview. This assignment of error is without merit.

In his third assignment of error, the father contends the trial court erred in finding E.S.’s reports of sexual abuse true under a preponderance of the evidence standard. At the hearing on the rule for the protective order, the petitioner must prove the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. La. R.S. 46:213 5(B); Thomas v. Hyatt, 2012-1891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/6/13), 2013 WL 4007777, *2 (unpublished). Specifically, the father argues that in addition to the CAC interview, the testimony of E.S.’s counselor, testimony regarding E.S.’s handwritten note, the Children's Hospital medical records, and the testimony of the grandmother, the step-grandfather, and the aunt were not sufficient to prove the allegations of abuse.

At the hearing on March 18, 2024, the Children's Hospital medical records, which included an assessment performed by a family nurse practitioner, was accepted into evidence, without objection. The November 7, 2023 assessment states, in pertinent part:

During her medical incident history today, [E.S.] made statements concerning ․ child sexual and physical abuse by her father. [E.S.] had difficulty providing some details and there were some fantastical elements to her history.

[E.S.] states that she and her father were on the sofa and Dad stuck his hand in her pants. [E.S.] describes that Dad's hand went in her pants through the waist, and rested flat on top of her vagina. [E.S.] states that Dad's hand stayed there for ~2 seconds and demonstrates that he moved his pinky and thumb underneath his other three fingers, on top of her vagina. [E.S.] denies that Dad touched the skin of her vagina or touched underneath her underwear. [E.S] states that it made her feel “weird” and “ashamed”. [E.S.] states that she left and went into her room. [E.S.] states that there was a time that Dad tried to do this again, but she jumped on the ceiling with her nails and landed on her feet. [E.S.] states that there is a custody battle going on and the judge asked grandpa to ask her [E.S.] if Dad has touched her. [E.S.] states that she wrote a note with pink highlighter on a paper towel.

Detrinis's assessment recommended a medical evaluation of A.S., counseling for E.S., and protective placement as per the Department of Child and Family Services.

Further, the grandmother testified that she and her husband had sole custody of E.S. from April 2017 to January 2019, but that E.S.’s parents were granted custody of E.S. in 2019. She stated that E.S. had lived with her on weekdays during the school year since 2021. The grandmother testified that E.S. gave her a note ¹⁵ , unprompted, indicating that E.S.’s father sexually abused E.S.¹⁶ The next morning, the grandparents contacted their attorney, DCFS, the sheriff's department, and Hope House. The grandmother stated they took E.S. to Audrey Hepburn Center in New Orleans and E.S. disclosed abuse while there. The grandmother testified that she thought the abuse occurred in August 2023 because that was the last time E.S. had seen her father. The grandmother also stated that she brought E.S. to CAC on November 1, 2023, for the CAC forensic interview.

The aunt testified that she spent a lot of time with E.S. and A.S. She stated that E.S. “had a lot of fascinations with the private parts of her toy animals and just peculiar behavior, wanting to point out buttholes to things.” She further stated that A.S. does not want her diaper changed. The aunt testified that, around December 2023, she asked E.S. why she did not want to go to her father's house, and E.S. said, “[m]y dad did horrible things to me.” However, the aunt stated that she did not ask E.S. any further questions.

The step-grandfather testified that E.S. is disobedient to adults and has outbursts, which have included instances where she hit her grandmother. The step-grandfather also testified that A.S. does not want her diaper changed. He stated that when he tried to bring E.S. to her father's house before she reported the abuse, E.S. physically jumped out of a moving vehicle. The step-grandfather testified that he told E.S. that she would probably never see her grandmother and step-grandfather again due to a new custody order. The step-grandfather further testified that he asked E.S. whether anyone ever touched her inappropriately, and she replied, “[n]o,” but E.S. then went inside and gave her grandmother a note stating that her father sexually abused her. The step-grandfather testified that he contacted Hope House to set up an interview for E.S. and that he and the grandmother brought E.S. to the CAC on November 1, 2023, for the CAC forensic interview.

The father argues that the trial court erred in finding E.S.’s reports of sexual abuse proven under a preponderance of the evidence standard. We are constrained to give great deference to the trial court's finding regarding the credibility of the grandmother, the step-grandfather, and the aunt and cannot disturb the trial court's reasonable credibility evaluations and reasonable factual inferences. See Compton, 341 So. 3d at 586. Thus, although this court might reach a different conclusion if it were conducting a de novo review, because we are bound by the applicable standards of appellate review, we cannot find that the trial court was unreasonable in accepting the evidence and testimony presented by the grandmother over the evidence and testimony presented by the father. Further, we find that the trial court was reasonable in relying on the Children's Hospital Report documenting E.S.’s report of abuse. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's finding that E.S.’s reports of sexual abuse were proven by a preponderance of the evidence. This assignment of error is without merit.

