STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TREVIONE JAMES TERRY (2025)

Trevione James Terry (“Defendant”) appeals his conviction and consecutive sentences totaling seventy-five years for armed robbery with a firearm. After review, we affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 3, 2020, Defendant was charged by bill of information with armed robbery and armed robbery with a firearm in violation of La.R.S. 14:64 and 14:64.3. Defendant was accused of committing armed robbery of Nederland Jewelers in Lake Charles, Louisiana, on June 8, 2020.

On June 14, 2024, a unanimous jury found Defendant guilty of armed robbery with a firearm. On June 31, 2024, Defendant was sentenced to seventy-five years without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence—seventy years for the violation of La.R.S. 14:64 and an additional five years to run consecutively for the firearm enhancement of La.R.S. 14:64.3.

Defendant filed motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, responsive verdict, and new trial, which were denied. Thereafter, on September 23, 2024, the trial court granted Defendant's motion for appeal.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues: “The trial court erred in denying Defense counsel's challenge for cause regarding Prospective Juror Brandon Le[B]ert.”

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS

Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying a defense challenge for cause when a prospective juror, Brandon LeBert (“Mr. LeBert”) expressed that he was a law enforcement officer employed part-time as a reserve marshal and that he was acquainted with one of the State's probable witnesses, Jessica Dougherty. Alternatively, Defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause.

APPELLEE'S POSITION

The State contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's challenge for cause of the potential juror based on his part-time, as needed, employment as a deputy city marshal or his social relationship with Jessica Dougherty. The State argues Mr. LeBert stated he would not give law enforcement testimony greater or lesser weight and could be impartial, and further, Mr. LeBert stated he knew Jessica Doughtery's husband and would occasionally see her with her husband. Mr. LeBert confirmed there was nothing about knowing Jessica Doughtery or her husband socially that would cause him to lean more to one side or the other in the case.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, this court reviews all appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. Our errors patent review reveals the trial court incorrectly advised Defendant concerning the time for filing post conviction relief.¹

The sentencing transcript shows the trial court informed Defendant he had “two years from the date [his] sentence [became] final to apply for what's known as post-conviction relief.” According to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(A) (emphasis added), the time period for filing post conviction relief is “two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final[.]” Thus, we find the instruction the trial court gave was incorrect.

Recently, a majority of this court's judges have chosen to allow the appellate opinion to serve as notice of the time limitation for filing an application for post conviction relief. See State v. King, 24-367 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/19/25), 405 So.3d 1162, writ denied, 25-381 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 223; State v. Washington, 24-308 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/25), 406 So.3d 579; State v. Mason, 24-407 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 407 So.3d 822, writ denied, 25-270 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.3d 620.

In Washington, 406 So.3d at 583 (alterations in original), this court stated:

We agree with the first, second, and fifth circuits who have allowed their opinions to serve as notice to Defendant of the correct time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief:

Finally, after the trial court imposed the sentences herein, it failed to advise the defendant of the applicable time period to file an application for post-conviction relief․ At the time of sentencing, the trial court shall inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for applying for post-conviction relief. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Its failure to do so, however, has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Further, the Article does not provide a remedy for an individual defendant who is not told of the limitations period. Id. at 1142-43.

Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922. Id. at 1143.

State v. Folse, 23-1299, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So.3d 645, 654. Accordingly, Defendant is advised that pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application for post-conviction relief, including applications seeking an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under La.Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922.

Thus, this opinion will serve as notice to Defendant of the proper time period for filing post conviction relief.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In Defendant's sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's challenge for cause of prospective juror Brandon LeBert. The court asked the prospective jurors if they had ever been employed by law enforcement. Mr. LeBert volunteered that he is currently a reserve deputy with the marshal's office. The following dialogue took place:

THE COURT:

Okay. Same questions I had of Mr. Black. Would you give law enforcement greater or less weight because of your past employment?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, MR. BRANDON LEBERT:

No, sir.

THE COURT:

You think you could be fair and impartial?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, MR. BRANDON LEBERT:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And you would base the decision on this evidence and not on just the fact that someone's wearing a uniform?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, MR. BRANDON LEBERT:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Now, are -- you're still currently a Marshal?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, MR. BRANDON LEBERT:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

And you are retired from the Sheriff's Office?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, MR. BRANDON LEBERT:

No, sir. I work for Lamar Outdoor Advertising full time.

MR. JOHNSON [counsel for the State]:

Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, MR. BRANDON LEBERT:

I just do the Marshal's Office reserve just part time.

One of the State's probable witnesses was Jessica Dougherty, who until recently was known as Jessica Single. When the State asked if anybody knew Jessica Doughtery, the following exchange occurred:

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay. You know Ms. Dougherty?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, BRANDON LEBERT:

I know her and her husband. But I --

MR. JOHNSON:

If we could pass the microphone, please, to Mr. LeBert. Her husband is an officer with LCPD.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, BRANDON LEBERT:

Yes, sir. I know her husband.

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.

THE COURT:

That's Mr. LeBert.

MR. JOHNSON:

Mr. LeBert, how well do you know Jessica?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, BRANDON LEBERT:

I see her, you know, occasionally out with him. We'll, you know, go watch his band play, and we're all in the same -- same group.

MR. JOHNSON:

He plays music, correct?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, BRANDON LEBERT:

Yes, sir. I can't tell you her birthday. But, you know, we do --

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, BRANDON LEBERT:

-- hang out after work, you know, occasionally.

MR. JOHNSON:

I think it's -- I think it's pretty likely that she'll testify in this case. Is there anything about you knowing her socially, you knowing her husband Scott socially, that would cause you to lean more toward my side or against my side or anything like that?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, BRANDON LEBERT:

No.

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay. Nothing at all?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR, BRANDON LEBERT:

No.

Trial counsel for Defendant challenged Mr. LeBert for cause. In argument, counsel stated, “I'm really concerned. He seemed to describe his relationship with Officer Dougherty's spouse as very close and a continuing relationship. It seemed a lot more so than these other people who said they have a cousin who is in law enforcement and that sort of thing.” The court noted that the maiden name “Single” did not trigger any response from Mr. LeBert. The court also considered that when asked direct questions about whether the relationship would affect his ability to be fair and impartial, “[Mr. LeBert] said, ‘No.’ There was no really voir dire handled by the Defense that would have changed the Court's decision.” The court denied the challenge for cause but reserved counsel's right to question him for additional potential prejudice.

Counsel for Defendant then used a peremptory strike to remove Mr. LeBert. However, no objection was made to the court's denial of the challenge for cause.

“A defendant may not assign as error a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause made by him, unless an objection thereto is made at the time of the ruling. The nature of the objection and grounds therefor shall be stated at the time of objection.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 800(A). An assignment of error in brief with no stated objection at the trial level was addressed in State v. Sagastume, 22-1824, pp. 8–9 (La. 12/8/23), 379 So.3d 1243, 1249, where the supreme court stated:

The legislature in amending La.C.Cr.P. art. 800(A) clearly stated, “A defendant may not assign as error a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause made by him, unless an objection thereto is made at the time of the ruling.” We find that the legislature clearly said what it meant in Article 800(A) and meant what it said. While it is settled that an objection need not be raised by incantation, the article requires that a defendant make a contemporaneous objection to a ruling that has denied his cause challenge, and the article further provides: “The nature of the objection and grounds therefor shall be stated at the time of objection.” That did not happen here. Instead, the record shows that defendant did not object to the two rulings that he later assigned as errors on appeal. Therefore, the court of appeal erred in reviewing one of those assignments and in finding that the cause challenge itself sufficed to preserve the issue for appellate review. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal. We reinstate defendant's conviction and sentence, which we hereby affirm.

As in Sagastume, the Defendant did not object in the trial court below; thus, the issue is not preserved for appellate review. To review Defendant's assignment would constitute error.