In his final assignment of error, the father contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the protective order. As mentioned above, an appellate court reviews the grant of a domestic protective orders under an abuse of discretion standard. Head, 265 So. 3d at 817. The Domestic Abuse Assistance Act (“the Act”), codified as La. R.S. 46:2131 to 46:2143, provides that a court may issue a protection order pursuant to La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq. The intent of the Act is to provide a civil remedy of immediate and easily accessible protection to endangered persons from domestic abuse. Johnson v. Payne, 2024-0290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/24), 404 So. 3d 882, 884. A court may issue a domestic abuse protective order, if the court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, and if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard is given to the person against whom the order is sought, such that his due process rights are protected. See La. R.S. 46:2136(B)(2). Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2135 and 46:2136 require that there be “good cause shown” for the issuance of a protective order. “Good cause shown” is defined in La. R.S. 46:2135 as a showing of “immediate and present danger of abuse.” Domestic abuse includes, but is not limited to, physical or sexual abuse and any offense against the person as defined in the Louisiana Criminal Code, except negligent injury and defamation, committed by one family member or household member against another. La. R.S. 46:2132(3).

We recognize that this protracted protective order litigation appears to be a proxy for a custody battle. E.S.’s statements are that of a seven-year-old, with the inconsistency one might expect from a child of that age. While the grandparents claim E.S. gave them a note “unsolicited,” the child's statements suggest the note was constructed in response to questioning by the grandparents. Specifically, E.S. claimed that her step-grandfather asked her if her father had ever done anything inappropriate to her. Additionally, the Children's Hospital November 7, 2023 assessment indicated that E.S.’s descriptions of the abuse were “fantastical” at times. In spite of all of this, the trial court, sitting as a trier of fact, is in the best position to evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses. See Head, 265 So. 3d at 817. We cannot substitute our own credibility determinations on appellate review absent manifest error. Id.

In addition to the evidence discussed above, the trial court also heard brief testimony of the mother and the father. The mother testified that she was still legally married to D.S. and that they “have a very good relationship.” Further, she stated that she did not believe that the father ever abused E.S. or A.S. and that she never witnessed him physically abusing them. However, she stated that she had not been allowed to visit the children since the protective order was granted. When asked about E.S.’s disclosure that she was abused, the mother stated,

I'm pretty sure she [was] coerced to say everything․ They did the same thing to us with our dad․ When we were young, they had us falsify letters, make recordings to try to railroad my dad when they were going through custody battles and child support with him. This is all the same thing except now with us and grandchildren.

The mother further stated, “[D.S.] has never touched our kids. And I stand by that statement.” Further, the father testified that he never physically or sexually abused E.S. or A.S. However, he then stated, “I haven't even barely whipped my kids.” Additionally, the father testified that the grandparents asked him to give up custody of his daughters at least four times and they drew up papers for voluntary transfer of custody to them, which he refused to sign.

After a thorough review, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining that there was good cause shown for the issuance of a protective order in favor of E.S. and against the father for the duration of one year. The trial court was presented with testimony from several witnesses, including the grandmother, the step-grandfather, the aunt, the mother, the father, and E.S.’s counselor. Further the trial court stated that it also considered the CAC interview in making its determination. As stated above, in matters of credibility, we must give great deference to the trial court's findings. See Compton, 341 So. 3d 581, 586. After considering the evidence presented, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that E.S. was in immediate and present danger of physical or sexual abuse by the father. See La. R.S. 46:2135. Thus, due to our determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a protective order in favor of E.S., we maintain the trial court's protective order as to E.S.

Further, since Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:2136(A) provides that “the court may grant any protective order ․ to bring about a cessation of domestic abuse or the threat or danger thereof, to ․ any minor [child],” we also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in extending protection to A.S. by granting a protective order in her favor. (Emphasis added.)

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the April 25, 2024 judgment granting a protective order in favor of the minor children, E.S. and A.S, and against D.S. is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against defendant/appellant, D.S.

AFFIRMED.