Alternatively, Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to lodge an objection to the denial of the challenge for cause. Defendant alleges that trial counsel's “failure to object does not fall within the ambit of trial strategy nor can there be any strategic reason, other than lack of experience or knowledge[.]”

Under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a reviewing court must reverse a conviction if the petitioner establishes (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that counsel's inadequate performance prejudiced defendant to the extent that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. When the substantive issue that an attorney has not raised has no merit, then the claim that the attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue also has no merit. State v. Williams, 613 So.2d 252, 256–57 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992); see also State v. Kenner, 336 So.2d 824, 831 (La. 1976) (counsel does not err in not undertaking futile steps).

State v. Dressner, 18-828, p. 7 (La. 10/29/18), 255 So.3d 537, 544, cert. denied, 587 U.S. 1053, 139 S.Ct. 2691 (2019).

A juror may be challenged for cause on the ground that “[t]he relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict[.]” La.Code Crim.P. art. 797(3). Here, the juror has a friendly relationship with a witness. Witnesses are not included in the list of individuals to which Louisiana statutory law ascribes a reasonable conclusion of influence over a juror. There is no indication or assertion that Mr. LeBert lacks qualifications, would not accept the law given, or had any other factors that would give rise to a successful challenge for cause.

Further, as indicated by the colloquy, Mr. LeBert was mainly familiar with the witness through the witness's husband—a non-witness. When asked if his social relationship with either of them would cause him to lean more toward the defense or the prosecution, Mr. LeBert stated “no” twice without equivocation. Here, neither attorney attempted to rehabilitate Mr. LeBert because there was never a need to do so. The trial court correctly determined that Mr. LeBert showed no partiality and could render an impartial verdict. The trial court's denial of Defendant's challenge for cause was proper.

In State v. Record, 18-614 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So.3d 592, a juror described her relationship with a testifying detective as good friends and her relationship with the detective's wife as best friends. The juror actually considered the detective's wife to be more like a sister than a friend. This court found that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's challenge for cause because the juror never expressed doubt or wavered about her ability to be a fair and impartial juror and “[d]efense counsel never brought out any way that [her] relationship with the [detective's] family would impact her jury service.” Id. at 605.

It should be further noted that the defendant in Record also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for the same reason as Defendant: “should this court find review of the denial of the challenge for cause of [the juror] is precluded by counsel's failure to object ․ to the denial of the challenge for cause, counsel's failure constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. This court rendered the assignment moot by its finding that the trial court did not err in its denial of the challenge for cause. Id.

In State v. Simien, 22-338 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/30/22), 354 So.3d 144, writ denied, 22-1847 (La. 6/21/23), 362 So.3d 427, a juror was challenged for cause on the basis that her brother-in-law was a local police officer and that her cousin was the local police chief. A separate juror was challenged because he had friends and family members in law enforcement. Because neither voir dire examination indicated that the connection to law enforcement would affect the jurors’ ability to be impartial, this court found that the trial court did not err in denying the challenges for cause.

In State v. Harris, 33,406 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/25/00), 765 So.2d 1230, writ denied, 00-2868 (La. 8/24/01), 795 So.2d 322, a juror admitted to knowing a testifying officer for three or four years and playing golf and cards with him every Tuesday. They played cards and golfed together in the winter months for at least three years. Nevertheless, the second circuit determined “the court in any event could properly satisfy itself regarding juror Nugent's ability to apply the law and serve. This assignment of error has no merit.” Id. at 1239.

Based on the facts and jurisprudence cited, the trial court properly denied the challenge for cause. Therefore, Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is meritless. Further, we find the overall analysis in this opinion supports the affirmation of Defendant's convictions and sentences.

DECREE

Defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed. Defendant is advised that in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application for post conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant's appellate brief noted the trial court's erroneous advisement and proposed the remedy of this court directing the trial court to send written notice of the proper time period for filing post conviction relief. The State had no opposition to either the error patent or Defendant's proposed remedy.

JONATHAN W. PERRY JUDGE