I respectfully dissent. The majority correctly states that the petitioner seeking a protective order under the Domestic Abuse Assistance statute “must prove the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.” La. R.S. 46:2135(B). However, I do not find the record satisfies this burden. Rather, I find the grandmother failed to carry her burden of proving the abuse allegations she lodged against the father of the minor children, who is her son-in-law.

Moreover, I find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the protective order that deprived the father of the minor children of all contact with them for a year. See Rouyea v. Rouyea, 2000-2613 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/01), 808 So.2d 558, 562; Petite v. Hinds, 2024-00010 (La. 3/12/24), 380 So.3d 553. The record reveals only limited evidence of abuse produced at trial -- primarily E.S.’s self-report, with indices of coercion and coaching by the grandparents. The timing of the abuse allegations also raises red flags, as the allegations surfaced just three days after the father was awarded sole custody of the children.

While the majority gives great deference to the trial court's findings regarding the credibility of the grandmother, the step-grandfather, and the aunt, the record does not reflect that the trial court actually found the grandmother, step-grandfather, or aunt credible. Instead, the trial court cited the Child Advocacy's Center's videotaped interview with E.S. (the CAC interview) and the testimony of a counselor employed by the Child Advocacy Center's Hope House in Covington, in support of the decision to grant the protective order. In her testimony, the counselor admitted that she is not responsible for determining whether what a child tells her is factual. In the CAC interview, E.S. stated that her father touched her genitals. However, before this, E.S. stated that “my [grandmother's] thinking about getting me a pet betta fish if they get custody of me” in response to the interviewer's prompt, “[t]ell me something about yourself.” This calls into question the grandmother's credibility and could be interpreted as coercion.

Meanwhile, during the hearing on March 18, 2024, the step-grandfather acknowledged that E.S.’s first report of sexual abuse only came after he asked E.S. if anybody had ever physically touched her inappropriately. The children's mother testified that although she and the father have separated, “[the father] has never touched our kids.” Rather, she believed that E.S. was “coerced to say everything,” and she pointed to similar conduct that occurred when she was a child, when her mother and step-father attempted to “railroad” her own father during custody and child support proceedings. The father testified that the grandparents asked him to give up custody of his daughters at least four times and then presented papers for a voluntary transfer of custody to the grandparents, which he refused to sign. The grandmother first accused the father of sexually abusing E.S. and A.S. after the father refused to sign the papers.

Before the instant matter was heard by the 22nd Judicial District Court judge, Commissioner Anderson recommended dismissal of the grandmother's Petition for Protection from Abuse on March 1, 2024 because the Commissioner found there was no pending DCFS investigation regarding the father, no criminal charges were brought against him, and the DCFS investigation did not validate any allegations of abuse. Additionally, the Commissioner pointed out that the children had been isolated from their mother and father since September 2023 and that the grandmother had been fired from her position of public employment for acts of gross dishonesty.

The record also contains evidence of forum shopping by the grandparents. After Judge Amacker denied the grandmother's request for emergency custody on October 27, 2023, the grandmother filed her Petition for Protection from Abuse on November 2, 2023 in the 21st Judicial District Court, raising the same sexual abuse allegations against the father. However, the 21st Judicial District Court ordered that the case be transferred to the 22nd Judicial District Court where the custody proceedings were pending. The timing of the grandmother's retention of counsel was also questionable. For instance, the grandmother retained Richard Ducote as her counsel of record on January 12, 2024. On January 30, 2024, Judge Amacker recused herself from the case because she has a standing order to recuse in any case in which Richard Ducote is enrolled as counsel of record. Shortly thereafter, on February 14, 2024, Mr. Ducote filed a motion to withdraw as the grandmother's counsel.

On this record, I find the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the allegations of abuse were proven. I also find that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the protective order purportedly to protect the minor children without including any protection for the children after the expiration of the one-year period, when the last custody order in the record awarded sole custody to the father. In other words, according to the record before us, the trial court would have the children return to the sole custody of the father, who the trial court found to have committed sexual abuse of his children, upon the expiration of the one-year protective order.

Moreover, I find that legal errors by the trial court interdicted the fact-finding process because the trial court awarded custody to the grandmother without applying La. C.C. art. 133, which governs the award of custody to non-parents. Here, the trial court's protective order granted the grandmother custody of the children, and thereby deprived both parents of the custody of their own children (including the mother who was not accused of sexual abuse). This custody award to the grandmother, albeit in a protective order, implicates the constitutional due process rights of parents, and I therefore find that the requirements of Article 133 should apply in this context. See Creed v. Creed, 94-268 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/21/94), 647 So.2d 1362; Diamond v. Jenkins, 56, 330 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25), 412 So.3d 1131. The trial court should not have awarded custody to the petitioner without first finding that an award of custody to either parent would result in substantial harm to the children. See Cook v. Sullivan, 2020-01471 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 152, 160. I also find that the trial court erred as a matter of law by limiting each side's presentation of evidence to 60 minutes each, given the gravity of the issues involved (i.e., whether the father sexually abused his own daughters and the award of custody to a non-parent).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In order to protect the identity of the minors involved in this appeal and to ensure their confidentiality, the initials of the parties and the minors are used throughout this opinion. See Uniform Rules, Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2.

2.   We note that under La. R.S. 46:2135(B), if a TRO is granted without notice, the matter shall be set within twenty-one days for a rule to show cause why the protective order should not be issued.

3.   The trial court ordered the father not to abuse, harass, assault, stalk, follow, track, monitor, or threaten E.S. and A.S.; not to contact E.S. and A.S.; not to go within 100 yards of E.S. and A.S.; not to go within 100 yards of E.S. and A.S.’s home; to stay away from E.S. and A.S.’s school; and not to damage any of the property of E.S. and A.S. The trial court further granted the grandmother temporary custody of E.S. and A.S. and ordered the father not to interfere with the custody of the children.

4.   We note this TRO was granted by the Tangipahoa Parish trial court. However, the judgment indicated that St. Tammany Parish would set the hearing date on the protective order. The St. Tammany Parish trial court later set a March 1, 2024 trial date to hear the petition for protection from abuse.

5.   In his motion, the father stated that although the grandmother denied in her petition for protection from abuse that there was any pending custody litigation involving the children, she had previously filed two emergency custody actions in St. Tammany Parish in 2023. He further contended that the grandmother's last request for ex parte custody, which included the same allegations made in the petition for protection, was denied by the trial court St. Tammany Parish on October 27, 2023.

6.   La. R.S. 13:721 created two offices of commissioner for the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court. The powers of the commissioners when hearing civil matters include reviewing and acting on petitions for protective orders and matters of domestic violence, including the issuance of temporary orders of protection and TROs, until such time as hearings may be conducted on the matters and conducting hearings regarding protective orders and making recommendations to the appropriate district judge for the issuance of a preliminary or permanent injunction. La. R.S. 13:721(E)(3)(c) and (d). Further, the commissioners have the same authority as hearing officers, “including but not limited to presiding over cases of domestic violence, child custody, and child support matters, as provided in La. R.S. 46:236.5.” La. R.S. 13:721(F).A litigant may object to a judgment or ruling of a commissioner and request a hearing before a district judge according to the procedure established by the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court Appendices to the Louisiana District Court Rules. La. R.S. 13:721(G)(1). A timely filed objection shall be heard by the district judge to whom the matter was originally allotted. La. R.S. 13:721(G)(2). The judge may decide the objection based on the record of the proceedings before the commissioner, receive further evidence and rule based on that evidence, or recommit the matter to the commissioner with instructions. La. R.S. 13:721(G)(3). If no objection is made within the time and manner established by court rules, the order shall become a final judgment of the court and shall be signed by the district judge assigned to the case. La. R.S. 13:721(G)(4).

7.   The commissioner stated the following:The allegations of abuse were raised in or about October of ’23, after the father was granted sole custody over the objection of the Petitioner. There is no pending DCFS investigation regarding the father and no criminal charges have been brought. In fact, the DCFS investigation did not validate any allegations of abuse. And DCFS doesn't say that the findings are invalid. They don't make conclusions of a negative. They just say we didn't validate any allegations of abuse. And, obviously, it's been enough time since October of 2023 if something was validated or they believed did happen, they would have taken action. And I think the same thing regarding any of the criminal authorities. I'm quite sure that the grandmother will ․ persist in her efforts to obtain custody of the child, despite all of that. At this point, the children have been isolated from their father and mother since September of 2023. The Petitioner, which is the maternal grandmother, has been persistent in her attempts to obtain custody of the children from [their] parents. All evidence supporting the Petition for Protection from Abuse were hearsay or unauthenticated. The Petitioner was fired ․ for acts of gross dishonesty, which does effect ․ the credibility of the Petitioner.

8.   Counsel for the grandmother stated the following:My request, Your Honor, is that if this court is in any way unsure as to whether or not this child has been sexually abused, I would ask the court to appoint a board certified forensic examiner who would be qualified to render an opinion for this court as to whether or not [E.S.] was coached and or whether or not this actually occurred.

9.   Also, on March 28, 2024, the grandmother filed a motion for in camera inspection, requesting the trial court conduct an inspection and review of any and all records of the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office pertaining to E.S. The trial court then ordered the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office to produce any and all records, including a copy of the forensic interview, for an in camera inspection. However, no evidence from the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office was introduced at the hearing on the protective order.

10.   Because the previous TRO was only effective through April 2, 2024, and the hearing on the protective order was ongoing at that time, the trial court signed a second TRO, which was effective through May 1, 2024. We note that if the hearing on the protective order is continued, a TRO may be made or extended as the trial court deems necessary. However, the continuance shall not exceed fifteen days, unless good cause is shown. See La. R.S. 46:2135(E).

11.   The protective order expired during the pendency of this appeal, but the issue is not moot because the entry of a protective order can have lasting effects on the father's personal and professional life. See Watson v. Banguel, 2021-01793 (La. 2/8/22), 332 So. 3d 632; see also Gilleo v. Gilleo, 2024-0173 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/18/24), 2024 WL 4523 502, *1 (unpublished). We note that in a recent decision, Flowers v. Tasker, 2024-0690 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/28/25), 407 So. 3d 927, which was decided after Watson and Gilleo, a different panel of this court found that an appeal of a protective order was moot because the protective order had expired. However, in that case, the protective order had expired more than a year before the appeal was lodged with this court. See Flowers, 407 So. 3d at 947-948.

12.   The finding that the child made a report may have independent relevance as a prerequisite to the application of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 804(B)(5). Pursuant to this article (prior to the August 1, 2025 effective date of La. Acts 2025, No. 346, § 3, changing the age from twelve to thirteen), a statement of initial or otherwise trustworthy complaint of sexually assaultive behavior made by a person under the age of twelve years is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.

13.   The CAC video was filmed the day before the petition of protection of abuse was filed by the grandmother in Tangipahoa Parish.

14.   The following history was established by a “Hearing Officer Conference Report” filed October 16, 2023. In April 2017, the grandparents filed for emergency custody of E.S., which was granted due to the parent's drug history and the mother's mental health issues. After two hearing officer conferences, the hearing officer recommended that the grandparents be granted temporary sole custody of E.S. until November 2, 2017, with the parents having visitation. The parties did not object, so the recommendation became the ruling of the court.In October 2017, the parties appeared for another hearing officer conference. The mother completed an outpatient substance abuse program, but did not follow the recommendations to enroll in an aftercare treatment group. The hearing officer recommended continued temporary custody with the grandparents and that the parents submit to random drug tests, an inspection of their home, and AA or NA meetings. The parents objected to the recommendation, and a hearing was set. At the hearing in April 2018, the grandmother and mother agreed to participate in reconciliation therapy, and the court set other requirements and programs for the parents to complete regarding their drug abuse. If the parents complied with the court's terms, sole custody of E.S. would transfer to the parents in January 2019. A consent judgment awarding the parents sole custody of E.S. was signed in February 2019. Subsequently, A.S. was born in December 2020, and the parents separated in April 2023.The grandparents filed a rule to establish custody with a request for emergency custody in July 2023. The allegations were that the parents were separated, the mother was using drugs again, the father was possibly using drugs, the parents could not support the children, and the children had been living with the grandparents for five months. Further, the mother was living with the grandparents at the time. The hearing officer recommended sole custody to the father, with the mother and the grandparents to have visitation. This recommendation was made a temporary order of the court on October 23, 2023, pending a hearing. On October 26, 2023, the grandparents filed a rule to establish custody with a request for emergency custody, alleging that E.S. stated that the father sexually abused her. The grandparents indicated that DCFS and the sheriff s office were contacted. On October 27, 2023, the trial court denied the grandparents’ request for emergency ex parte custody and set a hearing. The petition for protective order at issue herein was then filed on November 2, 2023.

15.   The note was E.S.’s first allegation of sexual abuse against her father. E.S. gave the note to the grandparents on October 24, 2023.

16.   While the grandparents testified generally as to the contents of the note, the note itself was not allowed into evidence. When the grandmother's attorney attempted to introduce the note into evidence, the father's attorney made an objection, arguing that the note was hearsay. The trial court stated that the “relaxed” rules of evidence that may apply in a custody proceeding do not apply in a protective order proceeding and sustained the objection. The grandmother's attorney then proffered the note.

MILLER, J.

GREENE, J. dissents with reasons.